SOVIET NAVY

INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS
DURING THE COLD WAR
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This collection of documents, spanning three decades from the 1960s to the 1980s, focuses on CIA’s collection and analysis of the Soviet Navy. In addition, this collection is a continuation of previous releases on the Warsaw Pact forces (available at cia.gov/library/readingroom/collection/cia-analysis-warshaw-pact-forces and cia.gov/library/readingroom/collection/soviet-and-warshaw-pact-military-journals) and adds 82 newly released documents ranging from translations of the clandestinely-obtained articles from the Soviet military journal, Military Thought, to the high-level National Intelligence Estimates. Many of the documents in this collection reflect the tensions in the bipolar Cold War and specifically focus on the Soviet Navy’s development of its naval forces during that timeframe. After World War II, U.S. leaders faced a nuclear armed rival and in no time, Soviet tanks were in the streets of Budapest, and the first Sputnik satellite was launched. Understanding how the Soviet Union envisioned the next combat situation required in-depth knowledge of both their high-level theory of warfare and probable tactical behavior. The collection will provide new insight into the Agency’s analysis of the evolving Soviet Navy and its military posture during the Cold War.

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CIA’s Information Management Services of the Agency Data Office is responsible for executing the Agency’s Historical Review Program (HRP). This program seeks to identify and declassify collections of documents that detail the Agency’s analysis and activities relating to historically significant topics and events. The HRP’s goals include increasing the usability and accessibility of historical collections. To do that, HRP works with partner organizations to organize release events to highlight each collection and make it available to the broadest audience possible.

The mission of the HRP is to:
• Promote an accurate, objective understanding of the intelligence information that has helped shape major U.S. foreign policy decisions.
• Broaden access to lessons learned, presenting historical material that gives greater understanding to the scope and context of past actions.
• Improve current decision-making and analysis by facilitating reflection on the impacts and effects arising from past foreign policy decisions.
• Showcase CIA’s contributions to national security and provide the American public with valuable insight into the workings of its government.
• Demonstrate the CIA's commitment to the Open Government Initiative and its three core values: Transparency, Participation, and Collaboration.

NATIONAL MUSEUM OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY
A component of the Naval History and Heritage Command, the National Museum of the United States Navy in Washington, D.C., collects, preserves, displays, and interprets historic naval artifacts and artwork for the information, education, and inspiration of naval personnel and the general public. As one of 10 naval museums throughout the country, it is the only one to present a complete overview of U.S. naval history 1775 to the present. Permanent and temporary exhibitions commemorate the Navy’s wartime heroes and battles, as well as its peacetime contributions in exploration, diplomacy, navigation, and humanitarian service. The museum’s Cold War Gallery highlights the Navy’s role in our nation’s 50-year-conflict with the Soviet Union. Special events and school programs are held throughout the year in both buildings, including book signings, demonstrations, lectures, and exhibition openings.

NAVAL HISTORICAL FOUNDATION
The Naval Historical Foundation (NHF) preserves and commemorates America’s naval heritage, using it to inform, educate and inspire current and future leaders in understanding the importance of our Navy, sea power and the maritime domain. We do this through education, youth programs and commemorative events; deep sea exploration of the maritime domain; increasing the awareness of naval history, heritage and maritime scholarship; award programs; and conferences. NHF supports the Naval History and Heritage Command by serving as the foundation partner to the National Museum of the United States Navy. NHF is a 501(c)3 membership organization located in the historic Washington Navy Yard.
www.navyhistory.org
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CIA Analysis of
Soviet Naval Strategy, Operations, and Force Capabilities

This collection of declassified documents on the Soviet Navy augments CIA’s initiative to provide the public with more detail on this subject. These documents were provided to U.S. policymakers, including the President, Vice President, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and other cabinet members, and used to assess the political and military strategy between the Warsaw Pact and NATO during the Cold War. The finished intelligence products¹ in the collection were based on clandestine, technical, and open sources, as well as other relevant intelligence information. These products, including NIEs (National Intelligence Estimates), influenced U.S. efforts to preserve the peace during the Cold War.

These declassified documents augment those that were previously released for the CIA Analysis of the Warsaw Pact: The Importance of Clandestine Reporting and the 2007 CIA release of the Caesar series of studies² and other significant CIA documents, as well as releases by other Intelligence Community (IC) agencies. These collections complement separate external projects, which include those of the Smithsonian Institution, Wilson Center and NATO’s reexamination of the Cold War with newly available documents released by several former Warsaw Pact countries.

¹“Finished Intelligence Products” is the CIA’s term for the final product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available intelligence information.

²The Caesar Studies are analytic monographs and reference aids that were produced by the CIA/Directorate of Intelligence during the period 1950 through the mid-1970s. They provided in-depth research on Soviet internal politics primarily intended to provide insight on selected political and economic issues and CIA analytic thinking of the period.
The CIA intelligence reports, produced by the Directorate of Operations (DO)\(^3\) made a significant contribution to understanding the history, plans and intentions of the Soviet Navy. Many of these documents are being released for the first time. These intelligence reports, however, do not represent the complete record—much information essential in the estimative process was from émigrés and defectors, as well as from the U.S. Navy, and imagery and signals intelligence, which are not specifically highlighted in this collection.

In accordance with the National Security Council Intelligence Directive\(^4\) from 1955 to 1961, the military services’ intelligence components were the principal contributors to the military-focused NIEs. The CIA, however, did make contributions on military-related economic and scientific subjects. The released finished products do not specifically address the contributions of political, weapons, and scientific intelligence efforts or economic analyses, including armaments production and naval shipbuilding; however they do address, as appropriate, the operational and strategic consequences of these efforts.

A command structure for a combined Warsaw Pact Navy existed, but the real Warsaw Pact Navy was the Soviet Navy from the signing of the Warsaw Pact Treaty in 1955 to the fall of the USSR in 1991, therefore the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact “navies” are not specifically addressed. An IC assessment of the Warsaw Pact “navies” appeared in NIE 11-3-55, Soviet Capabilities and Probable Soviet Courses of Action through 1960 and it states, “Owing to their small size, their meager equipment, and the unreliability of personnel, the satellite navies provide only a minor contribution to Soviet naval strength.”

The collection also includes many NIEs and finished intelligence products prepared by the Directorate of Intelligence (DI)\(^5\), some of which have been previously released. The DI reports were the detailed basis of CIA’s contributions to the NIEs focused on the Soviet Navy and its complementary role in a Warsaw Pact conflict with NATO. Those reports also provided the background for subsequent current intelligence. Included with this essay is a catalog with summaries of the newly released documents for each chapter and an appendix of documents previously released. All the documents are available on the CIA’s website at https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/historical-collections.


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\(^3\) The acronym, DO, Directorate of Operations, used interchangeably throughout the paper with the acronyms used in the earlier years: Directorate of Plans, 1950 to 1973, or National Clandestine Service (NCS), 2005 to 2015.

\(^4\) See NSCID No. 3, Coordination of Intelligence Production, 13 January 1948 and NSCID No. 3, Coordination of Intelligence Production, 21 April 1958 for details of the responsibilities of the CIA and other intelligence departments and agencies of the U.S. Government. NSCID No. 1 limited the role of CIA to economic and scientific analysis, making the military services responsible for all military intelligence. The 1958 revised version broadened the areas for which the CIA could produce intelligence.

\(^5\) The Directorate of Intelligence, renamed Directorate of Analysis in 2015, houses the Agency’s analytic cadre, and is responsible for the production of finished intelligence. This essay uses the DI terminology, as consistent with the nomenclature of the time frame.
Pacific Fleet Marines of the Soviet Navy hoisting the Soviet Naval ensign in Port Arthur, 1 October 1945
CLANDESTINE SOURCE REPORTING
Intelligence reporting derived from human and technical collection provide intelligence information that may contribute to or form the basis of such analysis—“raw” intelligence reports support “finished” intelligence products. During this period, the DO used the titles “Information Report,” “Intelligence Information Report,” and “Intelligence Information Special Report” for disseminated clandestine intelligence reports.

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE (DI) ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTS
The DI produces all-source finished intelligence (analysis) on topics of interest to the President, members of Congress, Cabinet members and the military services. All-source products are based on all relevant photographic, signals intelligence, clandestine and open source information. “Finished intelligence” has gone through the proper coordination within the office of origin, with other appropriate DI and/or DO offices; and has been reviewed by the appropriate managers including the DDI (Deputy Director for Intelligence).

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE (NIE)
A NIE is the highest form of finished national intelligence. It is intended to reflect the consensus of the Intelligence Community regarding some issue of major importance to national security, and it attempts to forecast the future development of present military, political, or economic situations in order to identify the implications for national policymakers. Most NIEs relate to issues of continuing concern, for example, Warsaw Pact naval forces opposite NATO, and are produced or updated annually or biannually, or on some other regular schedule. A Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) is produced when some unforeseen development, for example, the Berlin crisis, requires an immediate ad hoc collection of the situation. An Interagency Intelligence Memorandum (IIM) does the same thing as a NIE only on a more narrow issue of interest to a smaller audience.
CHAPTER I
Stalin’s Navy and the Early Khrushchev Period

Under Stalin’s direction, the Soviet Navy underwent a dramatic expansion after World War II, first in the Cruiser-destroyer force and later in submarines, becoming by many measures the second largest Navy in the world by 1957. The Stalin-era navy generally reflected the Soviet World War II experience but did not reflect the impact of nuclear weapons nor did it represent any real expeditionary capability—the Soviet Navy was seldom seen outside of home waters. When Stalin died the Navy lost its patron.

After Khrushchev became First Secretary of the party in 1955, he decisively altered Stalin’s naval policy and the direction of military policy and doctrine in general. His vision for the navy was not without precedent. In the earliest days of the Communist state until the early 1930s, the navy and naval thinking was dominated by ex-Tsarist officers, the “old school” theorists, who advocated the development of a high-seas fleet analogous in composition and intent to the fleets of other naval powers. Those naval officers were purged or sidelined by a new crop of officers brought up through the ranks under Lenin and Stalin. These were the “new school” theorists, who advocated limiting the navy to a coastal defense role with only modest forces of aviation and coastal patrol craft.

Khrushchev’s vision bore all the earmarks of the “new school” naval theories, but in the context of the nuclear age. As a result, new construction of major surface vessels for the Navy was very nearly terminated. Four or more cruisers were left unfinished in their shipyards and other projects were curtailed. At the same time Khrushchev shifted resources to the construction of new classes of submarines including conventionally-powered and nuclear-powered, missile-armed and torpedo-attack. He also shifted naval aviation emphasis to long-range attack and anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and abolished Naval Fighter Aviation.

Analysis in 1963 describes the changes in naval forces, strategy and doctrine during the period 1950–1959 based
on open source documents and Soviet classified documents clandestinely passed to CIA from 1961 to 1962.\(^6\)

Developments in nuclear and conventional weapons offered Khrushchev an opportunity to dramatically reduce overall military expenditures and reallocate military manpower quotas to civilian industry. This is reflected when Khrushchev announced a reduction of 640,000 men from the Soviet armed forces in August of 1955. In May 1956 he called for another cutback of 1.2 million men. Khrushchev later announced two additional unilateral troop reductions: one of 300,000 in January 1958 and another of 1.2 million in a January 1960 speech to the Supreme Soviet. All of the proposed reductions were meant to serve several purposes: to shift funds to the production of missiles and long-range bombers; to lessen the burden of military force requirements on heavy industry; to free labor for productive purposes in the civilian economy; and to bring international pressure on the United States to reduce its forces.

INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND ANALYSIS IN THE EARLY YEARS

CIA analytic efforts on the Soviet Navy during the 1950s focused on technical analysis of naval weapons systems and naval ship-building. Intelligence research on Soviet naval operations was conducted almost exclusively by the U.S. Navy’s Office of Naval Intelligence and associated military intelligence entities.

The Department of Defense intelligence entities had several important collection efforts against the Soviet Navy. CIA had a military clandestine source in place inside the Soviet armed forces during this time, Lieutenant Colonel Pyotr Popov. He provided the IC with unique classified documents otherwise unavailable after the late 1940s,\(^7\) and although he was an Army officer, he also provided some information gained in conversations with naval personnel, for example, the sinking of a Soviet battleship in 1955.

