The men who have held the highest office in the Central Intelligence Agency are an eclectic group. They include two Rhodes Scholars and a college dropout, captains of industry and career public servants, Agency veterans and newcomers to the field of intelligence. More than 65 years after the Agency was founded, there is still no established road to the top.

This is just one of the many themes presented in this revealing look at the 23 leaders who have directed the CIA and its forerunners from 1941 to 2012. The publication opens with a profile of Major General William J. Donovan—the legendary intelligence chief who ran the Office of Strategic Services, a precursor of the CIA during World War II—and those of two other intelligence pioneers who, like Donovan, never served at the CIA but helped lay the groundwork for its foundation. The publication then traces the careers of my predecessors in the Director’s office, who were known as Directors of Central Intelligence until that title was replaced in 2005 with Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, after the establishment of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

The profiles depict the 23 leaders in the context of their times, describing their triumphs and their setbacks not in isolation but as elements in a larger drama of domestic politics and foreign affairs. Their stories are inspiring, sometimes sobering, and always fascinating. They also feature, of course, the controversy that seems endemic to the sensitive and challenging work of intelligence.

Taken together, these profiles offer an illuminating account drawn from the full unclassified record. It is written in broad strokes but with enough detail to spark the kind of informed debate that has always been a hallmark of the CIA. Since its inception, our Agency has been rooted in a culture of inquiry and constant self-examination. This work stands as a fine example of that honorable tradition.

John O. Brennan
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, September 2013
## Directors Timeline

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Directors Timeline

William J. Donovan
Major General, US Army
Jul 11, 1941 – Jun 13, 1942 (COI)
Jun 13, 1942 – Oct 1, 1941 (COI)

Hoyt S. Vandenberg
Lieutenant General, US Army
DCL, Jan 10, 1946 – May 1, 1947 (CIG)

Richard M. Helms
DCL, Jan 10, 1960 – Feb 2, 1973

Stanislaw Turner
Admiral, US Navy

R. James Woolsey
DCL, Feb 5, 1993 – Jan 10, 1995

William H. Webster

William E. Colby
DCL, Sep 4, 1973 – Jan 10, 1976

George J. Tenet
DCL, Jul 11, 1997 – Jul 11, 2004

William F. Raborn Jr.
Vice Admiral, US Navy

Reeves H. Hillenkoetter
Rear Admiral, US Navy

James R. Schlesinger
DCL, Feb 3, 1973 – Jul 2, 1973

Robert M. Gates
DCI, Nov 6, 1991 – Jan 20, 1993

William J. Casey

Porter J. Goss
DCL, Sep 24, 2004 – Apr 22, 2006
D/CIA, Apr 23, 2005 – May 20, 2006

George H.W. Bush
DCL, Jan 30, 1977 – Jan 20, 1977

John M. Deutch

Raborn retired from the US Navy on September 1, 1963.

Turner retired from the US Navy on December 31, 1978, while serving as DCL.

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 abolished the position of DCI and created the position of Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (D/CIA).

Hayden retired from the US Air Force on July 1, 2008, while serving as D/CIA.

Panetta retired from the US Army on August 31, 2011.

Profiles = Leadership

1 Perushed Franklin D. Roosevelt nominated Donovan to the position of Coordinator of Information (COI) on July 11, 1941, creating the nation’s first peacetime, non-departmental intelligence organization. On June 13, 1942, COI was then superseded by the Office of Strategic Services, which had a mandate to collect and analyze strategic information and conduct counterintelligence operations during World War II.

2 Before the National Security Act of 1947 established the CIA on September 18, 1947, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) served as a member of the National Intelligence Authority and head of the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) by authority of a Presidential Directive of January 22, 1946.

3 The National Security Act of 1947, established the CIA, which replaced the CIG on September 18, 1947.

4 Raborn retired from the US Navy on September 1, 1963.

5 Turner retired from the US Navy on December 31, 1978, while serving as DCL.

6 The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 abolished the position of DCI and created the position of Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (D/CIA).

7 Hayden retired from the US Air Force on July 1, 2008, while serving as D/CIA.

8 Panetta retired from the US Army on August 31, 2011.
William Joseph Donovan
Major General, US Army

Tenure:
Director of the Office of the Coordinator of Information, July 11, 1941 – June 13, 1942
Director of Strategic Services, June 13, 1942 – October 1, 1945

Presidents Served:
Franklin D. Roosevelt
Harry S. Truman

Appointed:
July 11, 1941, by President Franklin D. Roosevelt as Coordinator of Information
June 13, 1942, by President Franklin D. Roosevelt as Director of Strategic Services

Born:
January 1, 1883, Buffalo, New York

Education:
Attended Niagara College, 1903; Columbia University, B.A., 1905; Columbia University Law School, LL.B., 1907

Career Highlights:
- Served with New York National Guard on Mexican border, 1916, and with 165th Infantry (69th New York) Regiment in World War I; awarded Medal of Honor in 1923 for bravery in 1918 Second Battle of the Marne
- Assistant US Attorney General, 1924-29
- Practiced law in New York, 1929-41
- Republican nominee for Governor of New York, 1932
- Placed on active duty and appointed Brigadier General in US Army, 1943
- Promoted to Major General, 1944
- Released from US Army, 1946
- Practiced law in New York, 1946-1953
- Ambassador to Thailand, 1953-54

Died February 8, 1959
As US involvement in World War II appeared increasingly likely, President Franklin D. Roosevelt recognized that America urgently needed to piece together the fragmented intelligence organizations across the US Government to bring focus, context and clarity to the information reaching the White House. To lead the effort, he turned to William J. Donovan, one of the most decorated US soldiers in World War I, asking him in July 1941 to begin laying the groundwork for what would become America’s first centralized intelligence organization.

Donovan’s military experience and keen interest in intelligence and foreign affairs made him uniquely qualified for the job. During World War I, Donovan led the 165th Regiment of the US Army, gaining the nickname “Wild Bill” for putting his men through grueling training drills to prepare them for battle. He was wounded in action three times and earned the Medal of Honor for bravery under fire during the Second Battle of the Marne in September 1918. He also was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross and two Purple Hearts.

In 1940, with Britain standing alone against Nazi Germany, President Roosevelt asked Donovan, his former classmate at Columbia Law School, to travel to England to determine if Britain would be able to withstand the Nazi onslaught. Donovan reported that the British could stand firm if given enough aid. While conducting his inquiry, Donovan developed a deep appreciation of British intelligence operations, which heightened his interest in establishing an American intelligence organization modeled on the British system.

President Roosevelt, impressed by Donovan’s views on intelligence, asked him to take the lead in centralizing the nation’s intelligence efforts. On July 11, 1941, he named Donovan to the position of Coordinator of Information (COI) to direct a small civilian intelligence unit that consolidated information collected abroad for review by the president. Within months, America’s entry into World War II prompted a reassessment of the COI, and in June 1942 the bulk of its mission was transferred to a new intelligence organization, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).

Donovan became director of the OSS, envisioning it as a strategic intelligence center encompassing collection, research and analysis, counterintelligence, and paramilitary activities. Throughout World War II, the OSS engaged in espionage and sabotage operations in Europe, the Middle East, North Africa and East Asia. Donovan’s vision for the OSS formed the basis for the future CIA and it shaped the role, structure and doctrine of America’s foreign intelligence effort for decades to come. Four Directors of Central Intelligence (DCIs)—Allen Dulles, Richard Helms, William Colby and William Casey—were OSS veterans.

By war’s end, Donovan was promoted to major general. He received the Distinguished Service Medal, the highest American military decoration for outstanding non-combat service. Although Donovan cautioned against it, President Truman disbanded the OSS in September 1945, folding some of its components into the War and State departments.

Donovan died on February 8, 1959, at the age of 76. President Eisenhower called him “the last hero,” and Donovan remains an inspiration to the men and women of the CIA. Although he never directed the agency that was based on his ideas and initially staffed in large part by people he personally led, Major General William Donovan embodied the creativity, courage and can-do spirit that are the hallmarks of the CIA. Its officers regard him as the founder of both their agency and the American intelligence profession.

“All major powers except the United States have had for a long time past permanent worldwide intelligence services, reporting directly to the highest echelons of their Governments. Prior to the present war, the United States had no foreign secret intelligence service. It never has had and does not now have a coordinated intelligence system.”

- OSS Director Donovan to President Harry Truman, August 25, 1945, quoted in For the President’s Eyes Only (1995) by Christopher Andrew

“Wild Bill” Donovan’s favorite picture of himself, taken in September 1918.

Major General William J. Donovan preferred to be in the field meeting with his officers instead of working behind a desk in Washington. It was said that if the American flag were raised and lowered every time Donovan came and went from OSS Headquarters, a Color Guard would have to be on hand 24 hours a day.
Tenure:
Director of Central Intelligence, Central Intelligence Group, January 23, 1946 – June 10, 1946

President Served:
Harry S. Truman

Appointed:
January 23, 1946, by President Harry S. Truman; sworn in on that date

Deputy Director:
Kingman Douglass, March 2, 1946, through the remainder of Souers’s tenure

Born:
March 30, 1892, Dayton, Ohio

Education:
Attended Purdue University; Miami University (Ohio), B.A., 1914

Career Highlights:
• Commissioned Lieutenant Commander, US Naval Reserve, 1929
• Volunteered for active duty, 1940
• Promoted to Rear Admiral and named Deputy Chief of Naval Intelligence, 1945
• Relieved from active duty, 1946
• Executive Secretary, National Security Council, 1947-50

Died January 14, 1973
As America took on a vastly expanded overseas role in the wake of World War II, President Harry Truman grew frustrated with the cables, dispatches and reports piling up at the White House and requested a systematic process for reviewing the information. In response, his administration established a small interdepartmental organization called the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), which was charged with consolidating intelligence reports into daily summaries for the president.

President Truman chose Rear Admiral Sidney Souers, the deputy chief of Naval Intelligence at the end of World War II, to lead the CIG, making Souers the first person to hold the title of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Souers, a wealthy businessman, wanted to return home after the war but accepted the job reluctantly, saying that he would serve no more than six months. At the swearing-in ceremony in January 1946, Truman added some levity to the proceedings by presenting Souers with a black hat, black cloak and wooden dagger, declaring him “Director of Centralized Snooping.” When asked not long after his appointment what he wanted to do, Souers responded, “I want to go home.”

The CIG was staffed and funded by the State, War and Navy departments because it was not receiving separate Congressional appropriations. Souers’s role was to enable the CIG to gain more control of intelligence collection and analysis since it had no capacity to collect information from agents in the field or to produce estimates.

Truman regarded the CIG as his personal intelligence service and became an avid consumer of its work. The CIG provided a comprehensive intelligence summary for Truman by consolidating reports and cables from other government departments. The CIG’s first Daily Summary was produced on February 15, 1946, and a Weekly Summary was added on June 7, 1946. As the president’s demands for intelligence increased, the group began conducting interdepartmental studies across intelligence elements.

When Souers left the CIG in June 1946, he submitted a progress report stating that it was ready to expand its mission into new areas, such as collecting foreign intelligence by clandestine methods, producing intelligence studies of foreign countries, and engaging in basic research and analysis. The CIG also needed to grow its professional and clerical staff, which numbered approximately 100 when Souers departed. Despite Souers’s begrudging acceptance of the post of DCI, he succeeded in establishing the framework for what would become the CIA.

