Policing a Nuclear Test Ban, Herbert Scoville, Jr. The East-West conference on methods of detecting violations of any international agreement to suspend nuclear tests, held in Geneva from 1 July to 21 August 1958, was in effect, as might be expected, a USSR-West conference. The Western delegation, a single team with members from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Canada, faced four separate delegations from the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania; but the Satellite delegates only presented papers apparently prepared by the Soviets and made no substantive contribution to the discussions. The Soviets attempted to broaden the scope of the conference to include agreement to stop testing nuclear explosions, but the Western delegations succeeded in maintaining the position that the agenda was technical, not political, and that the decision on halting tests was not a matter for consideration. Nevertheless the technical discussions were colored throughout with political overtones, and several of the technical agreements reflect Soviet political concessions ...
On Processing Intelligence Information, Paul A. Borel. The cycle of organizational activity for intelligence purposes extends from the collection of selected information to its direct use in reports prepared for policy makers. Between these beginning and end activities there lie a number of functions which can be grouped under the term information processing. These functions include the identification, recording, organization, storage, recall, conversion into more useful forms, synthesis and dissemination of the intellectual content of the information collected. The ever-mounting volume of information produced and promptly wanted and the high cost of performing these manifold operations are forcing a critical review of current practices in the processing field ...
The Guiding of Intelligence Collection, William P. Bundy. In tackling the subject labeled "Procurement" in the program for this conference, it seems most appropriate to discuss, for an audience predominantly of researchers or intelligence producers, not the whole range of collection activities, but simply the link between the people who use raw intelligence on the one hand and collectors of raw intelligence (or should I say "procurers?") on the other. To make even this restricted subject manageable, I have confined my illustration almost entirely to the procurement of positive intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc, excluding other geographic areas and excluding also the effort in support of intelligence collection operations themselves ...
The Monitoring of War Indicators, Thomas J. Patton. To provide warning of any surprise attack against the United States and its allies is our first national intelligence objective, but one, it has been our experience, that cannot be adequately served by the normal processes of estimative or current intelligence. We have therefore found it necessary to develop a somewhat specialized intelligence effort for advanced strategic early warning. This effort, which we have termed "indications intelligence," seeks to discern in advance any Soviet or other Communist intent to initiate hostilities, whether against the United States or its forces, its allies or their forces, or areas peripheral to the Soviet Orbit. It also seeks to detect and warn of other developments directly susceptible of enemy exploiting action which would jeopardize the security of the United States; and this effort has been extended in practice to any critical situation which might give rise to hostilities, whether or not there is an immediate threat of direct US or Soviet involvement ...
History's Role in Intelligence Estimating, Cyrus H. Peake. A major responsibility of the intelligence analyst is to make estimates or forecasts of developments in the field or country of his specialty. What can a knowledge of history contribute to the accuracy bf his estimates? It is frequently said that history cannot instruct the contemporary generation because it never exactly repeats itself. This negative viewpoint, held even by some professional historians, is of little comfort to the harassed analyst who is required to forecast economic trends and anticipate uprisings, election-results, coup d'etats, and even wars, when all too frequently he has observed that his effort to forecast an economic or political development on the basis of specialized knowledge provided by the methodology of economics, social or political science, or some other particular discipline, has missed wide the mark ...
Soviet Intelligence Training, Sherman W. Flemer. The younger generation of Soviet intelligence officers now operating around the world have received a professional education probably unequaled anywhere. They were energetic Party activists when the intelligence services spotted them. They were already college graduates, in our terminology, thoroughly grounded in the social sciences, history, foreign affairs and languages. Beyond the college level they had done graduate work in Party schools on the theory of human social evolution - i.e., Marxist-Leninist ideology - and had received some training in intelligence techniques and revolutionary tactics. Then they had been selected for their good characters, intelligence aptitude, and clean records from among many with similar educational qualifications to attend one of the intelligence institutes, where they spent at least two years in full-time study of tradecraft, the organization and methods of Soviet and foreign intelligence services, and the area and languages of their planned operational assignments. Those that have been in the business for some years have probably also taken a full-year refresher course by now ...