CIA was successfully operating U-2 aircraft covertly over the Soviet Union and analyzing the photography of military targets including naval shipyards and bases. The U-2 also photographed the Soviet construction of a new submarine base and the Soviet submarine squadron stationed in Albania in the late 1950s. In addition, CIA had a successful effort gathering and analyzing open source and classified Soviet naval-related documents.


\(^7\) By 1949, the Soviet Union and its allies were concealing much of their military activities and policy decisions from the outside world. The police state that Stalin established made recruiting human sources inside the USSR extremely difficult and prevented Western diplomats and military attaches from traveling widely there.
In 1967 Admiral Gorshkov wrote about the mid-fifties Khrushchev-Zhukov naval strategy and its consequences:

“In the course of the discussion which developed over the path of future development of our Navy in the mid-fifties, there abruptly appeared a struggle of the old views with the new ones not yet proved by life. At that time, too, were expressed even extreme ‘leftist’ views. It turned out, unfortunately, that we had some very influential ‘authorities’ who considered that with the appearance of atomic weapons the Navy had completely lost its value as a branch of the armed forces. According to their views, all of the basic missions in a future war allegedly could be fully resolved without the participation of the Navy, and even in those circumstances when to do so would require the conduct of combat operations on the broad expanses of the seas and oceans. At that time it was frequently asserted that only missiles emplaced in ground launching sites were required for the destruction of surface striking forces and even submarines.”

“In opposition to the views which were accepted in the early postwar years as to the significance of joint operations of the Navy with ground troops as one of its [the Navy’s] primary missions, views were advanced which were completely divorced from any necessity for the Navy to cooperate with ground troops in the conduct of coastal operations. According to these [views] it was considered that, for ground troops having nuclear weapons, support from the sea was unnecessary since, with their own forces, they could overcome any water obstacles in the way or even fight with an enemy fleet which attempted to strike blows against them from the sea.”

“...Obviously, the spreading of such ideas in addition to the still existing defensive tendencies not only interfered with the determination of the correct directions for the further development of the Navy but also held back the forward movement of our military-theoretical thought.”

CHAPTER II

Soviet Debate on Military Doctrine and Strategy

The Role of the Navy in a Nuclear War

CIA efforts to understand the Soviet Naval forces increased steadily and culminated in Soviet Naval Strategy and Its Effect on the Development of Naval Forces 1953–1963 and NIE-11-14-69, Soviet and East European General Purpose Forces, which represented the IC’s knowledge about the Warsaw Pact forces, including the Soviet Navy at the end of the 1960s.

After the death of Stalin in March 1953, sweeping reappraisals of political, economic, and military matters occurred, calling into question many of the policies Stalin personally supported. In the military field, his death offered a long overdue opportunity to devise a strategy more suitable to changing world concepts for waging war, and unleashed a debate about theoretical military science. In support of the effort, the Soviet military press undertook a systematic program to educate military officers and other responsible personnel on the character and potential of new weapons and military technology, and to induce responsible officers to write about military science and military art. After Khrushchev had consolidated his position by 1955, new policies began to be implemented. In the military sphere high-ranking officials recognized the potential of nuclear power and weaponry, and criticized the capability of the Soviet conventional naval fleet to defend the USSR in a future nuclear-missile war. The criticism was based on the failure to integrate nuclear-power and missile systems in its ships and to develop an ability to counter the emerging threat of a greater striking power, particularly nuclear, developed by the U.S. Navy. The Soviets believed they needed to revise their naval strategy and policies drastically. The Soviet Main Naval Staff was faced with determining the magnitude of the threat likely to be posed by the United States, and then attempting to develop the required naval organization, strategy, tactics, and weapons to counter that threat. In 1955 Soviet military publications began to emphasize the importance and value of submarine-launched missiles.

During his May 1956 visit to London, Khrushchev stated “guided-missile submarines were the most suitable naval weapon and they would receive emphasis in the future development of the Soviet Navy.” Khrushchev reportedly added possession of this weapon would give the USSR the capability to make “defensive” attacks against the United States. In May 1956, the Soviet military publication, Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), contained the following statement: “Submarines, having atomic propulsion and guided missiles as basic armaments, can perform at great distances from their bases and secretly strike blows not only against ships but also against land targets deep in enemy territory.” This apparently included nuclear strikes against the American continent.

From 1953 to 1959, the Soviet military debate was centered largely around the effect on the military of the rapidly advancing weapons technology on organization, doctrine and strategy. The early debate focused on adapting the new weapons to traditional concepts. By the end of 1959, when new long-range ballistic missiles capable of striking most of Europe had been successfully developed and put into production, Khrushchev and some influential Soviet military leaders began to advocate for long-range missiles, for the quick and decisive defeat of the enemy, which relegated conventional forces to a minor role. The more conservative or “traditionalist” elements of the military were opposed. The navy was able to muster support to rebuild the Soviet fleet along “modern” lines by integrating nuclear power and missiles. The Soviets emphasized the construction of submarines, and in particular, submarines capable of launching ballistic missiles. The Soviet Navy took its place in the new military strategy as its potential grew for naval ships to launch nuclear-armed missiles at enemy navies and land targets in both offensive and defensive roles.

Khrushchev viewed the potential of the new ballistic missiles as a means to provide greater security for the USSR at less cost, and outlined a new military policy in his January 1960 report to the Supreme Soviet. The essence of his plan was to place main reliance on nuclear-missile forces, reduce military manpower substantially, and accelerate the retirement of older weapons and forces. This, he asserted, was the force structure best suited both to deter war and to fight one when necessary. Khrushchev declared surface naval forces and other conventional armed forces no longer useful and predicted they would soon become obsolete. CIA analysts judged Khrushchev’s speech probably was prepared after consideration of this policy by the Central Committee of the Communist Party in December 1959.9

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9See CIA Current Intelligence Staff Collection, Caesar XI-60, Khrushchev on Nuclear Strategy, 19 January 1960, Annex page t.
In the context of the new weapons developments, in late 1959 the Soviet leadership instituted a “military-theoretical conference by correspondence.” Minister of Defense Marshal R. Ya. Malinovskiy authorized the publication of a Top Secret Special Collection series of the premier Soviet military journal, Voyennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), in addition to the regularly published Secret version to stimulate theoretical discussions of the most important and pressing problems of “Soviet military science, and above all, of military art.” Distribution of the Special Collection was restricted to a limited circle of officials from army commanders upward. Leading personnel of the armed forces, the troops, the military academies, the chief and central directorates, and the General Staff, who could contribute most to the development of Soviet military theory in the light of the requirements of modern warfare, were invited to write articles for the Special Collection.

There were twelve articles about naval matters written by ten senior naval authors among the many articles in the Special Collection during the period from early 1960 to 1962. They expressed a view of a future war as one of some duration and therefore, one involving extensive use of naval forces. These authors believed over-all military requirements necessitated the expansion, rather than a reduction, of naval forces. Furthermore, the officers supported a more conservative military position on strategy and policy, rather than the more radical position outlined by Khrushchev in January 1960. Indeed, there were some transparent refutations of Khrushchev’s position accomplished by attacking military proponents of his general hypothesis in the Special Collection.

INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND ANALYSIS

In 1960, the CIA acquired an important new clandestine source, Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy. He had served with distinction in World War II as a Soviet artillery officer and had access to high-level military officials and highly classified military documents. He began reporting in April 1961, passing articles from the Top Secret Special Collection of Military Thought and other classified Soviet military publications, along with other intelligence information to the West until arrested by the KGB in 1962. He provided the first high-level insight into the development of Soviet military hardware and strategy, and a wealth of data about the military establishment. He supplied invaluable insights into Khrushchev’s inclinations to use conventional military forces to achieve foreign policy goals while espousing a military policy and doctrine dependent on strategic nuclear-strike capabilities developed at the expense of those conventional forces. His reporting exposed the growing concern among the Soviet elite that Khrushchev’s threats and actions risked uncontrolled war. During this period Penkovskiy supplied approximately 5,000 pages of classified Russian-language documentary information of which over 90 percent concerned military subjects including the 1960–1962 Special Collection of the Top Secret journal Military Thought.\(^\text{10}\)

For more than ten years, the IC continued to use Penkovskiy’s reporting in their analysis on Soviet naval planning, capabilities, and intentions, and about developments in Soviet strategic thought, especially as it continued to be validated by other, more circumstantial evidence becoming available over the decade. The discussions of some new systems and their use remained relevant for naval analysts through the late 1960s and early 1970s. A large number of hardware developments observed in the early 1970s could be traced to discussions in the material Penkovskiy supplied, as the time from decision to completion of new ships and other sophisticated weapons could take more than ten years. Of perhaps more importance, the discussions about future naval operations and strategy revealed the purpose for new shipbuilding programs and fleet operations. The Penkovskiy collection helped validate the relevance of the new evidence for evaluating the Soviet naval capabilities.

\(^{10}\) Much of the discussion in this section is taken from “Penkovskiy’s Legacy and Strategic Research” by Len Parkinson, Studies in Intelligence, Volume 16, Spring of 1972.
CHAPTER III

Admiral Gorshkov’s Navy

Admiral Gorshkov’s Role in Transforming the Soviet Navy

As with Khrushchev’s new nuclear focus following the death of Stalin, the October 1964 replacement of Khrushchev with the “collective” leadership of Leonid Brezhnev (General Secretary) and Aleksey Kosygin (Premier) occasioned another shift in Soviet Navy doctrine.

CIA analysts characterized the new leadership as cautious, conservative, and consumed by internal debates and political maneuvering to consolidate their positions. Astutely, and in contrast to his predecessor, Brezhnev relied on the military for advice on strategic military policy issues. His policies emphasized persistent international dangers, citing the 1966 U.S. military expansion in Vietnam. He backed the military on the utility of conventional forces and supported the increase of strategic forces. He defended military interests by buttressing investment in heavy industry and the defense sector of the Soviet economy. The Soviet Navy was one of the beneficiaries.

With the change in policy under the “collective” leadership and in the context of the Vietnam War, Soviet military doctrine evolved in the late 1960s and during the 1970s, broadening the scope of official military doctrine to include the wartime contingency of conflict in which only non-nuclear weapons would be used. The seeds of the shift in the doctrinal development were already evident in debates among leading Soviet naval theoreticians contained in the Soviet classified writings dating from 1960-1962, passed clandestinely to the West by Colonel Penkovskiy. Although generally couched in terms consistent with Khrushchev’s focus on wars decided by massive use of nuclear-armed missiles, naval theoreticians described tasks for the navy consistent only with longer campaigns. Although there were no classified Soviet naval documents dated after 1962 available later in the decade, doctrinal shifts were evident in the unclassified Soviet military writings reflecting new or renewed Soviet interest in preparing for non-nuclear conflict, that is, wars of some scope in whole or in part not involving the use of nuclear weapons. The insight from the earlier classified articles illuminated the way for analysis of the evolving doctrinal changes.

\[11\] For a discussion about the new “collective” leadership, see CIA/DI/SRS Intelligence Report Caesar XXX, Policy and Politics in the CPSU Politburo: October 1964 to September 1967, 31 August 1967.

\[12\] There were some Soviet “restricted” versions of Military Thought available during this period.
Admiral Gorshkov

In 1955 when he became First Secretary, Khrushchev removed Stalin’s Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral Kuznetsov, a principal proponent of Stalin’s shipbuilding program, replacing him by 1956 with Admiral Sergey Georgevich Gorshkov. Under Khrushchev, Gorshkov navigated through what must have seemed a dim future for the Navy, barely protecting programs that would later blossom to support the building of the Soviet version of a high seas fleet. The story of Admiral Gorshkov is very nearly the story of the Soviet Navy for the thirty years he served as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. His lengthy tenure as Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy was a tribute both to his professional naval expertise and, perhaps more important in Moscow, his bureaucratic skill navigating through the hazards of the changing attitudes of the national and party leadership. In retrospect it seems clear Admiral Gorshkov never lost sight of his goal of creating a world class navy operating proudly on all the world’s oceans.