“THE EVALUATION OF INFORMATION IS NOT AN EXACT SCIENCE AND EVERY SAFEGUARD SHOULD BE IMPOSED TO PREVENT ANY ONE DEPARTMENT FROM HAVING THE OPPORTUNITY TO INTERPRET INFORMATION IN SUCH A WAY AS TO MAKE IT SEEM TO SUPPORT PREVIOUSLY ACCEPTED POLICIES OR PRECONCEIVED OPINIONS.”

- Rear Admiral Sidney Souers’s letter to presidential aide Clark Clifford before his appointment as DCI, December 27, 1945
Tenure:
Director of Central Intelligence, Central Intelligence Group, June 10, 1946 – May 1, 1947

President Served:
Harry S. Truman

Appointed:
June 7, 1946, by President Harry S. Truman; sworn in, June 10, 1946

Deputy Director:
• Kingman Douglass, until July 11, 1946
• No Deputy Director from July 11, 1946 – January 20, 1947
• Brigadier General Edwin Kennedy Wright, US Army, January 20, 1947, through remainder of Vandenberg’s tenure

Born:
January 24, 1899, Milwaukee, Wisconsin

Education:
US Military Academy, B.S., 1923; attended Army War College, 1939

Career Highlights:
• Pilot, flight commander, flying instructor in Army Air Corps, 1924–36
• Commanded 9th Air Force in Europe during World War II
• Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, War Department General Staff, 1946
• Appointed Vice Chief of Staff of US Air Force with rank of General, 1947
• Chief of Staff, US Air Force, 1948-53
• Retired from Air Force and Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1953

Died April 2, 1954
During the summer of 1946, US military forces quickly demobilized, and many military components were transferred to civilian government entities. Lieutenant General Hoyt Vandenberg, who succeeded Rear Admiral Sidney Souers as Director of the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), moved aggressively to claim some of the components for the CIG, obtaining the Foreign Broadcast Information Service and the intelligence portion of the Manhattan Project, the program that produced the atomic bomb. The acquisitions helped Vandenberg carve out a more significant role for the new organization.

Vandenberg was hesitant to accept the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) position, hoping instead to secure a leadership role in what would become the US Air Force. But Souers persuaded him to accept the DCI position, saying it was a wiser career move and would help him build relationships with senior officials.

Vandenberg reformed the CIG by creating new roles and responsibilities and by seeking additional authorities. He established four major offices during his short tenure: the Office of Special Operations, responsible for clandestine collection; the Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE), which conducted research and analysis; the Office of Collection and Dissemination, which coordinated the flow of intelligence; and the Office of Operations, which collected unclassified information from open sources. Covert action—operations designed to conceal a US role—remained outside the CIG’s portfolio. The CIG also received increased funding and personnel authorization, which permitted Vandenberg to grow the organization to some 1,800 officers by the end of 1946, reducing the group’s dependency on government departments.

When President Truman asked the CIG to provide an assessment of the strength and capabilities of the Soviet Union, Vandenberg oversaw the production of the CIG’s first intelligence estimate, ORE-1, the predecessor of the CIA’s National Intelligence Estimate. Released on July 23, 1946, the estimate concluded that Soviet leader Joseph Stalin did not have the capability or desire to wage war with the Western powers.

Vandenberg wanted the CIG to become a permanent organization with additional authority to collect foreign intelligence and conduct independent research and analysis. To achieve this, he advocated the establishment of a new organization, the CIA, which would be independent from the Department of State and the military. This required legislation, and Vandenberg—the nephew of a prominent Republican senator—had the contacts to foster the necessary political support. On July 26, 1947, President Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947, creating the CIA and overhauling the country’s outdated national security structure. The Act was not approved until shortly after Vandenberg left the CIG, but his efforts were pivotal in securing its passage and establishing the CIA.
Tenure:
• Director of Central Intelligence, Central Intelligence Group, May 1, 1947 – November 23, 1947
• Director of Central Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, November 24, 1947 – October 7, 1950

President Served:
Harry S. Truman

Appointed:
• April 30, 1947, by President Harry S. Truman; sworn in, May 1, 1947
• Reappointed under the National Security Act by President Truman, November 24, 1947; confirmed by the Senate on December 8, 1947

Deputy Director:
• Brigadier General Edwin Kennedy Wright, US Army, until March 9, 1949
• No Deputy Director for remainder of Hillenkoetter’s term

Born:
May 8, 1897, St. Louis, Missouri

Education:
US Naval Academy, B.S., 1919

Career Highlights:
• Assistant Naval Attaché, France: 1933-35, 1938-40, 1940-41 (Vichy regime), and 1946-47
• Officer in Charge of Intelligence, on the staff of Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Area (Admiral Chester W. Nimitz), 1942-43
• Promoted to Rear Admiral, 1946
• Commander, Cruiser Division 1, Cruiser–Destroyer Force, Pacific Fleet, 1950-51
• Promoted to Vice Admiral, 1956
• Inspector General of the Navy, 1956
• Retired from Navy, 1957

Died June 18, 1982
The CIA was created on July 26, 1947, as part of a broad reorganization of the nation’s intelligence structure. The new system, which was mandated by the National Security Act of 1947, established the CIA to coordinate intelligence collection and analysis across the US Government. The act also created the National Security Council (NSC) to advise the president on national security and foreign policy matters. With this new arrangement in place, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), Rear Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter, was directed to oversee the development of the CIA.

Hillenkoetter was a career naval officer who served as an assistant naval attaché in Vichy France from 1940-41. Later assigned to the battleship USS West Virginia at Pearl Harbor, Hillenkoetter was the most senior officer of his crew to survive the Japanese attack on December 7, 1941. As the US entered World War II, Hillenkoetter became the officer in charge of intelligence for the Pacific Fleet Staff. In the spring of 1947, President Truman asked him to become DCI.

Eight months into Hillenkoetter’s tenure as DCI, the NSC created a survey group to review the intelligence system’s progress since World War II and to determine how the NSC should oversee the CIA’s activities. The NSC Survey Group—of which future DCI Allen Dulles was a member—submitted a report to the NSC that was highly critical of Hillenkoetter and the CIA, identifying a failure to coordinate the efforts of the Intelligence Community (IC) and a lack of organizational structure as key problems. The NSC directed Hillenkoetter to reform the CIA based on the report’s suggestions, but Hillenkoetter failed to implement the requested changes, in large measure because of resistance from other federal agencies.

A major concern during Hillenkoetter’s tenure was the spread of communist regimes, which led him to establish an interagency committee to prepare estimates on East Bloc capabilities—the first time that intelligence estimates were conducted as an interagency effort. Despite the focus on communist expansion, however, the IC failed to provide sufficient warning about North Korea’s invasion of South Korea in June 1950, a major intelligence failure that contributed to Hillenkoetter’s departure as DCI later that year.

"The services have a tendency to reflect their own interests in their intelligence estimates. For this reason, CIA strives to maintain in its estimates an objective, balanced view, and to keep US national security, rather than departmental interests, as the dominant consideration."

- DCI Roscoe Hillenkoetter in a 1950 letter to President Truman, quoted in The Agency (1986) by John Ranelagh

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Tenure:
Director of Central Intelligence, October 7, 1950 – February 9, 1953

President Served:
Harry S. Truman

Appointed:
August 21, 1950, by President Harry S. Truman; confirmed by the Senate, August 28, 1950; sworn in, October 7, 1950

Deputy Director:
• William H. Jackson, October 7, 1950 – August 3, 1951
• Allen W. Dulles, August 23, 1951, through remainder of Smith’s tenure
  (served as Acting Director, February 9 – 26, 1953)

Born:
October 5, 1895, Indianapolis, Indiana

Education:
Attended Butler University; Army Command and General Staff School, 1935; Army War College, 1937

Career Highlights:
• Commissioned into US Army, 1917; served in France in World War I; received regular commission, 1920
• Served during World War II as General Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff, first in European Theater, 1942; then for Allied Forces in North Africa and Mediterranean, 1942-43; and during 1944-45 at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces
• Promoted to Lieutenant General, 1944
• Ambassador to Soviet Union, 1946-49
• Commanding General of First Army, 1949-50
• Retired from US Army, 1953
• Under Secretary of State, 1953-54

Died August 6, 1961
In 1950, after the CIA’s failure to warn of the outbreak of the Korean War, President Truman asked Smith to take over as DCI. Smith moved quickly to make changes and quell infighting among Agency officers, using a report submitted a year earlier by the National Security Council Survey Group—of which future DCI Allen Dulles was a member—as a blueprint for reforming the Agency.

Smith divided the Agency’s main activities into three directorates: one for espionage and covert actions, one for analysis, and one for administrative functions. The Directorate for Administration was formed in 1950 to centralize support elements such as finance, logistics, medical services and security. Smith later consolidated the offices responsible for covert action and intelligence collection into the Directorate of Plans—a predecessor of today’s National Clandestine Service. In January 1952, the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) was formed to conduct basic, current, and estimative analysis. The DI also performed a liaison function, collecting information from other intelligence services including the Department of State, the Armed Forces Security Agency—a predecessor of today’s National Security Agency—and Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence agencies. Smith also appointed the Agency’s first inspector general to increase accountability within the organization.

Smith continued the practice of sending a daily intelligence brief to the president and established regular Friday briefings at the White House. Smith also launched the Current Intelligence Bulletin and the Current Intelligence Weekly Review to provide President Truman and senior policymakers a customized review of the intelligence collection and analysis conducted at the CIA. After Truman received the first Bulletin, he wrote, “Dear Bedell, I have been reading the intelligence bulletin and I am highly impressed with it. I believe you have hit the jackpot with this one.” The Bulletin evolved into the President’s Daily Brief, a report the president continues to receive today. Smith also established the practice of providing intelligence briefings to presidential candidates and presidents-elect.

To improve analysis, Smith recruited Harvard professor William Langer—a veteran of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the predecessor of the CIA—to organize the Office of National Estimates. Langer persuaded another OSS veteran, Sherman Kent, to leave his teaching position at Yale and join him in Washington as his deputy. Langer and Kent developed a process to produce national estimates by reaching out to all the intelligence agencies to ensure that estimates were fully coordinated. Smith personally reviewed the estimates before sending them to the president.

Smith saw himself as a manager not only of the CIA but of the entire Intelligence Community. He is remembered as being one of the most effective DCIs because of his ability to lead and to revolutionize how intelligence was gathered, processed, analyzed and disseminated.

