The Office of Public Affairs (OPA) is the single point of contact for all inquiries about the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
We read every letter, fax, or e-mail we receive, and we will convey your comments to CIA officials outside OPA as appropriate. However, with limited staff and resources, we simply cannot respond to all who write to us.
Please check our site map, search feature, or our site navigation on the left to locate the information you seek. We do not routinely respond to questions for which answers are found within this Web site.
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Because of safety concerns for the prospective applicant, as well as security and communication issues, the CIA Recruitment Center does not accept resumes, nor can we return phone calls, e-mails or other forms of communication, from US citizens living outside of the US. When you return permanently to the US (not on vacation or leave), please visit the CIA Careers page and apply online for the position of interest.
Solicitations to transfer large sums of money to your bank account: If you receive a solicitation to transfer a large amount of money from an African nation to your bank account in exchange for a payment of millions of dollars, go to the US Secret Service Web site for information about the Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud or "4-1-9" Fraud scheme.
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If you have information relating to Iraq which you believe might be of interest to the US Government, please contact us through the Iraqi Rewards Program —
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and provide them with the threat information.
The Intelligence Necessary to the Formulation of a Sound Strategy, Lieutenant General John A. Samford. What follows is a consideration of the contribution that intelligence should make to the process of formulating a strategy. For this purpose a strategy is defined as a plan, made in advance of hostilities, for achieving the necessary and desired results of war. A sound strategy should give reasonable assurance of achieving both necessities and desires, but should most certainly be directed toward achievement of those things which are assessed as being necessary.
Is Intelligence Over-coordinated? by Ray S. Cline. Being in favor of coordination in the US intelligence community has come to be like being against sin; everyone lines up on the right side of the question. In fact, coordination has become what Stephen Potter calls an "OK" word - one which defies precise definition but sounds good and brings prestige to the user. Now I do not want to deny that coordination is a good thing, but I would like to suggest that there can be too much of a good thing. I am afraid the intelligence community is suffering from over-coordination ...
Coordination and Responsibility, by R.J. Smith. In discussing the coordination of national intelligence it seems to me essential to recognize at the outset that coordination is certainly here to stay and probably will continue to be conducted pretty much along present lines. No amount of talk will either make it go away or alter its basic nature. This is so not because those people presently responsible for coordinating national intelligence are insensitive to visions of an ideal world where gentleman scholars would discuss world problems broadly and then retire to write individual appreciations. It is so primarily because national intelligence has become an integral part of the complex machinery for planning and policymaking of the US Government and has thereby acquired responsibilities not previously held by intelligence ...
Industrial Planning in the US and the USSR, by Edward L. Allen. The past 18 months has been a period of unprecedented free discussion within the borders of the Soviet Union, of organizational and managerial techniques. We have already witnessed a sweeping reorganization of industry. But there are a number of other basic economic problems nagging Soviet leaders. For example, given the objective of rapid growth, what price structure would act as the best stimulant? What tools of analysis are really needed to decide among investment alternatives or to develop an optimum procedure for equipment replacement?
Comparative Survey of Soviet and US Access to Published Information, by Joseph Becker. In intelligence we are not often. able to catch the Soviets redhanded planning a bit of deception behind the scene. This occurred, however, early in 1957, when the Library of Congress discovered, attached to a book which it had requested from the Tashkent Institute of Railway Engineers, a copy of an internal USS Government memorandum signed by the Deputy Chief of Foreign Relations, Ministry of Railways, to the Chief of the Tashkent Institute granting the latter permission to send the book in question to the Library of Congress, but suggesting that he request, in return, a publication which the Institute needed. It further instructed the Tashkent Institute to inform the Administration of Foreign Relations of the Ministry of Railways concerning future requests received from American libraries as well as the kinds of technical literature exchanged ....
Footnote to Cicero, by Dorothy J. Heatts. One of the best known spy stories of our time is that of Operation Cicero, a textbook exercise in tradecraft set in neutral Ankara during World War II. It is, perhaps, of little importance that the exercise remained rather academic - that the information pilfered in the best traditions of the cloak-and-dagger business was never fully used by the Nazis; that the British, warned of the Ciceronian activity, took no effective action to stop it; and that Cicero himself was never brought to book. As a matter of fact, the academic nature of the exercise makes Operation Cicero a nice, neat package to handle, uncomplicated by consequences and relatively free of loose ends.
Intelligence Research--Some Suggested Approaches, by Bernard Drell. Research may be divided into two general activities, to collect information or extend knowledge, and to answer particular questions. Intelligence research properly consists of the latter kind. Because the problems of the intelligence community are many, research activity must be focused not only on intelligence problems but also must be directed at targets of highest priority, in order to make the most efficient use of the community's limited manpower and money.
The Role of Interindustry Studies in Economic Intelligence, by Robert Loring Allen. Interindustry economics, or, as it has sometimes been called, input-output analysis, is an organizational framework and tool of analysis for studying an economic system quantitatively, rigorously, and systematically. The techniques permit analysis of an economy as a whole and of individual products and industries simultaneously. Interindustry research must necessarily be regarded as long-run cumulative research. The requirements for data are large. In many cases intelligence sources cannot provide much of the information needed. Only a slow and painstaking process of continuous research can fill the gaps. In the short run, interindustry studies contribute mainly a system or framework in which many types of quantitative economic information can be related to one another. In the long run, as the data improve and accumulate, it will be possible to undertake the solution of complicated problems, as, for example, to estimate the economic consequences of given sets of wartime demands on an economy.