Admiral Gorshkov had been gradually transforming the Navy into a truly ocean going navy after assuming the position of Commander-in-Chief. He presided over the dramatic increase in the use of the Navy for diplomatic purposes; the expansion of the Navy ship and submarine construction programs and establishing the importance of the Navy in the Soviet strategic strike forces in naval policy, doctrine and strategy throughout his tenure. The expansion in roles and size, although implemented gradually, was as important for the Navy in a positive sense as its precipitous decline in the years following the death of Stalin was negative. Many of the more important changes were obvious to even the casual observer; others became clear only with the passage of time.

Soviet naval developments did not occur in a vacuum. The 1961–1962 and later documents made it clear no matter what Soviet propagandists wrote, many Soviet naval theoreticians continued to believe the U.S. Navy was dominant on the oceans throughout the period. Even Stalin’s ambitious naval programs did not change their minds. The “Old School” Soviet naval theorists, however, did seek a navy that could be seen challenging the U.S. dominance in some significant way. The Khrushchev-inspired military doctrine had no room for such challenges except during an all-out nuclear war. Hence, the Soviet Navy, largely designed to Stalin’s dictates and affected by Khrushchev’s reductions, played relatively little role in the non-nuclear Cuban Missile Crisis.

By the time Admiral Gorshkov published his book in the mid-1970s, it was clear to CIA analysts that the Soviets were building toward a “balanced fleet,” i.e., a fleet for open ocean operations and a broad array of contingencies. Nonetheless, it was equally clear that the Soviets still afforded top priority to defend against aircraft carriers operating within striking distance of the USSR and against western SSBNs. In Western terms the Soviet Navy aimed for sea control of the waters adjacent to the USSR and sea denial in the areas more distant but still within striking...
range of Soviet targets. Gorshkov’s vision of the Soviet Navy was still years in the future but signs were already appearing in the USSR naval-shipbuilding industry. The Soviets continued to produce long-range missile-carrying bombers and anti-submarine warfare aircraft, nuclear submarines, and had a broad array of major surface combatants under construction, including the Kiev-class aircraft carriers.

Into the 1980s Admiral Gorshkov continued to transform the Navy into a truly ocean going navy. By the time he was retired, he had presided over the dramatic increase in the size and prominence of the Navy. At the time of his retirement there were building programs for seven classes of major surface combatants in addition to a new aircraft carrier. Four 36,000 ton class VSTOL aircraft carriers and the largest nuclear-powered cruisers in the world were in or soon to be put into service. Several classes of new model nuclear submarines were entering service and Naval Aviation was being equipped with the new Backfire supersonic medium-range bomber. It was a far cry from the Navy advocated by Khrushchev.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS, CLANDESTINE REPORTING AND OTHER SOURCES

New classified intelligence on the Soviet military became available when the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 provided the catalyst for an increase of intelligence information on the Warsaw Pact militaries. Clandestine sources provided many highly classified documents bearing on the discussions of future Soviet naval strategy, operations and tactics during the 1970s and beyond. Some of the documents were articles published during the 1960s in the Secret version of the Soviet military journal, Military Thought, but were not available through clandestine sources until sometime after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Although analysts had other sources of information about the Soviet Navy during the 1960s, the availability of the older theoretical discussions provided invaluable insights into the future of Soviet naval strategy. NIE 11-14-69 reflected the views in the IC of the 1969 Soviet naval capabilities and planning, as well as judgments about trends for the 1970s. The CIA contribution to the 1969 NIE focused on emerging Soviet naval capabilities.

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13 VSTOL is the acronym for vertical short take-off and landing aircraft carriers.
to perform the tasks of ASW and anti-carrier strikes. Earlier, CIA analysts judged the Soviets were becoming more cautious in doctrinal discussions about the certainty that war with the West would necessarily be nuclear in the initial stages. As more Soviet classified military documents became available, CIA and other IC analysts saw an increasing prevalence of Soviet military theoreticians debating the thesis that war might even stay at a non-nuclear level to its conclusion, or very nearly so. It was not yet evident to the analysts that more than a technological evolution of Soviet naval forces was in the offing. By the 1970s, new shipbuilding programs indicated the Soviets had made major decisions about the nature, composition, and role of the Navy in a wide spectrum of conflict situations.

These newly available ten-year old documents were significant because they laid the groundwork for the doctrinal discussions and decisions that followed. Analysts were able to piece together the main outlines of the Soviet naval strategy for war with NATO on the high seas. Not only was Gorshkov’s navy continuously present on many oceans and seas around the world, but the construction program included larger surface combatants, for example aircraft carriers, he believed were necessary for a true “Blue Water Navy.” The challenges for analysts evolved from quantitative to qualitative questions. For example, how did the Soviets intend to operate to deny ocean areas to NATO? How well could the Soviet Navy execute tasks such as ASW in sea-denial operations and in sea-control operations? What was the real readiness of Soviet naval forces? How were the Soviets likely to apportion forces for the competing operational missions and tasks? Fortunately, the new clandestine reporting and other intelligence information during the 1970s addressed those questions. These documents were a major ingredient in the watershed estimate of Soviet naval operations and strategy presented in NIE 11-14-79.

Differences of opinion existed from time to time among members of the naval analytic community. Those differences are noted in this collection and in several interagency documents including: NIE 11-14-79; Interagency Intelligence Memorandum (IIM), Readiness of Soviet Naval Forces; the IIM, Soviet Intentions and Capabilities for Interdicting Sea Lines of Communication in a War with NATO; and in some previously classified interagency correspondence. New judgments often were initially controversial, but by the time NIE 11-15-82, Soviet Naval Strategy and Programs through the 1990s, was completed, there was general consensus in the IC about the most important capabilities and likely operations of the Soviet Navy.

“The seeds of the shift in the doctrinal development were already evident...in the Soviet classified writings dating from 1960–1962 passed clandestinely to the West by Colonel Penkovskiy.”
U.S. Developments

During the same period the United States Navy was undergoing major readjustments in size and focus. As military involvement in Vietnam was winding down, many of the Navy’s World War II ships were reaching the end of their service life. In the context of the attempt to reduce U.S. defense expenditures, Navy plans for replacing the retiring WWII era ships came under great pressure. Under the leadership of Admiral Elmo Zumwalt in the early 1970s, the U.S. Navy proposed a naval construction program controversially described as a “high-low” mix of new naval combatants. The “high-low” mix was in part an attempt to obtain a large number of new low-cost ships while retaining some fewer numbers of high capability combatants. Admiral Zumwalt’s vision was not fully implemented by his successors.
CHAPTER IV

Beginnings of Soviet Distant Naval Operations

Political Use of Sea Power in Peacetime

The changes implemented by Admiral Gorshkov resulted in not only an expanded navy that could function militarily, but also serve as an important diplomatic tool for the Soviets in the non-aligned world.

As far back as the time of Tsar Peter the Great, the Russians sought naval access to the western seas. Tsar Peter and his successors succeeded in establishing enduring control of a land outlet to the Baltic Sea, and gained control of much of the Black Sea coast through a number of wars with Turkey and its various allies. However, Russian efforts to seize non-contiguous territory in Europe had not produced lasting gains. Russian attempts to gain control of the Bosporus and Dardanelles all failed. Similarly, the Russians were thwarted in their late eighteenth and early nineteenth century efforts to gain enduring control of some islands in the Mediterranean Sea seized from Turkey and France.

In the Pacific, Tsar Alexander II sold Russian North American and Aleutian Island territories to the United States in 1867. The Russo-Japanese War cost Russia its Yellow Sea bases in China in 1905. Following territorial losses from World War I and the Russian Civil War, there were no real naval bases outside the USSR except in adjacent Finland and in China (which the Soviets voluntarily gave up in 1956) and by 1958, the sum total of bases in areas not contiguous to the USSR was zero.

“The first recorded Soviet naval activity outside fleet home waters after World War II occurred in 1953, when ships of the Soviet Navy participated in a coronation fleet review in England. In the Fifties some 20 ‘show’ visits to foreign ports. These visits were typically conducted by a Sverdlov-class light-cruiser accompanied by three or four destroyers, and most were to European countries.”

In the late 1950s, the Soviet Navy was actively establishing a naval base in the area of Valona, Albania. It had moved a submarine support ship and a squadron of submarines to the area as improvements ashore were underway. With this base

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14 See Admiral Gorshkov’s discussion of Russian naval history in his book, Sea Power of the State, pp 66–79.
16 Valona is also known as Vlone or Vlorë.
the Soviets would have their first unhindered naval access to the Mediterranean Sea for their Black Sea Fleet. The base was lost, however, as tensions between the two countries increased, and Albania broke with Moscow in 1961. In 1962 the Soviet Navy attempted to participate in the Cuban missile venture, but the imposition of the quarantine by the United States evidently foreclosed the participation of additional Soviet naval units. In the event, the intended Soviet Naval forces component of the Group of Soviet Forces Cuba, including a small combined cruiser-destroyer force, was so overshadowed by the massive size of the U.S. Navy quarantine force it never reached Cuba. It seemed clear to the analysts the Soviets did not believe their navy was ready to confront U.S. forces in the open ocean. The incident probably was a basis for the Soviet Navy to push through new and expanded shipbuilding programs after the removal of Khrushchev from office.

A 1964 policy statement by Admiral Gorshkov, the then Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, placed unprecedented emphasis on conducting long cruises, and marked the beginning of more extensive deployments. Moscow began realizing its aspirations in a modest way with the 1964 deployment of a small naval force to the Mediterranean Sea evidently capable only of maintaining itself largely at anchorages in international waters. Between 1965 and 1970 these deployments grew fivefold and were extended into the Indian Ocean, the Caribbean Sea, and West African waters.

The 1967 international crises in the Mediterranean area ushered in a new stage of Soviet naval activity. The Soviets began using their Navy to provide a military response to spontaneous crises when a client state was involved. In 1967, in 1970, and in 1973 they used surface ships and submarines in some kind of interposition operation in the Mediterranean to influence U.S. actions and show solidarity with erstwhile allies. In each case the Soviets surged extra surface combatants and submarines to join the ships already on station. Although the Soviets refrained from any hostile actions, they did keep combatants in the vicinity of U.S. forces. In the Pacific the Soviets surged several cruise missile-firing submarines and 5 to 10 surface combatants and auxiliary ships in response to the U.S. mining of North Vietnamese ports.

The National Intelligence Estimate 11-15-74, Soviet Naval Policy and Program, judged after the mid-1960s the Soviets had actively used the navy to support their economic and

As far back as the time of Tsar Peter the Great, the Russians sought naval access to the western seas.
political influence around the world. The number of annual naval visits to distant areas increased from six or less in the early 1960s to hundreds by the end of the decade. Such visits, involving a great variety of ships, became a common occurrence during the 1970s and 1980s.

NIE 11-15-74 judged regular out of area operations by the Soviet Navy were approaching their structural limits because of ship characteristics and inadequate at-sea logistic support. Indeed, NIE 11-10-79, Soviet Military Capabilities to Project Power and Influence in Distant Areas, stated the size of the Soviet Naval force in the Mediterranean had declined slightly during the period 1974–1979. Estimates in the early 1980s predicted improvements in capabilities for distant operations, if not in numbers of ships involved, but certainly by the impact of a new class of aircraft carrier, then under construction, when it became available sometime in the latter part of the decade or during the 1990s.

Despite the limitations of the capabilities of its navy, the Soviets continued to use it in support of military operations involving clients such as Angola, Somalia and Ethiopia during the 1970s. Support to clients often included agreements to use ports and some facilities ashore. The Soviets did not succeed in gaining a real base ashore in a non-conflict zone, however, until they began using and improving the facilities at Cam Ranh, Vietnam about 1980. By 1984 the Soviet Navy had a major presence of ships, submarines, and naval aviation supported by naval auxiliary ships and shore facilities in Vietnam with a more predictable, but independently minded, client.19

NIE 11-15-82 and NIE 11-15-85, Soviet Naval Strategy and Programs through the 1990s, contain sections about distant naval operations short of war with the main naval powers. The major changes in Soviet posture followed construction of ships better suited to the mission. The estimates judged the Soviet use of naval diplomacy and power projection would increase during the 1980s and 1990s.20 The 1980 Soviet Law of the Sea treaty negotiating instructions show the Soviets had changed their attitude about naval use of world oceans in two decades from one seeking to restrict Western naval access to one of virtually unconstrained transit of naval ships and aircraft.”21

19 NIE 11-15-82 and NIE 11-15-85 contain sections about distant operations short of war with the main naval powers. The major changes in Soviet posture followed construction of ships better suited to the mission. Those Estimates judge the use of naval diplomacy and power projection would increase in the 1980s and 1990s. See pp 5–6 of the key judgments of NIE 11-15-84.
20 Ibid NIE 11-15-84.
21 See NIE 11-15-84, Soviet Naval Strategy and Programs Through the 1990s, Key Judgments, pp 5–7.
An Overview of the Growth of the Soviet Navy

BY DAVID F. WINKLER, PH.D.

