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The Historical Collections Division (HCD) of the Office of Information Management Services is responsible for executing the CIA’s Historical Review Program. This program seeks to identify, collect, and review for possible release to the public significant historical information. The mission of HCD is to:

• Provide an accurate, objective understanding of the information and intelligence that has helped shape the foundation of major US policy decisions.
• Improve access to lessons learned, presenting historical material to emphasize the scope and context of past actions.
• Improve current decision-making and analysis by facilitating reflection on the impacts and effects arising from past decisions.
• Uphold Agency leadership commitments to openness, while protecting the national security interests of the US,
• Provide the American public with valuable insight into the workings of their Government.

The History Staff in the CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence fosters understanding of the Agency’s history and its relationship to today’s intelligence challenges by communicating instructive historical insights to the CIA workforce, other US Government agencies, and the public. CIA historians research topics on all aspects of Agency activities and disseminate their knowledge through publications, courses, briefings, and Web-based products. They also work with other Intelligence Community historians on publication and education projects that highlight interagency approaches to intelligence issues. Lastly, the CIA History Staff conducts an ambitious program of oral history interviews that are invaluable for preserving institutional memories that are not captured in the documentary record.
The Georgetown University Library, consisting of the Lauinger Library, Blommer Science Library, Woodstock Theological Center Library, Riggs Library, and other additional collections, provides preeminent services, collections, and spaces to shape the creation of knowledge, conserve culture for posterity, and transform learning and research. The Lauinger Library, the principle library on the main campus, is located at the corner of 37th and Prospect Streets, N.W. in Washington, DC. The Library supports research in the humanities, social sciences and business. The Special Collections Research Center, comprising archives, rare books, manuscripts and rare prints, includes a remarkable collection of books on the subjects of intelligence, espionage, covert activities, and related fields, one of the largest collections of its kind in the country. The Library's collections and resources are open to visiting scholars and researchers.

Georgetown University’s Center for Peace and Security Studies (CPASS) in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service offers an expansive curriculum, in-depth research, and critical dialogue on security issues. The Center is a hub where the academic and policy communities meet; and experts and scholars from every discipline that studies international peace and security issues come together. The academic pillar of the CPASS, the Security Studies Program (SSP), is the nation’s preeminent professional Master of Arts program devoted to security; including intelligence, military analysis, terrorism, and technology and security. The faculty publishes regularly in leading scholarly and popular journals as well as serves as advisors or analysts to leading security organizations and government agencies.
Overview
This collection of material by and about Richard Helms as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and Ambassador to Iran comprises the largest single release of Helms-related information to date. The documents, historical works, essays, interviews, photographs, and video offer an unprecedented wide-ranging look at the man and his career as the United States’ top intelligence official and one of its most important diplomats during a crucial decade of the Cold War. From mid-1966, when he became DCI, to late 1976, when he left Iran, Helms dealt directly or indirectly with numerous events whose impact remains evident today and which are covered in the release. They include the Vietnam War, two military conflicts between Israel and the Arab states, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, an unsuccessful covert action in Chile, arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union, Watergate, disclosures of controversial CIA activities, the formation of OPEC, and the first oil embargo. From his respective vantage points at CIA Headquarters in Langley, Va., and the US Embassy in Tehran, Helms participated in all of these developments—depending on the situation—as intelligence manager, presidential adviser, or representative of US national security interests.

No comprehensive biography of Helms has been written, and for years the most widely consulted work on his intelligence career has been Thomas Powers’s The Man Who Kept the Secrets (1979). With the release of Richard Helms as Director of Central Intelligence, 1966-1973 by Robert M. Hathaway and Russell Jack Smith—one of a series of internal surveys of DCI tenures—we have a solidly researched, lucidly written account of the major issues Helms confronted as DCI, prepared by a respected historian and an Agency veteran of scholarly achievement. Based mostly on CIA records and interviews with Helms and Agency officers and originally published in 1993, it stands for now as the definitive account of Helms’s directorship. The study was previously declassified in early 2007 but is being re-released with fewer redactions. When read with Helms’s posthumously published memoir, A Look Over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency (2003), Hathaway and Smith’s book gives a thorough look at how one of the Agency’s most influential directors handled a succession of complicated intelligence and political challenges.

An especially useful part of the release is the set of oral history interviews of Helms conducted for the Hathaway-Smith book; the articles from CIA’s in-house journal, Studies in Intelligence, including three by Helms; and the video of him speaking at a history symposium at CIA Headquarters in 1994. Taken together, these materials capture the man himself—thoughtful, direct, precise, discrete, politically astute, keenly cognizant of the interconnectedness of intelligence and policy, impatient with pretense, wryly humorous, and always adamant about the need for CIA to remain objective and independent. “If we ever lose our reputation for honesty,” he wrote in one of the articles, “we lose all our usefulness along with it.” The newly released materials also portray a career intelligence officer who was ardent about his profession and the Agency he worked for. As he told an assembly of CIA employees in 1996, “An alert Intelligence Community is our first, best line of defense. Service there is its own reward.”

President Richard Nixon—dissatisfied with Helms’s management of the Intelligence Community and, most important, angry at him for refusing to involve CIA in the Watergate cover-up—decided as early as September 1972 that “Helms has got to go.” As Hathaway and Smith show, Nixon’s choice of him to be Ambassador to Iran was a spontaneous move
by the President to offer the soon-to-be-dismissed DCI a consolation posting. The Shah, though, saw the early replacement of a recent political appointee (Joseph Farland) with such an influential national security official as a clear indication of his country’s significance to the White House and US foreign policy. The US Embassy in Tehran reported that local media coverage and private conversations with Iranian officials highlighted Helms’s closeness to the President “and his prominence in American life as [an] important public servant . . . as indicating [the] heightened importance Washington attaches to its relations with Iran.”

Iran was nearing the peak of its regional influence and its prominence as a US ally by the time Helms arrived there in February 1973. As DCI, Helms previously had noted that “During the past decade, and particularly during the past five years, the Shah has sought to provide for the security of Iran through the rapid development of that country as a modern industrial state with a rapidly expanding military establishment. He likes to describe Iran as the only strong, stable and important nation between Japan and the European Community.”

This situation had come about for geostrategic and economic reasons. Iran, with Saudi Arabia, had become one of the “twin pillars” the United States relied on to maintain stability in the Persian Gulf region after Great Britain withdrew its military forces in 1971. During the same time, the Nixon Doctrine, enunciated in June 1969, placed greater responsibility on regional powers to defend themselves. In May 1972, President Nixon agreed to let Iran buy essentially any kind of American conventional weaponry. In a speech at Iran’s National Defense University in February 1976, Helms said that the United States regarded Iran “as a stabilizing influence in the region” and that Iranians must be “able to defend themselves against outside threats and to play a role commensurate with their interests.” With oil wealth filling its coffers, Iran became the largest purchaser of US military wares (nearly $2 billion worth) by the time Helms left his post.

Meanwhile, with US encouragement, the Shah took an increasingly hard line against radical Arab states and established a close but quiet relationship with Israel.

Until the Department of State’s *Foreign Relations of the United States* volume on US-Iran relations during 1973-76 is published (it currently is undergoing declassification review), this release presents the most extensive collection of diplomatic material on that subject now publicly available. Although they comprise only a tiny fraction of the massive amount of traffic between Washington and Tehran during Helms’s ambassadorship, the more than 800 documents offer a snapshot of the workaday world of a senior diplomat: regularly meeting with the head of state and his principal officials; preparing reports on local and international developments for consumers back home; discussing the implications of US policy toward Iran with American leaders; and offering advice on appointments to key US Government positions dealing with Iran. Some of the dispatches show Helms striking the delicate balance between advocating US policy to the Shah and empathizing with him to Washington—a task made more difficult because at times it was not clear whether the Shah was being deliberately cryptic or was just confused. (There is no mention in the traffic that he seemed ill; in 1974 he was diagnosed with lymphatic cancer.)

Several portions of Helms’s ambassadorial traffic deserve special mention because of their policy significance, because they show some of the recurrent annoyances diplomats everywhere face, or because they illumine some distinctive aspects of Helms’s tenure. For example, at the time Iraq was conducting a counteroffensive against US-and Iran-backed Kurdish rebels, so Helms had periodic discussions with Henry Kissinger and the Shah about providing military and humanitarian aid to the Kurds. Helms complained to the White House about the Department of Defense not coordinating comments on US-Iran relations with him and about questioning some arms sales. He was put in the embarrassing position of explaining to his hosts what a disparaging remark by a senior US official meant—in this case, the Treasury Secretary calling the Shah a “nut” in a magazine interview.

Writing to DCI George H.W. Bush from the unique position as a former DCI, Helms expressed concern
that some pejorative words in a CIA analysis of Iranian leadership would severely damage bilateral relations if the paper were leaked. He pointed out to his former Deputy DCI that the Embassy was not in the business of arranging audiences with the Shah for US visitors (“For some strange reason, ‘seeing the Shah’ has become sort of a weird tourist attraction for Americans.”). Helms spent a remarkable amount of his time dealing with the fallout from Watergate and the “Family Jewels” disclosures, receiving notifications and answering queries from Agency officials, congressional investigators, journalists, and attorneys. Perhaps in exasperation, he wrote to DCI Bush that he was “increasingly bemused by the double standard practiced by the Congress and the press on this issue of the confidentiality of sources . . . If ‘the public has a right to know’ about governmental actions, why does it not have ‘a right to know’ about where the information originated? If you are offered a glass of water . . . you should also have a right to know that it came from a poisoned well.”

