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The Validity of Soviet Economic Statistics, Edward L. Allen. The publication, beginning in 1956, of a variety of Soviet statistical handbooks on the economy of the USSR signalled the end of a twenty-year data drought. This shift from the Stalin-imposed era of virtually complete concealment, when even a report on the production of samovars was considered a state secret, has been most welcome. No longer is the student of the Soviet economy forced to function like an archeologist, spending most of his time digging for individual isolated facts. He now can start with figures which, while far from complete, indeed quite skimpy by comparison with data published on the U.S. economy, provide a sufficient basis for serious analysis ...
Audiosurveillance, Alfred Hubest. The relatively modern art of technical audiosurveillance is the counterpart of audio communications, following like a shadow close on the heels of every development in the latter's techniques. Shortly after the first telegraph for commercial purposes was installed between Washington and Baltimore in 1844, private individuals began intercepting its messages in order to grab profits in east-west marketing manipulations, to steal exclusive news stories, and to further other unlawful purposes. By 1862 public concern over the interception of telegraph messages was shown in California's enactment of legislation prohibiting the practice. Extensive military use of wire-tapping during the Civil War established it as a recognized tool of the intelligence services of both armies ...
Laboratory Analysis of Suspect Documents, James Van Stappen. Seven or eight years ago an intelligence officer came into possession, under circumstances which aroused his professional ardor, of a small scrap of notepaper bearing only an address and a very common first name scribbled underneath it. For two years he persisted in trying to identify the writer of this note, collecting handwriting specimens from a number of likely places and submitting them for laboratory comparison. Some of them matched the original. The points of venue of these marked the writer's trail through several trouble-ridden countries, but none identified him. Finally, back in his own country, the traveler wrote to one of the prospectively useful acquaintances he had made on the trip, and this correspondent was careless enough to let the letter fall into our intelligence officer's hands. Verified as the same handwriting, it gave a complete name and home address. A search of visa records and other materials on file now yielded the true identity of the writer, his cover story, background, and even photographs of him. He is a Soviet intelligence officer, who since then, thanks to this identification, has unwittingly kept us informed by his presence of certain activities of his organization ...
Postal Forgeries in Two World Wars, Gordon Torrey and Donald Avery. The history and high state of development of stamp collecting has long since made collectors alert to forgeries of postal stamps. Not long after the first stamp appeared in 1840 forgery began to plague collectors, and as early as 1862 a Brussels dealer published a treatise on the subject. As stamps proliferated and the rarer early issues brought a higher price, the forgers' techniques improved. Collectors were forced to educate themselves in methods of production, papers used, postal rates, and cancellations. Today thousands of collectors in all countries can differentiate at a glance among fine color shadings, perforation gauges, papers, and printing methods ...
Obstacle Course for Attachés, Thomas W. Wolfe. It may be useful, now that it seems possible the Soviet Union may one of these days agree to admit nuclear inspection teams to its territory, to review the kinds of obstacles it regularly strews in the path of other legitimate trained foreign observers, the military attaches. As Soviet officials have already given voice to their suspicion that any nuclear inspectors will be bent on spying, so they have taken the attitude, in their obsession with secrecy, that the attaches are spies when they exhibit an interest in matters which in most other countries lie open in the public domain. Hence, although as a bow to international usage they accept the military attaches of foreign diplomatic missions, they severely circumscribe their opportunities to travel and make observations-a traditional attaché activity ever since the system came into being during the Napoleonic era ...
The Military Attachés, Peter J. Dorondo. Dear Sirs: Lyman Kirkpatrick's "Unrecognized Potential in the Military Attaches"1 is such a good summary of important considerations with which I have been closely concerned over quite a period of time, as a former G-2 and Army attache now with CIA, that I cannot resist the temptation to comment on it. The article, affirming that attaches contribute heavily to our national intelligence and defending them against some of their critics, notes deficiencies resulting from the cross accreditation system; but its main burden is that attaches in many countries have a natural entree, one that should be more fully exploited, to political leaders with a military background, and especially to junior officers who are likely to become the country's future leaders. In an extension of this thesis the author notes that of the many foreign officers that come to the United States for training a number have later turned out to be political leaders in their countries; he suggests that there is a great potential for intelligence and covert action operations in this situation ...
Intelligence Operations of OSS Detachment 101, W. R. Peers. For Detachment 101 intelligence was an all-pervasive mission. The Detachment did plan and carry out espionage operations specifically to collect both strategic and tactical information, but intelligence was also a by-product of all its other operations, including guerrilla actions, sabotage, and psychological measures. Its intelligence activities were therefore augmented rather than decreased when large-scale guerrilla operations were initiated in the spring of 1944 ...
For College Courses in Intelligence, Peter J. Dorando. The transition in the U.S. national posture accomplished during the first half of this century, from a seeking of security in isolation to recognition that our national welfare depends upon active participation in international politics, had its corollary in the academic world. Many non-government organizations, foundations, universities, and colleges have played an important role in increasing the public knowledge and administrative skills prerequisite to effective U.S. action in the international arena. A wide variety of new courses and entire schools have been devoted to foreign affairs and international relations, and additional ones still continue to be established ...
Soviet Publicists Talk About U. S. Intelligence, Leslie D. Weir. Peter Deriabin, in The Secret World,1 recalls that an old Soviet pamphlet on the subject of U.S. intelligence treats the CIA, CIC, Naval and Air Intelligence, and even the FBI as components of a single organization. This concept is entirely in accord with the standard Soviet public attitude, which regards U.S. intelligence as a distinct service or function in which many different U.S. government and private agencies may participate at one phase or another. The Soviets most often, therefore, refer generically to "U.S. intelligence," ignoring the niceties of bureaucratic organization. When they do mention individual components of the intelligence community, they are likely to blur or confuse their operational roles. If this imprecision seems a deliberate device to permit indiscriminate name-calling or to hide what they do know about U.S. intelligence organization, one should recall that U.S. citizens, officials, and even intelligence officers are likely to discriminate poorly among the several Soviet intelligence agencies, which have nevertheless been thoroughly described in Deriabin's book and others ...