Devastated by the Germans and restricted to supporting land operations during World War II, the Soviet Navy could muster no challenge even to a greatly reduced postwar U.S. Navy. In presentations to the President and Congress, Vice Adm. Forrest P. Sherman noted that the 700 to 800 ships the Soviet Navy possessed were “of low combat value except for submarines and motor torpedo boats.”¹ The Soviets also faced an ongoing internal struggle over their employment of naval forces and the types of forces to deploy. With origins long predating World War II, the struggle pitted “old school” officers favoring a traditional Mahanian battle fleet against a “young school” that argued for a Navy with a guerre de course strategy centered on submarines, light surface ships, and aircraft.²

Learning from World War II and noting how the United States deployed its fleets to support its foreign policy, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin selected a modified old school approach. He wanted a big navy, capable of deterring Western sea powers from employing their maritime supremacy. Stalin’s proposed force structure combined elements of the young school strategy with a “fortress fleet” of craft and shore-based elements designed to provide coastal defense. There would also be a “fleet in being” to form the foundation of a blue water navy centered on aircraft carriers. American naval actions off Korea at the start of the Korean

²Robert W. Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy: Fifty Years of Theory and Practice (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1968), 9, 21-22.
War only reinforced Stalin’s conviction that the USSR needed a large ocean-going navy. The Soviet leader pushed forward a large construction program that began producing cruisers and fast destroyers at about the time of his death in 1953.3

After Stalin’s death, plans for the large Navy also died. The Soviet Union’s top security nightmare was surprise attack by Strategic Air Command bombers, and the new leadership shifted resources to improve air defenses and build up the USSR’s own strategic forces. The Soviets curtailed large surface ship construction and concentrated instead on submarines, light surface craft, and land-based naval aviation. While the shift marked an apparent victory for the “young school,” the dearth of resources allocated by the Kremlin made implementing even the envisioned lighter force structure a challenge.

Years later, Soviet Navy Commander in Chief Admiral Sergey G. Gorshkov wrote that with the development of atomic weapons, influential authorities believed that the Navy had completely lost its value as a branch of the armed services. Future wars could be fought without Navy participation. With such a mindset, the Soviets allowed the navies of the United States and the western alliance to steam uncontested on the world’s oceans through the end of the 1950s.4

Then on 20 July 1960, the submarine George Washington fired a ballistic missile from under Atlantic waters off Cape Canaveral. The imminent deployment posed by Polaris missiles on board American nuclear-powered submarines was a threat that the Soviets were unprepared to handle. The new mobile undersea strategic missile bases were simply beyond the reach of the Soviet submarines, warships, and land-based aviation that had been amassed to counter the nuclear threat from the new big-deck carriers being commissioned by the United States Navy.5

Facing this new threat, Adm. Sergey G. Gorshkov began a deliberate campaign to urge Nikita Khrushchev to reverse his naval outlook. As of January 1960, the Soviet leader still retained his view that the surface ships had a diminished role in the modern Soviet Navy. Gorshkov first succeeded in preventing the scrapping of the Sverdlov-class cruisers built as part of Stalin’s postwar shipbuilding program. In 1960 and 1961, additional reassessments of naval strategy apparently took place within the Kremlin leadership. By the spring of 1962, the conversion had almost been completed as Khrushchev toured a Leningrad shipyard and praised the work on new surface ships under construction.6

If Khrushchev had any doubts of the value of a strong blue water Navy, they evaporated after the Cuban Missile Crisis. After the conclusion of the crisis, Khrushchev reportedly summoned Admiral Gorshkov. The soon-to-be-deposed Ukrainian told his navy chief that neither he nor any successor should ever have to back down again in such a situation. Gorshkov assured his leader that plans were being implemented to prevent a repetition of such humiliation in the future.7 Gorshkov had reason to offer such reassurance. Soviet shipyards were beginning to produce the type of warships

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3 Ibid., 59-61, 63-65.
7 As told to then Secretary of the Navy John Warner by Gorshkov during the 1972 Moscow summit. John W. Warner, interview by Thomas B. Allen, 6 June 1989. Interview provided by Allen.
that could be deployed away from home waters. Late in 1962, the Soviets completed the first of four Kynda-class cruisers. Armed with large deck canisters containing SS-N-3 anti-ship cruise missiles, this first modern Russian warship class displaced 5,500 tons fully loaded. Early in the following year, the Kynda was joined by another revolutionary ship class: the Kashin. Featuring a gas turbine propulsion plant over a decade before any American warships did, the Kashin offered high speed and an ability to get underway at the flick of a switch. These sleek warships packed an intimidating array of sensors and weapon systems, some modified to carry the SS-N-2 Styx surface-to-surface missile. With the addition of these modern warships to a fleet that already held an inventory of fourteen Sverdlov-class light gun cruisers completed during the Stalin shipbuilding program, plus assorted conventional destroyers and frigates, Admiral Gorshkov finally could begin to challenge western supremacy on the high seas.9

“Could the Soviet Union agree to the age-old dominance on seas and oceans of the world by western maritime powers, especially in conditions which allow the extension of these areas as nuclear launch platforms? Of course not!” wrote the Soviet Navy Commander-in-Chief. To demonstrate their developing naval capabilities, the Soviets conducted two massive global OKEAN naval exercises in 1970 and then in 1975.

Soviet submarines remained a major concern to the Americans three decades after the struggle in the North Atlantic against German U-boats. The Soviets had always maintained a large undersea fleet. By the early 1970s, that fleet was composed of both conventional diesel-electric and nuclear-propelled classes. In addition to launching torpedoes, many of the newer Soviet submarines could fire missiles at surface ships. While some, such as the Juliett and Echo II classes, had to surface to fire their missile salvos, the Charlie-class could launch its anti-ship missiles from below the surface.10 Newer classes of surface warships entering the Soviet naval inventory compounded the problem. The Kresta and Kara classes, typifying the new-construction Soviet warships, bristled with weapons and electronic sensors and were increasingly seen on the world’s oceans. Meanwhile, shore-based Soviet naval aviation aircraft carrying long-range air-to-ship missiles posed another threat. Under Gorshkov, the submarine remained the capital ship in the naval inventory for countering American submarine and surface forces. However, to complement Soviet submarine deployments and contribute to the hunt for American ballistic-missile…Soviet naval deployments would eventually cover all areas of the globe—including the Caribbean. The Cold War at sea entered a new era.”

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10 Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, 72, 74, 76.
submarines, Gorshkov ordered his growing surface fleet away from home waters. The need to deploy to the Mediterranean became a major priority, given the American deployment of Polaris missile submarines into this basin beginning in 1963. Despite relative inexperience, lack of training, and logistical difficulties, by mid-1964 Soviet warships had established a continual presence in the Mediterranean Sea that would only grow larger. Soviet naval units also ventured farther out into the Atlantic and Pacific. As additional modern combatants joined the fleet, Soviet naval deployments would eventually cover all areas of the globe—including the Caribbean. The Cold War at sea entered a new era. 11

U.S. naval leaders agreed that maintaining the North Atlantic SLOCs was a critical mission and practiced for that contingency in exercises such as Northern Wedding. However, they thought that the Navy could do more than reenact World War II’s Battle of the North Atlantic to help stem the Red Army push in Central Europe. Besides, there were indicators that the Soviet naval strategy was shifting away from the sea denial mission that the Nazis had pursued three decades earlier.

With the commissioning of Delta-class ballistic missile submarines in the 1970s with 4,000-mile-range SS-N-8 ballistic missiles, the Soviet strategic submarine force did not need to venture past the ASW chokepoints constructed by the United States and its allies along the northeastern rim of the Atlantic and the northwestern rim of the Pacific. Since the Deltas could launch ballistic missile attacks from the Barents Sea or the Sea of Okhotsk, Western analysts speculated that the Soviets were configuring their fleet to complement a strategy that would establish and protect Soviet SSBN bastions.12

In retrospect, the indicators were obvious. Whereas Soviet ships built in the 1960s such as the Kynda, Kresta I, and Kashin-classes featured anti-ship missiles as a component of their main batteries, the Kresta II, Kara, Krivak, and Kiev-classes of the 1970s were armed with antisubmarine missiles for use against American SSNs. 13 Analysts did not immediately recognize the Soviet shift because of an intelligence blunder that classified the main missile carried by Kresta II and Kara-class cruisers and Krivak-class destroyers as an anti-ship missile. One intelligence officer noted that the Soviets had classified the Kresta II and Kara as large ASW ships, “but we simply did not believe them.” 14 By 1975, Western intelligence analysts had finally begun to conclude that the Kresta II, Kara, and Krivak-classes indeed had an ASW mission. The same was true of the Kiev when this ship became operational in 1976. The largest Soviet surface warship built to date, featuring an angled flight deck that initially carried helicopters and later could operate vertical/short take-off and landing (VSTOL) jet aircraft, the Kiev was seen by Western naval analysts as a first step in challenging Western carrier and air power dominance on the high seas. When the Soviets declared that the ship was a “large aircraft carrying cruiser,” analysts simply saw that as a ploy to get her legally through the Dardanelles to conform to the Montreux Convention, which forbade the transit of aircraft carriers through the strait. However, with her complement of KA-25 Hormone helicopters and assorted ASW weaponry, the Kiev also had an ASW mission. 15

After 1975, the Soviets conducted no more OKEAN global fleet exercises to practice delivering a crippling blow to Western naval forces in a coordinated, devastating strike. By the late 1970s, analysts had begun speculating about a new Soviet bastion strategy, and U.S. naval leaders had to account for this trend in their calculus on how to use the fleet if war broke out. 16 U.S. Navy operational commanders reacted. In the Pacific, during his tenure as Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, from 1977 to 1978, Adm. Thomas B. Hayward developed a “Sea Strike Project” that envisioned Pacific Fleet units conducting offensive actions against the eastern Soviet Union. In the 1980s the Soviet Navy continued to grow in size and capability, but was challenged by a reinvestment in American sea power by the Reagan administration that aimed for a 600 ship navy to execute a “Maritime Strategy.” In the late 1980s, recognizing that a naval arms race was hurtful to the Soviet economy, Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachov took a less confrontational approach to the western alliance with “Glasnost.” This easing of relations and the subsequent breakup of the Soviet Union, effectively eliminated the Russian Navy as a serious threat to the United States for nearly two decades. Today, the Russian Navy is again demonstrating a blue water capability but still remains far less capable than its Cold War predecessor.

15 For a critique of the Kiev emphasizing her role as an aircraft carrier, see Polmar, Soviet Naval Power, 53-54.

Excerpted from Dr. Winkler’s dissertation. Cold War At Sea (American University, 1998) to be republished in December by the Naval Institute Press under the title Incidents At Sea: Confrontations and Cooperation between the United States, Russia, and China, 1946–2016.
Key Events During the Cold War

**1950**

- 1953: Stalin dies
- 1953: Khrushchev becomes General Secretary

**1956**

- Hungarian Revolution
  - “We will bury you”

**1957**

- Sputnik launched

**1960**

- 1962: Cuban Missile Crisis
- 1964: Gulf of Tonkin Resolution

**1961**

- Construction of Berlin Wall

**1963**

- Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

**1964**

- Brezhnev becomes First Secretary

**1968**

- Prague Spring
1970

1972
Nixon to China

1974
Nixon resigns

1979
U.S. Embassy in Tehran seized

1980

1979
SALT and ABM Treaties

1974
Saigon falls

1973
USSR invades Afghanistan

1983
Able Archer war scare

1989
Berlin Wall falls
Catalog of Documents and Summaries

Finished Intelligence,
Clandestine Reporting, and Other Sources

This catalog contains a list and summaries of the declassified clandestine source reports and finished intelligence publications by chapter. There are also memoranda between the CIA and NSC officials, with officials from policy-making agencies and departments, as well as within the Intelligence Community. The documents are generally arrayed chronologically, according to the dates of dissemination within the IC, not the dates of publication by the Soviets, which sometimes were years earlier. For every newly-released document in the catalog there is some commentary describing the background and substance of the clandestine report or the analysis. In some cases, there are additional comments, pertaining to customer comments, for example, describing the impact on U.S. policy, or some context for a clandestine report.
A Note about Translating Soviet Military Ranks and Naval Terminology to English

Much of the text in this section is from the foreword to “Essential Facts of the Penkovskiy Case,” from Deputy Director for Plans, Richard Helms, CIA/DP Memorandum for the DCI, 31 May 1963.