“Our intelligence system,” Helms wrote in one of the Studies in Intelligence articles, “is in truth an expression of our society, with all its vigor and ingenuity, with all its complexity and some of its contradictions, as that society gropes for answers to challenges its founding fathers could never have conceived.” Helms’s service as DCI and Ambassador to Iran exhibits those same complexities and contradictions. For most of those years he worked under two of the most complicated presidents the United States has ever had, Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon, and had to confront the welter of intelligence and policy conundrums that arose from US engagement with Southeast Asia, the Soviet Union, and the Middle East. Acting upon one of his guiding principles—“you only work for one president at a time”—he skillfully adapted to the changing atmospherics in Washington and to the break-up of the Cold War consensus in American politics. What Helms observed in one of the interviews about serving under Nixon could as easily be applied to the ten years covered in the material released today: “it seems to me that the fact I ended up with my head on my shoulders . . . is not the least achievement of my life.”
Eulogy
A Life In Intelligence

Eulogy
by George Tenet
Former Director of The CIA

As we marked the 50th anniversary of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1997, Richard Helms spoke of those who had gone before, those who had given so much of themselves to build and nourish a vital institution of government that itself has given so much to the treasured cause of freedom.

"Each of us," he said, "has his own heroes and heroines." He was right. Here today, I join with you in this tribute to one of our greatest heroes.

A life such as his, rich in years and richer still in honor and achievement, is not easily described. Over the many decades, in the decisions he made, in the actions he took, he influenced countless other lives—thousands, perhaps even millions—in ways both subtle and direct.

At its best, that is what intelligence does in service to liberty. And, in Richard Helms, intelligence in service to liberty found an unsurpassed champion.

As a young reporter for the United Press in the Germany of the 1930s, he saw at first hand the menacing machinery of totalitarianism. In a few short years, though, he would go from the recording of history to the making of it.

With his knowledge of Europe, his proficiency in languages, and his gift for observation and analysis, he was a natural for the fledgling intelligence service of a nation plunged suddenly into global war.

And it was there that the military ultimately sent him, proving that the bureaucracy can get it right, sometimes anyway.

Richard Helms did more than adjust to this new world of intelligence and espionage. He made it his own.

In the ranks of the Office of Strategic Services, a dazzling collection of talents thrown together for the country's urgent defense, Richard Helms found the calling of his lifetime.

In its Secret Intelligence Branch, he mastered the delicate, demanding craft of agent operations. He excelled at both the meticulous planning and the bold vision and action that were then—and remain today—the heart of our work to obtain information critical to the security of the United States—information that can be gained only through stealth and courage.

He came to know, as few others ever would, the value of a stolen secret, and the advantage that comes to our democracy from the fullest possible knowledge of those abroad determined to destroy it.

In 1945, in the ruins of a fallen Berlin, amid the rubble of one conflict just over, Richard Helms saw the stirrings of another just beginning: a Cold War, destined to be fought against a very different enemy in a very different way. Now, the open clash of arms would be replaced by a fierce contest of wills and ideas.

As a seasoned officer, he understood the key role that espionage would have to play in divining the strengths and weaknesses of the closed, predatory tyranny that was the Soviet Union.

And so, he stayed with the profession in an America eager to enjoy the fruits of a hard-won peace. He stayed as our nation decided on the kind of intelligence service it would need as a new superpower in a new and dangerous atomic age.

His faith, his patience, and his persistence were not in vain.
When our country found its answer in the Central Intelligence Agency, Richard Helms was ready. His career at CIA, now the stuff of legend, was a rise of profound skill and of strength of character to match.

In an organization where risk and pressure are as common as a cup of coffee, he was unflappable. In an organization where exceptional dedication and extraordinary hours are the norm, he was, in the words of an admiring colleague, “always there. When you had to get Mr. Helms, he was there.”

In the Agency’s maze of rundown, temporary buildings down along the Reflecting Pool, a place where, he fondly recalled, “we learned the difference between perspiration and sweat”—I can see him saying it—he was almost as famous for his disdain for the trappings of high office as he was for his thorough success in it.

His sound operational judgment, his complete command of the facts, his reputation as the best drafter of cables anywhere—and his modest black Plymouth, decrepit enough to be heard from a long way off—these are but a few images of Richard Helms.

His focus—and his austerity—never left him. Nor, thankfully for all of us, did his sense of identification with the mission he knew so well and with the men and women of CIA, whom he loved so much.

In his nearly seven years as DCI, he set standards of leadership—and standards of excellence—that endure to this day. Though associated most closely with our Clandestine Service, which he had guided with tremendous insight, Richard Helms is for all of us the complete American intelligence officer.

For he not only understood the complicated mechanics of his business, he understood both its possibilities and its limits.

He saw intelligence for what it truly is: an essential service to the President of the United States. His goal, as he used to say, was to try to “keep the game honest”—to stick to the facts and their interpretation, to be an impartial voice, and to leave the policy decisions to others.

He once remarked that “God did not give prescience to human beings.” And he recognized that perfection is impossible in a profession devoted to the complexities and unknowns of the world. In pursuit of the truth, he urged his officers to be bold and to take risks. He led from the front.

He gave them the authority to do those things, while keeping for himself the one thing that no real leader can ever delegate: ultimate responsibility for the actions of the men and women he leads.

These are some of the principles that Richard Helms stood for. And he stood for them not in times of quiet or ease, but in turbulent times—times of grueling war in Southeast Asia, of enormous tension and conflict in the Middle East, and of Cold War everywhere.

He was shaped by the 20th century, but he was not bound by it. For the values he embodied are timeless: love of country, dignity and discipline in its service, and a grace and elegance of style, paired with a restless desire not simply to know about the world, but to help change it for the better.

In his life of accomplishment, Richard Helms had a great advantage—the unfailing love and support of his wonderful wife, Cynthia. Her care, her affection added to his focus and his strength.

Husband. Father. Patriot. Friend. Servant of liberty at the Central Intelligence Agency and far beyond. A lasting source of inspiration. A man who had reached the top of his field, who had kept the company of presidents, kings, and prime ministers, but who—to the end of his life—made time to inspire young people establishing their own careers in intelligence. To them, and to so many others, he offered priceless counsel and encouragement.

What others hoped to be, he was.

He will be missed by many. But he will be remembered and revered by many more. Wherever American intelligence officers strive to defend and extend freedom, Richard Helms will be there. By word, by deed, by example, he taught them all. They are his legacy. They will be his memorial.
I was fortunate and indeed privileged to have our paths cross. I could have had no finer mentor, no better teacher, no wiser friend. Whatever the problem, I knew he had faced it. Whatever the challenge, I knew he had met it. And I always knew he was in my corner.

In the toughest of times, it was his voice on my answering machine, his notes in the mail, or the phone call where he would simply say keep your head up—get on with it—always get on with it, because there is so much at stake.

His was the most valuable advice, the advice of experience. He was the voice of constant encouragement.

I am going to miss the twinkle in his eyes, his signature smile, the great stories, knowing this giant of a man and talking to my friend. May God bless you always, Dick. May your memory be everlasting.

George J. Tenet is a former Director of Central Intelligence. He delivered these remarks at the memorial service for former DCI Helms at the Fort Meyer Officers’ Club on 20 November 2002.
The Intelligence Professional Personified
A Life In Intelligence

The Intelligence Professional Personified

by David S. Robarge

In Memory and Appreciation

Editor’s Note: From 1997 to 2002, David Robarge worked as a research assistant for Richard Helms while the Ambassador was writing his memoirs, and also interviewed him extensively for other historical projects. In the course of those and many other professional and social contacts with the Ambassador and his family, the author came to regard Helms as a friend and counselor.

Richard Helms
Director of Central Intelligence, 1966-1973

The Central Intelligence Agency, Allen Dulles once told Congress, “should be directed by a relatively small but elite corps of men with a passion for anonymity and a willingness to stick at that particular job.” Richard Helms, the eighth Director of Central Intelligence (1966-1973) who died in Washington on 23 October 2002 at the age of 89, embodied those qualities. He was among the last of a dwindling group of trailblazers who dominated American intelligence for much of the Cold War. When Helms entered on duty with the new Agency 55 years ago, he was one of a cohort of young veterans of clandestine warfare during World War II who chose to stay in the secret world to fight a new, and in many ways more formidable, enemy. Seemingly a natural at managing secret operations, Helms rose from desk officer to DCI and came to represent a newtype of government professional: the career intelligence officer, steeped in the culture of clandestinity and devoted to the Agency as an institution. Intelligence work, Helms would later say, was “not merely . . . a job, but rather . . . a calling.”

Formative Years

Born in 1913 into a family of means and international connections, Helms grew up in smart suburbs of Philadelphia and New York. One of his brothers described their youth as “conventional upper-middle class, well educated, well traveled, interested in good schools and sports, and with a social life centering around the country club.” Helms took part of his schooling at academies in Switzerland and Germany and became fluent in French and German. In 1931 he entered Williams College and majored in literature and history. He became class president and head of the school paper, and was voted “most respected,” “best politician,” and “most likely to succeed.”

