WARSAW PACT
WARTIME STATUTES
INSTRUMENTS OF SOVIET CONTROL
Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.

Warsaw Pact Countries, 1955-91

Albania* Hungary
Bulgaria Poland
Czechoslovakia Romania
East Germany U.S.S.R.

*Albania withheld support in 1961 over the China split and officially withdrew in 1968.
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Sponsorship

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OVERVIEW
SOVIET CONTROL OF EAST EUROPEAN MILITARY FORCES

New Evidence on Imposition of the 1980 “Wartime Statute”

by A. Ross Johnson

Senior Scholar, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Soviet military planning for conflict in Europe after World War II from the outset harnessed East European military capabilities to Soviet military purposes and assumed operational subordination of East European military formations to higher-level Soviet commands. A Polish command-staff exercise in 1950, for example, assumed subordination of a Polish Army (comprised of five divisions and other units) to a Soviet Maritime Front (tasked in the exercise with occupying Denmark).1 Following founding of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw Pact) in May 1955, a supreme Warsaw Pact military command was established in Moscow, but this institution existed largely on paper until the 1960’s.

It was only in 1969 that the Warsaw Pact adopted at Soviet insistence (along with the Committee of Defense Ministers and Military Council) a “Statute on the Combined Armed Forces and Combined Command of the Warsaw Pact Member States (for Peacetime)” that created an elaborate Warsaw Pact military headquarters in Moscow with East European deputy defense ministers designated as deputy Warsaw Pact commanders.2 These institutional changes gave the Warsaw Pact more semblance of a multinational military alliance and granted to the East European military establishments a greater consultative voice in Warsaw Pact military matters, while streamlining decision-making on training and armaments in a manner serving Soviet interests.3

Oddly for a military alliance, the 1969 military statute was silent on wartime command arrangements and explicitly confined its purview to “peacetime,” notwithstanding the greater importance that East European armed forces assumed in Soviet military planning in the 1960’s. As in World War II, Soviet coalition warfare doctrine of the 1960’s envisaged the controlled use of military allies of questionable military efficiency and political reliability by

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1 Recollection of Colonel Michael Sadykiewicz, who participated in the exercise, letter to the author, March 8, 2010. In Soviet practice, a theater headquarters commanded Fronts, comprised of Armies, which were in turn comprised of divisions and other large military units.

subordinating East European military formations to Soviet operational commands at the Front level or below. The respective Soviet commands were in turn subordinated not to the Warsaw Pact military headquarters but to the Soviet General Staff and High Command in Moscow. As veteran British observer and official Malcolm Macintosh observed at the time, the Warsaw Pact Combined Command remained a peacetime structure, equivalent to a traditional European war office with administrative duties for training, mobilization, and armaments, but without responsibility for conduct of military operations. In Ryszard Kuklinski’s words, “the banner of the so-called Combined Command of the Combined Armed Forces masked Soviet control.”

In the late 1970’s, the USSR sought to formalize these wartime Warsaw Pact command arrangements in a new “Statute on the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Member States and Their Command Organs for Wartime,” adopted in March 1980. This effort to fill the glaring gap highlighted by the “peacetime statute” was delayed by objections from Nicolae Ceausescu’s Romania, which viewed it as an unacceptable surrender of national sovereignty. The Polish General Staff raised questions along similar lines. In the end, the Ceausescu regime never signed or agreed to abide by the provisions of the wartime statute, while Polish Party chief Edward Gierek did. Kuklinski argued that the Romanian example demonstrated it was possible for an East European country to resist Soviet pressure even within the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact. While a different Polish leadership might have attempted a more autonomous course, Poland was not Romania. Poland, part of the Warsaw Pact Northern Tier and with the largest East European military force, was central to Soviet military planning for conflict in Europe; Romania was not. Soviet military forces had vacated Romania in 1958. Romania under Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceausescu had for two decades pursued an independent foreign, military, and intelligence policy. Poland under Władysław Gomułka and Gierek had remained closely aligned with Moscow in all these areas. Poland was home to the Soviet Northern Group of Forces, headquartered in Legnica, which in the 1980’s was also the location of the headquarters of the Western Theater of Military Operations (TVD), established as the forward Soviet

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1 Johnson, Dean, Alexiev, op. cit., p. 15.
3 Interview in Kultura, Paris, April 1987, p. 54.
4 CIA document FIRDB-312/01995/80 dated July 25, 1980 (English translation from the original Russian). A full German translation from East German military archives was published on-line by the Parallel History Project (http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/colltopic.cfm?ln=en&id=20786&navinfo=15697) and a partial English text is published in Mastny and Byrne, op. cit., document 86. Detailed comparison of Warsaw Pact peacetime and wartime command structures is provided in Michael Sadykiewicz, The Warsaw Pact Command Structure in Peace and War (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1988), Report 3528-RC.
5 Kuklinski interview, op. cit., pp. 56-57.
command for military operations in Europe. In 1980-1981, with the emergence of the Solidarity trade union and preparations for Soviet intervention and martial law, the Soviet high command demonstrated that it could operate independently in Poland, ignoring the Polish military whenever it wished.

The Warsaw Pact wartime statute adopted in March 1980 formalized Soviet wartime control over East European military forces that had been assumed since the 1950’s. It demonstrated that the Warsaw Pact military Combined Command in Moscow was irrelevant for a Soviet Union at war in Europe. It made clear that in marshalling military forces for imminent conflict as well as in conducting combat operations, Soviet generals would bypass East European political and military leaders and command East European generals directly.