**The Director of Central Intelligence is one of those jobs where one can never be right, as the American people expect the incumbent to predict with accuracy just what Stalin is likely to do three months from today at 5:30 a.m., and, of course, that is beyond the realm of human infallibility.”**

- General Walter Bedell Smith, August 1950 before becoming DCI, quoted in The CIA and American Democracy (1989) by Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones
Tenure:
• Acting Director of Central Intelligence, February 9 – 26, 1953
• Director of Central Intelligence, February 26, 1953 – November 29, 1961

Presidents Served:
• Dwight D. Eisenhower
• John F. Kennedy

Appointed:
• February 9, 1953, by President Dwight D. Eisenhower; confirmed by the Senate, February 23, 1953; sworn in, February 26, 1953
• Asked by President-elect John F. Kennedy to continue as Director of Central Intelligence, November 10, 1960

Deputy Director:
General Charles Peare Cabell, US Air Force, April 23, 1953, through remainder of Dulles’s tenure

Born:
April 7, 1893, Watertown, New York

Education:
Princeton University, B.A., 1914, M.A., 1916; The George Washington University, LL.B., 1926

Career Highlights:
• US Diplomatic Service, Department of State, 1916-26
• Practiced law in New York, 1926-42 and 1946-50
• Head of Office of Strategic Services post in Bern, Switzerland, 1942-45
• Deputy Director for Plans, CIA, 1951
• Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, 1951-53
• Private pursuits including writing several books
• Served on President’s Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, 1963-64

Died January 28, 1969
Allen Welsh Dulles once said that “intelligence is probably the least understood and most misrepresented of professions.” Dulles, the longest-serving Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), had perhaps the most intimate knowledge of how intelligence is perceived and how it influences policy.

Dulles’s early life and career afforded him a unique opportunity to build impressive experience in world affairs. Many of Dulles’s relatives were prominent government officials; in fact, his older brother, John Foster Dulles, was President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Secretary of State. Dulles began his government career in the Foreign Service in 1916. His first tour was in Vienna, Austria, as third secretary, and his next assignment was at the US Embassy in Bern, Switzerland, where he was introduced to espionage operations. When Dulles arrived in Vienna, the first secretary said, “I guess the best thing for you to do is take charge of intelligence. Keep your ears open. This place is swarming with spies.” Dulles advanced in the State Department, but he eventually resigned and joined John Foster Dulles’s law firm in New York City. Despite becoming a partner at the law firm in 1930, Dulles kept his hand in international relations.

In 1942, Dulles joined the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), after having been selected by General William Donovan to run intelligence operations in Switzerland. Dulles had also been offered a position in London, but chose Switzerland, calling it “a less glamorous post, but one where I felt my past experience would serve me in good stead.” Dulles recruited and ran agents like Fritz Kolbe, a German diplomat who identified Nazi spies for the US, and Hans Bernd Gisevius of the German Consulate in Zurich, who informed Dulles of plans by a German opposition group to assassinate Hitler. Dulles also was a key player in Operation Sunrise, facilitating the surrender of German forces in northern Italy on May 1, 1945. After the war, Dulles served as the OSS station chief in Berlin for six months and then returned to the US to practice law.

Dulles was widely recognized as one of the nation’s leading experts on intelligence and was consulted about developing the CIA by President Harry Truman and the National Security Council (NSC). In 1948, the NSC asked him to work with a team to review the intelligence system’s progress since World War II. The report, disseminated in 1949, criticized DCI Roscoe Hillenkoetter for failing to coordinate the Intelligence Community’s (IC) efforts. When Walter Bedell Smith became DCI in 1950, he reportedly called Dulles and said, “You made your comments and now come down and run the place.” Smith named Dulles the Deputy Director for Plans, responsible for running the Agency’s clandestine operations; Smith promoted Dulles to Deputy Director of Central Intelligence in 1951.

As President Eisenhower took office, Dulles was concerned about the lack of intelligence on Soviet intentions and capabilities and feared the US could face another strategic surprise like the attack on Pearl Harbor. Eisenhower appointed Dulles DCI in 1953 and authorized him to lead the effort to confront communist expansion through covert means. He also asked him to keep a close eye on Soviet actions and intentions regarding the United States.

Dulles launched a range of covert operations, including the overthrow of leftist leaders in Iran and Guatemala who were viewed as potential Soviet allies. In February 1955, the completion of the Berlin Tunnel allowed American and British intelligence units to tap the telephone lines of the USSR’s military in East Berlin. The CIA also organized “hearts and minds” campaigns to motivate those under communist rule to take action against their governments. Dulles increased the use of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, created by CIA in 1950 and 1953 respectively, to support the free flow of information behind the Iron Curtain.

To assess the number of strategic bombers and missiles in the Soviet arsenal, the CIA needed to devise a way to look behind the Iron Curtain. Dulles advocated partnering with Lockheed to develop several reconnaissance projects, including high-altitude aircraft—such as the U-2, A-12 OXCART and the CORONA satellite imagery programs. The U-2 enabled the CIA to scrutinize Soviet capabilities from 70,000 feet, leading to discoveries that dispelled concerns within the US Government of a “bomber gap” or “missile gap.” This intelligence led to the cancellation of defense programs that were intended to counter those perceived gaps, ultimately saving the government billions of dollars.
Perhaps Dulles’s most tangible legacy is the CIA headquarters compound in Northern Virginia. In the 1940s and 50s, the Agency occupied several temporary buildings along the Mall in Washington, DC. DCI Smith recognized the need for a new building, and Dulles pushed for a new headquarters once he became DCI. Initially, Dulles considered tearing down the old Heurich Brewery—on the site that now houses the Kennedy Center—to build the CIA Headquarters. However, President Eisenhower opposed the location because he felt Washington lacked the space to accommodate another government agency. Dulles presented an alternate location—Langley, a former peach orchard near the town of McLean, Virginia—and Eisenhower accepted. Construction on the Original Headquarters Building (OHB) started in late 1958 and was completed in the fall of 1961, near the end of Dulles’s term; Dulles never occupied the DCI’s OHB office.

Dulles’s tenure also had its share of missteps. He was criticized for neglecting analysis and leadership of the IC while focusing on covert action operations, and for the abortive efforts to destabilize the Castro regime in Cuba. The Bay of Pigs fiasco in Cuba in April 1961 effectively ended Dulles’s career as DCI; he left office seven months later.

Nonetheless, Dulles is remembered as a giant in the field of intelligence who, perhaps more than anyone, helped turn the CIA into the global intelligence service it is today. In the main entrance of the CIA Headquarters, a memorial to Dulles bears an inscription that sums up his many contributions to the Agency: “His monument is around you.”

“IT HAS TRUTHFULLY BEEN SAID THAT INTELLIGENCE IS OUR FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE.”

- Allen Dulles’s statement regarding the proposed National Security Act of 1947, April 25, 1947
Tenure:
Director of Central Intelligence, November 29, 1961 – April 28, 1965

Presidents Served:
• John F. Kennedy
• Lyndon B. Johnson

Appointed:
September 27, 1961, by President John F. Kennedy; sworn in as recess appointee, November 29, 1961; confirmed by the Senate, January 31, 1962; sworn in, February 13, 1962

Deputy Director:
• Lieutenant General Marshall A. Carter, US Army, April 3, 1962, through remainder of McCone’s tenure

Born:
January 4, 1902, San Francisco, California

Education:
University of California, Berkeley, B.S., 1922

Career Highlights:
• Private pursuits in corporate business
• Member of President’s Air Policy Commission, 1947-48
• Deputy Secretary of Defense, March-November 1948
• Under Secretary of the Air Force, 1950-51
• Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, 1958-61
• Member of public committees investigating race relations and inner city poverty in California, 1965-67
• Member of President’s Commission on Strategic Forces (Scowcroft Commission), 1983
• Awarded Presidential Medal of Freedom, 1987

Died February 14, 1991
The sixth Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), John McCone had a reputation for being dynamic, hard-driving and brilliant. Ray Cline, McCone’s second Deputy Director for Intelligence, observed that “his sharp, penetrating queries kept everyone in the Central Intelligence Agency on his toes, and he had little patience with imprecision, inefficiency or slowness in producing results.”

McCone’s drive started at a young age. His father died in 1920 when he was a junior in college and McCone helped support his family and paid his college tuition by working summers in shipyards and iron mills. After graduating with honors from the University of California at Berkeley, McCone rapidly worked his way to a management position in the steel industry, joining Consolidated Steel and becoming a General Sales Manager at age 29. He established the Bechtel-McCone Corporation, which won enormous contracts with oil companies and produced Liberty ships during World War II.

After the war, McCone turned to government service, first as undersecretary of the Air Force and later as chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission from 1958 to 1961. He gained experience dealing with a variety of agencies, including the CIA.

Following the Bay of Pigs failure, President John F. Kennedy turned to McCone to lead the Agency. When McCone was sworn in as DCI, Kennedy shook McCone’s hand and told him that he was “now living on the bull’s eye, and I welcome you to that spot.”

President Kennedy regarded McCone as an adviser and expanded his advisory duties beyond those of his predecessors, asking McCone to help formulate the Kennedy Administration’s national security policy. McCone was aware of the danger of politicizing intelligence judgments, saying, “You have to be very, very careful … that your views on the policy are not affecting the purity of your intelligence … and you have to be awfully sure that nobody suspects that it is.”

In August 1962, imagery from U-2 flights over Cuba captured the distinctive six-point star pattern indicative of Soviet surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites. McCone—recently remarried after the death of his wife a year earlier—had departed for his honeymoon but was informed of these developments through a series of messages dubbed the “honeymoon cables.” McCone was the only senior US Government official who argued that Moscow intended to deploy nuclear missiles in Cuba. During those famous 13 days in October, McCone advised the president, asserting that Washington should give Moscow a deadline for removing the missiles before taking additional measures. After relying on the Agency’s technical skills to bolster that assessment, McCone created the Directorate of Science and Technology less than a year later to centralize the capabilities.

After President Kennedy’s assassination on November 22, 1963, McCone reported to a new boss, President Lyndon B. Johnson. Whereas Kennedy had been fascinated with espionage and covert action, Johnson knew little about intelligence and was indifferent toward the CIA. It became clear that Johnson was not reading the daily publications the CIA produced for the White House. McCone revamped the product to suit Johnson’s interests and habits, culminating in the President’s Daily Brief. Nonetheless, McCone realized his prominent role as adviser to the president was waning. The decisive break was over Vietnam. McCone argued that deploying ground forces was a mistake and that gradual escalation of the bombing campaign would not work. He did not hesitate to voice his opinions on Vietnam, which increasingly distanced him from Johnson. McCone resigned on April 28, 1965, and returned to the private sector. He died of cardiac arrest at home in Pebble Beach, California, on February 14, 1991, at the age of 89.

Today, McCone is known as one of the CIA’s greatest directors and was named as one of the Agency’s Trailblazers in 2011. Arthur Schlesinger Jr., historian and adviser to President Kennedy, wrote one of the first assessments of McCone as DCI in early 1965: “McCone was a cautious, realistic and self-efficacious director who repaired morale within the Agency, instituted measures to keep the CIA and himself out of the newspapers … restored its relations with the State Department and Congress … declined to allow his own views to prejudice the intelligence estimates … and showed a fair-mindedness which shamed some of us who had objected to his appointment.”

"SUCCESSFUL WARNING IS ESSENTIALLY A TWO-FOLD PROCESS: IF WARNING IS TO BE EFFECTIVE, NOT ONLY MUST THE ALERT BE GIVEN, BUT THE CONSUMER OF INTELLIGENCE MUST ACCEPT THE FACT THAT HE HAS IN FACT BEEN WARNED."