After graduating in 1935, Helms set out to be a journalist and newspaper owner, and by age 23 was a European correspondent for United Press International. He advanced from writing obituaries of English celebrities to covering the 1936 Summer Olympics in Berlin—the so-called “Hitler Games”—and interviewing the Führer just after a chilling Nazi rally at Nuremberg. He returned to the United States the next year to learn the business side of newspapers, working up through the advertising ranks at the Indianapolis Times, a major Midwestern daily.

Wartime with the OSS

In 1942, Helms joined the US Navy Reserve, received a commission as a lieutenant, and worked in the Eastern Sea Frontier headquarters in New York City, plotting the locations of German submarines in the
Atlantic Ocean. A former wire service colleague approached him about working for the new Office of Strategic Services in its Morale Operations Branch, which produced “black” propaganda. In 1943, the Navy transferred Helms to OSS in Washington. He underwent the standard tradecraft training at a covert facility in suburban Maryland, which included hand-to-hand combat instruction from the legendary English expert Col. William Fairbairn and an exercise in infiltrating and “spying” on a local defense contractor.

On finishing OSS “boot camp,” Helms began what he would spend most of his intelligence career doing: planning and directing espionage operations from an office in Washington. In this case, the target was Germany, and the agents were run out of Central Europe and Scandinavia. Early in 1945, Helms got his first overseas assignment, in the London office of OSS’s espionage branch. Working under (and sharing a Grosvenor Street flat with) William Casey, Helms organized infiltrations of agents behind German lines to spy and set up resistance networks. Late in the war he was “forward deployed” to Paris. Then, after V-E Day, he moved on to Luxembourg and Germany, where he was made deputy chief of the espionage element in Wiesbaden. In August 1945, he was transferred to a similar job in Berlin under Allen Dulles. From there he tracked down Nazi sympathizers and war criminals, collected information on stolen goods, traced German scientists, and monitored Soviet military misdeeds.

**A Life’s Work**

After President Truman abolished OSS in late 1945, Helms moved into the Berlin office of the Strategic Services Unit, a carryover operational organization warehoused in the War Department. In December he came back to Washington (for good, as it turned out) to run the Central Europe branch of the short-lived Central Intelligence Group. In late 1947, he took a similar position in the new CIA’s Office of Special Operations. After the Directorate of Plans was created in 1952, Helms served as chief of operations (the number two job) for eight years, largely running the directorate as DDP Frank Wisner’s health deteriorated. Besides overseeing espionage operations during those years, Helms smoothed relations between competing factions in the directorate—the spy handlers and the covert operators represented different cultures and often worked at cross purposes—and helped protect the Agency from Sen. Joseph McCarthy’s efforts to seed it with informants.

Probably Helms’s greatest personal disappointment through this phase of his career was not being chosen to replace Wisner as DDP in 1958. If Helms had been selected, rather than Richard Bissell, he might have kept the Agency from committing its biggest blunder to date, the Bay of Pigs operation. Although the Eisenhower Administration almost certainly would have ordered the CIA to do something to remove Fidel Castro from power, Helms probably would not have approved a project anywhere near as large and unwieldy as the one Bissell backed. Without that covert action disaster on his record, Allen Dulles most likely would have finished his directorship quietly in a year or two and turned over a respected, even popular, Agency to his successor—assumed by many at the time to be Richard Helms.

As it turned out, Helms’s eventual selection as DDP in 1962 under John McCone—the DCI who had replaced Allen Dulles the year before—proved important symbolically and substantively. It quieted many of the rumblings from Clandestine Service careerists after Bissell’s and Dulles’s ouster, and allayed their fears that McCone, a shipping and construction tycoon, was bent on running the Agency like a big business. Helms’s promotion also signaled a shift in emphasis from covert action to espionage—a reorientation with which he wholeheartedly agreed.

During the bitter peace of the Cold War, when nuclear superpowers and their proxies faced off in hot spots all over the globe, Helms and his CIA colleagues had to be, in columnist George Will’s words, “resourceful, tough-minded people” who “were not too squeamish to do hard things.” Wherever CIA operatives were—behind the Iron Curtain, in Third World cities, or out in the jungle or desert—“[e]spionage is not played by the Marquess of Queensberry rules,” Helms noted, “and the only sin in espionage is getting caught.” Secret intelligence work demands a special character in its practitioners, who must be able to bear the bleak reality that they “have only each other on whom to
to the fact that intelligence is inherently political in that it exists in a policy environment and sometimes tips the balance in favor of one decision or another. In that way, analysis can never be truly “objective” because the policymaking community will use it to justify or sidetrack initiatives. At the same time, Helms believed that finished intelligence should not be politicized—skewed to support a particular course of action or an ideological or departmental viewpoint. Instead, it should reflect the honest appraisal of all available evidence, evaluated by fair-minded observers—in some ways like the journalism he once practiced. “Objectivity puts me on familiar ground as an old wire service hand,” Helms remarked to a group of newspaper editors in 1971, “but it is even more important to an intelligence organization serving the policymaker. Without objectivity, there is no credibility, and an intelligence organization without credibility is of little use to those it serves.”

Never wear two hats. Perhaps the best way for a DCI to avoid the politicization mire, according to Helms, was to stick to the facts and stay out of policy debates. Unless explicitly requested, Helms avoided offering advice that would tie the CIA even indirectly to a policy outcome. Otherwise, the Agency’s most valuable commodity—its reputation as a source of independent, unbiased information and analysis—would be devalued, and the CIA would become just another voice in the chorus of policy advocates. According to Henry Kissinger, Helms “never volunteered policy advice beyond the questions that were asked him, though never hesitating to warn the White House of dangers even when his views ran counter to the preconceptions of the President or of his security adviser. He stood his ground where lesser men might have resorted to ambiguity.” Helms recalled that at meetings in the Johnson White House, “[t]he other people present had to be a little careful about the way they pushed their individual causes . . . because they knew very well that I probably had the facts fairly straight and wouldn’t hesitate to speak up.” To him, that was the best way a DCI could serve a president.

Stay at the table. Helms thought that CIA officers sometimes forget that they work for a “service organization”—that the product they provide must be relevant, timely, and cogent to be of value to their customers. If the Agency prepares analyses that are
out of date by the time they are received, deal with topics that policymakers are not following, or are crafted in ways that do not resonate with consumers, the CIA will lose its audience. On the operations side, Helms acted from the presumption that presidents are going to get done what they want done, whether the DCI or the Agency likes the idea or not. A nay-saying CIA will find itself left out of discussions about activities that it may be able to do better than anyone else. The Agency, Helms said, “is part of the President’s bag of tools . . . and if he and proper authorities have decided that something has to be done, then the Agency is bound to try to do it.” The alternative is irrelevance.

Serve only one President at a time. Henry Kissinger has observed that Helms “never forgot . . . that his best weapon with Presidents was a reputation for reliability.” Any DCI, Helms believed, must adapt to the Chief Executive he works for and has to suppress political or other differences that may arise when a new occupant enters the Oval Office. Living through the changes from John Kennedy (whom he often observed while DDP) to Lyndon Johnson to Richard Nixon, Helms saw that Presidents have their own appreciation of intelligence and their own way of dealing with the CIA. They may be fascinated with certain kinds of secret information or types of clandestine activity, or they may not be interested in intelligence at all. A DCI who does not learn to live with those differences, or who tries to oversell the Agency or obstruct policy, will soon find himself disinvited from the Oval Office—which Helms watched happen with McCone and Johnson. “We would have a very strange government,” Helms remarked in retirement, “if everybody with an independent view of foreign policy decided he was free to take or not take the President’s instruction according to his own likes and beliefs.”

Make intelligence a profession, not just an occupation. Helms had little time for officers who joined the CIA for any reason other than to serve their country by making intelligence their career. There was a big difference between that and being a careerist, however. With his characteristic bluntness, Helms warned a new class of trainees in 1960 that “[f]iguring out where you’ll be five years from now is a feckless exercise.”

If you’re already concerned about promotions and perquisites, you are wasting your time and ours. You’re either getting a kick out of your organization, or not. If you are not . . . you would be better off outside . . .

You are the agency, its future. It will be as good or as bad as you are. No genius in command will ever change that fact . . . But you are not God’s gift to the CIA and you have not been sent here to rearrange it . . .

Committing one’s life to the profession of intelligence often exacted a high price, but as Helms told an assembly of Agency employees in 1996: “An alert Intelligence Community is our first, best line of defense. Service there is its own reward.”

Helms’s Style

Urbane, cool, shrewd, sure-footed, tight-lipped, controlled, discreet—such adjectives appear frequently in colleagues’ and friends’ recollections of Helms. On the job, he was serious and demanding. An efficient worker and delegator, he left his desk clear at the end of the day (almost always before 7:00), feeling assured that the trustworthy subordinates he had carefully chosen could pick up the details and handle any problems. According to a colleague, “Helms was a fellow who by and large gave the people who worked with him his confidence . . . his instinct was to trust them . . .”

Sometimes, however, Helms’s hands-off style and deference to deputies worked against him. In the area of covert action, for example, more “proactive” management on his part might have averted the near-collapse of the CIA’s political action capabilities after the Agency’s network of international organizations, propaganda outlets, proprietaries, foundations, and trusts was exposed in Ramparts magazine in 1967. Similarly, in the area of counterintelligence, Helms accorded the chief of the CI Staff, James Angleton, much leeway in vetting assets, dealing with defectors and suspected double agents, and searching for “moles” inside the Agency—despite the costs of disrupting legitimate operations and tarnishing officers’ careers.
Helms’s office-hours rapport with most associates was cordial and proper; he was not a feet-on-the-desk yarn spinner like Dulles. John Gannon, a friend and former chairman of the National Intelligence Council, described him as “a man you had to work to get to know. He had a certain reserve about him . . . but if you cut through that and got to know Dick[,] he was an extremely warm man with a really great capacity for friendship.”