Soviet military ranks, “general-mayor and general-leytenant,” are one-star and two-star ranks respectively. To avoid confusion with U.S. military ranks, they are not translated.

The Soviet term, “front,” approximates a Western army group plus an air army in support. It is underlined to avoid confusion with the usual U.S. military term, front, meaning forward area or front line.

Similarly it is not always possible to find precise English synonyms for the military nomenclature used by Soviet naval writers. Even the Soviet authors themselves do not always agree on the precise meaning and scope of coverage of some military terms. Moreover, the conceptual scope of these Soviet terms differs from seemingly similar U.S. terms, as shown in the following highly simplified diagram:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Soviet</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grand Strategy</td>
<td>Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategy</td>
<td>Operational Art</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tactics</td>
<td>Tactics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The term military science had been defined in the USSR as “a unified system of knowledge on preparing and conducting armed struggle in the interests of defending the socialist fatherland against imperialist aggression...It studied armament and technology, working out the most effective methods and forms of armed struggle, the basic principles in organizing the army and navy, and the training and upbringing of the armed forces personnel. It also took into account and studied economics and moral, political, and military capabilities of the imperialist aggressors.”

In November 1961, Minister of Defense Malinovskiy used the term doctrine to refer to the “theses” he enunciated in his speech before the Twenty-Second Party Congress.

Malinovskiy established a new trend in the use of this term, and subsequent Soviet commentators attempted to use the term in a similar manner. Another Soviet definition from the same period is the term military doctrine, defined as embracing “unified principled views of a guiding nature, touching on the nature and aims of a possible war, the basic problems of preparing the country and the people for repelling an imperialist aggression, and the basic problems of organizing and consolidating the combat power of the USSR armed forces and their utilization in war.”

The CIA translations of Soviet military terminology conform as nearly as possible to U.S. practice, as follows:

- **Grand military strategy** is the science and art of employing all of the armed forces to achieve national objectives.
- **Strategy** embraces all phases of planning, disposition, and general employment of armed forces preliminary to their contact with an enemy force. This term is similar to, although less broad in scope than, the Soviet term operational art.
- **Strategic defense** includes strategic planning directed toward attaining national objectives and the use of armed forces in the large-scale or over-all defense of the country by preventing or repulsing attacks by the enemy’s armed forces.
- **Mission** is the major continuing duty assigned to naval, air, or ground forces as their part in strategic defense.
- **Task** is a definite, usually operational, objective assigned to a unit or group of units within the naval, air, or ground forces.
- **Doctrine** refers to officially formulated and accepted principles for conducting military operations or principles intended or proposed by military theorists for the future conduct of naval combat.
- **Tactics** denote the maneuvering of forces during combat.
The documents included in this collection showcase a range of topics from the mundane to reports on Soviet submarines and the introduction of nuclear propulsion and nuclear armed missiles, and represent a variety of types of intelligence products. They tell the story of the movement of the Clandestine Service from modest beginnings to increasing accomplishment, and the expansion of DI military analysis to cover Soviet military capabilities, intentions, and threat.

The collection also highlights internal debates about roles and doctrine. Included are documents Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy provided containing articles in the debate among the Soviet high-ranking military officers conducted during the period 1960–62. The debate centered on the role of and doctrine for nuclear weapons and missiles in a war with NATO in Europe, including the role of the navy in a future war. The collection includes articles by both sides in the debate, some of which directly attack positions taken by other officers in articles appearing in the special collection of top secret and secret Military Thought issues. The editors have included several Military Thought articles that do not primarily address naval issues, but describe a strategy that would seem to exclude or reduce the role of naval forces to which naval officers responded.

Other documents include information and documents provided by clandestine sources, finished intelligence analysis documents, and estimates of the Soviet naval forces, their capabilities, doctrine, strategy, and intentions relevant to the evolution of Soviet naval operations in areas distant from the USSR. The collection also shows the long-term utility of intelligence information in formulating analysis; a number of documents depict discussions of future Soviet naval strategy, operations, and tactics during the 1970s and beyond that were clandestinely obtained by CIA during the period following the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia through the first half of the 1980s. Documents such as the Military Thought articles—many previously released—remained valuable for years because of the nature of the classified discussions on such topics as the initial period of war, naval doctrine, and the role of surface vessels, submarines and air defense forces in various warfare situations. As a collection such documents formed the basis of the watershed estimate of Soviet naval operations and strategy presented in NIE 11-14-79. Also important are the analyses of Soviet antisubmarine warfare strategy, the readiness of Soviet forces, and interdiction of the sea lines of communications (SLOCs), some of which were controversial in the intelligence community.

As additional context for the reader, CIA participation in the collection and production of intelligence in the 1950s was constrained by NSCIDs. See NSCID No. 1 (revised), Duties and Responsibilities, 28 March 1952; NSCID No. 2, Coordination of Collection Activities Abroad, 13 January 1948; NSCID No. 3, Coordination of Intelligence Production for details about the responsibilities of the CIA and other IC entities. These NSCIDs limited the role of CIA to economic and scientific collection and analysis, and directed the military services to provide military intelligence. The revised version of NSCID No. 3, Coordination of Intelligence Production, 21 April 1958, broadened the areas about which the CIA could produce intelligence to include military intelligence.
Catalog

Soviet Naval Arsenals, CIA/DP Information Report, 7 September 1954
This reporting provides limited information about two possible naval support installations in the USSR.

Alleged New Type of Soviet Submarine, CIA/DP Information Report, 10 August 1955
This reporting contains second-hand information and rumors about a new submarine that reportedly could operate to a depth of 400 meters, where it was believed it could not be detected by aircraft and was secure from depth charges.

(1) Conversion of Soviet Naval Vessels to Nuclear Propulsion and Missile Weapons, (2) Operational Status of Soviet Atomic Submarine, CIA/DP Intelligence Information Report, 20 June 1957
This reporting provides second-hand information claiming nuclear-powered submarines and surface vessels were being built in the USSR and one nuclear-powered submarine was in operation. The source reported he believed an official announcement had been made stating that Soviet ships were to convert to nuclear systems and missiles.

This reporting relates information from an unidentified Soviet naval officer claiming he had been sent to Leningrad in 1957 to accept a nuclear submarine, which was one of a series in production.

The article discusses the combat goal of disorganizing and destroying U.S. capability to support a nuclear war and its capabilities for nuclear attack. The author looks at missions naval and aviation forces could accomplish. They include the strategic mission of destroying enemy transport and other ships carrying wartime supplies of weapons, delivery systems, forces and fuel, a portion of which he believes would probably be dispersed at sea at the beginning of a war. He believes the strategic missile troops were not yet ready to accomplish these missions effectively, but that it was a mission the navy and aviation could accomplish.

Babadzhanyan reviews the positions on the nature of modern war taken by five Soviet general officers in articles published in the special collection of top secret Military Thought issues during the period 1960–1961. (Editors’ note: For the Five Generals’ articles see Goryainov, 1960; Gastilovich and Tolkonyuk, 1960; Tolkonyuk, 1960, Baskakov, 1960; Kurochkin, 1960) Babadzhanyan contests the views of Gastilovich et al on the singularly decisive nature of nuclear weapons in modern warfare, but he sees merit in the arguments of General Kurochkin who seeks a more balanced mix of missile and ground forces.

The article illustrates the continuing interest in changing naval strategy and doctrine long after the death of Stalin. Admiral Tributs expresses support for Marshal Malinovskiy’s decision to establish the special collection of Military Thought to develop a new theory of military art and to close the gap in developing a unified view on waging nuclear war. He singles out the period of threat and the initial period of war as the most important military problems needing solutions. He disagrees with the authors appearing in the special collection of Military Thought who assert war could begin suddenly and a period of threat would not occur under modern conditions. He declares the period of threat will always occur but its duration could be extremely short. He disagrees with those who assert preparations for a surprise attack against the Soviet Union could not be detected and agrees there would be warning sufficient to allow for preparations and readiness of all forces. His list of indications of an imminent threat include: sociopolitical, economic, mobilization, and military measures, as well as defensive measures undertaken by the populous and the military preparations for combat operations. He emphasizes the importance of increased intelligence collection to ensure ample warning and to prepare naval and other forces to defeat an initial attack. He concludes with a critique of Colonel General Gastilovich’s Military Thought article that disparages the use of naval forces to defeat enemy amphibious landings along the coastal front. Admiral Tributs asserts that the best defense against seaborne invasions is before they reach

The article is critical of Admiral V. Platonov’s article, *The Missions of the Navy and Methods of Carrying Them Out.* (Editors’ note: See Platonov, 1961.) The author questions several of Platonov’s propositions about naval operations in a future war. For example, he believes there is no basis for Platonov’s assertion that enemy carrier groups would operate mainly on the open sea. He cites Western military specialists, NATO command, and numerous U.S. and NATO exercises carried out by joint naval forces to demonstrate the ability of carrier groups to maneuver in small areas and cover large distances in minimum time.

He also believes the enemy would not choose to operate carrier groups in coastal waters. He disputes Platonov’s idea that carrier groups should provide cover for convoys or be part of a complement of hunter-killer groups of antisubmarine defenses in remote areas. He disagrees with Platonov on his low evaluation of the long-range possibilities of nuclear-armed aircraft because their range is insufficient at low altitudes, which Platonov claims will impede their use in distant areas of the ocean. He agrees, however, with Platonov on the threat from enemy nuclear-armed submarines and the Soviet “less than perfect” capability to defeat them. He believes it is wrong to rely solely on a single weapon. Instead he suggests using an array of weapons to defeat the submarines and employing nuclear-armed aircraft alone only in an emergency. He disagrees with Platonov’s opinion that there is no other way to defeat submarines and with Platonov’s pessimistic evaluation of the capability of Soviet naval aviation to detect submarines. He believes the technology for detecting submarines and flight ranges at low altitudes had improved. His solution to the problem is to improve the ability to detect submarines and an array of weapons to attack them.


This author agrees with the thesis espoused by the ‘modernist’ Khrushchev group in the special collection of *Military Thought* articles. The thesis claims the initial period of war would be characterized by nuclear-missile attacks by both sides; the strikes would set the operational-strategic situation in the theaters of military operations and determine the tasks facing the maritime fronts. The author differentiates between ICBM attacks and those carried out in a theater of military operations. The naval missile fleets would participate in the latter case with their forces forming the basis of the strategic offensive in the theaters of military operations. He believes a thorough examination of all aspects of the concept, including the makeup of the forces and the expected results are necessary to correctly plan the maritime-axis front operation. The remainder of the article contains his analysis of the elements for, and the planning of, such an operation. (Editors’ note: The articles mentioned in the text and in the footnotes of this article are in order of appearance: Gorbatov, 1960; Gusakovskiy, 1960; Babadzhanyam, 1961; Field Service Regulations, 1959; Malikhin, 1960; Ivanov, 1961; Kastonov, 1960)

**Cuba 1962: Khrushchev’s Miscalculated Risk**, CIA/DI/ORR Staff Study, 13 February 1964

This is one of the definitive CIA analyses of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis conducted immediately following the agreement by Khrushchev to remove the missiles from Cuba in 1962. Part One, Section IV contains evidence concerning the nature, scope and timing of the Soviet naval buildup in Cuba and the implications of that evidence.

**Leningrad Enters Nuclear Submarine Program with New Attack Class**, CIA/DI/OSR Intelligence Report, 1 May 1968

This report merges theoretical information about naval strategy found in the 1960–62 Soviet top secret special collection of *Military Thought* articles with other evidence about submarine production. It describes the increased Soviet efforts to produce nuclear-powered submarines in larger numbers and states the program reflects the expanded role of the Navy in strategic offense and in defense against western naval forces.