If the Warsaw Pact wartime statute served Soviet purposes in formalizing and rationalizing Soviet wartime control over East European military forces, it was adopted just as those forces were becoming relatively less important in Soviet military planning. By the early 1980’s, “coalition warfare” terminology had almost disappeared from Soviet military writings. This was only one of a number of indicators of reduced reliance in Soviet military planning on East European forces. Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces lacked the operational capabilities of Soviet forces for rapid advances with high-technology conventional weaponry on the modern battlefield under new concepts first advocated by Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov. In the course of the 1980’s, mounting economic problems and social unrest in Eastern Europe and weariness of its ruling elites made East European armed forces a less attractive even junior partner to the Soviet military. The paradox of the Warsaw Pact military statute was illustrated by the 1988 Warsaw Pact Shchit-88 pre-war mobilization exercise. That exercise assumed subordination of Polish forces (in this case the Eighth Army) to a Soviet-dominated Front (which would have been subordinated in turn to the Western TVD headquarters and the Soviet High Command). Yet unlike earlier Warsaw Pact exercises through the early 1980’s, which assumed rapid offensive operations into Western Europe, Shchit-88 utilized a (initially) defensive and essentially defeatist scenario that can be read as striking acknowledgment of the degree of demoralization of Polish forces and limitations on Soviet use of the Polish army by that time.

These observations provide context for the 22 documents on the Warsaw Pact in this CIA release. 17 of the documents are English translations of key original Warsaw Pact military documents obtained clandestinely at the time and now declassified. Three of the documents, issued after 1981, offer insightful observations by an informed military insider. They cover a range of issues discussed publicly by and attributed to Ryszard Kuklinski. One document is a 1983 CIA Directorate of Intelligence analysis that drew on these Warsaw Pact documents,
and other clandestine materials, to provide a detailed picture of "Soviet Control of Warsaw Pact Forces." A final document, released earlier, is the 1983 National Intelligence Estimate on East European military reliability. Both the CIA analysis and the Estimate stand the test of time, indicating that the intelligence reports released here, and other materials, allowed U.S. officials to accurately appraise Soviet-dominated mechanisms of the Warsaw Pact at the time. It is noteworthy how quickly some of these highly sensitive Warsaw Pact documents became available in Washington. The final wartime statute and ratification documents were dated March 18, 1980 and April 30, 1980; they were issued as a translated CIA intelligence report on July 25, 1980.

Following collapse of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, dissolution of the USSR, and abolition of the Warsaw Pact, many original Warsaw Pact and East European military documents have become available in a number of archives, especially the German Military Archive in Freiburg (incorporating East German military archives), the Polish Institute of National Remembrance, and the Czech military archive. Many such documents were obtained and posted on-line by the Parallel History Project (http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/) and some were translated for the PHP book, A Cardboard Castle? Some documents related to the Warsaw Pact military statute released by CIA in English translation can be found in (East) German versions on the PHP web site. Other documents in the CIA release and all original Russian texts have yet to be located in East European archives. The documents released by CIA serve historians today not only as useful translations but as valuable source material. As such they complement previous CIA releases of classified Military Thought articles, classified Soviet military academy course materials, and Polish military plans for martial law.11

11 Kuklinski interview, op. cit.; Benjamin Weiser, A Secret Life: The Polish Officer, His Covert Mission, and the Price He Paid to Save His Country (Public Affairs: New York, 2004); Benjamin B. Fischer, "Entangled in History: The Vilification and Vindication of Colonel Kuklinski," Studies in Intelligence 9 (Summer 2000), pp. 19-34. Weiser’s book is based in part on interviews with Kuklinski and on CIA reports from Kuklinski ("750 pages of notes and raw files") that have not otherwise been released (Weiser, op. cit., pp. xi-xii).

ORIGINS AND SIGNIFICANCE
OF THE WARSAW PACT WARTIME
STATUTE DOCUMENTS

Personal Recollections and Comments
by Les Griggs

As a serving intelligence officer and foreign area specialist (Poland and Czechoslovakia) in the United States Army from 1959 until 1986, I was exposed to special human intelligence (HUMINT) reporting concerning Eastern Europe as required from time to time. In 1974, when one of my tasks on the Army Staff in the Pentagon was to screen such reporting and brief it to my superiors, I noticed reporting from what appeared to be new special source(s). Over the following years, as an Army General Staff officer and in other assignments, I noted the wide range of topics reported on by what clearly were the same source(s)... information on such subjects as current and future weapons systems, war plans, exercises, etc. of direct interest and value to the Army and other elements of the Department of Defense.

We gradually discerned that the materials probably were from one source. As I rose in rank and acquired more responsibilities, my exposure to the special reporting from this source continued, but were less frequent. For example, while commanding a psychological operations (PSYOP) battalion at Fort Bragg in the early 1980's, I occasionally was called upon by the Army Staff to provide my views on some of this reporting. From my position at the time, I noted—but was not overly surprised by--the series of reports dealing with the drafting and ratification of a new wartime statute by the Warsaw Pact. To me, the reporting served mainly to confirm the view that the Soviets dominated the Warsaw Pact and could have their way on any issue, great or small.