Also unlike Dulles, Helms did not cultivate a public persona. Reserved, unostentatious, and self-effacing—in the term of the day, a “gray flannel” executive (but much better dressed than that)—he gave only one speech to a nongovernmental audience as DCI. He nonetheless made himself known in quiet ways to those outsiders he judged needed to know him, such as certain members of Congress and the media, whom he met at briefings and lunches.

In contrast to John McCone—the archetypical “Type A” executive—Helms did not come to the directorship with a “vision” or try to remake the Agency in his image. He did not have any ideas formed from outside experience about how the CIA ought to be run. As a career insider, he knew how it was run, and he was inclined, by temperament and judgment, to leave it alone. In Thomas Powers’s apt description, Helms’s “instinct was to soften differences, to find a middle ground, to tone down operations that were getting out of hand, to give faltering projects one more chance rather than shut them down altogether, to settle for compromise in the interests of bureaucratic peace.” A colleague similarly recalled that “the question he would tend to ask himself on an issue was: ‘Is there something about this that is going to make it difficult for me? Is it going to trigger political reactions that are going to be unpleasant?’” Helms was a skilled infighter who knew when to step away from trouble, and he thought that most interdepartmental skirmishing over turf and prestige—particularly with the Pentagon—was pointless and self-defeating. After all, he observed, the Secretary of Defense was the second most powerful official in Washington, but “I am the easiest man in Washington to fire. I have no political, military or industrial base.”

Off the job, Helms was a charming conversationalist, a wry wit, a convivial partygoer, and a proficient dancer. He always returned from social events at a reasonable hour, his wife Cynthia once remarked, because “[h]e’s got to be in a fit state to make a decision; it’s always a crisis.” While at home, Helms relaxed by playing tennis, gardening, and reading. Although not a devotee of espionage fiction like Dulles, he enjoyed the occasional spy novel—except for John le Carré’s. According to his son, he “detested” The Spy Who Came In From the Cold, with its portrayal of intelligence work as steeped in cynicism, defeatism, and betrayal, and its unconcealed suggestion that, at least in the espionage “game,” East and West were morally equivalent. To Helms, the differences between the Free World and the Communist World were stark and incontrovertible, and intelligence organizations could not attract worthy officers, let alone survive, unless they were founded on trust and loyalty.

A Tempestuous Tenure

Helms spent much of his nearly seven years as DCI—the second longest tenure of any director—trying to defend the Agency from political attack and preserve its influence as the Vietnam war fractured the Cold War consensus on foreign policy and a resurgent Congress asserted itself against “imperial presidents.” In that contentious environment, he served under two presidents—Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon—who neither trusted nor heeded the CIA. He secured a coveted seat at Johnson’s “Tuesday Lunches” after the Agency called the 1967 Arab-Israeli war correctly, but he never was close to the Chief Executive who picked him as DCI. In the Nixon administration, besides the President’s political and social resentments toward the CIA, Helms also had to joust with an ambitious and secretive national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, who insisted on being the President’s senior intelligence officer. Throughout, Helms worked from the premise that the Agency’s survival depended on his ability to preserve its part in informing the policy process. “Dick Helms was a survivor and was in for the long haul,” a colleague remembered. “His aim was to protect the long-term interests of the Agency.”

As DCI, Helms was generally successful at “keeping in the game” but often found that hard to balance with “keeping the game honest.” Some Agency colleagues thought that he compromised the objectivity he lauded to maintain access downtown.
They accused him of politicizing estimates by removing judgments that the Pentagon disagreed with, as in the cases of assessments of the enemy order of battle in Vietnam and the Soviets’ SS-9 missile. Helms responded that he was treating intelligence politically, demonstrating his concern for the policy implications of “objective” analysis. To him, the coordination process was unavoidably political; everyone involved had to engage in bureaucratic give and take. Moreover, all sides had to accept that they frequently would have reasonable and defensible differences of opinion over the meaning of ambiguous information, especially when forecasting likely outcomes—“God did not give man the gift of prescience,” he observed. When CIA analysts produced assessments on aspects of the Vietnam war that suggested that US policy was not working but that did not have to be coordinated with other agencies—for example, studies of the ineffectiveness of the Rolling Thunder bombing campaign against North Vietnam, the communists’ will to persist, and flaws in the Domino Theory that posited the almost inevitable spread of communism—Helms did not try to alter their conclusions or limit their distribution.

In 1968, Helms weathered two major intelligence failures. Headquarters analysts played down field reports about a major communist military operation in Vietnam and did not issue warnings about the long-prepared wave of attacks that became the infamous Tet offensive until a few days before they began. That same year, the CIA gave no warning of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia because it had next to no intelligence about the military buildup on the Czech border. Two years later, Helms felt the fallout from a dispute with the military over the size of North Vietnamese arms shipments into the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville. Information from a newly recruited source in the Cambodian port showed that the Agency’s estimates were wrong and the military’s were more accurate. Afterward, whenever the CIA disagreed with the Pentagon, the White House would ask Helms: “What about Sihanoukville?”

On at least two occasions, Helms was accused of being too subservient to the White House: first, for allowing the CIA to spy on American antiwar protesters—whom Johnson and Nixon believed were receiving foreign support—and, second, for letting the Agency supply equipment to the “Plumbers” in their attempts to stop critics of Administration policy from “leaking” national security information to the media. Helms said that although some aspects of the first operation “went too far,” he believed that refusing that presidential order was pointless; he would have been fired and the assignment given to someone else to carry out, perhaps with unhealthy zeal. “I’ve known him not to want some of these things done,” a former operations colleague said, “but if they have to be done, he’d rather have them done within the CIA.”

The Unraveling

During his later years at the CIA, Helms witnessed the Agency and the whole enterprise of intelligence fall into disrepute as Congress and the public subjected US foreign policy to unprecedented criticism. Helms took the occasion of his only public speech as DCI to affirm that “the nation must to a degree take it on faith that we too are honorable men devoted to her service.” By the end of his directorship, however, years of political protest, social upheaval, and revelations of government incompetence and wrongdoing had depleted much of that faith. Helms became a (not entirely blameless) casualty of that rapid and sweeping change in the American people’s sense of what their government should and should not do. He had once said that Americans “want an effective, strong intelligence operation. They just don’t want to hear too much about it.” But now prominent voices demanded of the CIA far more accountability than Helms was used to or thought appropriate. As he wrote in this journal in 1967:

. . . it is sometimes difficult for us to understand the intensity of our public critics. Criticism of our efficiency is one thing, criticism of our responsibility quite another. I believe that we are . . . a legitimate object of public concern . . . I find it painful, however, when public debate lessens our usefulness to the nation by casting doubt on our integrity and objectivity. If we are not believed, we have no purpose. . .

Helms declined a presidential request to submit his resignation after the 1972 elections, not wanting to set a precedent that he thought would politicize the position of DCI. After he was forced out in 1973— he believed that Nixon was mad at him for refusing to use the CIA in the Watergate cover up—Helms
spent several years coping with controversies ensuing in part from some of his acts of omission and commission while at the Agency. He became a lightning rod for criticism of the CIA during its “time of troubles” in the mid-1970s. He was called back many times from his ambassadorial post in Tehran to testify before investigatory bodies about assassination plots, domestic operations, drug testing, the destruction of records, and other activities of dubious legality and ethicality known collectively as the “Family Jewels.” He responded to inquiries about them cautiously, sometimes testily, as he tried to walk the increasingly fuzzy line between discretion and disclosure.

Helms ran into legal troubles resulting from his judgment about when and when not to reveal secrets. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee just after leaving the Agency, he denied that the CIA had tried to influence the outcome of the Chilean presidential election in 1970. Helms described his quandary this way: “If I was to live up to my oath and fulfill my statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, I could not reveal covert operations to people unauthorized to learn about them.” He eventually pleaded no contest to charges of not testifying “fully, completely and accurately” to the committee. His statement to the federal judge who was about to sentence him, although addressed to the immediate situation, could also summarize nearly his whole experience as DCI: “I was simply trying to find my way through a difficult situation in which I found myself.”

**Restoration**

After resolving his legal affairs, Helms embarked on a second career as an international consultant on trade and other matters. He named his firm the Safeer Company (safeer means “ambassador” in Farsi) and once again became a fixture on the Washington scene. In the late 1970s, Helms was one of the CIA’s staunchest public defenders. He complained that Congress was naively weakening the Agency and warned that “This is a time when our intelligence can’t possibly be too good and when we can’t have enough of it.” He also criticized the Carter Administration for emphasizing human rights instead of Cold War enemies—“We ought to keep quiet and go to work where it matters,” he said. In 1978, he lent his support to oft-maligned officers:

_A professional intelligence service is essential to our survival, but too often [CIA officers] are reviled and cast as second-class citizens. If this is the way the public wants to deal with its intelligence professionals, then we ought to disband the Agency and go back to the way we were before World War II. Otherwise, it is up to the citizens of this country, the Congress and the President, to support these people . . ._

In the different atmospherics of the 1980s and 1990s, political leaders and intelligence professionals regarded Helms as an éminence grise and sought his counsel on a range of foreign policy issues. He received the National Security Medal from President Reagan in 1983 and considered the award “an exoneration.” Early in his administration, President Bill Clinton asked Helms how the US government could best protect the country against terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. His advice was simple and direct: “Strengthen the CIA and the FBI and see to it that they stay on top of their jobs.” In recognition of his decades of contributions to the craft of espionage, DCI George Tenet recently named an Agency training center and an instructional chair after him.

