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Great Frusina Revisited, Wallace E. Seidel. In 1949 Sherman Kent referred to strategic intelligence as "the intelligence of national survival" and elsewhere, more lexicographically, as "high-level foreign positive intelligence." This paper is focused in its particulars on one aspect of the highest-priority positive intelligence problem of today, that of the Soviet long-range ballistic missile, especially the ICBM. In a larger sense, however, its subject is the change that has taken place during the past decade in the kinds of knowledge that constitute strategic intelligence and the meaning of this change in terms of what kind of organization and activity is needed to produce the intelligence of national survival ...
The Yo-Yo Story, Charles R. Ahern. Electronic components are a critical part of modern weapons systems, less dispensable than some of their more obviously important features. It is possible to conceive of an air defense system without interceptor aircraft, for example, but it is not possible to conceive of one without electronic devices, systems, and techniques. Intelligence on the electronic portions of Soviet weapons systems has therefore become a key item in our knowledge of these systems. Here is a case history of community teamwork in gaining such intelligence on an unprecedented type of radar control for surface-to-air missiles in the Soviet air defense system. The story features a concerted effort to obtain observations, an imaginative analysis, a lucky break, and an excellent follow-through by research and development ...
Psywar by Forgery, Alma Fryxell. There is nothing new about the use of forged documents in the psychological warfare operations of the Sino-Soviet Bloc intelligence services, especially in pursuit of particular aims within a single country; West Germany, for example, has been flooded with them for years. But the years 1957 and 1958 saw a noticeable increase in internationally distributed propaganda-by-forgery supporting the general Bloc objectives of discrediting the United States and other Western countries and of promoting division in the West. For these two years and the first half of 1959, 18 such forgeries surfaced in facsimile have been discovered, and a number of other instances wherein the text of a purported document was quoted without attempt at reproduction or a document was at least falsely reported to exist makes a total of 32 cases available for study from this period ...
Galahad: Intelligence Aspects, Charles N. Hunter. The six-month saga of Galahad's action in Burma has been sketched as a part of the larger history recorded in Romanus and Sunderland's Stilwell's Command Problems, and more recently it has been told in vivid detail and with greater accuracy in Charlton Ogburn's The Marauders, the unit's nickname invented and popularized by the press. The Army account is marred by omissions and errors, however, and skillful a narrator as Ogburn is, he was not in a position to view the campaign in its command and intelligence aspects nor to take fully into account the failures in planning, coordination, and intelligence that characterized CBI Theater operations under General Joe Stilwell's erratic and nepotistical direction ...
The Progress of Pinyin. If the Communists have their way in China, the age-old characters of the Chinese language will finally join the Egyptian and Mayan hieroglyphics and the more recently buried Vietnamese ideographs in oblivion. Like Kemal Ataturk's a few decades ago, the Communists' effort to remold the nation includes a drive for drastic changes in a language ill suited to science and technology, to education of the masses, to the communications of a directed economy, to their international purposes. Much of the heritage that was dear to old China, obnoxious to the new, will also be buried with the old language: future generations of school children, taught from latinized textbooks, will not be able to read the undesirable ancient classics. The gentility of the cursive characters will be replaced by the classlessness of proletarian typefaces ...
Edward Bancroft (@ Edwd. Edwards), Estimable Spy. Sketch of a successful British penetration at high level into the American Revolutionary effort. The American Revolution, as John Bakeless illustrates with copious detail in his recent book,1 teemed with spies and undercover agents, military and political, on both sides. What often seems surprising, in the hindsight of the current age of highly organized espionage, is that rather inexpertly camouflaged penetrations went undetected by those on the other side astute enough to employ clandestine means themselves, who therefore should have known what to expect of the enemy. Certainly a man with Benjamin Franklin's reputation for astuteness should not have been taken in and milked for years by a British agent making his maiden venture into espionage. Yet Edward Bancroft, whom Franklin appointed, worked with, and defended as private secretary to himself and Silas Deane, American commissioners in Paris, did just that, with untold damage to the American cause. Praised, accused, and vindicated, he maintained his cover almost in perpetuity. When his agent role was unmasked he had been dead for 68 years...