The Collector's Role in Evaluation, Bruce L. Pechan. Ever since the establishment of a defined and ordered central intelligence program, the community has performed one of its fundamental functions on the basis of a fiction. This fiction has by now come to be accepted as fact in some circles, and there is a dangerous chance that ultimately it could be universally accepted. I refer to the notion that the collector of information is not qualified or authorized, much less obligated, to participate in the evaluation of the reports he transmits. If this idea in its full implication is ever accepted by the collector, it will do great harm not only to our evaluative and estimative performance but to our performance in clandestine collection as well ...
Psywar in Intelligence Operations, John Brockmiller. The intelligence operator, whether collector or analyst, in any Western nation engaged in a defense effort against the Sino-Soviet bloc and the world Communist movement has at least four major reasons to take an active interest in psychological warfare. First, much of the information he collects or analyzes is of value primarily for psywar purposes. Second, psywar may, and does, influence his operational environment and so affects the availability of information to him. Third, intelligence operations have an intrinsic psywar significance, immediate or latent, intentional or unintentional. Fourth, psywar operations, under the specific condition of cold war with the Sino-Soviet bloc and the world Communist movement, require effective clandestine support, which can be provided best by intelligence personnel knowledgeable in the requirements of covert activity ...
Seven Men at Daybreak by Alan Burgess. Book review by R.C. Jaggers. SEVEN MEN AT DAYBREAK. By Alan Burgess. (New York: E. P. Dutton. 1960. Pp233. $3.95.)
This is an inaccurate and fictionalized account of the circumstances surrounding the assassination in 1942 of the Nazi RSHA chief Reinhard Heydrich by two agents of Czech intelligence in London, Jan Kubis and Josef Gabcik, parachuted in for that purpose. Because the author represents that his construction of the events is validated by research into records and interviews with surviving witnesses, claiming the "advantage ... of records amassed by both friend and enemy" and "a footnote of authority" conferred by his "coming so late to this story," and because he has indeed unearthed enough facts to provide a distorted skeleton for his yarn, his failure to distinguish between fact and invention may disconcert readers familiar with my own earlier presentation of the case history of the operation.1 ...
John Andre: Case Officer, Robert Amory, Jr.. In May of 1779, two and a half years before its decisive victory at Yorktown, the Continental cause was in a precarious state. Stalemate in the north and almost uninterrupted British success in the south had brought not only despair to General Washington's forces and dissension among the revolutionary politicians, but also disenchantment to our French allies. At the same time, however, England was war-weary and Parliament was buffeted by Whig demands for a settlement on the colonists' terms. Thus all hung in balance, and it seemed one brilliant military stroke on either side could be enough to make the other give up the struggle. Raids and forages might go on endlessly, it was thought at Sir Henry Clinton's New York headquarters, but the capture of a critical position and a major corps of the rebels would bring elusive victory within grasp. ...
A Sharp Look at SinoSovietology. Perhaps it is a human failing for practitioners of a new science to assume that all problems within its purview become immediately solvable through proper application of its techniques. After long travail, Kremlinologists learned a measure of caution and due modesty. But now we have a new species or subspecies of inquirer into Communist factionalism - the Sinosovietologist - and the lesson must be learned again ...
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