To the end, Richard Helms was “at the table.” He remained privately engaged in public affairs for so many years after leaving Langley that it is easy to forget how long ago he entered the secret world and how far he traveled within it. His forthcoming memoir, _A Look Over My Shoulder: A Life in the CIA_, will enable us to accompany him on that fascinating journey. When it is over, we will better understand the man who declared, at the depths of the Agency’s travail in the mid-1970s, “I was and remain proud of my work there . . . I believed in the importance to the nation of the function that the Agency served. I still do: without regrets, without qualms, without apology.” If he could speak to us now, he would say the same—and probably add, “Let’s get on with it.”

_Note: footnotes in copy on DVD_
In His Own Words
Congressional Relations

Jack Smith
I don't know Dick, I thought that you might try to begin by—just give you some structure to work around—you might talk about what the system was in your relation to the Congress as you understood it and how it worked, the frequency with which you met with these people, the membership of the groups you talked with.

Richard Helms
I certainly don’t, Jack; want to get into any statistics because I assume those are available from the records of the Congressional Liaison Office. Besides whatever I said would be affected by the accuracy of my memory in any given situation. What I do want to discuss and to underline is the fact that despite the problems of Congressional relations for the Agency, the Agency had a record over the years of being very forthcoming with the Congressional Committees to which it was supposed to report. In the Senate, it was a sub-committee of the Armed Services Committee and Appropriations; in the House, it was a sub-committee of the House Armed Services Committee and, of course, the House Appropriations. Over time, in the Senate, this composition of the sub-committee, to which the Agency was to report, changed. In the days of Senator Richard Russell, he set-up a small sub-committee to which he brought Senator Hayden, who in those days was the chairman of Appropriations, so that whether we had a hearing on policy or covert action or something of this kind, or whether it was a hearing on the budget, the same group of senators—and it was a small group—did the work with Russell in the chair and, in agreement with Hayde, Hayden present, and then the normally Margaret Chase-Smith, who was the senior Republican at the time, or Senator Saltonstall, who was the senior Republican at another time. In any event it was by-partisan, but small, discreet, and very secure. In the House, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee inevitably or invariably chaired the sub-committee. Whether it was back in the days of Carl Vinson or whether it was later in the days of Mendel Rivers, they maintained a secure hold on Agency affairs and had a larger group than in the Senate but nevertheless a tidy group of secure Congressmen who took care of the Agency’s affairs.

Now as far as the Appropriations sub-committee was concerned, by the time I really had a thorough knowledge of these matters, George Mahon, of Texas, had taken over as Chairman of Appropriations. He was most interested in keeping private the Agency’s affairs so he had a small sub-committee that met in a secure basement room of the Capitol, met secretly; he had on that the Senior Democrat on Appropriations, whoever it might have been at the time, and also the senior Republican on Appropriations, whoever that might have been at the time. So that usually it was a committee composed of five people, three Democrats and two Republicans. In this fashion, the Agency, laid before the House Appropriations sub-committee in detail, dollar for dollar, its budget every year. There was nothing held back from the Mahon sub-committee. Since according to the Constitution, money bills all originate in the House, this is the
place where, obviously one has to make one's case. So that articles in newspapers and allegations to the contrary not withstanding, the Agency had an unexceptionable record of laying out every dollar of its expenditures, what it was for, where it went, whether it was covert action, secret intelligence, counter-intelligence, airplanes, satellites, whatever it was, that sub-committee got the material.

Now let us get off to one of the problems the Agency ran into, certainly during my time, I don't know if it was the case so much before but it still will be recalled that the first sort of unzipping of covert operations that the Agency was involved in arose in 1967, I believe, with the revelation that the National Student Association had been financed in its overseas operations by the CIA. This caused, obviously, a good deal of checking into various other organizations that the CIA had been supporting. There were a certain number of revelations that took place at the time. Nevertheless, the fact that Senator Russell spoke up publicly and said that he had known about the Agency's support of the National Student Association, followed by a public statement by Robert Kennedy that he had also known about this and had approved it, turned off the fire storm which was about to begin over this. So things rather settled down again but never to be precisely the same.

When Senator Russell passed on and Senator Stennis took over as Chairman of the Preparedness Sub-committee of Senate Armed Services. This was obviously a personal dislike, or distaste, or something between Senator Stennis and Senator Symington. They referred to each other in private in most unflattering language and since Senator Stennis did not want to give Senator Symington this particular post, Senator Symington who was also on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, went to Senator Fulbright and got himself a kind-of investigative sub-committee so that he was not able to do under the aegis of Armed Services. Also since Symington was quite senior, Stennis did not like to have hearings of the Agency sub-committee simply because of this squabble between these two men. The net result of it was that we had comparatively few hearings under Senator Stennis' aegis. Despite pleadings and "can't we have a hearing" and "we'd like to check some things out" and so forth, Senator Stennis was quite reluctant to do this. On two or three occasions Senator Jackson told me that he had attempted to get Senator Stennis to permit him to set-up a small sub-committee of Armed Services In an effort to have more regular hearings and give more guidance and help to the Agency, but Senator Stennis simply declined to do this. This obviously reacted unfavorably for the Agency because when the allegation was made that there had not been many briefings the allegation in effect was true. Also despite all those who say, "Well, you shouldn't talk about secret matters with Congressional committees" and all the pomposity that follows this, in our kind of democracy a Director of Central Intelligence does need guidance from time to time from the people in the Congress as to how far he may go in certain kinds of activity. At least he would like to have some advice. When this is not available through regular hearings it makes it slightly difficult for him. In fact, it makes it very lonely indeed. Not that I was unwilling to take on the onus of the responsibility or any of the rest of it. It was simply that I thought that a better system of relationships between the Agency and the Congress should have been arranged. I would hope that now. That there is a select committee in the Senate and a Select Committee in the House that this would all work much more satisfactorily, because it is obviously preferable, in my opinion, to have consultation between Congress and the Agency and not to have any law or legislation or statute which guides or hems in the Agency's activities.
One day, I believe it was in 1967; it might have been in 1968, President Johnson suddenly told me that he was not going to include the budget funds for Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. I was stunned by this decision and asked him why it was that he was not willing to support what we thought were very effective organizations. Who had got to him I never did find out but he was quite adamant about this. So, a serious dispute erupted between us, the end of which was that he said, “All right, I’m just not going to support you on this. If you can go down to the Congress and get the money, you can have the money. But I’m not going to support you, and when you go down there to talk about this I want you to tell them that I’m not supporting you.” I was a bit wistful under these circumstances because after all money for the Executive Branch has the support and advocacy of the President. In any event, those were the days when the Congress still had powerful chairmen. By visiting the Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, Mr. Mahon and the Senate Appropriations Committee chairman whose identity at the moment I’ve forgotten, the senior Republican on Appropriations in the House and the senior Republican on Appropriations in the Senate I finally came back with the money to continue Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty for another year. I mention this because I don’t know what the record in the Agency shows, but I thought it was an interesting example of the support that one could get in the Congress from time to time for things in which they believed.

Jack Smith

You’ve underlined what I’ve always felt which was that you had a special relationship with Dick Russell.

Richard Helms

Well, I wouldn’t call it a special relationship. He felt responsible for the Agency. I was its Director. He was a very straight-forward individual, and therefore he wanted to be helpful. He was always available and I find him an extraordinary fellow.

Jack Smith

You could go to him anytime for guidance or counsel.

Richard Helms

That’s right.

Jack Smith

Dick, the system as you describe it, was exactly as I understand it, which is that the leadership of the Congress determined, in effect, for the Congress who was going to be privy to CIA briefings.

Richard Helms

That’s correct. In fact, Jack, I remember on one occasion going to Senator Russell and suggesting that perhaps in order to get wider support in the Senate for the Agency and its affairs that I should maybe brief certain other Senators about what we were doing and so forth. Senator Russell was absolutely opposed to this. He looked me right in the eye and his eye got a little bit glinty. He said, “If you feel any necessity to go around and talk to other Senators about the Agency’s business I certainly can’t stop you Mr. Director. But I’ll tell you this; I will withdraw my hand and my support from your affairs.”

Jack Smith

No question about it, the system eventually broke down. Now did it start to show cracks during your regime?

Richard Helms

Yes, the cracks weren’t bad but Senator Stennis was no Senator Russell. He had no where near the swat and standing in the Senate that Senator Russell did. There were few Senators who wanted to attack Senator Russell. Whereas in 1975, you will recall, when this big push for hearings on the Agency took place, the other Senators stampeded Senator Stennis right into the ground. They just rode over him. Whereas they never would have been able to do that with Russell, he would have found some way out of this. That made all the difference.
Was Mahon his counterpart in the House—would you say?