In 1981 I returned to the Army Staff in the Pentagon to work for General Bill Odom in the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence. He immediately ordered me to work full-time on this source’s materials, and the wartime statute issue moved up on my list of priorities. I soon discovered that US Army intelligence analysts and Army strategic planners found the wartime statute issue to be intriguing, but difficult to apply as actionable intelligence. It was hard to quantify the materials in the preferred way—placing a dollar and cents savings tag on the information (E.g., this information saved us $XXXXX on the design of...
our new tank). Even so, the information about the statute and its implementing structure (new headquarters, communications systems, etc.) was of value to war planners, war gamers, targeteers and even PSYOP strategists, who could hope to take advantage of the surrender of national sovereignty issue during crisis or war. In fact, some high officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense pushed for making the statute reporting public immediately as a public diplomacy weapon against the USSR; however, this notion reportedly was vetoed by the DCI for source-protection reasons.1

A few high-level US military and civilian leaders also saw this intelligence as an early “war-winner,” offering NATO an opportunity to destroy or disable the Warsaw Pact command and control system at the Theater of Military Operations (TVD) level almost immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities. Accordingly, driven largely by the statute reporting, appropriate modifications and reprioritizations reportedly were made to target lists. Thankfully, the Warsaw Pact collapsed before target strikes became necessary.

The collection of wartime statute documents released here by the Central Intelligence Agency and Wilson Center is concise and to the topic yet rich with substance, and should be of enormous use to historians of the period. The documents provided from the Wilson Center and elsewhere provide a fulsome background and context for the issues, while the finished intelligence documents—the national estimate and particularly the incisive CIA analytic paper—afford the reader a glimpse of the intelligence cycle and the challenges of “making of the intelligence stew.” In my view, however, the heart of the collection consists of the operational field reporting by one special human intelligence source...the one discussed above. His reports are filled with facts and his field analysis, even while conveying the frustrations and emotions you might expect from this patriotic officer. We owe him a lot for his courage.
A JOURNEY OF REDISCOVERY

by Aris Pappas
Retired CIA Officer, Senior Director of the
Microsoft Institute for Advanced Technology
in Government

A journey of rediscovery. That's the feeling I have as I review the material that serves as the core of this event. While involved daily with professional responsibilities, there is very little time for quiet retrospectives. Life is evolutionary, and the job of intelligence is focused on the future. But now, thanks in no small measure to the heroic efforts of the people who combined their skills and, literally, risked their lives to obtain this material, we have the golden opportunity to look back.

It's not really a pretty sight. These papers document a record of oppression and outright bullying that, although commonly understood, was rarely so painfully visible – even in the stark reality of the world of intelligence. Clearly, the sovereignty of the Soviet Union's East European "allies" was a chimera; a status to be revered in diplomatic venues, but never allowed to interfere with the needs of Soviet security.

Repetition even affected the lazy and gullible in the West because public pronouncements, by master and servants alike, allowed all-too-easy and facile comparisons between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. But the reality was far different. Indeed, reading through these records, it's hard to avoid pity for the vassals who paid a heavy price in terms of their own integrity to protect their benefits. They were both beholden to and threatened by their Soviet rulers. A friendless situation in which power was derived from obeisance to a cruel master, while their ties to their own people was characterized by moral capitulation; like the imposition of Polish martial law or the slaughter of Czechs and Hungarians.

These documents were not widely distributed, but they did provide context to important decision-makers who were afforded the opportunity to understand better the nature of their opposition. To see the pressures and tensions working internally to tear the Warsaw Pact apart, but also to recognize the great danger represented by such unalloyed power. Such differences between appearance and reality remain pertinent, and the need for deep understanding by intelligence agencies is no less significant today.

Thankfully, the Wartime Statute was never invoked. We never had to test the reliability of the Soviet "allies." An essentially unnatural and flawed system proved simply too difficult to sustain and finally collapsed.

History tends to record great victories by reference to battles won and lost. These documents, however, offer a small insight to a Cold War victory where measured, though never perfect, understanding helped us avoid pitched battle.

I consider myself fortunate to have played even a minor role in that great effort.
SELECTED INTELLIGENCE

DOCUMENTS
STATUTE

ON THE COMBINED ARMED FORCES OF THE WARSAW
PACT MEMBER STATES AND THEIR COMMAND ORGANS
FOR WARTIME

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

1. In view of the constant imperialist threat to their security, the Warsaw Pact member states, affirming the obligations of the Warsaw Pact of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance which they have assumed, express their determination to strengthen their defense capability to the utmost and to use the entire political, economic, scientific, technical, and military potential of the allied countries for the purpose of defending the gains of socialism and preserving peace.

They believe that military defense of the gains of socialism is their national and international duty and that the aggressive forces of imperialism in Europe must be opposed by the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states, under a single Supreme High Command, that are powerful and well prepared for combined combat actions.

2. The overall policy of the allied countries in the area of defense, the organization and conduct of armed combat in defense of the gains of socialism, and other military matters requiring coordination among the Warsaw Pact member states, will be examined at meetings of the Political Consultative Committee as stipulated by the Warsaw Pact.

3. The present Statute defines the composition, mission, and bases of operation of the Combined Armed Forces and specifies their command organs: the Supreme High Command; High Commands of the Combined Armed Forces in the Western and Southwestern Theaters of Military Operations; the Commands of the Combined Baltic Naval Fleet and the Combined Black Sea Naval Fleet; the bases of control, air defense, organization of political work, rear services and special technical support of the Combined Armed Forces in the
theaters of military operations, and of mutual relations between the command organs of the Combined Armed Forces and the national military-political leadership of the Warsaw Pact member states; and financial support."