**The Soviet Y-Class Submarine Construction Program**, CIA/DI/OSR Intelligence Report, October 1968

The report states that the production of this submarine at the Severodvinsk shipyard probably will reach a level of six per year by 1969 because of new construction techniques. The paper also reports that Y-class submarines may be under construction in the Soviet Far East. The paper predicts that the tempo of construction at Severodvinsk could result in a fleet of nearly 35 submarines by 1974 and that the program could enable this goal a year sooner.

**The Soviet Mediterranean Squadron**, CIA/DI/OSR Intelligence Report, December 1968

This report provides intelligence on expanded Soviet distant naval operations after the publication of NIE 11–6-67. It provides more documentation and a broader assessment of Soviet intentions for, and capabilities of, the growth of distant operations of the Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean following the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War.
The OSR contribution examines Soviet capabilities against submarines, carrier task forces and Sea Lines of Communications. OSR also scrutinized Soviet “forward posture” capabilities and that of East European naval forces. An annex covers Warsaw Pact general purpose naval forces, Soviet general purpose large combatant ships; Soviet general purpose naval air forces and Eastern European naval strength at midyear 1969. OSR concludes that the Soviets had pressed forward with a number of maritime programs and had emerged as one of the major maritime nations. For example, since 1945 the Soviet navy’s missions had extended beyond coastal defense, support of theater forces and anti-shipping operations. The emphasis had changed to defense against U.S. carrier and ballistic missile submarine forces and to strengthening Soviet strategic strike capability. Moscow also had increased the use of its naval forces for political ends, notably in the Mediterranean. The analysts estimated that the Soviet Navy’s missions would not change appreciably during the 1970s, assessing that Moscow would continue increasing its capabilities for long-range operations. For example, OSR reported the Soviet merchant marine had trebled its tonnage since 1959; and its fishing fleet was one of the world’s largest, ranking third in fish catch. The analysts concluded that the USSR had a large oceanographic fleet comparable to that of the United States, but that its research activities fell behind Western work in some qualitative aspects. OSR predicted that the Soviets would continue their efforts on undersea warfare, development of fisheries and would devote increasing attention to exploring the mineral resources of the sea.

The Soviet Attack Submarine Force: Evolution and Operations, CIA/DI/OSR Intelligence Memorandum, 1 September 1971
The memorandum traces the evolution in the missions of the Soviet attack submarine force during the period 1950–71 and describes the various classes of attack submarines the Soviets had built. It briefly describes the operations and capabilities of the force and speculates about trends in force composition, capabilities, and operations. An annex contains the characteristics of Soviet attack submarines.

The Soviet Naval Cruise Missile Force: Development and Operational Employment, CIA/DI/OSR Intelligence Report, 1 December 1971
The report provides the history behind the Soviet decision in the 1950s to build cruise missiles to counter the threat posed by Western aircraft carriers. It describes the acceleration in Soviet development of cruise missile forces beginning in the mid-1960s, discusses the Soviet cruise missiles and their missions in the Soviet Navy in 1971, and describes projected cruise missile force levels for 1975.

The Uses of Soviet Military Power in Distant Areas Annexes A through I, 15 December 1971
Tied to NIE 11-10-71, these annexes provide detailed information regarding specific Soviet military capabilities and logistics in areas such as the Indian Ocean, Mediterranean, and western Africa, as well as information on basing arrangements and airlift capabilities.

Soviet Capabilities to Counter U.S. Aircraft Carriers, CIA/DI/OSR Intelligence Report, 1 May 1972
The report reviews the history of the Soviet naval forces designed specifically to counter Western aircraft carriers beginning in the mid-1950s with the Soviet decision to concentrate on cruise missiles as the weapon best suited to counter the threat. The report describes how those capabilities continued to grow through the 1960s as the Soviet naval operations expanded beyond their coastal waters and they recognized the need to protect their deployed naval forces from the carrier-based air power. It discusses how the cruise missiles became the main armament on Soviet submarines, aircraft, and surface ships designed to combat Western surface forces. Finally, the report describes the Soviet response to the U.S. carrier threat, tracing the development of the anti-carrier forces, describing their operations, and examining recent improvements in these forces.

Soviet Antisubmarine Warfare: Current Capabilities and Priorities, CIA/DI/OSR and DST/Office of Scientific Intelligence, Intelligence Report, 1 September 1972
The report examines the evolution of attack submarines beginning with WW I, when they emerged as a serious threat to surface ships, through the advent of ballistic missile submarines that radically altered the dimensions of the ASW problem for the Soviets. It describes the first Soviet efforts in open ocean ASW coinciding with the post–WW II venture of the Soviet Navy from coastal waters onto the high seas and its subsequent development of ASW defenses. The report then examines the Soviet response to the emergence of the U.S. nuclear-attack submarine in the late 1950s that increased Moscow’s longstanding concern for the security of its coastal areas, and examines Soviet efforts to develop ASW defenses in coastal areas as well as on the open ocean. The report judges that by the mid-1960s the Soviets probably had enough experience to realize that their conventional naval forces could not solve the problem of the Polaris submarine. This report then evaluates the spectrum of Soviet ASW operations, including early-1970s ASW methods, the ships and aircraft employed, and the organization and command and control of Soviet ASW forces.

The article discusses the use of amphibious aircraft and surface-effect vehicles in antisubmarine warfare. The author describes new developments for detecting submarines, emphasizing sound-ranging and underwater surveillance. Along with standard antisubmarine weapons, the author mentions a remote-controlled torpedo directed from helicopters operating either from shore or off helicopter carriers.


The article addresses identifying patrol areas of enemy nuclear missile submarines, determining effective search methods and the best methods to attack them. The author is most concerned with locating and identifying Polaris submarines in peacetime rather than waiting for a crisis or the outbreak of war. He assumes U.S. missiles are ready for launch within 15 minutes and are not limited to specific launch areas. He recommends establishing zonal defenses to locate Polaris submarines and “explosive signaling for communications relay” to hunter-killer submarines. (Editors’ note: Rear Admiral Gonchar believed that Soviet antisubmarine submarines must carry out searches for the enemy [Polaris SSBNs] at “great depths (130 to 240 meters).” He proposed using a relay submarine operating at a depth consistent with current radio frequency propagation wherein the relay submarine receives the long distance radio commands and converts them to a combination of small explosions in accordance with a specific previously established signal. The explosives are to be set to activate near the floor of the underwater sound channel with consequent propagation of the simple message over as much as several thousand kilometers.)

Soviet Naval Shipbuilding Programs: Impact on Major Surface Forces, CIA/DI/OSR Intelligence Report, 1 November 1973

The report describes the Soviet program to construct new major surface combatants and to modernize some older types and the growing problem of obsolescence affecting many of the ships in the 1973 force. For example, in late 1973 the Soviets had over a dozen new surface combatants under construction including two VSTOL aircraft carriers, four frigates, at least seven destroyers, and probably a few ocean escorts. The Soviets also had programs to improve antisubmarine, air defense, and probably anti-ship systems on destroyers and to install improved antisubmarine systems on ocean escorts. Programs to modernize older combatants, some of which were built in the early 1950s, included the conversion of two cruisers to command ships and the addition of surface-to-air missiles to a number of destroyers. The report judges that to maintain the size of the force would require either an increase in new construction substantially above 1973 levels or retaining aging ships of doubtful combat effectiveness. Subsequent events showed the Soviets had accepted some reduction in the size of the forces while deploying fewer, but relatively more capable, surface ships.


The article characterizes Soviet forces as generally capable of assisting in operations against enemy missile submarines and makes recommendations for improving these capabilities. The author disagrees with the thesis of Colonel G. Lebedev in his article appearing in *Military Thought*, Issue No. 1, 1965 that long-range aviation can combat missile submarines. He rules out long-range as a significant element in antisubmarine warfare, but builds a case for upgrading other antisubmarine warfare aircraft forces and equipment. He advises Soviet forces to carry out preemptive attacks against missile submarines or destroy them after only a few of their missiles have been launched. (Editors’ Note: The article by Colonel G. Lebedev mentioned on page one of this article has not been found in the CIA archives.)


The article examines possibilities for using tactical rockets against naval targets. The author looks at the possibility of using four rockets with ranges of 65 to 500 kilometers with yields of 10 to 500 kilotons against probable naval targets such as enemy nuclear attack capabilities, carrier strike forces, and amphibious landing forces.


The article discusses the necessity of creating a reliable system for controlling combined Warsaw Pact naval actions. It recommends expanding the system of communications among the allies’ naval command posts, adopting more sophisticated equipment, and establishing communications.
among computer centers. The article also recommends introducing unified planning and measures to detect and maintain surveillance of enemy groups, using the U.S. Sixth Fleet as an example because it enters the Black Sea several times a year.

**Soviet Naval Strategy: Concepts and Forces for Theater War against NATO, CIA/DI/OSR Intelligence Report, January 1975**

Based mainly on classified and open-source Soviet naval writings, the author concludes: Soviet naval strategists as of 1975 had become more flexible in their view of the possible course of development of a theater war with NATO. Likely future developments in Soviet naval strategy for theater war with NATO would include greater emphasis on open-ocean ASW, greater use of submarine launched ballistic missiles, and the development of increased capabilities for conventional war.

**“Certain Problems in the Coordination of Large Units and Units of Allied Navies in Combined Tactical Exercises,” by Rear Admiral V. Saakyan, Information Collection of the Headquarters and the Technical Committee of the Combined Armed Forces, published by Warsaw Pact Headquarters, Moscow, secret issue No. 5, 1973, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 24 February 1975**

The article examines a ground forces offensive operation on a coastal axis requiring support of naval forces. It enumerates specific tasks to be accomplished by the navy: destroying enemy naval forces, conducting amphibious landings, anti-landing defense, disrupting enemy SLOCs. He emphasizes the importance of close and well-organized cooperation and careful coordination of actions to achieve success. The article lists measures requiring cooperation and gives specific attention to coordinating the efforts of troops in delivering the initial massed strike.

**“Tasks to be Accomplished by the Navy when Assisting Ground Forces Attacking on a Coastal Axis,” by Vice Admiral V. Em, Information Collection of the Headquarters and the Technical Committee of the Combined Armed Forces, secret issue No. 5 1973, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 2 August 1976**

The article examines the role of Soviet attack carriers and the development of reconnaissance capabilities for ships and aircraft. The authors discuss the problems ships have in assessing U.S. capabilities for carrying out a surprise nuclear strike and Soviet capabilities and difficulties in detecting enemy strike preparations. They explain that the main
reconnaissance indicators of U.S. preparations for a surprise nuclear attack are to be developed by carrier task forces at sea and could involve the movement of forces from the U.S. mainland to various parts of the globe or the activation of the Sixth and Seventh Fleets, the replenishment of supplies, increase in combat readiness, and alerts transmitted by radio.

“Certain Problems of Superiority at Sea under Conditions of Closed Naval Theaters,” by Vice Admiral V. Em, Deputy Minister of National Defense, commander of the Navy of the German Democratic Republic, Information Collection of the Headquarters and the Technical Committee of the Combined Armed Forces, secret issue No. 11, 1976, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 29 June 1977

The article discusses the capabilities of naval forces for gaining superiority at sea in a closed naval theater. He explains that the prerequisites and tasks for gaining superiority require the massive use of ship strike forces and aircraft. He proposes ways of preventing the buildup of enemy forces once superiority has been gained to retain superiority at sea.


This is a translation from Russia of an apparent draft of an undated top secret Soviet Academy-level text or a lecture. It provides an overview of Soviet thinking on the content, planning and conduct of strategic operations in the western theater. The front is considered the basic force operating in a continental theater in conjunction with strategic rocket forces, long-range aviation, air defense forces, and the navy under the overall leadership of the Supreme High Command. A strategic operation may include both nuclear and non-nuclear offensive actions. The defense is considered a legitimate action of a forced, temporary nature. The majority of the document is devoted to measures for restoring combat effectiveness and resuming the offensive following an exchange of nuclear strikes, and to a strategic offensive begun with conventional weapons.


The author describes the functions, organization, and procedures of rear services support of naval forces under conditions of a closed theater of naval operations. He explains the need for cooperation with the rear services of other armed forces branches, in this case with the ground forces operating on the coastal axis. He also explains several features characteristic of coastal theaters hampering or facilitating the work of the fleet rear.