No, I think that Mahon was never a tiger when it came to defending the Agency. He was just careful about its affairs and never allowed anything to leak. As a matter of fact, let me just say for the record, that my experiences with the Senators and Congressmen with whom I dealt in all the years I was with the Agency was a very good experience except for a couple of quixotic examples which are not important. There were no leaks from the Congress of which I was aware, and they were perfectly secure in their dealings on Agency affairs.

I seem to have a recollection that one time some Congressmen wanted to be briefed in detail on some ‘program or other and you raised the question with Mahon, and Mahon said send him to me and I’ll talk to him. Does that jibe with your understanding?

Well I think that that story is somewhat accurate but not entirely. I believe that this has to do with a request from Senator Proxmire that I was to testify before the Joint Economic Committee of which he was the Chairman. I didn’t think that this was something that Senator Russell wanted me to do. So I went to see Senator Russell. He said, “No, I don’t want you to go up there for the Agency testifying about things like that. I want you to go back to Senator Proxmire. Just say you’ve discussed this with me and that I would prefer that you didn’t do it and that if he has any continuing problems would he please give me a call.” That was the end of the matter. When I told Senator Proxmire this he just sort of waved his hands and that was the end of the discussion.

Now that also had an event prior which was, as you will recall, that John McCone when he was Director asked Ray Cline to hold a press conference about a piece which had been written in the Agency about the Soviet Economy. It so happened that a day or two after that press conference I happened to accompany John McCone to a hearing at the Senate Armed Services Committee. Before the committee hearing began, Senator Russell came in and he really went to town on John Mccone. He had John Mccone flushed red. He said, “If you ever do this again, if you ever go public in this manner on things of this kind again, I simply am not going to support the Agency in its works or its budget or anything else. You leave those matters to the State Department or the Commerce Department, or the recognized agencies of Government that are supposed to testify before this body on matters of economics or politics or whatever the case may be. The Agency must stay in the background. I just want to tell you this is my warning to you about this.” I’ve rarely seen John Mccone so put down in my life. But the message rang loud and clear that as long as Russell was there this was not to be.

By-and-large, my relationship with (President Johnson) was excellent. He didn’t badger me; I was well treated by him. My impression was that a button labeled “Covert Operations” was not on his organ. He was quite willing to be involved in them, he would approve suggestions brought to him, but usually they had to originate somewhere else in contradistinction to Presidents Kennedy and Nixon who really thought frequently in covert action terms. But the net of it all was that I felt very well treated by President Johnson. I had none of the complaints about him that some of the people did, that he was rough and unreasonable and so forth. I felt that he had a regard for the Agency, was respectful of its work, and the relationship had been a good one.
Each President has to be dealt with by a Director according to his personality and according to his way of doing business. To have a board or a commission say that the Director's relationship with the President should be X, Y, or Z, is absolutely worthless. It's a waste of time. I have seen important men in the United States sit there and nod their heads and say the President should see this Director every hour on the hour or every other day or some dam thing like this. There is no way that these things can be legislated or controlled. Every President is going to do his business the way he wants to do it. You say, well, he should discipline himself but they never do. They do it exactly the way they want to do it. Even if you convince them that they ought to do it differently, they'll never do it for more than twice differently, and then they go back to the way they wanted to do it before. Now President Johnson was much better at reading documents. The way to get his attention was to present a well-reasoned, well-written piece of paper. With President Nixon, it was very much the same. He took it in better through the eye. The question was getting the documents, the relevant ones, on Johnson's desk and on Nixon's desk. Talking to them about or briefing them was not the way to get their attention or the way to persuade them about anything. With President Johnson, when I would brief at National Security Council meetings from time to time, I finally came to the conclusion that what I had to say I should get into the first 60 seconds, or at best 120 seconds, that I had on my feet, because after that he was pushing buttons for coffee or Fresca or talking to Rusk or talking to McNamara or whispering here or whispering there. I had lost my principal audience.

With Nixon, it was very much the same way. He liked longer briefings, he would sit there for longer briefings, but after the first five minutes his mind too would start to wander unless something came up that he was particularly interested in, so one has to adjust to these things. The notion that a Director should constantly see and be in the presence of the President is not necessarily true. In other words, it does not necessarily make him more effective. As a matter of fact, he can become an irritant. It's one of these things that finished John McCone with Lyndon Johnson. McCone started briefing him every once he became President after President Kennedy's assassination, and I know exactly what happened. Johnson finally got bored, closed the door and that was the end of that. He just didn't want to do it any more. You couldn't make him do it anymore. This one-on-me, that people hold to be so important who live in academia, does not necessarily achieve your objective. You either adjust your production to the man you have in the office or you're going to miss the train.

Let's talk now—in kind of a summing up—your thoughts on running the Agency from 1966 to 1973. You must have had in your mind—you probably never articulated it—but you probably had somewhere a set of guiding principles or some ideas of how you wanted to run the Agency. Perhaps the best way to delineate them or at least one way might be for you to say how you wanted to run the Agency differently from the way John McCone ran it.

Well, I don't how whether that is the most useful way to discuss it or not. Let me just give what my philosophy was, and then you can see how that fitted together. I am a believer that the Director of Central Intelligence, as the principal intelligence officer to the President, should not be involved in the foreign relationships policy except to the extent that the presentation of any intelligence material to a President is in itself a type of policy recommendation. This is inevitable. I don't think that his position ought to be a partisan one. I don't think it's helpful to a President to have all of his
people surrounding him involved in policy issues. You may note that Kissinger in the first volume of his book, when he’s discussing the various people with whom he has dealing as advisor on National Security Affairs, mentioned this point about policy and intelligence and so forth. John Mccone believed that he could wear two hats. One hat was a Director of the Agency and the presenter of intelligence information which the Agency produced, the other that he could sit in meetings and help to formulate the policy which the Administration ought to follow. I did not agree with that. I felt, as I said to you earlier, that I played a more useful role for President Johnson by keeping the game honest, by seeing to it that the Secretary of State or Defense or whoever was advocating whatever they were advocating, stayed within the acceptable limits of the facts as we knew them, the parameters of events that had transpired, and that this was a useful function to perform for the President. Because every cabinet officer, in advocating policies, whether the President’s policy’s or not, is constantly tempted to overdrive and to oversell, to over persuade. Often the degree to which something is being done gets lost sight of. I figure that the intelligence Chief has a role to play in keeping all these things in perspective, keeping the perceptions as accurate and as objective as possible.

As far as running the Agency was concerned, I had had it in my mind for a long time that intelligence is really not an end in itself. That intelligence people should not get the impression that because they’ve got an organization and a lot of people and do a lot of work and produce a lot of papers, that this is an entity which therefore should struggle for turf, for influence, for having a certain section of the budget for itself—a whole host of demands get tossed into these matters. It’s easy for the intelligence people to forget that they’re really a service organization, that they’re really there to assist in the policy making process through other people. If you stripped the Government down and left nothing but the intelligence organization, what would it do?

It would have to consume its own smoke and that would obviously give the President, the Vice President, the Cabinet the impression that the Agency was there to be useful, to be of service, to be helpful. I did my damnedest, as a result of demands placed on the Agency in various fora, to see to it they were carried out and that the Agency put its best foot forward and the papers were produced in a timely fashion, and even when this meant sacrifice on the part of the analyst or the producers who had the work to do, that this is what we were in business for and we were going to do this as best we could.

I suppose that there are things that happen in life that cause more anguish or irritation than others though I must say that the charge that the Agency was not objective, that it did not attempt to deal fairly with the facts and controversies and various estimative problems, I think has absolutely no basis in fact, I don’t know of any time when there wasn’t a sincere effort to accommodate all the varying pressures and still come out with what we thought was a proper answer. There may have been differences at times as to whether it was or nor—these things will always be debatable; I chose not to turn off debate, if I could possible help it. I did feel that this was one of the most important functions the Agency had to play, whether it was under President Johnson or President Nixon.

Continuing along those same lines, I very much wanted to see the Agency continue, to be innovative in the technical field, particularly in overhead reconnaissance. I supported as best I could all of those ideas which came up from DDS&T particularly, about new kinds of satellites whether they were photographic or electronic or what they might be, and to try and see that we’ve got these things funded and supported. We’ve already
discussed the KH-11 earlier. That was the kind of thing I wanted to see the Agency move forward on. It just seemed to me that we were more independent, that we were more innovative than anybody else in the Government, including the Department of Defense, and that break-through ideas were going to be born and they were going to be born in the Agency to some of these young scientists.

On the estimative side I tried to expand somewhat, the interests of the Board of National Estimates rather than having so much focus on the military estimates. I wanted to try to get somebody in there on petroleum, which I thought was an on-coming and very important item, and there were two or three that I attempted to add to the mix on the Board so that there would be a little wider sphere of interest and comprehension and experience.

As far as the DDP was concerned, I, to the end, thought that the principal function of the DDP was to try and work on Soviet Union, Communist China and the satellites. That was the reason we’d been set up in the first place, and that although some of these other things were interesting, like Vietnam and information of the sort that helped policy makers. For example, producing documents about what a certain negotiating position of the Japanese was going to be before the negotiations took part. That kind of thing, useful as it was, we really should continue to fight to penetrate the hard targets. We had some success; we had a lot of failures. It was probably as difficult a period in that respect as any, and I can’t say that I was necessarily charmed with the results that we actually achieved over all those years. But that wasn’t for want of trying, or my taking my eye off what I considered to be the ball, which was that.