- DCI John Mccone in 1962, quotation in CIA's Historical Intelligence Collection
William Francis Raborn Jr.
Vice Admiral, US Navy (Retired)

Tenure:
Director of Central Intelligence, April 28, 1965 – June 30, 1966

President Served:
Lyndon B. Johnson

Appointed:
April 11, 1965, by President Lyndon B. Johnson; confirmed by the Senate on April 22, 1965; sworn in, April 28, 1965

Deputy Director:
Richard M. Helms, April 28, 1965 – June 30, 1966

Born:
June 8, 1905, Decatur, Texas

Education:
US Naval Academy, B.S., 1928; attended Naval War College, 1952

Career Highlights:
• Director, US Navy Special Projects Office, 1955-62
• Promoted to Vice Admiral, 1960
• Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Development), 1962-63
• Retired from US Navy, 1963
• Private industry, 1963-65

Died March 6, 1990
William Raborn's 14-month tenure as Director of the Central Intelligence (DCI) was dominated by increasing US involvement in Vietnam and concern over the potential spread of communism in the Caribbean and elsewhere. Raborn had extensive military and technical expertise, but was inexperienced in foreign affairs. Raborn was best known for directing the Navy’s Special Projects Office, where he completed the Polaris submarine-launched missile program three years ahead of schedule. He quickly won the confidence of Congress when President Lyndon B. Johnson appointed him as DCI.

On April 28, 1965, the day Raborn was sworn in, a rebellion underway in the Dominican Republic raised concern about a possible communist takeover. As the US Government intervened, Raborn spent most of his time working with the Operations Center at CIA Headquarters to receive around-the-clock updates on the rebellion. Rethinking the Center’s mission would prove to be the most lasting legacy of Raborn’s relatively brief tenure. He assigned senior officers to weekend duty in the Operations Center to ensure that emergencies were managed effectively; though implementation changed over time, the policy of staffing the Center with senior duty officers continues today. The Dominican crisis gradually receded, and Raborn turned his attention to other matters. He established a Vietnam Task Force to further consolidate and focus the Agency’s diverse operations in the volatile Southeast Asia region. Additionally, he created a China community coordinator position to produce better intelligence on China after its test of an atomic weapon in late 1964.

Overhead reconnaissance programs were a point of contention during the mid-1960s, especially because of their cost and the difficulty of coordinating CIA and Air Force interests. Revolutionary technology had been developed and was now operational, including the CORONA satellite and the OXCART (the A-12)—a supersonic, high-altitude plane designed to avoid radar detection and equipped with a high-resolution camera. Although 12 planes were ready for use in November 1965, they were never fully deployed during Raborn’s tenure because of conflicts over the need for imagery and the risks associated with flights over hostile countries. The Agency gained greater control over reconnaissance programs when Raborn signed an agreement—initially negotiated by DCI McCone—to further define the roles and responsibilities of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). The agreement resulted in formal recognition that the DCI would determine the intelligence requirements that would drive NRO’s research and development programs.

Raborn never became a close national security adviser to President Johnson. As Raborn left the DCI position, the Agency was the target of increasing public criticism over its activities in Vietnam.
Tenure:
Director of Central Intelligence, June 30, 1966 – February 2, 1973

Presidents Served:
• Lyndon B. Johnson
• Richard Nixon

Appointed:
June 18, 1966, by President Lyndon B. Johnson; confirmed by the Senate, June 28, 1966; sworn in, June 30, 1966

Deputy Director:
• Vice Admiral Rufus L. Taylor, US Navy, October 13, 1966 – February 1, 1969
• Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters, US Army, May 2, 1972, through remainder of Helms’s tenure

Born:
March 30, 1913, St. Davids, Pennsylvania

Education:
Williams College, B.A., 1935

Career Highlights:
• Journalist
• Commissioned into US Naval Reserve, 1942
• Served with Office of Strategic Services and its successors, 1943-47
• Various posts in CIA
• Deputy Director for Plans, CIA, 1962-65
• Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, 1965-66
• Ambassador to Iran, 1973-77
• Private consultant

Died October 22, 2002
Richard Helms’s tenure as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) came at the height of the Vietnam War, a time that presented the Agency with a difficult mission in the field and a tough political environment in Washington.

Richard Helms was the first career Agency officer to lead the CIA.

Helms grew up in a suburb of Philadelphia in a community described by his brother as “conventional upper-middle class, well educated, well traveled, interested in good schools, and sports, and with a social life centering around the country club.” Helms spent two of his high school years attending the prestigious Institute LeRosey in Switzerland and the Realgymnasiium in Freiburg, Germany, becoming fluent in both French and German. Upon graduation from Williams College in 1935, Helms became a journalist, covering the 1936 Summer Olympics—dubbed the “Hitler Games”—in Berlin. Helms even managed to interview Adolf Hitler just after the Nazi rally at Nurenburg.

During World War II, Helms joined the US Navy Reserve as a lieutenant, eventually transferring in 1943 to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), where he worked in the Morale Operations Branch producing false data known as “black” propaganda. In early 1945, Helms deployed to London for his first overseas assignment in the OSS, working under and sharing a flat with another future CIA director, William Casey. Helms helped set up resistance networks and worked to infiltrate German lines. In August 1945, under the leadership of future DCI Allen Dulles, Helms was transferred to Berlin, where he tracked down remaining Nazi sympathizers and monitored the Soviet military. Helms then returned to Washington and began working for the new Central Intelligence Group, which became the CIA in 1947.

At the CIA, Helms was assigned to the Office of Special Operations, which collected foreign intelligence. He became the office’s chief of operations before his promotion in 1962 to lead the Directorate of Plans, handling espionage and covert action.

As McCone departed the Agency, he recommended Helms or Ray Cline, also a CIA officer, for the DCI position. President Lyndon B. Johnson instead chose Vice Admiral William F. Raborn Jr., and appointed Helms as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. President Johnson believed Helms needed more Washington experience before becoming DCI.

Helms assumed the position of DCI in 1966, becoming the first career Agency officer to lead the CIA. He learned of the appointment shortly before President Johnson held a press conference to announce the news. As DCI, Helms opted for a moderate approach to reform, sensing that drastic changes would be counterproductive while the Agency weathered the turbulence of the Vietnam War.

The first major Agency success under Helms came in 1967, when the Agency correctly predicted that Israel could prevail in the Six-Day War without US support. President Johnson soon began inviting Helms to “Tuesday lunches,” where senior policymakers met informally to discuss international affairs. In 1970, the Agency further enhanced its reputation under Helms by correctly predicting that a US invasion of Cambodia would destabilize Cambodia and widen the war throughout Southeast Asia.

Helms also experienced failure during his tenure. In January 1968, for example, the Agency did not issue adequate warnings that the communist forces of North Vietnam were preparing to launch a wave of major attacks in the South, in what became known as the Tet Offensive. That same year, the CIA failed to warn of the Soviet Union’s invasion of Czechoslovakia despite having intelligence about a military buildup on the Czech border.

Helms was criticized within the Agency for politicizing community estimates, especially for what some saw as his removal of judgments that displeased the Pentagon. Helms disagreed with the assertion, and when CIA analysts produced assessments on the Vietnam War suggesting that US policy was not working, Helms did not alter them or limit their distribution.

President Lyndon B. Johnson meets Richard Helms at the White House. (Courtesy of the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library)
As DCI, Helms focused his energies on serving the president, leaving leadership of the Agency’s day-to-day functions to his deputies. But he found that supporting the president was at times difficult, especially during the Nixon Administration, when he had to compete with National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger for influence on intelligence matters. Kissinger, in effect, served as President Richard Nixon’s senior intelligence officer.

Under Helms’s leadership, the CIA spied on American antiwar protesters at the direction of President Johnson and President Nixon, who believed the protesters were receiving foreign support. Helms believed he would be fired if he did not carry out the presidents’ requests. Helms also allowed the Agency to supply equipment to the “Plumbers,” a group set up during the Nixon Administration to stop the “leaking” of national security information to the media. The “Plumbers” later carried out the Watergate break-in at the Democratic National Committee headquarters in 1972.

Near the end of Helms’s tenure, the Agency drew criticism from Congress and an American public growing increasingly distrustful of the US Government. During this time, Helms tried to protect the Agency’s reputation. In his only public speech as DCI, he said, “The nation must to a degree take it on faith that we, too, are honorable men devoted to her service.”

In 1972, President Nixon asked for the resignation of all agency directors, federal department heads, and presidential appointees. Helms declined, believing the move would cause the DCI position to become politicized. President Nixon eventually forced Helms out in 1973.

President Nixon later nominated Helms to be Ambassador to Iran, hoping to take advantage of Helms’s good relations with the ruling Shah—Helms’s former schoolmate at Le Rosey. During Helms’s public confirmation hearings in 1973, senators asked him if the CIA—at the behest of President Nixon—had tried to overthrow the government of Chilean President Salvador Allende in 1970. Since the operation was still secret, Helms responded that the CIA was not involved. As a result, Helms was convicted of misinforming Congress. Helms later stated, “If I was to live up to my oath and fulfill my statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, I could not reveal covert ops to people unauthorized to learn about them.”

In 1983, President Reagan awarded Helms the National Security Medal, which Helms considered “an exoneration.” Helms died of bone cancer on October 22, 2002, and was buried with full military honors at Arlington National Cemetery.

Helms dedicated his career to enabling the work of an agency he so greatly admired. He remained the director for seven years under difficult conditions. Despite evolving threats from around the world and administrations that were at odds with the Agency, Helms continued to deliver essential intelligence to policymakers during a time of great uncertainty.
James Rodney Schlesinger

Tenure:
Director of Central Intelligence, February 2, 1973 – July 2, 1973

President Served:
Richard Nixon

Appointed:
December 21, 1972, by President Richard M. Nixon; confirmed by the Senate, January 23, 1973; sworn in, February 2, 1973

Deputy Director:
Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters, US Army, through remainder of Schlesinger’s tenure (served as Acting Director, July 2, 1973 – September 4, 1973)

Born:
February 15, 1929, New York, New York

Education:
Harvard University, B.A., 1950; M.A., 1952; Ph.D., 1956

Career Highlights:
• Assistant and Associate Professor of Economics, University of Virginia, 1955-63
• RAND Corporation: Senior Staff Member, 1963-67, and Director of Strategic Studies, 1967-69
• Assistant Director and Acting Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget, 1969-70
• Assistant Director, Office of Management and Budget, 1970-71
• Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, 1971-73
• Secretary of Defense, 1973-77
• Assistant to President-elect Jimmy Carter, 1976
• Secretary of Energy, 1977-79
• Private consultant
taught at the University of Virginia and worked in various corporate and government positions. In 1970, as the assistant director of the Office of Management and Budget with responsibility for international programs, he was asked by President Nixon to identify ways to improve the quality of US intelligence. Working with the National Security Council, Schlesinger suggested improvements that ranged from conservative to radical. The study was controversial, and it changed how the DCI position was perceived and how the IC was managed. It also led President Nixon to streamline and strengthen intelligence collection throughout the IC.

Once selected as DCI, Schlesinger wasted no time putting his reform plans into place. One of his most significant reforms was to designate the DCI as the head of the IC, reserving the leadership role of the CIA for the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. This change affected all future DCIs, allowing them to oversee the preparation of the IC’s budget, establish intelligence requirements and ensure the quality of products across the IC.