4. The present Statute has been prepared in accordance with the Pact of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance concluded in Warsaw in 1955 and with the decision adopted at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee on 23 November 1976.

The Statute goes into effect immediately upon ratification by the Warsaw Pact member states.

I. THE COMBINED ARMED FORCES OF THE WARSAW PACT MEMBER STATES

5. By the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states for wartime are understood the armed forces of these states that have been allocated to them and that are intended to repel aggression and to defeat an aggressor on land, at sea, and in the air irrespective of the state borders of the Warsaw Pact member states; and the command organs of the Combined Armed Forces.

6. The Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states for wartime are subdivided into the strategic groupings in the Western and Southwestern theaters of military operations, and the reserves of the Supreme High Command.

The strategic groupings are composed of troops, naval forces, and control and rear services organs allocated to the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states and either subordinate to the High Commands of the Combined Armed Forces in the Western and Southwestern theaters of Military Operations or directly subordinate to the Supreme High Command.

* By national military-political leadership here and further in the text are understood the highest military-political (state) organs of the Warsaw Pact member states.
The reserves of the Supreme High Command include Combined Armed Forces — allocated national formations, large units, units (ships), and control and rear services organs of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact member states which have not been made subordinate to the High Commands of the Combined Armed Forces in the Western and Southwestern Theaters of Military Operations or have not been made directly subordinate to the Supreme High Command but are intended to reinforce the strategic groupings of the Combined Armed Forces in the theaters of military operations, build up efforts in the course of combat actions, and execute other tasks; also / included in the reserves of the Supreme High Command are specially allocated reserves of material and technical means of the Warsaw Pact member states.

All the remaining troop contingents, military training establishments, and control and rear services organs remain subordinate to the national military-political leadership and are used in accordance with its plans. Should it be necessary, the forces and means of these troop contingents and control and rear services organs, by mutual agreement between the national military-political leadership and the Supreme High Command, may be used in support, and in accordance with the plans, of the Supreme High Command and the High Commands of the Combined Armed Forces in the Theaters of Military Operations.

7. The composition of the Combined Armed Forces in peacetime is determined by special Protocols, in accordance with the overall military-political and strategic objectives established by the military-political leadership of the Warsaw Pact member states. As a rule, the Protocols cover a five-year period, are signed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Member States and by the ministers of defense of each state, and are ratified by the governments of the respective Warsaw Pact member states.

The combat and numerical strength of the troops and naval forces allocated to the Combined Armed Forces can be refined and changed, depending on the military-political situation: in peacetime, by the national state leadership upon representation of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Member States; and in wartime, by the Supreme High Command of the Combined Armed Forces and the High Commands of the Combined Armed Forces in the Theaters of Military Operations in coordination with the national military-political leadership.
8. The Combined Armed Forces become subordinate to the Supreme High Command, depending on the situation, from the moment the Warsaw Pact member states find it necessary or in the event of a surprise armed attack by an aggressor against one or several of this Pact's member states. Simultaneously with this the High Commands of the Combined Armed Forces are activated /vestiguit v svom pravv, i.e. "come into their own"/ in the Western and Southwestern theaters of military operations and the Commands of the Combined Naval Fleets /are activated/ in the Baltic and Black seas.

9. The Combined Armed Forces are converted from peacetime to wartime status by order of the Supreme High Command -- and before the Supreme High Command is activated, by order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Member States -- in fulfilment of a decision of the Warsaw Pact member states.

In the event of a surprise attack against one or several Warsaw Pact member states, the national military-political leadership converts the troops and naval forces to wartime status and, at the same time, reports this immediately to the Supreme High Command or the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Member States (the High Commands of the Combined Armed Forces in the Theater of Military Operations), and to the national military-political leadership of the Warsaw Pact member states.

II. THE SUPREME HIGH COMMAND OF THE COMBINED ARMED FORCES OF THE WARSAW PACT MEMBER STATES

10. A single Supreme High Command is established for the centralized command of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states in wartime. A Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces is appointed, and the composition of the Supreme High Command is determined by a decision of the Warsaw Pact member states. The central organ of the Supreme High Command of the Combined Armed Forces is to be the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

11. The Supreme High Command is charged with directing the strategic planning and conduct of military actions by the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states.
The Supreme High Command directs military actions through combined and national organs for the control of troops and naval forces. The High Commands of the Combined Armed Forces in the Western and Southwestern Theaters of Military Operations, national commands, Commands of the Combined Baltic Naval Fleet and the Combined Black Sea Naval Fleet, the Commander of the Air Defense Forces of the Warsaw Pact Member States, and others.

In the area of the preparation and conduct of armed combat, the national military-political leadership of the respective allied states is guided by the decisions of the Warsaw Pact member states and the Supreme High Command.

III. THE HIGH COMMANDS OF THE COMBINED ARMED FORCES IN THE WESTERN AND SOUTHWESTERN THEATERS OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

12. The High Commands of the Combined Armed Forces in the Western and Southwestern Theaters of Military Operations are organs for the command of the strategic groupings of troops and fleets in the theaters of military operations, and are directly subordinate to the Supreme High Command of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Member States.

