Library

 

html

Agency PageFive Weeks at Phalane
Five Weeks at Phalane, Edwin K. Stockinger. Between 24 March 1971 and 4 May 1971, two understrength paramilitary battalions of ethnic lowland Lao captured, occupied, defended, and finally lost the Route 9 town of Muang Phalane in southern Laos. During those five weeks, their operations encompassed a little bit of counterintelligence, a considerable amount of covert action, some effective intelligence collection, and some very hard fighting. They took heavy casualties, and in the end were overrun and shattered. But the survivors came back with their honor, and with a smug conviction that they had actually won the battle. These were not the feeble Lao troops made infamous by the press. Their story should be told...
Agency PageChasing Bitterfeld Calcium
Chasing Bitterfeld Calcium, Henry S. Lowenhaupt. In December 1946 a chemical engineer from the former 1. G. Farben plant at Bitterfeld in East Germany volunteered in Berlin that this plant "had started in the past few weeks producing 500 kilograms per day of metallic calcium. Boxes of the chemical are sent by truck every afternoon to Berlin, labeled to Zaporozhe on the Dnieper. Calcium is believed to be used as a slowing agent in processes connected with the production of atomic explosive." ...
Agency PageDeception
Deception, The Editor. In April 1972, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sponsored a week-long Strategic Planning Seminar concentrating on the question of deception. Seminar presentations by participating U.S. Government departments and agencies, and by the Syracuse University Research Corporation (SURC) under contract to the Advanced Research Projects Agency, have been summarized in JCS's Strategic Planning Seminar 17-21 April 1972, Vol. I (SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM). They appear in full in a 525-page Volume II which is TOP SECRET/ NO FOREIGN DISSEM. Studies in Intelligence reproduces the presentation made by Euan G. Davis, Director of the National Indications Center, and prepared in collaboration with Cynthia M. Grabo of the NIC staff, because it relates the question of deception and the entire scope of the seminar to the intelligence warning function...
Agency PageThe Prediction of Soviet Intentions
The Prediction of Soviet Intentions, Robert M. Gates. The record of U.S. intelligence in anticipating Soviet tactical and intermediate-range intentions, understanding them, and putting them in proper perspective is not particularly distinguished. We were unable (except, of course, for the then DCI) to predict the Soviet intention to put missiles into Cuba until we saw the photographs of them already there. We failed to anticipate the construction of the Berlin Wall, the ouster of Khrushchev, the timing of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and other events of importance...
Agency PageThe Problem of Chinese Statistics
The Problem of Chinese Statistics, Leo A. Orleans. he military intelligence analyst responsible for assessing the capabilities and potential of the People's Republic of China is a professionally frustrated individual. Much of his frustration stems from the basic paradox that China represents. On the one hand, it is a country that has a nuclear capability, is developing a variety of modern weaponry, and represents a potential threat; on the other hand, it is a country that is overwhelmingly rural, essentially underdeveloped, and lacking a data base that one normally expects a nuclear power to have. For all practical purposes, Peking has published no national statistics for more than a dozen years (and only inadequate ones before then)...
Agency PageThe Problem of Chinese Statistics
Agency PageBook review of OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency
Book review of OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency by R(ichard) Harris Smith. Reviewed by Sherman Kent. On its face, at least, this work on the OSS has made and will continue to make a good impression. Even a cursory glance reveals the diligence of the young author who has done a large amount of research and who writes engagingly. Several discerning readers have given him very good marks for his effort, among them Arthur Schlesinger whom the author thanks for his pre-publication tour through the entire manuscript and for his helpful comment and criticism. Other OSS alumni were consulted about parts of the book in which they had a notable role, and some of them thought the effort commendable and said as much. One at least was well pleased at Mr. Smith's approach to his subject, which he saw as an implicit rebuttal of the cynical interpretation of American foreign policy which revisionist historians of the New Left have been touting. (More about this approach later.) I must confess that my own first reactions were favorable; to be sure I found a number of errors in the chapters whose content was most familiar to me and a number of surprising omissions, but as some readers will, I charitably concluded that other chapters — the ones whose substance lay not within my personal OSS experience — were probably sounder than the ones I knew about. The earmarks of scholarly endeavor which stuck out all over the book were an earnest of the author's training in systematic research...
Agency PageStrategic Arms Limitation and Intelligence
Strategic Arms Limitation and Intelligence, Richard Helms. Several of my senior associates will be joining you next Monday to discuss CIA, what its role is, and how it relates to the rest of the intelligence community. In my own appearance here, I will try to give you an appreciation for our work by describing one of our major intelligence problems and how we try to cope with it in practice. I hope that our two visits will give you a full picture of what we do and persuade you, when you return to your own departments, that our efforts are worthy of your cooperation and support...