Believing that the CIA's structure was ineffective, Schlesinger made organizational changes and cut the CIA's workforce by nearly 7 percent. He focused in particular on reductions in the Directorate of Plans, which Schlesinger renamed the Directorate of Operations (the precursor to today's National Clandestine Service). By contrast, Schlesinger expanded the workforce in the Directorate of Science and Technology, believing that technical collection had been used insufficiently. Schlesinger also thought the quality of the CIA's intelligence was uneven and not commensurate with the cost of producing it. To help guide further reforms, he established the Center for the Study of Intelligence within the Agency to act as an internal “think tank,” capturing insights of historical importance.

When the media connected the CIA to the Watergate scandal in May 1973, Schlesinger took steps to end the CIA's participation in activities that might appear legally or ethically suspect. He ordered the CIA officers to report any Agency activity that could be seen as a violation of the Agency’s charter. The responses covered activities going back as far as the 1950s and resulted in a nearly 700-page internal document coined the “Family Jewels.” Public disclosure of some of its contents in 1974 caused a major controversy and prompted inquiries into CIA activities by a presidential commission and two Congressional committees. (The report was released to the public in 2007.) The CIA's relationship with Congress deteriorated further as more questionable operations surfaced, ranging from assassination plots to espionage against US citizens.

Indeed, Schlesinger’s tenure was a time of controversy both inside and outside the CIA, but it included many reforms that shaped the intelligence business for years to come. Schlesinger departed the Agency upon being appointed by President Nixon as Secretary of Defense.

“Intelligence is inherently a difficult business. Intelligence is not only supposed to gather facts, many of which others are eager to conceal or disguise. It is also expected to provide a coherent picture that helps to prepare us for future developments.”

- Statement of former DCI James Schlesinger before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, October 14, 2003
William Egan Colby

Tenure:
Director of Central Intelligence, September 4, 1973 – January 30, 1976

Presidents Served:
• Richard Nixon
• Gerald Ford

Appointed:
May 10, 1973, by President Richard Nixon; confirmed by the Senate, August 1, 1973; sworn in, September 4, 1973

Deputy Director:
Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters, US Army, through remainder of Colby’s tenure

Born:
January 4, 1920, St. Paul, Minnesota

Education:
Princeton University, B.A., 1940; Columbia University, LL.B., 1947

Career Highlights:
• 2nd Lieutenant, US Army, 1941
• Office of Strategic Services, 1943-45
• Attorney in private practice, New York, 1947-49; with National Labor Relations Board, Washington, DC, 1949-50
• Various operational posts in CIA, 1950-62
• Chief, Far East Division, Directorate of Plans, CIA, 1962-67
• Assigned to Agency for International Development as Director of Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS), Saigon (with rank of ambassador; on leave from CIA), 1968-71
• Executive Director-Comptroller, 1972-73
• Deputy Director for Operations, 1973
• Post-CIA pursuits included practicing law, work on public policy issues, and writing books

Died April 27, 1996
William Colby was appointed Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) at a time when the CIA was under great scrutiny from Congress and the public. Because he was an Agency insider, many believed that Colby would resist demands for greater oversight and transparency. Instead, Colby embraced transparency, asking the Agency to be more open with Congress. He also sought to better use resources to ensure both intelligence analysis and collection were treated as core missions.

Colby’s father worked with the US Army and the family moved frequently during Colby’s childhood. The longest period the young Colby spent in one location was three years in Burlington, Vermont, where his father was an ROTC instructor at the University of Vermont. Colby graduated from Princeton University in 1940 and then studied law at Columbia University. In August 1941, Colby put his law degree on hold; he enlisted in the Army to serve in World War II and was assigned the rank of second lieutenant. Following various assignments in the Army—including parachute training—Colby joined the Office of Strategic Services in 1943 and organized and directed resistance forces in France during World War II. He later led Operation Rype—a cleverly conceived ski-parachute operation—in Norway to prevent German troops from returning home to combat the Allied forces there. In carrying out that mission, Colby and his team skied across the Norwegian countryside sabotaging railroads and destroying bridges. Colby was awarded the Bronze Star medal, the French Croix de Guerre and the Silver Star for his service during World War II.

After the war, Colby returned to the US, where he finished law school in 1947 and became an associate attorney at William J. Donovan’s New York City law firm. In 1949, Colby moved to Washington, DC, and worked at the National Labor Relations Board, gaining experience in government litigation.

In 1951, Colby began his career at the CIA, where he was given increasingly important field assignments. In 1962, he returned to Washington to lead the CIA’s Far East Division. While overseas in 1968, Colby supervised a highly controversial initiative—called the Phoenix Program—designed to eliminate the Viet Cong infrastructure at the village level. The initiative was labeled an assassination program by critics.

Colby returned to Washington in 1971, becoming the executive director comptroller in 1972 and then the Deputy Director for Operations. On May 10, 1973, President Richard Nixon nominated Colby to succeed Schlesinger as DCI.

As Colby began his tenure, the onset of the Yom Kippur War—also known as the 1973 Arab-Israeli War—caught the US Government by surprise and became the first intelligence failure to occur on Colby’s watch. The war surprised intelligence analysts in part because they were not expecting another conflict so soon after the 1967 Six-Day War; other factors included inadequate technical collection against the Arab forces and signals intelligence that—although abundant—still failed to reveal Egyptian invasion plans. Moreover, Colby had recently dissolved one of the Agency’s key forecasting groups, the Board of National Esti-
mates, which he planned to replace with a new group of senior officers that would be more responsive to the needs of the policymakers.

Later in Colby’s tenure, Congress began to take an aggressive look at the Agency because of disclosures by New York Times journalist Seymour Hersh. In December 1974, Hersh revealed some of the controversial CIA operations that had been compiled in the Agency’s so-called “Family Jewels” report, which had been prepared under Colby’s predecessor. While the operations took place before Colby’s directorship, Colby handled the aftermath. Colby responded by revealing the existence of other activities and programs that had been hidden from Congress, believing that transparency was the best way to rebuild the Agency’s trust on Capitol Hill.

President Gerald Ford established a commission headed by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller to investigate the Agency’s questionable activities. Both houses of Congress launched investigations of their own, with the Senate’s Church Committee focusing on covert action and the House’s Pike Committee examining analytic failures. The result was additional Congressional oversight, which at one point required the CIA to report to eight Congressional committees.

Despite the increased oversight from Congress, press leaks, and the lack of support from the Nixon and Ford administrations, Colby still managed to leave a lasting mark on the CIA, positioning the Agency to handle the intelligence requirements of the future. While Colby was heavily involved in operations throughout his career, he recognized that the Agency would benefit from devoting more resources and attention to other aspects of its mission, such as analysis. In so doing, he helped the Agency shift from what was perceived as a one-dimensional, operations-focused organization to a well diversified intelligence service.

Colby stepped down as DCI on January 30, 1976, and went back to practicing law. He drowned in a boating accident on April 27, 1996, possibly after collapsing from a heart attack. He was buried with military honors at Arlington National Cemetery.

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"Intelligence has traditionally existed in a shadowy field outside the law. This year’s excitement has made clear that the rule of law applies to all parts of the American Government, including intelligence ... Its secrets will be understood to be necessary ones for the protection of our democracy in tomorrow’s world, not covers for mistake or misdeed ... The costs of the past year were high, but they will be exceeded by the value of this strengthening of what was already the best intelligence service in the world."

- DCI William Colby’s assessment of his tenure shortly after leaving office

Colby’s tenure was a transitional period for the Agency. Many CIA officers and former CIA directors were frustrated by Colby’s admissions to Congress of controversial operations. But even some of Colby’s most fervent critics later began to change their minds about his leadership of the CIA. According to Colby’s book, Honorable Men, Henry Kissinger took Colby aside in the Oval Office in late 1975 and said, “Bill, I feel required to say this to you. For the longest time I believed that what you were doing was wrong, that what you should have done was to cry havoc over the investigations in the name of national security. But I have come around to believe that your strategy was really correct.”
George Herbert Walker Bush

Tenure:
Director of Central Intelligence, January 30, 1976 – January 20, 1977

President Served:
Gerald Ford

Appointed:
November 3, 1975, by President Gerald R. Ford; confirmed by the Senate, January 27, 1976; sworn in, January 30, 1976

Deputy Director:
• Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters, US Army, until July 2, 1976
• E. Henry Knoche, from July 3, 1976, through remainder of Bush’s tenure (served as Acting Director, January 20, 1977 – March 9, 1977)

Born:
June 12, 1924, Milton, Massachusetts

Education:
Yale University, B.A., 1948

Career Highlights:
• Volunteered for active duty, US Navy, 1942
• Served in World War II as naval aviator in the Pacific
• Member of Congress, 7th District, Texas, 1966-71
• Ambassador to the United Nations, 1971-72
• Chairman, Republican National Committee, 1973-74
• Chief, US Liaison Office, People’s Republic of China, 1974-75
• Private business and politics
• Vice President of the United States, 1981-89
• President of the United States, 1989-93
• Awarded Presidential Medal of Freedom, 2011
• Founded the George Bush Presidential Library & Museum and George Bush School of Government and Public Service, both located at Texas A&M University
Thirteen years before becoming the President of the United States, George H.W. Bush was appointed the 11th Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Many believed leading the CIA would mark an end to his political career. Instead, Bush became the only US president to have previously held the position of DCI, which gave him a unique perspective on both providing and receiving intelligence.

Discharged from the Navy in September 1945, Bush enrolled in an accelerated program at Yale University, where he excelled in both academics and sports. He was the captain of the baseball team and played in the first two College World Series. After graduating in 1948, Bush and his family moved to Midland, Texas, where he started his career in the oil industry as a sales clerk with Dresser Industries. In 1951, Bush started Bush-Overby Oil Development and later cofounded Zapata Petroleum. In 1954, Bush was named president of Zapata Offshore Company and moved it to Houston, Texas.

Bush’s focus later turned to public service; in 1966, he became the first Republican to represent Houston in Congress where he served two terms. He also made two unsuccessful bids for a US Senate seat from Texas. Throughout his political career, Bush received a series of high-level appointments, including US Ambassador to the United Nations, chairman of the Republican National Committee, and chief of the US Liaison Office in the People’s Republic of China, with the rank of ambassador. Upon Gerald Ford’s nomination as Republican candidate for president, Bush was considered for vice president, but the Governor of New York, Nelson Rockefeller, received the nod instead.

On November 1, 1975, while serving as ambassador in Beijing, Bush received a telegram from President Ford’s Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, requesting that Bush accept the position of DCI. Bush later recalled, “Almost every friend I had in politics felt this would be the dead end, the absolute end of any politics in the future for me. And I kind of thought that maybe was true. That happily proved to be wrong.” Bush began his tenure on January 30, 1976. Though an outsider, Bush quickly restored morale, using his political influence to restore the Agency’s access to the White House. He also allayed fears within the Agency that he would use his position to support his political agenda, and he demonstrated his commitment to the Agency by solving problems rather than overhauling the organization.