They participate in strategic and operational planning, organize operational cooperation among the fronts, fleets, and operational formations of the branches of the armed forces of the Combined Armed Forces in the theaters of military operations, organize the use of the reserves of the Supreme High Command that have been allocated to them, and exercise control of the coalition groupings of troops and fleets in the respective theaters. They conduct joint undertakings with the national military-political leadership of the allied countries to maintain the combat effectiveness of the troops and naval forces and to provide for their all-round support.

13. The High Command of the Combined Armed Forces in the Western (Southwestern) Theater of Military Operations is composed of the following:

- Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces in the Theater of Military Operations;
- Chief of Staff of the Combined Armed Forces in the Theater of Military Operations/First Deputy Commander-in-Chief;
-- Chief of the Political Directorate of the Combined Armed Forces in the Theater of Military Operations;

-- deputies to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces in the Theater of Military Operations from each allied country, the troops and naval forces of which form part of the Combined Armed Forces in the theater of military operations;

-- deputies to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces in the Theater of Military Operations for the branches of the armed forces, for the rear services and for armament;

-- commanders (chiefs) of the branch arms, and other officials.

The control organs of the High Command of the Combined Armed Forces in the Theaters of Military Operations are the Staff, the Political Directorate, the staffs (directorates, departments) of the branches of the armed forces, rear services, branch arms (special troops), and services, and other control organs which by necessity may be created.

14. A Military Council of the Combined Armed Forces in the Theater of Military Operations is established, which is attached to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces in the Western (Southwestern) Theater of Military Operations.

The Military Council consists of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces in the Theater of Military Operations/Chairman of the Military Council, Chief of Staff of the Combined Armed Forces in the Theater of Military Operations/First Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Chief of the Political Directorate, deputies to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces in the Theater of Military Operations, and deputies to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces in the Theater of Military Operations, and deputies to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces in the Theater of Military Operations, and in agreement with the national military-political leadership, the Military Council may include other officials as well.

The Military Council reviews matters concerning the status and activity of the troops and naval forces composing the Combined Armed Forces in the theater of military operations.
The Soviet Union's Control of the Warsaw Pact Forces

The Warsaw Pact, despite organization and procedures suggestive of a military alliance of equal members, is in fact the instrument of Soviet control over the armed forces of Eastern Europe. It is currently organized under authority of the Peace-time Statute ratified in 1969. Its organization for war is detailed in the 1980 Wartime Statute, signed by all the Warsaw Pact nations except Romania. The Soviet-imposed provisions of that statute, when implemented, legally subordinate the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact to a bilateral Soviet Supreme High Command, essentially extinguishing the sovereignty rights of the East European states.

The Soviet Supreme High Command assumes absolute control of the Combined Armed Forces well in advance of hostilities, according to the Wartime Statute's provisions. This early subordination of their armed forces to direct and complete Soviet control would deny the East Europeans a full voice in the later stages of a crisis.

The command structure established by the Wartime Statute reflects the Soviet General Staff's concept that all command and control must be centralized in a single, Soviet Supreme High Command without East European representation. The statute establishes two subordinate High Commands with absolute authority for operations in the Western and Southwestern Theater of Military Operations, East Europe. Forces, including forces and air defense units, will operate under the direct control of these commands.

The command and control structure of the Wartime Statute is designed for actual war fighting and is not intended to expand the Soviets' control of the Pact during peace-time. The organization established by the statute appears to be the result of the Soviets' general nationalization of all theater-level assets and commands, including their own. The statute was prepared at the same time that the Soviet General Staff, despite internal service resistance, shifted its own theater-oriented naval and air forces to the theater High Commands.

Romania, in the exception to the Pact members' acceptance of the Wartime Statute, has not accepted Soviet command of its forces and insists on developing its own defense concepts.
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Military cooperation among the Warsaw Pact nations is
foundational to the same principles as applied between these
countries in other areas. These include mutual and
common prosperity, solidarity, interdependence, mutual
equality and sovereignty of the nations parties; unity in
attaining the two objectives of defense of the Warsaw
Pact nations and the collective responsibility for ensuring
their security and defense of the achievements of
international alliance...

So wrote General of the Soviet Army Nikolai N. Kliuchkov,
Commander in Chief of the Combined Armed Forces of the
Warsaw Pact, to a volume The Collective Security

Kaidar, Mongolian Communist Party First Secretary, noted
that there may be additional measures authorized that
would strengthen the current level of cooperation.

The Warsaw Alliance is said to be a

'vertual treaty.'

Differing views of statesmen and observers represent
the lack of mutual understanding. Secrecy of the negotiations
meant a departure from

an earlier era of openness.

[Signature]

[Title]

[Director of the Joint Institute for Nuclear Physics,

Budennovsk, First Deputy Minister of Defense,

U.S.S.R., and Commander in Chief, Combined

Strategic Forces of the Warsaw Pact]
The Soviet Union's Control of the Warsaw Pact Forces...

Preceding Structure of the Warsaw Pact

The Warsaw Pact's public posture is that of a military alliance of sovereign nations, joined together for common defense. It is a formal structure and, as such, has formally constituted bodies to achieve its purposes as set forth (page 2). One body—the Political Consultative Committee (PCC)—was formed the same year, 1955, that the Pact was created. A 1959 document, known as the Posen Paper, created the Committee of Defense Ministers (CDM) and an organization of forces called the Combined Armed Forces (CAF) of the Warsaw Pact. While the CDM and the Combined Command of the CAF exist only in principle, the PCC is to exist during both peace and war.