Counter-Intelligence

Richard Helms
That leads me to what was an on-going problem between the counter-espionage staff of the DDO, and what was then known as the Soviet-Russian Division. A constant fight over whether agents that were recruited who were Soviets, whether they were double-agents or not. This was one of the most bitter controversies, and always seemed to end up in the Director’s office as to which side was going to win out in these debates. It would have been very tempting to do what Colby later did, and that is fire one of the fellows involved. But it never seemed to me that that made any sense at all. The tension here was the tension born of necessity and that if you didn’t have a counter-espionage fellow who was constantly challenging all the agents that were recruited, you were going to end up with one of these situations in which you were going to be very seriously penetrated. It’s almost the same as if you prevented in a trial in court in this country, cross-examination, what the prosecution said was the case. In other words, you don’t have a chance to hammer at the witness which is after all part of our judicial system and the judicial balance. And it seemed to me the only way you could keep the balance was to keep this tension in the DDO or the DDP. Painful and difficult as this was, and made unnecessarily painful by circumstances and personnel, the fact remains that it seemed to me it had to be borne because otherwise you weren’t going to do the job very competently.

The Intelligence Community

Richard Helms
Now as far as the Community was concerned, there I realize—as one looks back at it—some differences developed, particularly during the Nixon Administration, because I think there was a desire to have the Director move out much more and control the Community. I never thought that would work. I did not pick up this invitation with a
fervor that was expected that I would because in my best judgment I thought we were going to get into a situation which was not only going to be very tenable. It simply goes to this: these other entities were largely controlled by the Department of Defense. The Department of Defense is the most powerful Department in the United States Government, both in terms of money and votes, and whatever else one would like to consider. The heads of these Departments, their efficiency reports if you like, were made out by the Department of Defense. The money came from the Department of Defense. Therefore, when the Director of Central Intelligence, who was the jack-rabbit against the elephant in this, attempted to assert his authority over the funds that they could have and things of that kind, it seemed to me he was getting himself in an almost impossible position vis-à-vis, the Secretary of Defense. Therefore, through John Bross and Bronson Tweedy I attempted to carry out the President's wishes, by suasion, by consultation, by talks, we could work together on targets, and on production and an all the rest of these things, and could gradually get ourselves, as a Community, all headed in a common direction. I think that to a certain extent this was achieved. The contrary approach, or the other approach, was obviously the one followed by Admiral Turner later. How people have thought it worked out, I don't have any particular judgment on the matter because I don't know; I did get the impression from Admiral Inman that it had been a failure. That Turner had over-reached himself and that he had run into the problem that was predicted that he would run into, and that was that the Secretary of Defense was not going to have all his turf taken away from him. This is why I use the term "turf" a few minutes ago. I think the struggles of the Intelligence Community for authority and who's going to run whom, and who's going to control what tend to stultify what I think is the Community's real job. That is to use its best brains to work on the, Russians and oil problems and money problems, and all the rest of it, and stop squabbling among themselves over who's going to control what.

Accomplishments

Jack Smith

Dick, looking back, what would you say was the greatest satisfaction you had in being Director of Central Intelligence?

Richard Helms

You mean an event? Any way you want to answer it. You must look back on your career and you must say to yourself, there are aspects of this of which I’m very, very proud and pleased. Well, as I said in that interview with Frost, of which I gave you a copy. The estimate on the Six Day War, I think, was the really intelligence bingo of my time because it was so apt, concentrated, you could see cause and effect. I mean the whole thing was put together in a tidy little bundle there is a short space of time. I still look back on that as being one of the neatest pieces of intelligence work that was done. I also look back on certain other things as having been really distinct achievements, some of them not when I was Director. I remember I thought the Berlin tunnel was a remarkable operation. I thought the Popov and Penkovsky cases were run as well as anything of that kind could possible have been run. I thought that a lot of the work that we did on the Vietnam War, even though the war came out so badly, was nevertheless extraordinarily good intelligence work of which I’m pleased.
Helms Papers
SECRET 211659Z DEC 72 STAFF
CITE DIRECTOR

PRIORITY TEHRAN

WHAT

FROM KNIGHT

REFS: TEHRAN

DIRECTOR

1. WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT BEING MADE TODAY.
2. AM TAKING TWO WEEKS LEAVE BEGINNING 22 DECEMBER.
3. MERRY CHRISTMAS AND HAPPY NEW YEAR.  E2 IMPDET

SECRET

HR70-14
(U)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAR 2008
CITE TEHRAN

TO PRIORITY DIRECTOR

EYES ONLY DIRECTOR SCHLESINGER FROM AMBASSADOR HELMS

1. APPRECIATE DIRECTOR HAVE THUS FAR ELUDED NEW YORK TIMES WHICH UNDER VARIOUS GUISSES HAS BEEN TRYING TO SPEAK TO ME ON TELEPHONE FOR LAST FORTY-EIGHT HOURS.

2. MAY I SUGGEST THAT, IF YOU HAVE NOT ALREADY DONE SO, YOU BRIEF HAIG AND RICHARDSON ON STRICTLY LIMITED AGENCY INVOLVEMENT WITH HUNT. BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT ALSO THAT THEY UNDERSTAND ITS GENESIS I.E. DIRECT, HIGH-LEVEL WHITE HOUSE REQUEST TO CUSHMAN. E2, IMPDET.

SECRET

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

DATE: MAY 1973

HR70-14

(U)
TO: HENRY A. KISSINGER (EYES ONLY), WASHINGTON
FROM: AMB. HELMS, TEHRAN

1. AT LARGE DINNER ON AUGUST 18 GIVEN BY QUEEN MOTHER IN HIS HONOR, SHAH ASKED ME TO JOIN HIM FOR BRIEF DISCUSSION SINCE HE WAS IMMEDIATELY RETURNING TO NOWSHAHR FOR ANOTHER WEEK BEFORE SETTLING DOWN IN TEHRAN.

2. SHAH TOUCHED BRIEFLY ON AFGHAN NOTE ABOUT ARREST IN PAKISTAN OF BALUCHI LEADERS. THIS IS COVERED IN NORMAL STATE CHANNELS.

4. SHAH REMINDED ME THAT BOTH YOU AND DEFENSE HAD PROMISED

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAY 2008
HR70-14
(U)

RELEASED:

S E C R E T / E Y E S O N L Y
HIM RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE PROPER MIX OF F-14 AND F-15 AIRCRAFT HE SHOULD PURCHASE. I INDICATED THAT SUCH STUDIES TAKE TIME BUT THAT I WOULD INQUIRE OF YOU WHEN SOME RESPONSE MIGHT BE EXPECTED.

5. WE AGREED TO TALK ABOUT CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR SAUDI ARABIA AND JORDAN WHEN HE RETURNS TO TEHRAN. HE SAID THAT YOU HAD MENTIONED THIS MATTER TO AMB. ZAHEDI BUT THAT HE HAD TOLD ZAHEDI HE WOULD HANDLE WITH ME. INCIDENTALLY, THERE WAS SOMETHING IN SHAH'S MANNER WHICH MADE ME CONCERNED THAT HE MAY BE OVERREADING THIS EXERCISE. THE ORIENTAL MIND CAN RAPIDLY CONJURE UP ELEMENTS WHICH DO NOT NECESSARILY EXIST, AND I FEEL THAT IT BEHOEVES ME NEXT TIME AROUND TO PUT THIS IN PROPER PERSPECTIVE. THE LAST THING WE NEED IS SOME ILL-ADVISED MOVE OR INQUIRY WHICH MIGHT GET BACK TO SAUDIS. IT IS HAZARDOUS ENOUGH TO DEAL WITH THE SHAH HIMSELF AND WHAT MIGHT BECOME HIS TEMPTATION TO DO SOME LEAKING FOR HIS OWN POLITICAL PURPOSES.

6. WARM REGARDS.
TOP SECRET/eyes only 161822 OCT 73

CITE TEHRAN

TO: IMMEDIATE GENERAL SCOWCROFT, WHITE HOUSE
FROM: ANS. HELMS, TEHRAN

1. PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING TO SECRETARY KISSINGER FOR PRESIDENT AND HAH.

2. PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO SUMMONED ME FEW MINUTES AGO. AFTER GIVING BRIEF RUNDOWN ON HIS PRODUCTIVE MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT IN WASHINGTON, HE DESCRIBED DOMESTIC PRESSURES BUILDING UP IN HIS COUNTRY, AS RESULT OF WHAT HE REFERRED TO AS "ALL-PERVASIVE MUSLIM INFLUENCE", FOR POSITIVE ACTION IN SUPPORT OF ARAB CAUSE IN CURRENT CONFLICT. HE SAID THAT HE HAS BEEN CONTAINING THIS PRESSURE BY VARIOUS DEVICES, BUT IN ADDITION TO DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS, HE HAS BEEN GETTING INSISTENT REQUESTS FROM ARAB PARTICIPANTS, PARTICULARLY SYRIA, FOR MILITARY SUPPORT. EVEN HIS MILITARY CHIEFS OF STAFF FAVOR SENDING A BRIGADE TO SYRIAN FRONT. BHUTTO CLAIMS HE ARGUED THEM OUT OF SUCH AN ADVENTURE BUT HE DID AGREE TO SENDING SOME AMMUNITION TO SYRIA WHICH HE HAS DONE AND IS DOING. HIS QUERY TO THE PRESIDENT IS THIS: IN CONTEXT OF PAK DOMESTIC POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS PRESSURES, HE STILL WANTS TO BE HELPFUL, AND IF POSSIBLE CONSTRUCTIVE, IN BEHALF OF HIS FRIEND AND VALUED ALLY, THE UNITED STATES. HE WANTS TO KNOW

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DATE: MAR 2008

MR70-14
(U)
whether on balance it would be useful for him to proceed to Damascus after he visits Turkey and Saudi Arabia, which are currently scheduled. He sees a plus in this visit, because he could convince Syians of his inability to help them militarily except for ammunition. He could also try to persuade them that the time has come for a cease-fire in place. He sees a minus in the fact that such a visit might be misunderstood, that it would look as though he were throwing what weight Pakistan has behind the Arab cause. In short, he wants USG opinion as to whether he should proceed to Syria or whether he should return home directly from Saudi Arabia. His pride would not permit him to put the question in terms of USG approval or disapproval.