Bush’s tenure at the CIA lasted just less than a year, but he worked swiftly to raise morale internally and to restore the Agency’s reputation with the public. He also recognized that congressional support was critical to the CIA’s success, and he worked with the Senate and House of Representatives to establish permanent intelligence oversight committees. On May 19, 1976, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence was established, followed by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on July 14, 1977—shortly after Bush departed the Agency.

To sharpen the Agency’s analysis, Bush also helped pioneer a new analytic technique known as “Team A /Team B.” In 1976, he agreed to an exercise that pitted a team of working-level Intelligence Community (IC) analysts (Team A) against one from the Pres-
Bush is remembered as one of the CIA’s most popular directors. The first DCI who had served in Congress, he had the political influence and authority to mold the Agency into an entirely different organization, but he chose not to do so. Instead, he focused on protecting the objectivity and independence of the CIA. Bush nevertheless realized that the Agency needed to become more forthright with information to earn the respect of Congress and the American public.

On April 26, 1999, the CIA named its headquarters compound “The George Bush Center for Intelligence” in honor of Bush’s contributions to the field of intelligence and to the Agency. At the dedication ceremony, then-Director George Tenet read a message from President Bill Clinton that paid tribute to Bush’s achievements, “When you assumed your duties as Director of Central Intelligence in January 1976, the nation had just endured one of the most tumultuous periods in its history. Many Americans had lost faith in government. Many asked whether the CIA should continue to exist. As Director, you accomplished a great deal. You restored morale and discipline to the Agency while publicly emphasizing the value of intelligence to the nation’s security. You also restored America’s trust in the CIA and the rest of the Intelligence Community.”

On April 26, 1999, DCI George Tenet honored George H.W. Bush at a ceremony to officially change the name of the headquarters compound to the “George Bush Center for Intelligence.”

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“IT’S HARD FOR PEOPLE IN A FREE SOCIETY TO ACCEPT THE FACT THAT COVERT ACTION IS OFTEN NECESSARY FOR A WORLD POWER TO SURVIVE. AN AMERICAN PRESIDENT FACED WITH A POTENTIAL THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY SHOULD HAVE SOME ALTERNATIVE BETWEEN DOING NOTHING AND WAITING FOR A CRISIS TO BLOW UP IN OUR FACE. THE ANSWER IS COVERT ACTION—BUT IT HAS TO BE CONDUCTED ALONG STRICTLY LEGAL GUIDELINES.”

- Vice President George H.W. Bush, Looking Forward (1987)
Stansfield Turner
Admiral, US Navy

Tenure:
Director of Central Intelligence, March 9, 1977 – January 20, 1981

President Served:
Jimmy Carter

Appointed:
February 8, 1977, by President Jimmy Carter; confirmed by the Senate, February 24, 1977; sworn in, March 9, 1977

Deputy Director:
• E. Henry Knoche, until August 1, 1977
• Frank C. Carlucci, from February 10, 1978, through remainder of Turner’s tenure

Born:
December 1, 1923, Highland Park, Illinois

Education:
Attended Amherst College, 1941-43; US Naval Academy, B.S., 1946 (Class of 1947); Rhodes Scholar, Exeter College, Oxford University, B.A., 1950, M.A., 1954

Career Highlights:
• Commissioned in the US Navy, 1946
• Director, Systems Analysis Division, Office of Chief of Naval Operations, 1971-72
• Promoted to Vice Admiral, 1972
• President, US Naval War College, 1972-74
• Commander, US Second Fleet, 1974-75
• Promoted to Admiral, 1975
• Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe (NATO), 1975-77
• Retired from the US Navy on December 31, 1978 while serving as Director of Central Intelligence
• Author, professor, corporate director, and senior research scholar
The CIA had five directors during the 1970s. The last director of the turbulent decade was Admiral Stansfield Turner, picked by President Jimmy Carter to succeed George H.W. Bush. Turner sought to create a more integrated Intelligence Community (IC), reshaping some of the Agency's traditional roles. Familiar issues, like the spread of communism, and new ones, like the Islamic fundamentalist movement, were the pivotal intelligence problems of Turner's tenure. The Iranian Revolution in early 1979 surprised the US Government and introduced new and unfamiliar political movements that were a source of deep concern.

Turner was a career naval officer and former classmate of President Carter's at the US Naval Academy. He was an analyst at heart and an experienced leader who liked to challenge the ideas of those around him to spur action and debate. Early on, Turner immersed himself in studies and briefings on the structure of the IC, seeking ways to improve its organization. One of his conclusions was that the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) lacked the authority to fully manage the IC. In response to Turner's urging, President Carter gave him additional authority to handle requests from policymakers, produce analysis and manage the overall intelligence budget.

Turner's solution for improving the management of the IC was a "Three Vice President" model. Turner believed that assigning three senior managers to oversee resource collection, analysis, and resource management would make the IC more efficient and improve its long-range planning. But his experiment ran into trouble almost immediately when he brought in Navy colleagues to fill the three manager positions, alienating many career CIA officers. Turner intended to create a lean management structure; instead, his system only added to the bureaucracy. The top-level structure ultimately did not work.

Turner considered the CIA's operational side overstaffed and made deep cuts to its personnel, which led to low morale. Both Turner and President Carter believed that satellite imagery could provide the bulk of intelligence collection and that human intelligence would be needed only to fill the gaps. The Directorate of Operations was reduced to half of what it was at its peak during the Johnson Administration as technical intelligence gained prominence.

On the analytical side of the CIA, Turner promoted more innovative analytic techniques on a wider range of intelligence issues and even involved himself in preparing the annual estimate of Soviet offensive strategic nuclear forces. According to the IC Staff's chief budget officer at the time, Turner would approve any budget increase that promised to improve analysis. The IC Staff was convened to oversee the integration and performance of the IC.

In 1978, Turner faced new restrictions on the CIA when President Carter signed Executive Order (EO) 12036, which banned domestic espionage operations and mandated that the National Security Council provide closer review of covert action. New legislation also required the CIA to give the newly established House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence prior notification of "significant" covert action operations.

In 1979, two challenges in the Middle East and South Asia caught the CIA by surprise. In February, the Iranian Revolution, arising from an Islamic fundamentalist movement, took root with unexpected speed. The CIA lacked intelligence sources in the region to provide information on exiled opposition leader Ayatollah Khomenei and on popular attitudes toward the Shah's government. In November 1979, the US Embassy in Tehran was taken over by Iranian students and militants who supported the revolution. Several attempts to rescue the hostages were made, some of which were costly and disastrous. In December 1979, a second challenge emerged when the Soviet Union—at the behest of the pro-Soviet Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA)—invaded Afghanistan, beginning a long fight against the Mujahideen—Afghan resistance fighters who opposed communism and rebelled against DRA and Soviet troops.

Turner's efforts to create a more integrated IC were frustrated by counterintelligence issues and a changing political landscape in the Middle East. A major effort to integrate the IC would not be made again until the early 2000s.

"America's intelligence system is unlike any other. It answers the special news of a democratic superpower with worldwide interests; it is relatively young, as is our nation; it benefits from the technological genius of American industry; and it is peopled by Americans of every stripe who share the patriotism, the high moral standards, and the decency for which Americans are known."

William Joseph Casey

Tenure:
Director of Central Intelligence, January 28, 1981 – January 29, 1987

President Served:
Ronald Reagan

Appointed:

Deputy Director:
- John N. McMahon, June 10, 1982 – March 29, 1986
- Robert M. Gates, April 18, 1986, through remainder of Casey’s tenure (served as Acting Director, December 18, 1986 – May 26, 1987)

Born:
March 13, 1913, New York, New York

Education:
Fordham University, B.S., 1934; St. John’s University, LL.B., 1937

Career Highlights:
- Lawyer, writer and businessman
- Commissioned into US Naval Reserve, 1943
- Joined Office of Strategic Services, 1943
- Chief of Special Intelligence Branch in European Theater of Operations, 1944-45
- Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission, 1971-73
- Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, 1973-74
- President and Chairman, US Export-Import Bank, 1974-76
- Member, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 1976-77
- Campaign Manager for presidential candidate Ronald Reagan, 1980

Died May 6, 1987
William Casey came to the CIA determined to improve the Agency’s access to the president, to reenergize its workforce and to sharpen its focus on defeating Soviet expansion efforts. Casey’s time as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was not without controversy, but he took risks to confront the great challenges of his tenure.

Casey graduated from Fordham University in 1934 and earned his law degree from St. John’s University in 1937. He finished law school in just two years—a year ahead of schedule—even though he was also working full time as a social worker. In 1943, Casey was commissioned into the US Navy Reserve and joined the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) as a lieutenant commander. OSS Director William J. Donovan appointed Casey chief of espionage operations in the European Theater, where he was responsible for coordinating more than 100 teams for deployment into Germany. Casey was awarded the Bronze Star for his service during the war.

After the war, Casey became a successful venture capitalist, founding, directing or financing about 30 businesses. One former associate stated, “Bill Casey had the two absolutely essential traits of a venture capitalist. He could pick horses and jockeys. He could spot a promising company, an idea, an invention, and he could judge if the people running it were any good.”

Casey lost a 1966 Congressional race but went on to hold several senior positions in politics and government, including chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, president and chairman of the US Export-Import Bank, member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and campaign manager for presidential candidate Ronald Reagan. Casey’s effective management of the campaign prompted President Reagan to appoint him as DCI.

Casey brought influence and prestige to the Agency as a result of his relationship with President Reagan. Casey’s leadership helped restore the CIA’s prominent role in the national security arena. He became the first DCI to receive cabinet rank, giving him a stake in policy decisions and unprecedented political influence. The move conflicted with what many saw as the CIA’s traditional role of informing policy rather than making it.

Casey and President Reagan shared the belief that Soviet expansion posed a grave threat to US interests and that any softening of Western opposition to communism was a mistake; they were determined to curtail Soviet influence. Casey believed centralized intelligence was necessary to win the Cold War and persuaded President Reagan to give him a free hand in revitalizing the Agency. Casey rebuilt the CIA’s operations division—which was downsized under DCI Turner—hiring a significant number of new officers and growing the Intelligence Community’s budget, which had been declining for years. The larger budget funded the construction of a new building at CIA Headquarters in Langley.

Many observers credit Casey with forming a strategy to end the Cold War and implementing the “Reagan Doctrine,” the new policy of confronting Communist forces in the Third World by backing opposition elements. Casey was creative in identifying opportunities to end the Cold War. For example, he persuaded Saudi Arabia to increase oil production to force down the price of crude oil, an important source of revenue for the Soviets. Casey also convinced South African gold mining companies to expand production and depress the price of gold, another key Soviet export.

Under Casey, the CIA also took a more aggressive approach to fighting terrorism. On April 18, 1983, a truck bombing at the US Embassy in Beirut killed seven CIA officers, marking the greatest loss of Agency lives in a single incident. In 1986, Casey established the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center—the first Agency unit in which operators and analysts worked side by side—with the mission of disrupting and defeating terrorists and expanding the Agency’s counterterrorism efforts.
Despite success in fighting the Cold War and building CIA capabilities, Casey’s tenure was not without controversy. Casey bristled at the idea of oversight and his relationship with Congress was strained. The ultimate unraveling of Casey’s tenure came during the effort to fund opposition fighters in Nicaragua through arms sales to Iran, in what came to be known as the Iran-Contra Affair. The initiative, which violated the US embargo on arms sales to Iran, prompted fierce criticism from Congress. Casey suffered two seizures just as the Congressional hearings were underway in December 1986 and never returned to his position as DCI. He died on May 6, 1987, at the age of 74.