The Early Development of Communications Intelligence, Wilhelm F. Flicke. For three thousand years history has offered examples of great political and military successes due solely to methods of spying on the transmitted thoughts of an opponent. Alexander the Great, Caesar, Cleopatra, Napoleon, and Metternich owed their successes to the extensive use of this kind of spying. But in modern times the invention of the telegraph, telephone, and finally radio communications has enormously increased its possibilities and given birth to organized systems of illegal listening-in, to the intercept services ...
Agent Radio Operation During World War II, Anonymous. During World War II the use of clandestine radio for agent communications was widespread. Literally hundreds of agent circuits were operated during the war. On the enemy side they ranged in type from highly organized nets involving German diplomatic installations to single operations in such widely scattered places as Mozambique and isolated locations in the United States. On the Allied side there was no part of Axis territory where we did not have clandestine communications representatives - "Joes," as they were called. It was almost impossible to tune a communications receiver of an evening without running across signals which were so obviously not what they were trying to seem that you wondered why they were not wrapped up the first time they came on the air ...
Book review of Man Hunt in Kenya by Ian Henderson and Philip Goodhart. Man Hunt in Kenya is a fascinating and well-written book about the last important operation against the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya. Its British title is more precise; Dedan Kimathi was the undisputed leader and guiding spirit of the largest and most dangerous Mau Mau gangs, and this story shows how he was also a master of bushcraft of the highest order. The fact that it took 10 months to capture Kimathi even in the Mau Mau's dying days in 1956 gives some indication of the problem the security forces set for themselves when they elected to make an all-out effort to get him one way or another ...
The Office of Public Affairs (OPA) is the single point of contact for all inquiries about the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
We read every letter, fax, or e-mail we receive, and we will convey your comments to CIA officials outside OPA as appropriate. However, with limited staff and resources, we simply cannot respond to all who write to us.
Please check our site map, search feature, or our site navigation on the left to locate the information you seek. We do not routinely respond to questions for which answers are found within this Web site.
Employment: We do not routinely answer questions about employment beyond the information on this Web site, and we do not routinely answer inquiries about the status of job applications. Recruiting will contact applicants within 45 days if their qualifications meet our needs.
Because of safety concerns for the prospective applicant, as well as security and communication issues, the CIA Recruitment Center does not accept resumes, nor can we return phone calls, e-mails or other forms of communication, from US citizens living outside of the US. When you return permanently to the US (not on vacation or leave), please visit the CIA Careers page and apply online for the position of interest.
Solicitations to transfer large sums of money to your bank account: If you receive a solicitation to transfer a large amount of money from an African nation to your bank account in exchange for a payment of millions of dollars, go to the US Secret Service Web site for information about the Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud or "4-1-9" Fraud scheme.
If you have information which you believe might be of interest to the CIA in pursuit of the CIA's foreign intelligence mission, you may use our e-mail form. We will carefully protect all information you provide, including your identity. The CIA, as a foreign intelligence agency, does not engage in US domestic law enforcement.
If you have information relating to Iraq which you believe might be of interest to the US Government, please contact us through the Iraqi Rewards Program —
Contact Us Form
The United States and its partners continue to face a
growing number of global threats and challenges. The CIA’s mission
includes collecting and analyzing information about high priority
national security issues such as international terrorism, the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber attacks,
international organized crime and narcotics trafficking, regional
conflicts, counterintelligence threats, and the effects of environmental
and natural disasters.
These challenges are international in scope and are priorities for
the Central Intelligence Agency. If you have information about these or
other national security challenges, please provide it through our secure
online form. The information you provide will be protected and
confidential. The CIA is particularly interested in information about
imminent or planned terrorist attacks. In cases where an imminent
threat exists, immediately contact your local law enforcement agencies
and provide them with the threat information.