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A National Name Index Network, Walter Jessel. The development of automatic processing systems has now opened up the possibility of constructing a central facility that would provide quick access to information on foreign personalities stored anywhere in the intelligence community. The establishment of such a center would not require pooling the information itself: compartmentation and need-to-know security should be maintained by linking electrically the indexes of individual agencies housed separately in computers programed and operated by their own personnel. The new permanent facility would be only a switching and message center with a medium-sized computer storing names in alphabetical and phonetic look-up tables. Intelligence officers, and systems engineers representing their parent agencies would form a committee to keep programs and equipment compatible and the look-up tables up to date. If work were to commence in all agencies by the middle of 1962, the center could be in partial operation by 1965...
A New Source for Figures on Soviet Military Output, J. F. Freeman. One of the characteristics of the Soviet system of economic statistics is that it is designed to embrace, and in practice, must embrace, all industrial activity that takes place in the USSR. This being the case, it has long been considered that the Soviet statistical aggregates "national income" and "gross output of industry" must include somewhere in their totals the amounts for such concealed activities as the production of military and space equipment. On this premise efforts have been directed for some years toward getting the best possible understanding of the two aggregates and their statistical subconcepts and trying to identify where within both sets of them the production of military and space equipment might be included. Although the detailed findings of this work are not yet firm enough to be used in official estimates, the operation has proved exceedingly interesting and now appears sufficiently definitive to warrant an interim methodological report ...
The Map in Field Reporting, Louis Thomas. Maps have long been essential tools in intelligence reporting because, in locating features of intelligence interest with respect to one another and with respect to geographic coordinates or other reference systems, they do a basic job that cannot be done as quickly or as satisfactorily by verbal description. Not infrequently a map constitutes the heart of a field report, conveying the whole message with little need for support in the accompanying text. More commonly, however, the text tells What and the map tells Where. Maps accompanying reports also serve to some extent as graphic abstracts to help end users confronted with a multitude of source documents decide quickly whether a given report offers anything pertinent to a problem at hand. In this role the map often has much to do with determining whether the detailed textual body of the report is read and used. Clear maps invite follow-up reading; cryptic or confusing ones discourage it...
A Dim View of Women, Chef de Renseignements. As agents, mind you. Personally, I'm quite fond of women, and attracted sometimes by their very faults. But as the officer responsible for supplying my government with foreign intelligence, I had to regard them as unreliable and insecure elements in the organization, to be used only when all circumstances chanced to be favorable or when I had no choice ...
Anti-Soviet Operations of Kwantung Army Intelligence, 1940-41. In April 1940 Japanese military strength in Manchuria, consisting mainly of the Kwantung Army, was in the midst of a general expansion. The number of divisions had increased from two in 1931, when the Mukden Incident led to full Japanese control of Manchuria, to nine. Nondivisional strength, moreover, a significant proportion of the total Japanese garrison, had increased steadily. In the intelligence establishment, however, personnel strength had lagged and tactical and organizational deficiencies persisted...
Porthole to the West. One of the reasons the United States is so belligerent about West Berlin, the Soviets charge, is that the NATO countries have made the city their most active "hotbed of espionage and subversion against the Socialist camp," or, taken out of propagandistic language, their most useful intelligence window to the East. Could be; but every shoe has its mate, and one of the reasons the Communists were for so long reluctant to cut their losses by sealing the border between sectors must have been the crimp it would put into East Berlin's most influential big business--intelligence activity. In addition to the locally ubiquitous East German services...
Postwar Soviet Espionage -- a Bibliography. This is a selective bibliography of publications that describe the activities of the Soviet intelligence services since the end of World War II. Some works of broader scope, covering also wartime and prewar operations, have been listed because of the postwar material they contain. Serious studies and official materials have been given preference over sensationalized or undocumented accounts intended for popular consumption...
A Technique for Coastal Infiltration, John A. Hurley. The various means of agent infiltration into a target area--overland travel, parachuting from or landing in aircraft, paddling a small boat or kayak, swimming from a submarine--all have their disadvantages. Controls on overland travel usually render it more difficult than entry by air or water. The use of an airplane either for parachuting or for landing, however, is often contraindicated by the likelihood of detection and the difficulty of making an accurate blind drop or landing...