“**The Estimates are my Estimates. I’m a little bit looser about that when it comes to putting in other views. But they’re my Estimates. I’m responsible for drawing the conclusions and presenting them. But I feel I have a concomitant obligation to the user to see that any well-substantiated alternative view is also laid on the table.**”


Casey was respected by Agency personnel for revitalizing operations and analysis. He implemented a strategy to defeat Soviet expansion and carved a more significant role for the CIA in US security policy. President Reagan paid tribute to Casey by stating, “His nation and all those who love freedom honor today the name and memory of Bill Casey. In addition to crediting him with rebuilding America’s intelligence capability, history will note the brilliance of his mind and strategic vision, his passionate commitment to the cause of freedom and his unhesitating willingness to make personal sacrifices for the sake of that cause and his country.”
Tenure:
Director of Central Intelligence, May 26, 1987 – August 31, 1991

Presidents Served:
• Ronald Reagan
• George H.W. Bush

Appointed:
• March 3, 1987, by President Ronald Reagan; confirmed by the Senate, May 19, 1987; sworn in, May 26, 1987
• Requested by President-elect George H.W. Bush to continue as Director of Central Intelligence, December 6, 1988

Deputy Director:
• Robert M. Gates, until March 20, 1989
• Richard J. Kerr, from March 20, 1989, through remainder of Webster’s tenure (served as Acting Director, September 1, 1991 – November 6, 1991)

Born:
March 6, 1924, St. Louis, Missouri

Education:
Amherst College, A.B., 1947; Washington University Law School, J.D., 1949

Career Highlights:
• Lieutenant in US Navy, World War II (1943-46) and Korean War (1951-52)
• Private law practice, 1949-59 and 1961-70
• US Attorney for Missouri’s Eastern District, 1960-61
• Judge, US District Court for Missouri’s Eastern District, 1970-73
• Judge, US Court of Appeals for Eighth Circuit, 1973-78
• Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1978-87
• Private law practice
The late 1980s brought major change to the international political scene and to the CIA’s approach to national security. During Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) William Webster’s tenure, the Berlin Wall came down after nearly 30 years, ending the post-WWII division of Europe and leading to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The fall of communism prompted the CIA to reevaluate its mission to ensure that it remained relevant to US national security. Webster wanted to change the image of the Agency as a “runaway” organization and direct it toward new challenges, such as nuclear proliferation, counternarcotics, and counterterrorism.

As DCI, Webster improved cooperation across the Intelligence Community (IC) and repaired the Agency’s reputation after the Iran-Contra scandal. Webster had a reputation for integrity, and upon becoming DCI, he asked President Ronald Reagan to restore the position to its traditional non-cabinet status because he believed it allowed him to maintain an objective stance when providing intelligence judgments. Webster’s desire to isolate the DCI from policymaking may have reflected his experience as a federal judge and as a director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Under Webster’s leadership, the CIA’s Inspector General (IG) evaluated the performance of the IC Staff, which oversaw the integration and performance of the IC. The study concluded that the Staff was carrying out a useful mission but was unfocused and lacked impact. The study also found that recent DCIs were detached from the rest of the IC and segregated from the Staff. Webster approved most of the IG’s recommendations, which included developing a mission statement and creating a leaner IC Staff. He also tried to strengthen ties within the IC by hosting conferences and initiating biweekly luncheons with heads of intelligence agencies.

As the new decade progressed, Webster recognized that redefining intelligence objectives was critical to the Agency’s ability to confront new threats. Webster created two more interdisciplinary centers—for counterintelligence and counternarcotics—adding to the Counterterrorism Center established by DCI William Casey. The centers enabled collectors and analysts to span regional boundaries by focusing on an issue instead of a specific country.

Webster also tightened internal review processes for covert action initiatives in response to the Iran-Contra Affair. A government review of the scandal concluded that the Agency as an institution was not involved, but Webster nonetheless instituted guidelines for covert action to guard against similar problems.

The Persian Gulf War presented the US Government with a new set of national security concerns. In August 1990, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein led his forces into Kuwait City, seizing 10 percent of the world’s proved oil reserves. The Agency increased collection and analysis on Iraq to support President George H.W. Bush, who eagerly consumed the intelligence. Diplomatic efforts failed to secure an Iraqi withdrawal and Operation Desert Storm began in January 1991. The US-led coalition bombed Iraqi positions for six weeks, and a discrepancy emerged between CIA and US military tank-kill estimates. The destruction of Iraqi tanks was critical to the plans of General Norman Schwarzkopf—the Commander of US Central Command and Coalition Forces for the Gulf War—and he was frustrated with the lack of a coordinated estimate for the number of tanks eliminated. An estimate produced by Army intelligence components—indicating a weaker Iraqi army—was ultimately used. The Bush Administration lost confidence in Webster, resulting in his departure from the Agency.

Webster had a detached management style, but he improved the Agency’s credibility, helped unify the IC and transitioned the CIA to the emerging challenges of the post-Cold War era.

“THE ACTIVITIES IN WHICH WE ENGAGE MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH OUR FOREIGN MISSION AND OUR OWN LAWS, AND THEY MUST REFLECT WHAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE EXPECT OF US. WE MUST FIND WAYS TO GET THAT MESSAGE KNOWN AND UNDERSTOOD. THE AMERICAN PUBLIC IS VERY RESPONSIVE WHEN IT BELIEVES THAT THERE IS SOME ORDER IN THIS ELUSIVE WORLD OF CLOAK AND DAGGER.”

- DCI William Webster, remarks at the Intelligence Community Attorney’s Conference, Williamsburg, Virginia, May 11, 1988

DCI William Webster (right) briefs President George H.W. Bush in the Oval Office along with Robert Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs. (Picture courtesy of the George H.W. Bush Presidential Library)
Robert Michael Gates

Tenure:
Director of Central Intelligence, November 6, 1991 – January 20, 1993

President Served:
George H.W. Bush

Appointed:
May 14, 1991, by President George Bush; confirmed by the Senate, November 5, 1991; sworn in, November 6, 1991

Deputy Director:
- Richard J. Kerr, until March 2, 1992

Born:
September 25, 1943, Wichita, Kansas

Education:
College of William and Mary, B.A., 1965; Indiana University, M.A., 1966; Georgetown University, Ph.D., 1974

Career Highlights:
- Intelligence analyst, CIA, 1966-74
- National Security Council Staff, 1974-79
- Director, DCI/DDCI Executive Staff, CIA, 1981-82
- Deputy Director for Intelligence, 1982-86
- Chairman, National Intelligence Council, 1983-86
- Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, 1986-89
- Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 1989
- Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs, 1989-91
- Author:
  - Interim Dean of the George Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University 1999-2001
  - President, Texas A&M University, 2002-06
  - Secretary of Defense, 2006-11
  - Chancellor of the College of William and Mary, 2012 – present
Robert Gates became the first Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to come from the Agency’s analytic arm, the Directorate of Intelligence. Besides having 25 years of analytical experience, he had earned a reputation as a knowledgeable and insightful voice on national security during his tours at the National Security Council (NSC). He had also worked successfully with leaders throughout Washington, developing a broad understanding of how government worked.

Gates had a difficult confirmation process. Originally nominated to succeed DCI William Casey in 1987, Gates withdrew his nomination because of controversy surrounding the Iran-Contra Affair; Gates had been the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence during the scandal. When President George H.W. Bush nominated Gates to the DCI position a second time, Gates faced opposition from former CIA analysts who believed he forced intelligence estimates to conform to his own views. Gates was eventually confirmed, and he asserted his commitment to unbiased and objective intelligence analysis.

During his confirmation hearing, Gates signaled his intention to take advantage of the opportunity presented by the end of the Soviet Union to reassess the role, mission, priorities and structure of US intelligence. While still at the NSC, Gates began a review of national security policy, asking policymakers to provide a comprehensive list of the key countries and intelligence questions for the United States through 2005.” This effort will allow us to correlate resources and requirements we can or cannot meet at different budget levels—in essence, to let the customer decide what to do without at different budget levels,” Gates explained. In March 1992, President Bush signed National Security Directive (NSD) 67, which formalized the review and provided a list of requirements through 2005, dividing them into four levels of priority. The directive served as a guide for the Intelligence Community (IC) during Gate’s tenure as DCI.

In his first month as DCI, Gates established task forces to study ways to improve organization and process. He immediately commissioned 14 task forces, adding 10 more four months later. They were assigned topics ranging from imagery to human intelligence to National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs). The work of the task forces resulted in many organizational changes, including the creation of an Office of Military Affairs, the restructuring of the National Reconnaissance Office—as well as public acknowledgement of its existence—and the eventual establishment of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, which eventually became the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

In addition, Gates disbanded the IC Staff, which had overseen the integration and performance of the IC, and divided its responsibilities between the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and the newly created Community Management Staff (CMS). CMS—established based on the studies that DCI William Webster initiated—handled resource matters; the NIC dealt with substantive matters. Gates believed that this distribution of duties allowed him to better fulfill his community management responsibilities.

The whirlwind changes that Gates brought to the Agency included increased accessibility and openness to the media and public. Gates understood that intelligence must match the needs of its customers, including the public. He modified declassification standards so the public could access CIA records of historical significance. Gates resigned when it became clear that President-elect Bill Clinton wanted to select his own DCI. Thirteen years later, Gates returned to public service as Secretary of Defense, once again helping to defend the country he had long served.

“**The most difficult task that falls to us in intelligence is to see the world as it is, not as we—or others—would wish it to be.**”

- DCI Robert Gates address at CIA Headquarters, December 4, 1991
Tenure:
Director of Central Intelligence, February 5, 1993 – January 10, 1995

President Served:
William J. Clinton

Appointed:
January 21, 1993, by President William J. Clinton; confirmed by the Senate, February 3, 1993; sworn in, February 5, 1993

Deputy Director:
Admiral William O. Studeman, US Navy, April 9, 1992, through remainder of Woolsey’s tenure (served as Acting Director, January 10, 1995 – May 10, 1995)

Born:
September 21, 1941, Tulsa, Oklahoma

Education:

Career Highlights:
• Captain, US Army, 1968-70; Program Analyst, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1968-70
• Adviser with US Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I (SALT I), Helsinki and Vienna, 1969-70
• National Security Council Staff, 1970
• General Counsel, Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, 1970-73
• Under Secretary of the Navy, 1977-79
• Delegate-at-Large, US-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and Nuclear and Space Talks (NST), Geneva, 1983-86
• President’s Commission on Strategic Forces, 1983-84; President’s Commission on Defense Management, 1985-86; President’s Commission on Federal Ethics Law Reform, 1989
• Ambassador and US Representative, negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 1989-91
• Private Consultant
Advancements in communications technology in the 1990s changed how the CIA managed the Intelligence Community (IC), established security standards, and collected foreign intelligence. At the same time, the CIA was adjusting to a declining intelligence budget in the post-Cold War environment.