The Political Consultative Committee

The PCC is the most important body of the Warsaw Pact. In The Collective Defense of Socialist States, Marshal Viktor G. Kulikov describes the PCC as the "highest political organ of the Warsaw Pact Organization" (page 1). With the participation of the first secretaries, the PCC makes decisions of the broadest nature concerning the overall interest and collective defense of the Pact member states. Throughout, the "principle of sovereign equality in the basic political and economic activities of the Pact" representatives of all member states enjoy equal rights in putting questions on the agenda, discussing them, and reaching decisions on them. Marshal Kulikov also stressed, "Participation in the work of the PCC meetings by the leaders of the ruling parties and governments and in the adopted decisions provides the weight and gravity that the international prestige of this body.

The Committee of Defense Ministers

Next in the formal hierarchy is the Committee of Defense Ministers (figure 4). It is made up of the Ministers of Defense of the member states and the Commander in Chief and Chief of Staff of the CAF of the Warsaw Pact. This body, unlike the PCC, deals more specifically with military questions than the CDM and, according to Marshal Kulikov, is occupied with "strengthening the defense capability of the allied nations, operational development and improvement of the Combined Armed Forces, and increasing their combat readiness." Each defense minister presides at the annual meeting when it is held in turn in his country. Marshal Kulikov stresses that the operating procedure for the Ministers of Defense Committee depends on the principles of equality and sovereignty on which mutual relations among the Warsaw Pact member nations are based.

The CDM's specific responsibilities also include overseeing the control bodies of the CAF and their readiness for wartime use. Because the 1969 statute that established the CDM reportedly specified that it is empowered during peacetime and is not, therefore, a wartime body, its statutory executive agent is the CAF Staff. The CDM's recommendations are submitted to either the PCC or the governments of the member states for approval.

The Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact

Citing the Warsaw Treaty provision concerning the requirement to provide mutual assistance, the 1969 Peacetime Statute created the Combined Command of the Combined Armed Forces, as indicated by Marshal Kulikov, the CAF consists of forces allocated to it by the member states in accordance with their economic capabilities, CAF executives, and recommendations from the Commander in Chief of the Combined Armed Forces (CAF). The use of this allocation is laid out in bilateral protocols between individual states and the Combined Command. The statute specifies that allocated forces remain directly subordinate to their own Ministries of Defense.
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: John H. Stein
Acting Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Letter from the Warsaw Pact Commander-in-Chief to Defense Ministers on Drafting a Wartime Statute to Govern the Combined Armed Forces

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is a translation of a TOP SECRET December 1978 letter from the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces to Warsaw Pact defense ministers which sets the structure, content, and preparation deadlines for a proposed statute to govern the forces and their command in wartime. The statute, which is to be ready for consideration by the Committee of Defense Ministers later this year, tentatively will consist of at least five sections defining the wartime composition and mission of the Combined Armed Forces and Combined Naval Fleets, the roles of the theater high commands and the national commands, as well as logistical and technical support arrangements.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.

John H. Stein

FIRDB-312/01790.79
HR70-14

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Page 1 of 7 Pages
Intelligence Information Special Report

COUNTRY: USSR/WARSAW PACT

DATE OF INFO: 15 December 1978

SUBJECT:
Letter from the Warsaw Pact Commander-in-Chief to Defense Ministers on Drafting a War-time Statute to Govern the Combined Armed Forces

SOURCE: Documentary

Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russian of a TOP SECRET letter from the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces to Warsaw Pact defense ministers setting the structure, content, and preparation deadlines to be observed in drafting a statute to govern the forces and their command in wartime. The statute, which is to be ready for consideration by the Committee of Defense Ministers in late 1979, tentatively will consist of at least five sections defining the wartime composition and mission of the Combined Armed Forces and Combined Naval Fleets, the theater high commands, their functions, and relationships with the national commands, as well as logistical and technical support arrangements. The defense ministers were requested to provide their input by 1 March 1979.

End of Summary

Comment:
The decision of the Political Consultative Committee which is cited in the letter was disseminated in

Previous discussion of the proposed wartime statute was reported in

TS #798199
Copy 1/4
First section. The wartime Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states. It is proposed that this section provide a definition of what is understood by wartime Combined Armed Forces and indicate their composition, mission, and the procedure and time for placing them in direct subordination to the High Commands of the Combined Armed Forces in the theaters of military operations. This section could also set forth the system for using the national reserves established for wartime by each Warsaw Pact state.

Second section. The functions, authority, and responsibilities of the High Commands of the Combined Armed Forces in the theaters of military operations. The idea here is to set forth the main functions of the High Commands of the Combined Armed Forces in the theaters of military operations and to indicate the authority and responsibilities of the Commander-in-Chief, his deputies, and Staff, and those of the commanders and chiefs of the branch arms and services.

One could probably also specify in this section a time for deploying the Staff and other control organs of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces in the theaters of military operations that allows them to assume command of the coalition troops and naval forces in a theater of military operations.

Third section. This section should expound on matters of cooperation between the High Commands of the Combined Armed Forces in the theaters of military operations and the national commands of the Warsaw Pact member states. In this section it is advisable to define the principles of cooperation between the High Commands of the Combined Armed Forces in the theaters of military operations and the national commands and to specify the role and place of the operations groups to be made available on a reciprocal basis from the High Commands of the Combined Armed Forces in the theaters of military operations and the national ministries of defense, and of the representatives of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces in the allied armies which exist in peacetime. The section should set forth the main functions of the national commands of the allied countries with respect to the troops and naval forces made directly subordinate to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces in the theaters of military operations.

