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Unrecognized Potential in the Military Attachés, Lyman B. Kirkpatrick. The system of U.S. military attachés, a worldwide liaison service which today is accredited to 75 countries, including five behind the Iron Curtain, is one of the least well understood of the Government's intelligence arms. Probably because of this lack of understanding its great potentialities remain relatively untapped...
Notes on the Critic System, William A. Tidwell. Joseph Addison's job description in 1712 could also be the motto for a special CRITIC set up by the intelligence community in mid-1958, the reporting system responsive to a directive that critical intelligence be communicated from the field to the "highest authorities" in "speeds approaching ten minutes." CRITIC does communicate rapidly to this high executive world things that are worthy of their urgent attention, specifically indications of international crisis or impending military hostilities. If, in its present state of development and with the communications hardware now in use, there are relatively few occasions on which a CRITIC message actually moves from reporter to intelligence user in ten minutes' time, the establishment of the system has nevertheless made radical changes in the flow of critical intelligence to Washington, and messages handled under it take only a fraction of the average time required for similar messages before its inauguration...
The U.S. Hunt for Axis Agent Radios, George E. Sterling. I hope that this country, particularly its intelligence agencies, has become better organized to handle a national emergency than it was in 1941. When the war, after slowly creeping for two years from Europe toward U.S. shores, suddenly exploded upon us at Pearl Harbor, thousands of new kinds of things had to be undertaken in desperate haste and with at times disorderly improvisation. Many agencies were given emergency duties for no better reason than that they were using equipment approximating what was needed for the wartime work. That they by and large discharged these extraordinary responsibilities well, at the same time helping cooperatively toward the gradual readjustment of temporarily assigned functions, is something in which all those who participated can take pride...
Operation Portrex, Edwin L. Sibert. There used to be some truth in the gibe that a war's first battles are fought with the weapons and techniques (including intelligence techniques) of the final engagements of the last previous war. Now, however, the practice of conducting large-scale and realistic maneuvers in time of peace, incorporating new developments not only in weapons and tactics but also in intelligence, psychological, and paramilitary devices, provides assurance that the first battles of the next war will at least be fought with the methods of the last maneuvers. One such war game in which I participated during the military doldrums between World War II and the Korean War was a particularly stimulating illustration of how realistic an exercise can be made, of some practical limitations on realism, and of the extent to which deception and unconventional operations can be worked in ...
The Last Days of Ernst Kaltenbrunner. The list of the 22 once exalted Nazis on trial at Nuremberg was led by the notorious names Goering, Hess, Ribbentrop, and Keitel, in that order. The man who came fifth, after Robert Ley's suicide, was not well known to the public, either in Germany or abroad. The prosecution was distressed that documents bearing his signature were few and far between. His name had rarely appeared in public print. The official Reich photographer, Heinrich Hoffman, had been unable to find in his extensive collection a likeness of the man. The press kept running some other Nazi official's photo to represent him and getting mixed up about what his position and duties had been. This obscurity was fitting and proper from the professional point of view, for Ernst Kaltenbrunner had headed the at last unified Reich intelligence and security services ...
The Lohmann Affair. The Weimar Republic's attempts in the twenties to circumvent the Versailles restrictions on its armed forces produced clandestine operations which in their financing, cover devices, and hazards of exposure present a close parallel with intelligence operations. One such series of undercover research and development projects, carried out by a Captain Walther Lohmann of the German Naval Transportation Division, got out of hand and became a source of acute embarrassment to the Weimar Ministry of Defense. The affair was hushed up, and in more recent times has been virtually overlooked by historians. Sufficient material is now available, however, for a scrutiny of Lohmann's work, its oddities and blunders, and for an account of the way the German Cabinet successfully veiled its true nature after some of the clandestine activities had been exposed in the press ...
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature: Espionage and Counterespionage. The Panther's Feast. Robert Asprey's fictionalized life of Colonel Alfred Redl, Austrian counterintelligence genius and Russian agent within the Imperial General Staff before the first world war, make little contribution to a professional understanding of this famous espionage case long cited, without detailed or adequate study, as a classic instance of the recruitment of a homosexual under threat of exposure. Yet if the jacket of the book (not an unbiased source) can be believed, Asprey has studied the files that survived Austrian efforts to suppress the Redl case as well as the inadequate and sensational literature that has grown up around it. He claims to have talked to survivors, including Redl's paramour Stefan, who were familiar with details. The end result should have been worthy of all this work ...