The Principles of the Organization and Control of a Combined Fleet in a Theater, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 31 March 1978

The document is a draft of a secret Warsaw Pact document that examines the wartime organizational structure and system of control of the combined fleets formed in the Baltic and Black Sea theaters from the naval forces allocated to the Combined Armed Forces. The document stresses measures for cooperation among the forces of the national navies, including the use of standard documents and a common communications and observations system intended to ensure coordinated actions of the combined fleets. It lists the main tasks of the command of the combined fleets in peacetime and in wartime.


This report is the first of several reports assessing the level of resources the Soviets would likely assign to attacks on merchant shipping in a war with NATO. It also assesses Soviet capabilities for such interdiction. Major findings include: the Soviets would allocate the majority of their forces in wartime to three principal missions, strategic strike, antisubmarine warfare, and antiaircraft warfare; they would conduct selected attacks on merchant shipping over a wide arc of ocean to disperse Western naval resources; and the Soviet submarine force was not optimized for operations against Western SLOCs in the open ocean. Major limitations of Soviet submarines for the anti-SLOC role were: low operational availability and limited torpedo loads on many of the submarines, long transits from Soviet bases to the likely areas through which the SLOCs would run, and Soviet naval strike aviation had insufficient range to participate realistically on open ocean anti-SLOC operations. The report concludes the Soviets probably would allocate only a small portion, perhaps 10 percent, of their attack submarine force toward this task.

The Role of Interdiction in Soviet Naval Strategy and Operations, CIA/DI/OSR Intelligence Assessment, May 1978

This CIA Intelligence Assessment is the second of several versions addressing interdiction of Western SLOCs. Each of the succeeding versions responded to concerns expressed by the NIO for General Purpose Forces, by DCI Turner, and by various Navy components. There are, however, no significant substantive differences in the two versions. (Editor’s note: For the first pieces of CIA analysis on this topic, see “Soviet Viewpoint on Interdiction of Merchant Shipping in Wartime,” 1977)
“Regarding Size of the NATO Owned and Controlled Merchant Fleet,” Memorandum for Presidential Briefing Coordinator, from John S. Loverro, chief, International Transportation Branch, International Trade and Services Division, CIA/DI/Office of Economic Research, 29 August 1978
The memorandum questions the difference in data provided by the Naval Intelligence Support Center (NISC) on the size of the NATO-flag merchant fleet with those cited in the Intelligence Assessment, The Role of Interdiction at Sea in Soviet Naval Strategy and Operations. He further states the NISC analysts believe there is undercounting of certain ships and would like to have more precise data.

“Response to DCI Comments on SLOC Paper,” Memorandum for the DCI from OSR, 11 September 1978
This OSR memo addresses DCI Turner’s comments on the OSR intelligence memorandum preparatory to the DCI’s meeting with the Secretary of the Navy and OSR’s responses to the DCI’s comments.

SLOC Interdiction, Memorandum from the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for the Director of Central Intelligence, 12 September 1978
The memorandum includes a sequence of Memoranda about the OSR SLOC paper.

SLOC Interdiction, Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence from the Presidential Briefing Coordinator, 14 September 1978.
Two days later this memorandum suggested the DCI attach a note proposing a joint CIA-Navy study to his proposed forward for a revised study on The Role of Interdiction at Sea in Soviet Naval Strategy and Operations.

OSR addresses in detail every Navy question about the OSR assessments of Soviet intentions and capabilities to interdict NATO SLOCs.

The Soviet Attack Submarine Force and Western Sea Lines of Communication, CIA/DI/OSR Intelligence Assessment, 1 April 1979
This widely disseminated version represents the final CIA analysis of the SLOC question laid out first in an Intelligence Report on 17 February 1978. DCI Turner, in an unusual move, included a foreword to this printed version outlining some of his views on the subject. He also notes his plan to sponsor an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum (IIM) with Navy participation to assess the Soviet capabilities on a broader basis. He also stressed the Navy would be able to supply more information about possible U.S. actions in interdiction scenarios.

The article contains an overview of the basic factors involved in attaining supremacy at sea in an enclosed naval theater with the goal of supporting the coastal flanks of ground forces in the capture of straits. The author explains the various aspects of coping actively and passively with a mine threat and the need for air supremacy, support for amphibious operations, and blockade action. The article also discusses organizing for combat, combat methods, reconnaissance requirements and tasks, and coordination and control.

The article describes in general terms the organization and procedure for training conscript seamen and conscripts selected to be petty officers in the East German Navy. This training was provided on combat ships until 1970–71 when the training was switched to a training detachment with instructions taking place on a training brigade of ships and craft. The duration, nature, and content of the training are described only in general terms.

Naval deployments to areas outside the USSR’s home waters in 1978 were slightly higher than in 1977 but below the peak of 1974, when Soviet ships were involved in mine-clearing and salvage operations in Bangladesh and the Suez Canal, and the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron had access to facilities in Egypt. Although the level of deployments remained relatively constant, there were fluctuations in the number of ships deployed to particular regions. The high levels of naval activity during the first 3 months of 1979 almost guarantee that total Soviet ship-days in distant areas would increase slightly once again. When measured against the terms of either operational capability or potential political impact, the Soviet naval presence was expected to be more significant than in the past.

Warsaw Pact Modernization Program, CIA/DI/OSR Memorandum for DCI, 13 August 1979
This memorandum from OSR assesses probable developments in the modernization of Polish ground and tactical air forces through the mid-1980s. According to the Polish General Staff recommendations, the number of weapons to be procured falls far short of the goals established by the Warsaw Pact plan.
Naval Aviation in Soviet Anti-ship Attack Planning, CIA/DI/OSR Intelligence Assessment, 1 September 1979
The assessment focuses on the naval air forces for anti-ship attack. It describes those forces, discusses the concepts guiding Soviet planning for anti-ship attacks, and examines the capability of Naval Aviation to carry out such attacks in various operational situations. Special emphasis is placed on anti-ship attacks during a theater war with NATO because Soviet anti-ship strategy is keyed to such a war.

Directive of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces on the Combat Readiness of the Troops and Naval Forces Allocated to the Combined Armed Forces, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 13 March 1978
The directive defines the levels of combat readiness to be maintained by the troops and naval forces allocated to the Combined Armed Forces in wartime. It describes the notification procedures and steps to be taken in shifting to increased and full combat readiness levels in the armed forces as a whole and in the individual branches. It came into effect in 1972, superseding a 1968 directive.

The article is a synopsis of how the East German Navy does combat readiness evaluation of a unit. It lists the objectives, describes the general procedure, and offers some techniques that had been found effective to improving the quality of the evaluations or checks.

Draft Directive on the Combat Readiness of the Troops and Naval Forces Allocated to the Combined Armed Forces, issued by Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 30 March 1979
The directive defines the levels of combat readiness used in the Combined Armed Forces and describes the notification procedures and steps to be taken in shifting the Warsaw Pact forces to successively higher levels of combat readiness. It also defines a new level of readiness called “military threat” as an intermediate level between increased and full combat readiness. Other new information includes the role of military educational institutions and commissariats in the mobilization process. When finalized, the directive will supersede the 1971 directive on combat readiness.

Wartime Fuel Stockpiles and Authorizations, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 25 April 1980
This report contains a translation of three documents, classified top secret or secret. Together they provide the size of the Warsaw Pact Combined Command fuel stockpiles in Poland and proposed wartime unit allocations to the Polish Armed Forces. The list of materiel supplies indicates the total Combined Command reserve located in Poland as of 1 January 1979. The other two documents provide the tonnages of one fueling for the combat equipment of the Polish army, Air, front, and missile units, and totals for the Air Defense Forces and Navy.

The article emphasizes the importance of the combined training of senior naval personnel as the key to organizing cooperation and control of multinational naval forces during combined combat actions and operations. The author explains the advisability of establishing combined naval forces in closed theaters and their organization under a unified command.

This article provides an overview of the use of computer equipment to promote effective problem solving in the control organs of the East German armed forces. The author describes a mobile subscriber center established by the army in 1978 to make effective use of stationary computers similar to the way other services use a common computer system. The author describes the time required for computer calculations on radar field parameters, radiation and meteorological conditions, marches, engineer preparations, minesweeping, and other operations. He advocates the development of systems of minicomputers for use by ground troops, as well as further program design, staff training, and the prioritization of computer use throughout the services.

Reserve Supplies for Polish Forces Assigned to the Warsaw Pact in Wartime as of 1 January 1980, a Russian document classified “Secret of Special Importance,” CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 6 October 1980
The document contains charts with data on the locations and capacities of storage depots and bases. There are charts containing data on the tonnage of differ-
ent ammunition, mines, and explosives at the depots and information about distribution capabilities.


The article discusses NATO plans to employ mines for offensive and defensive purposes in the event of war in the Baltic Sea and recommends responses for Warsaw Pact naval forces. The author proposes the creation of a unified Combined Fleet anti-mine observation system to track NATO mine carriers in peacetime with the intention of destroying them at the start of war. The author also proposes establishing multiple-arm large units to perform anti-mine support tasks in naval operations during the debarkation of an amphibious landing and during the clearing of obstacles from the straits. He explores possible compositions, command structures, and operating methods for an anti-mine force.


The document provides details of the instructions issued for use by the Soviet delegation to the Law of the Sea conference [LOS] during the Ninth Session of the LOS conference in late August 1980 and the Tenth Session, scheduled for March 1981. The instructions are the basis for Soviet positions to be taken at the next conference and were generally consistent with known Soviet positions.


The article is part of a series devoted to the 25th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact. The author surveys trends in the development of U.S. and NATO naval forces and outlines the main achievements of the Warsaw Pact maritime countries after the mid-1950’s in improving the combat capabilities of their navies. These include a major ship-building program and the introduction of new naval weapons and combat equipment. The author emphasizes the operational and combat training measures carried out in common by the national navies to strengthen cooperation for countering the NATO naval threat. He emphasizes training for amphibious-landing operations and working out methods of repelling enemy landings from the sea.

Appraisal of the Naval Forces of the Potential Enemy, a secret Polish document, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 29 June 1981

The document provides current status information on the navies of the Federal Republic of Germany [FRG], Denmark, and Norway about their naval vessels, naval aviation, command and control systems, projected vessel strengths, tactical-technical data on missile and torpedo craft, submarines and fighter bombers. It also provides detailed tactical-technical data about Warsaw Pact and NATO missiles, the range and lift capacities of FRG and Polish aircraft, and FRG, Danish, and Polish information about naval mines.

Recommendations on the Preparation and Organization of Alternate Naval Loading-Unloading Areas to be Established on the Territories of the Warsaw Pact Member States, secret, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 30 November 1981

The document provides recommendations on the preparation and operational organization of alternative naval loading-unloading areas [ZMPVRs] to be set up near small ports in the Warsaw Pact countries to ensure continuity in troop and materiel transport and transshipment when main naval ports are threatened or destroyed, or when land traffic routes are obstructed. The document covers site selection and deployment design of ZMPVRs in peacetime by Ministry of Defense organs, the allocation of the forces and means for preliminary preparation of communications and transportation lines, security and control, the deployment time and minimum daily throughput capacity of a ZMPVR for dry and liquid cargo, and the responsibilities of the ZMPVR chief and subordinate officials and organs. There are two appendices with the organizational chart of a ZMPVR and its deployment on the ground.


The document specifies the forces assigned to the Warsaw Pact Combined Armed Forces in peacetime and wartime. It provides details about the development and expansion guidelines of the forces assigned to the Combined Armed Forces and the mechanism for supplying the Polish forces. The protocol examines the need to improve rear services support and maintain essential materiel reserves and lists the projects preparing Polish territory as part of a theater of military operations. There are five attachments listing basic command organs of the Polish armed forces, personnel strength and equipment of units assigned to the Combined Armed Forces, materiel reserves, and details of preparatory projects for their potential use in a theater of military operations.
Warsaw Pact Recommendations on Anti-mine Defense in the Baltic Sea by Polish Navy Commander, Admiral Janczyzsyn, for the Polish General Staff, secret, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 21 April 1982

The document presents the Polish Navy Command approval of implementing Warsaw Pact recommendations dealing with anti-mine defense in the Baltic Sea. The tripartite approach includes the Soviet Baltic Fleet and the German Democratic Republic [GDR] and Polish Navies. It calls for standardized support and training approaches and the use of minesweepers and sweeping gear manufactured by Poland. The report also recommends continued work on the tactical use of frogmen, data recording and display equipment, sonar, and the underwater vehicle, Blotniak, about to go into production in Poland.


