Coordination and Cooperation in Counterintelligence

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is to be able to say, "We didn't do it-someone else did." The fact that a product is surfaced gives the CI man something to work on. He has one end of the trail of evidence in his hand. What he wants to do, of course, is follow it all the way back to the source. In other words, counterintelligence work carried out against covert activity uses the same methods as does CI waged against espionage and counterespionage. What we need to do is to spot the Soviet hand behind the visible product.
We therefore study, for instance, the African, West German, or American writer whose work consistently echoes the main Communist lines. Such themes have become familiar: the US government is fascistic; in America all minorities, including the poor, are ruthlessly oppressed; American foreign policy is bankrupt, a mere display of brute force; CIA and the FBI are Gestapo-like organs; CIA, in particular, has usurped the function of the State Department and is secretly making policy; America is dominated by commercial interests-Wall Street, the United Fruit Company, the big oil companies; the American negro can win equal rights only through violence; and there are plenty of others. When we see these themes played and replayed-often appearing first in a supposedly nonCommunist publication, then picked up and replayed by Tass and Radio Moscow, then repeated in Africa-we seek to learn all we can about the original author and the magazine or paper in which the piece first appeared. However far to the left the tone of such an article may be, the question is whether it is legitimate, in the sense of being an indigenous attack. If so, we can do no more than grin and bear it. Intelligence services can't be cry-babies, and they can't get into a public arena and slug it out with attackers who, no matter how hostile, misled, or mendacious, are nevertheless expressing their convictions in their own terms.
But the picture is very different if the supposedly non-Communist writer is in reality a Soviet agent, receiving the standard Soviet package of material from which to work, holding secret meetings with a Soviet case officer or a go-between, and accepting Soviet money. This sort of thing is as deadly as spying.
In sum, the US needs to pay more attention to counterintelligence operations against Soviet covert action. We need to identify the agents, double some of them, place surveillance on them and their case officers, and finally mount operations to recruit Soviet CA specialists.


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Posted: May 08, 2007 08:23 AM
Last Updated: Aug 05, 2011 02:10 PM