3. your reply can be passed to bhutto either here or via acobser in ankara. he says he does not care which. he departs theran at 1400 local october 17, proceeding from turkey to saudi arabia october 18.

4. this message has been passed through me, because bhutto did not want to deal with saher in islamabad on this kind of matter. his reasons can be handled separately in another message if you need them.
CITE TEHRAN

TO: DIRECTOR.

RE: REAT

EYES ONLY FOR ANGLETON FROM HELMS

1. THIS IS SIMPLY TO INFORM YOU THAT [ ] CAME IN TO SEE ME AT THE OFFICE MORNING OF DECEMBER 20 TO HAVE A BRIEF CHAT AND TO DELIVER A SMALL GIFT FOR CYNTHIA. SINCE I HAVE NO WAY OF KNOWING WHAT HE AND OTHER ISRAELI OFFICIALS HAVE SHARED WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE AGENCY, I WILL SIMPLY NOTE HERE THE ITEMS DISCUSSED FOR WHATEVER VALUE THIS MAY HAVE TO YOU.

2. [ ] WAS CLEARLY INTERESTED IN GETTING MY VIEW ABOUT TOP IRANIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD ISRAEL. I TOLD HIM THAT IT WAS MY IMPRESSION ISRAEL WOULD HAVE NO TROUBLE WITH IRAN. I POINTED OUT THAT THE SHAH SEES QUITE CLEARLY WHAT HIS PROBLEMS WOULD BE SURROUNDED BY TRIUMPHANT ARAB COUNTRIES AND CONSEQUENTLY THAT HE WOULD DO NOTHING TO DISTURB ONGOING ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE ISRAELIS. [ ] CONCEDED THAT HE HAD GOT THE SAME IMPRESSION FROM THE CHIEF OF SAVAK. HE EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THE GREAT

(Continued)
IMPORTANCE OF IRAN TO ISRAEL THESE DAYS.

3. I SPENT A FEW MOMENTS BEMOANING THE DISINTEGRATION (THIS MAY BE TOO STRONG A WORD I AM USING) OF WESTERN EUROPE AND THE WILLINGNESS OF THESE COUNTRIES TO SUBMIT TO BLACKMAIL OF ONE SORT AND ANOTHER. HE WAS PARTICULARLY CRITICAL OF ITALY AND GREECE IN THEIR HANDLING OF THE TERRORIST PROBLEM. HE WAS BEMUSED BY THE FACT THAT THE RECENT HIJACKERS APPARENTLY DID NOT KNOW THAT THE GREEKS HAD ALREADY RELEASED THE TWO TERRORISTS WHOM THE HIJACKERS WERE TRYING TO FREE AND THAT THEY PRODUCED TWO OTHER INDIVIDUALS IN AN EFFORT TO SATISFY THE HIJACKERS' DEMANDS. HE TOLD ME THAT HE HAD ALREADY PASSED ALONG THAT THE RECENT ROMA AIRPORT EPISODE WAS MOUNTED FROM LIBYA AND WAS DESIGNED TO TRY TO GET KISSINGER.

4. I NOTED THAT DURING THE OCTOBER WAR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAD USED THE RELEASE OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION TO AN EXTENT AND IN A MANNER WHICH IT HAD NEVER DONE BEFORE, I.E., TO INFLUENCE ISRAELI ACTIONS AND DECISIONS. HE SAID THAT THE USG WILLINGNESS TO ANSWER INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS, AND IN FACT NOT TO ANSWER THEM, APPEARED DESIGNED TO SUPPORT AMERICAN

/CONTINUED/
POLICIES AND ATTITUDES TOWARD ISRAEL.

5. EMPHASIZED HOW LONELY THE ISRAELIS ARE FEELING THESE DAYS. IN ADDITION HE POINTED OUT THAT ISRAEL HAS NOTHING TO GAIN EITHER POLITICALLY OR MILITARILY BY FURTHER RIGGING, SINCE ADDITIONAL ISRAELI MILITARY GAINS RUN THE RISK OF BRINGING IN THE RUSSIANS TO SAVE THEIR CLIENTS. THIS APPLIES TO BOTH THE EGYPTIAN AND THE SYRIAN FRONTS.

6. AFTER EMPHASIZING POINTING OUT HOW GOOD SOVIET EQUIPMENT WAS IN THE OCTOBER WAR AND HOW REMARKABLY QUICKLY THE RUSSIANS HAD BEEN ABLE TO DELIVER THIS EQUIPMENT TO EGYPT AND SYRIA, REPORTED THAT MOSHE DAYAN’S RECENT TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES WAS IN PART DESIGNED TO CONVINCE AMERICAN MILITARY AUTHORITIES THAT SOVIET MATERIEL WAS AS GOOD OR BETTER THAN AMERICAN, PARTICULARLY IN THE MISSILE FIELD.

7. WITH A TWINKLE IN HIS EYES, TOLD ME THAT THE SAVAK PEOPLE POLITELY AND IN LOW KEY INQUIRED OF HIM AS TO HOW WELL THE UNITED STATES HAD DONE IN SUPPLYING EQUIPMENT TO ISRAEL AND IN REPLACING LOSSES OF THE WAR. THE IMPLICATION CLEARLY IS THAT THE IRANIANS WONDER WHETHER THE UNITED STATES WILL BE /CONTINUED/
STEAFAST IN CONTINUING TO SUPPLY THEM WITH MILITARY EQUIPMENT
IF THEY ARE CONFRONTED WITH SOME KIND OF MILITARY CRISIS.\[...\]
IMPDET.
SECRET
Confidential

TO: Donald Rumsfeld, White House
F ROM: Ambassador Helms, Tehran

November 4, 1975

Heartiest congratulations on your appointment as Secretary of Defense! You will do a great job, but what is more important, our country will be well served. Cynthia joins in these congratulations and in warmest greetings and best wishes to you both.

Approved for release
Date: Mar 2008

Eyes only
1. In re para two of RCI 136, assume you aware that I will be returning to Washington on October 18 arriving that evening.

2. Would you please call Mr. John Gardner at his home, 301-654-3724, and ask him if he can see me some time on Sunday, October 19. I would ask that he set the time, if he is going to be in town, so that you can advise me of the hour and place.

3. Please telephone Mr. Thomas Karamessines at 703-534-1325 and ask him if we can get together on Sunday, October 19.

Please ask him if he could also arrange a meeting with Mr. Angleton and pick the place the three of us can get together.

Please call Mr. Gardner first so that you do not agree to a time with Karamessines and Angleton which is in conflict.

4. Please phone Mr. Rowland Evans at his office (298-7850) and give him the following message from me: QUOTE In keeping with my promise to you when I was last in Washington, I propose to have dinner with you on Wednesday, October 22. Hope this is convenient. If not, please advise. UNQUOTE.

5. Look forward to seeing you. Much appreciate your help. Warm regards.

[Signature]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAR 2008
The Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) Office of Information Management Service's Historic Collections Division reviewed, redacted, and released hundreds of documents covering the career of Mr. Helms as Director of CIA and while Ambassador to Iran. The accompanying DVD contains over 800 documents and 4,100 pages of formerly classified material.

The material is organized into the following subject oriented categories.

- The Helms correspondence – over 775 documents, spanning critical events in US foreign policy.
- CIA publications on Helms – such as the internal biography on Director Helms, George Tenet's eulogy for Helms, and various Studies of Intelligence articles on the late Director.
- In his own words – oral interviews and speeches given by Helms.
- A video of Helms addressing new CIA officers never before seen outside the halls of CIA.
- Photos of Helms as Director meeting with various Presidents.
- As an added bonus, CIA is also releasing 21 historical studies examining the organization of the Intelligence Community, and evaluations of proposals for reorganization and reform.

This DVD will work on most computers and the documents are in .PDF format.
Georgetown University, Gaston Hall
April 28, 2008

Speakers
The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Former Secretary of State
General Michael V. Hayden, USAF
Director, Central Intelligence Agency

Panel discussion to include

Burton L. Gerber
Moderator, Professor in Practice in Intelligence: Security Studies Program,
Center for Peace and Security Studies Georgetown University

Michael R. Beschloss
Author, NBC News Presidential Historian

William Hood
Former OSS, Former CIA, Author

David S. Robarge
Chief Historian of the CIA

Brent Scowcroft
Former National Security Advisor

Jennifer E. Sims
Director of Intelligence Studies: Center for Peace and
Security Studies Georgetown University

Albert (Bud) Wheelon
First Deputy Director of Science & Technology, CIA