The document is one of a series of Soviet documents about the development of liquid rocket propellants and the strategic missile weaponry and rocket-space systems based on them. The documents are based on reports delivered at a 6–8 June 1978 interagency, all-union conference of leading representatives of the Soviet missile research and design establishment to discuss the status and prospects for developing programs dealing with liquid rocket propellants. This document discusses the problem of selecting a new liquid propellant for naval ballistic missiles to replace the standard pair that had been used in sea-based missiles for more than 15 years. The conference considered two new propellants, one of which was more attractive because it would make prospective Soviet naval missiles superior to Trident-2 in terms of tactical-technical characteristics. The author describes the experience of its design bureau in developing liquid-propellant missiles for the Navy beginning with the R-13 missile put in service in 1961. The document includes a cutaway view for the R-29D missile and its basic specifications. It lists various designs and technological and organizational measures the Soviets devised to ensure safe and reliable operations for submarine-based missiles.

Conclusions on Results of an Inspection of the Ninth Coastal Defense Flotilla of the Polish Navy signed by Admiral V. Mikhaylin and approved by General of the Army A. Gribkov, chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact Combined Armed Forces, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 20 September 1982

According to the document the inspection team recommended the flotilla make plans to replace its aging fleet, acquire OSA and STRELA missile systems for defense against low-level air attacks for the next five-year plan. It stresses improving command and control and operating skills for transitioning to combat readiness and for functioning in environments of electronic warfare, the use of weapons of mass destruction, bad weather, and darkness. (Editors’ note: Strela is the name for Russian-built surface to air missile systems.)

Design and Performance of Soviet Naval Nuclear Reactors, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 11 January 1983

This report describes some aspects of the Soviet development program for naval nuclear propulsion plants, which makes extensive use of nuclear icebreakers as test-beds for new core designs. The cores described are the VM-14-5/02, the VM-14-5/03 using reprocessed fuel, and the VM-149/M. Brief data are given on the nuclear reactor aboard the KIROV-class guided missile cruiser and the liquid-metal cooled reactor aboard the ALFA-class submarine. A new type of nuclear submarine “with eggs” is reported to be undergoing testing in the Black Sea. The fuel burn-up value is given for a future icebreaker reactor core. (Editors’ note: The meaning of “with eggs” is unknown.)

“Some Aspects of an Operation to Destroy Enemy Missile Submarines, by Rear Admiral V. Saakyan special collection Military Thought, secret issue No. 2, 1975, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special report, 23 August 1983

The article describes the methods to be employed by the Soviet Navy in a two-phase operation to detect and destroy enemy SSBNs with the use of either conventional or nuclear weapons at the outbreak of a war. The first phase of the operation involves a massed search by diversified Soviet naval forces consisting of nuclear attack submarines, diesel submarines, long-range ASW aircraft, and surface ship hunter-killer groups having ASW helicopters with all elements operating jointly; using torpedoes, mines, depth charges, and “special” nuclear warheads. A second phase of the operation is a nuclear-war-fighting scenario in which the Soviet Navy targets land-based ballistic missiles from the Strategic Rocket Forces and Air Force long-range aviation against detected enemy SSBNs, and, in some cases, distant straits and narrow.

“An Operation to Destroy Enemy Submarine Forces by Rear Admiral V.A. Samoylov, special collection Military Thought, secret issue No. 7, 1975, CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 23 September 1983

The document judges that the Soviet naval infantry had improved its ability to carry out amphibious assaults near the Soviet Union, and that large Soviet exercises indicated the Soviets were exploring concepts for conducting amphibious operations in distant areas. For example there was evidence that Moscow was showing some willingness to use small contingents of naval infantry to protect Soviet interests in the third world. The paper judges that the Soviets were not moving rapidly to overcome major deficiencies in the force structure or in training.
The following nine documents are translations from Russian of a 12-chapter secret edition of the Combat Regulations of the Navy for Division, Brigade, Regiment, and Ship. They were put into effect in 26 January 1983 by Order 039 of the USSR Minister of Defense and published by the Military Publishing House, Moscow, 1983. The twelve chapters have been arranged by chapter, not the date of dissemination to the IC.


Chapter 1 provides a basic overview of the component structure of the Soviet Navy Brigades, a listing of naval operational terminology, the main functions and the responsibilities of the Soviet Navy plus a description of its highest readiness state in peacetime. It is divided into three sections. The first section provides a description of the different forces and components within the Soviet Navy, with a delineation of the composition and responsibilities of each component. The second section covers basic operational doctrine and terminology as it applies to the Navy. The roles played by components of the navy in a battle are extensively treated. The third section defines the highest peacetime readiness state and “combat duty for the Soviet Navy,” wherein Soviet naval forces can be in close proximity to enemy forces and must be ready for immediate conflict. It also delineates in detail the component and command responsibilities entailed in the performance of “combat duty”.


Chapter 2 covers the command, control, and communications of Soviet naval forces. It also delineates the responsibilities of commanders, staffs, flag staff-officer specialists, and subordinate units in a wide range of specific situations. The chapter covers the use of stationary and mobile control posts and systems for automated control of forces along with a description of the responsibilities of the control posts of naval aviation, the organization of communications, the command and control decision making process, and the precise form and content of combat orders for effective performance of combat tasks. The last part of the chapter covers the allocation of tasks and responsibilities in different combat situations when the Soviet Navy is involved in organizing joint cooperation between its own forces and those of the other branches of the Soviet armed forces.


Chapter 3 contains an overview of the political officer’s duties and responsibilities, including instilling the virtues of Marxism-Leninism., Soviet patriotism, a heightened sense of political consciousness, high morale, military discipline, and a readiness to obey all combat orders in the servicemen and officers during battle and especially during a nuclear engagement. The political officers are also responsible for protecting state secrets, and ensuring they are not disclosed. The chapter also discusses special propaganda measures, such as radio broadcasting and leaflet distribution, which are directed at undermining the morale of the troops and the populace of the enemy.


Chapter 4 is about general operational doctrine for naval combat missions involving submarines, surface ships, naval aviation, naval infantry, and coastal missile-artillery units at the division, brigade, and regimental level. It provides an overview of the commander’s decision-making process, and general guidelines for deployment, protection, and support of SSBNs (Submarine ballistic missile nuclear propulsion);
deployment, and weapons employment of general-purpose submarines; employment of surface ships in strike forces and with amphibious forces; the process of landing amphibious forces; and the positioning of coastal missile-artillery forces.


Chapter 5 describes the details of the command structure for a Soviet warship, the duties performed aboard a warship, and, where applicable on a submarine by the ship's commanding officer, the executive officer, the first lieutenant, and the ship's department heads prior to, during, and after battle. It describes the functions of the following eleven shipboard departments: control, navigation, missile-gunnery, mine-torpedo, communications, engineering, aviation, radio-technical, medical, chemical, and supply. It also describes the ship's two combat readiness levels and their variants, the methods used to defend and protect the ship against diverse naval conventional and nuclear weapons, and the procedures to follow to survive nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) warfare and to restore the ship's combat capability after battle.


Chapters 6–8 cover the methods used by Soviet submarines, surface ship combatants, and naval aviation to destroy enemy SSBNs, aircraft carrier groups, ASW forces, and pertinent land and coastal targets, with the main emphasis on the elimination of enemy SSBNs and aircraft carriers. Specifically: Chapter 6 covers methods that Soviet SSBNs, cruise missile submarines, naval attack aircraft, and coastal missile-artillery troops use to knock out enemy land and coastal targets.

Chapter 7 provides directives for Soviet ASW forces, made up of surface ships, submarines, aircraft and helicopters, operate and coordinate their actions against enemy SSBNs, and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) forces in open ocean areas and littoral seas.

Chapter 8 discusses the combat actions of a variety of Soviet combatants (submarine reconnaissance-strike groups, surface ship strike groups, guided-missile and torpedo boats, aircraft, etc.) against enemy aircraft carrier groups, ASW forces, and general-purpose surface ships. The main focus of this chapter is the destruction of the enemy's aircraft carriers by the above Soviet forces in groups or singly, and also in cooperation with Soviet Long-Range Aviation and Strategic Rocket Forces.

Combat Regulations of the Soviet Navy for Division, Brigade, Regiment, and Ship, Chapter 9: “Joint Actions of Naval Large Units with Large Units and Other Branches of the Armed Forces,” CIA/DO Intelligence Information Special Report, 10 April 1987

Chapter 9 describes the combat actions of Soviet naval forces afloat and ashore when coordinating and cooperating with different branches of the Soviet Armed Forces (Ground Forces, Air Forces, Long-Range Aviation, and Air Defense Forces) in airborne and amphibious landing operations and in anti-landing operations on maritime axes. The primary focus of the chapter is on landing and supporting amphibious landing forces. The chapter provides details for the various phases of landing, staging, embarkation, and loading of the forces onto ships, sea transit of the force; and the actual assault. It describes the types of naval forces which participate (landing-support forces, fire-support ship detachments, obstacle-clearing groups, landing ship detachments, etc.), the missions and dimensions of landing sectors and deployment areas, and the specifics of command and control responsibilities. The final section of the chapter relates information about cooperation with troops advancing and defending on a maritime axis.


Chapter 10 describes the actions taken by the Soviet Navy when operating alone or in cooperation with other branches of the armed forces to defend naval basing areas, sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and convoys against mines, submarines, or small-combatant threats. It describes the system of basing, rebasing, and redeployment of Soviet naval forces and defines naval basing. The bases are protected by setting up defenses against enemy submarines, mines, small combatants, and combat-swimmer forces using naval war ships and, when warranted, using units from the ground forces and air defense forces. The chapters describe the methods used to protect Soviet submarines, ships, and auxiliaries as they exit from or enter basing areas. It also describes how to provide those areas with maximum protection against nuclear weapons before, during, and after a nuclear attack. The section on SLOC defenses deals primarily with the screening and protection of convoys against enemy submarines, mines, and small combatants.

Chapter 11 describes the system and purpose of basing, rebasing, and redeployment of Soviet naval forces, and defines such terms as main basing points, dispersal basing points, maneuver basing points, supply points, anchorages, and dispersed ship-repair points.
Chapter 12 provides in-depth coverage of the different types of support provided to Soviet naval forces afloat and ashore during their preparations for and during combat action. This support is broadly categorized as combat support, special technical support, and rear services support. The section on combat support contains information on the Soviet Navy’s support requirements for intelligence, and intelligence collection, radioelectronic warfare, cover and deception and for engineers. It also covers support for chemical and radioelectronic warfare, cover and deception, and for ASW and navigation.

The special technical support section primarily deals with the procedures for handling, storage, repair, and combat preparation of nuclear and missile weaponry and its associated equipment. It consists of organizing and implementing measures to maintain nuclear munitions and other weaponry of all types, and providing, maintaining and restoring them under constant combat readiness.

The section about rear services support includes details on various aspects of logistics support in the areas of materiel supply, transportation, billeting, and about medical, financial, and general services support. It consists of carrying out measures to prepare, deploy, and relocate rear services units during a developing situation to provide timely and uninterrupted materiel and other support.

Combat support consists of organizing and implementing measures designed to attain high effectiveness when, for example, large units, or ships are employed in combat actions.

“On the Trail of Submarine Disasters”

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Sergey Petrovich Bukan compiled information and wrote a book on the Soviet Navy titled, *On the Trail of Submarine Disasters (Po Sledam Podvodnykh Katastrof)*, published by Gildya master-ov “Rus,” Moscow. It contains translations of a collection of Russian newspaper and periodical articles written during the period 1956–1991 about disasters that occurred to the Soviet submarine force. It uses photographs and materials from holdings of the Northern Fleet Museum, the TASS pictorial review, the journal TIME (USA) and the pamphlet “Soviet Military Power,” 1987 (USA). It was published on 15 September 1992 in Russian with 208 pages, and is available in Russian or potentially online.

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