Fourth section. We believe that this section should define matters of the command of the Combined Naval Fleets in the Baltic and Black seas: their composition, mission, and the procedure and time for reorientating the forces of the allied navies to the commanders of the Combined Naval Fleets.
Fifth section. Rear services and technical support of the troops and naval forces allocated to the Combined Armed Forces in the theaters of military operations. This section should indicate the role of the High Command of the Combined Armed Forces in the theaters of military operations and the national commands in providing material support to groupings of the Combined Armed Forces from national resources, providing transportation support to ensure uninterrupted military deliveries, and organizing medical and technical support. It should indicate the nature of cooperation with the general (main) staffs of the allied armies on matters of accommodating the rear services of Combined Armed Forces groupings on the territories of the allied countries, allocating transportation lines of all types, maneuvering reserves, restoring the combat effectiveness of the rear services, and using local resources for repairing equipment.

It is not ruled out that in the course of working out and coordinating the draft Statute, other matters or sections may arise that should be included in this document.

We believe that it is necessary, after having allocated specially appointed generals, admirals, and officers for the work, to proceed immediately with working out the draft Statute.

It is proposed that the following dates be established for the timely preparation of the draft Statute:

a) Preparation of the structural plan of the draft Statute and its coordination -- prior to 15 March (1979).

b) Writing of the main sections of the draft Statute -- prior to 1 June.

c) Preparation of the draft Statute and its preliminary coordination with the Defense ministers of the allied countries -- June to July.

d) Final work on the draft Statute and its preparation for discussion at the 12th session of the Committee of Defense Ministers -- August to October, 1979.
MEMORANDUM FOR:  The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM:  John N. McMahon  
Deputy Director for Operations
3. Report of the Commander-in-Chief on the Organizational Structure of the Combined Armed Forces Control Organs

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is a translation from Russian of three TOP SECRET and SECRET documents pertaining to the Tenth Session of the Committee of Defense Ministers of the Warsaw Pact held in Budapest in November-December 1977. The Official Report of the session contains the agenda and resolutions of the Committee on the topics of the unified air defense system, the control organs of the ground forces, an improved structure of the control organs of the Combined Armed Forces, civil defense, and the standardization of weapons and equipment. The full report of the Commander of Air Defense Forces indicates the current status of the unified air defense system and plans for updating its weapons and equipment. The report of the Commander-in-Chief outlines the basic proposals for improving the organizational structure of the Staff and other control organs of the Combined Armed Forces and presents a detailed organization chart and funding table.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.

John N. McMahon  
HR/C-14

FIRDB-312/00507-78

Page 1 of 50 Pages

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WAR/STATE STATUTES
Intelligence Information Special Report

Page 3 of 50 Pages

COUNTRY USSR/WARSaw Pact

DATE OF INFO. 8 November - 2 December 1977

DATE 28 March 1978

SUBJECT Official Report of the Tenth Session of the Warsaw Pact Committee of Defense Ministers, the Status of the Unified Air Defense System, and the Organizational Structure of the Combined Armed Forces Control Organs

SOURCE Documentary

Summary: The following report is a translation from Russian of three TOP SECRET and SECRET documents pertaining to the Tenth Session of the Committee of Defense Ministers of the Warsaw Pact, held in Budapest on 29 November - 2 December 1977. The Official Report of the session contains the agenda and resolutions of the Committee on the topics of the unified air defense system, the control organs of the ground forces, an improved structure of the control organs of the Combined Armed Forces, civil defense, and the standardization of weapons and equipment. The full report of the Commander of Air Defense Forces indicates the obsolescence of some of the missiles and aircraft in the unified air defense system and plans for supplying more modern aircraft, weapons and control systems to the member countries up to 1990. The report of the Commander-in-Chief outlines the basic proposals for improving the organizational structure of the Staff and other control organs of the Combined Armed Forces, which includes establishing Deputy Commanders-in-Chief for the Air Forces and Navy and dividing their directorates into west and southwest divisions. The organization chart and manning table approved at the session are included. End of Summary

Comment: The figures and diagrams mentioned in the documents, except for the organization chart of the Combined Armed Forces, are not available. According to the chart, Air Defense was made a directorate of the Staff, instead of the independent department proposed.
OFFICIAL RECORD NO. D012
of the Session of the Committee of Defense Ministers
of the Warsaw Pact Member States

6 December 1979

Warsaw

The Twelfth Session of the Committee of Defense Ministers of the Warsaw Pact member states was held on 4-6 December 1979.

The following members of the Committee of Defense Ministers participated in the session:

- Minister of National Defense of the People's Republic of Bulgaria General of the Army D. DZHUROV;
- Minister of Defense of the Hungarian People's Republic General of the Army L. CZINEGE;
- Minister for National Defense of the German Democratic Republic General of the Army H. HOFFMANN;
- Minister of National Defense of the Polish People's Republic General of the Army W. JARUZELESKI;
- Minister of National Defense of the Socialist Republic of Romania Colonel General I. COMAN;
- Minister of Defense of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. USTINOV;
- Minister of National Defense of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic General of the Army M. DZUR;
combat equipment in the course of an operation in a theater of military operations, for carrying out needed preparatory work in the theaters and, after they have been approved, to forward them as recommendations to the allied armies.

3. To perform the work indicated in points 1 and 2 of the present decision in accordance with the "Plans of Combined Measures for Developing the Weapons and Equipment of the Warsaw Pact Member States" in close cooperation with the CEMA Permanent Commission for the Defense Industry, using the forms of cooperation which have taken shape among our countries and armies.

The Fifth Item

The Committee of Defense Ministers, having heard the briefing of the representative of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Colonel General N.A. ZOTOV, on the draft "Statute on the Coordination of Actions Taken by Warsaw Pact Member States in Implementing Military-Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries," takes cognizance of it and RESOLVES:

1. to approve the aforementioned draft "Statute" and recommend that it be submitted for ratification by the governments of the Warsaw Pact member states.

The Sixth Item

The Committee of Defense Ministers, having heard the briefing by the Chief of Staff of the Combined Armed Forces, General of the Army A.I. GRISHOV, on "The Progress of Preparations and Measures to Celebrate the 25th Anniversary of the Warsaw Pact Organization," takes cognizance of it and approves the measures set forth in it in connection with the 25th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact Organization.

The Seventh Item

The next (thirteenth) session of the Committee of Defense Ministers of the Warsaw Pact member states is to be chaired by
The CIA has established this site to provide the public with an overview of access to CIA information, including electronic access to previously released documents. Because of CIA’s need to comply with the national security laws of the United States, some documents or parts of documents cannot be released to the public. In particular, the CIA, like other U.S. intelligence agencies, has the responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods from disclosure. However, a substantial amount of CIA information has been and/or can be released following review. See “Your Rights” for further details on the various methods of obtaining this information.

**Special Collections**

Additional document collections released by the Historical Collection Division can be found on the FOIA Electronic Reading Room and include:

**Strategic Warning and the Role of Intelligence: Lessons Learned From the 1968 Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia**

This collection consists of DI intelligence memorandums, various estimates and memos written by the Office of National Estimates (ONE), articles from the Central Intelligence Bulletin (a current intelligence daily publication), Weekly Summaries, Intelligence Information Cables, and Situation Reports, which were published up to three times a day during the crisis when tensions flared.

**The Warsaw Pact: Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance**

A collection of sensitive Soviet and Warsaw Pact military journals from 1961 to 1984 that provide a view into Warsaw Pact military strategy. New information was added to this site in January 2010.

**Air America: Upholding the Airmen’s Bond**

A fascinating assembly of documents revealing the role that Air America, the Agency’s proprietary airline, played in the search and rescue of pilots and personnel during the Vietnam War. The collection has personal accounts by the rescued pilots and thank you letters as well as commendations from various officials.

**Preparing for Martial Law: Through the Eyes of Col. Ryszard Kuklinski**

A captivating collection of over 75 documents concerning the planning and implementation of martial law in Poland from mid-1980 to late 1981. Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski, a member of the Polish Army General Staff and the source of the documents, provided information and personal commentary that gave intelligence analysts and US policy makers invaluable insight into the crisis.

**Baptism by Fire: CIA Analysis of the Korean War.**

This collection includes more than 1,200 documents consisting of national estimates, intelligence memos, daily updates, and summaries of
foreign media concerning developments on the Korean Peninsula during 1947-1954. This collection, coinciding with the 60th anniversary of the start of the war, is the largest collection of CIA documents on this issue ever released. HCD and the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library co-hosted a conference entitled “New Documents and New Histories: Twenty-first Century Perspectives on the Korean War” that highlighted the document collection.

Creating Global Intelligence

Discover the back story of the US intelligence community by exploring this collection of more than 800 documents from the late 1940’s to the early 1950’s that pertain to the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency. The collection provides perspective on the complex issues that senior US government officials grappled with as they considered how to establish an enduring national intelligence capability.

The Original Wizards of Langley: Overview of the Office of Scientific Intelligence

This overview and collection of documents and other material related to the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) offer a glimpse of CIA’s contribution to the analysis of Soviet capabilities in science and technology during the Cold War.

A Life in Intelligence—The Richard Helms Collection

This collection of material by and about Richard Helms as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and Ambassador to Iran comprises the largest single release of Helms-related information to date. The documents, historical works and essays offer an unprecedented, wide-ranging look at the man and his career as the United States’ top intelligence official and one of its most important diplomats during a crucial decade of the Cold War. From mid-1966, when he became DCI, to late 1976, when he left Iran, Helms dealt directly with numerous events whose impact remains evident today and which are covered in the release.

A-12 OXCART Reconnaissance Aircraft Documentation

This release, containing approximately 1,500 pages of material, consisting of about 350 documents, maps, diagrams, and photographs will provide researchers on aviation and intelligence with significant additional detail about the design and development of the A-12.
Since the establishment of the Warsaw Pact in 1955, the anticipated reliability of Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) forces in the event of a crisis was a topic of intense interest for the United States and its NATO allies as well as for the Soviet Union. As the Soviet Union engaged in successive efforts from the late 1960’s onwards to codify its command and control arrangements over the armed forces of its East European allies—first through a peacetime and later a wartime statute—the U.S. Intelligence Community’s collection and analytic efforts on the subject were ongoing.

**ABOUT THIS PUBLICATION**

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The companion DVD will work on most computers and the documents are in .PDF format.

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Thanks to the Wilson Center’s Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) for hosting and co-organizing this important event and for contributing images as well as documents from their own collection of non-US sources for the publication.