After his election in 1992, President Bill Clinton chose R. James Woolsey as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), based on recommendations from foreign policy advisers. Clinton did not know Woolsey personally, and the two never developed a relationship. Woolsey brought impressive experience in national security, including service as Undersecretary of the Navy in the Carter Administration and as an ambassador in Europe negotiating arms control limitations on non-nuclear forces at the end of the Cold War. Woolsey continued DCI Robert Gates’s efforts to integrate the IC while also taking on new issues, such as improving the CIA’s relationship with law enforcement and redefining security standards.

In 1994, a CIA officer, Aldrich Ames, was arrested on charges of spying for the Soviet Union. An investigation revealed that Ames had been passing information to the KGB—the Soviet Union’s external intelligence agency—since 1985, initially motivated by money. Ames gave the KGB enough information to compromise at least 100 US operations and the identities of CIA assets, at least 10 of whom were executed. Woolsey reprimanded Ames’s supervisors, but Congress criticized the punishment as inadequate.

The Ames case highlighted the need to redefine security standards across the IC. Woolsey worked with senior officials in the Clinton Administration to establish a Joint Security Commission to review the IC’s security systems as new technologies emerged. The commission concluded that the US Government’s security systems were inadequate to identify top-tier threats and that security standards varied widely across the IC. It recommended improving personnel security and giving more resources to protect information management systems. Woolsey developed policies and practices aimed at fostering an exchange of information among intelligence and law enforcement elements, which he believed were critically important to US national security.

A new communications system called Intelink—which had recently been developed to unify electronic communications throughout the community—also drew criticism. Linking members of the IC electronically made sense from a community management viewpoint, but security concerns—stemming from the Aldrich Ames case—led some to question the new system and the ease with which sensitive information could be shared.

The Clinton Administration’s effort to return Haiti’s first democratically-elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, to power also turned to controversy during Woolsey’s tenure. In September 1991, Haiti’s security forces, with the broad support of the civilian elite, removed the newly-elected Aristide from power. The resulting violence against Aristide’s supporters caused many Haitians to flee their country. Both the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations tried to restore Aristide to power over a three-year period. The CIA’s analysis on Aristide was criticized by some policymakers and members of Congress as inaccurate and policy prescriptive. This became a major point of contention among the Agency, the Clinton Administration, and Capitol Hill, and it significantly impaired Woolsey’s relationships with the White House and Congress.

Improved security and IC integration were major themes during Woolsey’s tenure. But Woolsey struggled to carry out many of his initiatives, in large part because he never established a close relationship with President Clinton.

"We have slain a large dragon. But we live now in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes. And in many ways, the dragon was easier to keep track of."

- R. James Woolsey, February 2, 1993, in testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence explaining why intelligence resources are still needed in the post-Cold War era
John Mark Deutch

Tenure:
Director of Central Intelligence, May 10, 1995 – December 15, 1996

President Served:
Bill Clinton

Appointed:
March 19, 1995, by President Bill Clinton; confirmed by the Senate, May 9, 1995; sworn in, May 10, 1995

Deputy Director:
• Admiral William O. Studeman, US Navy, until July 3, 1995
• George J. Tenet, July 3, 1995, through remainder of Deutch’s tenure (served as Acting Director, December 15, 1996-July 11, 1997)

Born:
July 27, 1938, Brussels, Belgium

Education:
Amherst College, B.A., 1960; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), B.S., 1961, Ph.D., 1965

Career Highlights:
• Became US citizen, 1945
• Systems Analyst, Department of Defense, 1961-65
• Assistant Professor of Chemistry, Princeton University, 1966-69
• MIT faculty, 1970-77 and 1980-93; Professor of Chemistry, Chairman of Chemistry Department, Dean of Science, Provost
• Director of Energy Research, Acting Assistant Secretary for Energy Technology, and Under Secretary, US Department of Energy, 1977-80
• Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, 1993-94
• Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1994-95
• MIT Professor
The shift in roles and responsibilities that occurred throughout the Intelligence Community (IC) after the Cold War proved difficult to manage. Sharing information was now critical to addressing intelligence questions that spanned geographic and bureaucratic boundaries, but many resisted this new approach to national security.

For his second Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), President Bill Clinton appointed John Deutch because of his knowledge of national intelligence issues gained while serving as Deputy Secretary of Defense. Deutch’s Department of Defense (DoD) background left many concerned that Deutch’s loyalties would be split during a time when the Agency was competing with DoD for more authority and for shrinking resources.

Deutch’s decision to bring in personal aides and senior officers from outside the CIA to assume top positions created internal resentment, yet he succeeded in having a lasting effect on the CIA’s organization. Deutch aided in the establishment of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency—now the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency—first recommended by DCI Robert Gates. Deutch created the position of Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support to improve coordination with the military. He also created the first formal program encouraging employees to take positions in other IC agencies, strengthening personnel development.

The DCI’s role as manager of the IC proved to be a contentious matter during Deutch’s tenure. Intelligence committees in Congress wanted a more powerful DCI, while the defense committees wanted a more powerful Secretary of Defense. Unless Congress revised the National Security Act of 1947, DoD would have a decisive advantage because of its control over most of the intelligence budget. This essentially prevented the DCI from effectively managing the entire IC.

On March 2, 1995, President Clinton issued Presidential Directive, PDD-35, which grouped intelligence topics into tiers based on their importance to the president and policymakers. George Tenet, then-senior director for Intelligence Programs at the National Security Council, championed PDD-35. When Tenet became Deputy Director of Central Intelligence in July 1995, he and Deutch initially planned to focus the Agency’s efforts on “hard targets,” where collection was most difficult. Many feared that targets of lesser importance would have reduced resources; that concern eventually led Tenet and Deutch to settle on the concept of “global coverage,” which aimed to strike a balance between intelligence priorities.

President Clinton also urged the IC to intensify its efforts against terrorism as the threat continued to grow. As a result, Deutch created a Terrorism Warning Group—a dedicated national-level threat warning unit within the Counterterrorism Center—to provide warning on possible terrorist attacks against the US. Officers from across the IC filled the positions to review intelligence from all sources.

In December 1996, after President Clinton’s re-election, Deutch resigned as DCI. Despite his short tenure, he accomplished some important changes within the Agency. He also made an effort, just as other directors had, to integrate the community, but the DCI’s role in leading the IC remained uncertain.
Tenure:
Director of Central Intelligence, July 11, 1997 – July 11, 2004

Presidents Served:
• William J. Clinton
• George W. Bush

Appointed:
March 19, 1997, by President William J. Clinton; confirmed by the Senate, July 10, 1997; sworn in, July 11, 1997

Deputy Director:
• John E. McLaughlin, October 19, 2000, through remainder of Tenet’s tenure (served as Acting Director, July 11, 2004 – September 24, 2004)

Born:
January 5, 1953, Flushing, New York

Education:
Georgetown University, School of Foreign Service, B.S.F.S., 1976; Columbia University, School of International Affairs, M.I.A., 1978

Career Highlights:
• Legislative Assistant, Legislative Director, office of Senator John Heinz, 1982-85
• Staff Member, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), 1985-88
• Staff Director, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), 1988-93
• Member of President-elect Clinton’s national security transition team, 1992-93
• Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Intelligence Programs, National Security Council, 1993-95
• Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, 1995-97
• Visiting Professor at Georgetown University

George John Tenet
The CIA faced an unprecedented challenge after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Knowing that intelligence would be essential to American success in the campaign against al-Qa’ida, Agency leaders immediately began developing a blueprint for collecting intelligence and conducting operations against the terrorist group and its Afghan allies, the Taliban. Guiding the Agency during this demanding time was Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet, whose years of intelligence experience helped instill public confidence in the Agency’s ability to conquer the challenges ahead.

Tenet began his career in public service in 1982 in the office of former Senator H. John Heinz II of Pennsylvania, where he served as a legislative assistant and legislative director. In 1985, Tenet became a staff member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and was involved with monitoring arms control negotiations between the Soviet Union and the US. In 1988, Tenet was appointed staff director of SSCI, coordinating the staff support to the committee’s oversight and legislative activities. He worked to strengthen covert-action reporting requirements, to create a statutory inspector general for the CIA, and to reorganize the Intelligence Community (IC). In 1992, Tenet was a member of President Bill Clinton’s national security transition team and later served as special assistant to the president. In 1993, he was named senior director for intelligence programs at the National Security Council (NSC); he was named Deputy Director of Central Intelligence in July 1995. Two years later, he was appointed DCI.

The challenges Tenet faced as DCI were far different than those of his predecessors. Tenet’s mission was to revitalize the Agency, which had experienced a 25 percent decline in personnel from its Cold War peak, while also managing the continued integration of the IC. Moreover, Tenet came to office as the technology revolution of the 1990s was creating new opportunities for technical collection. Old familiar targets were also changing rapidly, forcing the Agency to upgrade its human intelligence.

Early in his tenure, Tenet placed particular emphasis on addressing the increased threat of terrorism. He expanded and revitalized the Agency’s Counterterrorism Center (CTC), adding new officers and taking steps to further integrate the analysts, operations officers and technical experts who were working there.

On October 12, 2000, the Navy destroyer USS Cole was attacked in the port of Aden, Yemen, by a small boat carrying suicide bombers. Al-Qa’ida operatives were identified as the perpetrators. Soon thereafter, Tenet asked CTC to develop a comprehensive plan to address terrorism; it was called the “Blue Sky” report. The paper outlined the Agency’s ideal strategy for fighting terrorism, assuming no resource or policy limitations. CTC recommended disrupting al-Qa’ida networks in Afghanistan and providing support for the Northern Alliance in an effort to combat al-Qa’ida’s host, the Taliban. The plan highlighted the need to employ a multifaceted approach to fighting terrorism, but it was not immediately implemented because of policy constraints and insufficient resources.

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the George W. Bush Administration called on the CIA to develop a plan to respond to the attacks. Agency leaders used the “Blue Sky” report as their guide. As quoted in Tenet’s book, At the Center of the Storm, Tenet explained to President George W. Bush, “We’re prepared to launch in short order an aggressive covert action program that will carry the fight to the enemy, particularly al-Qa’ida and its Taliban protectors.”

The CIA created a seven-man team that landed in Afghanistan on September 26, 2001; it linked up with the Northern Alliance to overthrow the Taliban and deny al-Qa’ida its safe haven. By mid-November of that year, all of Afghanistan had fallen to US and Northern Alliance forces. Usama Bin Ladin’s mountain

On September 29, 2001, three days after the first CIA team entered Afghanistan, Chief of Staff Andrew Card, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, President George W. Bush and DCI George Tenet held a meeting at Camp David (clockwise, from bottom left).
hideout of Tora Bora was cleared on December 22, 2001, but he escaped, marking the close of the first phase of Operation Enduring Freedom.

The Agency’s close relationship with President Bush and senior policy-makers after 9/11 moved the CIA into a pivotal role in national security decision making. Tenet promoted the CIA’s capabilities and carved a larger role for the Agency through increased funding and personnel.

Tenet led the Agency through one of its darkest periods, as it faced withering criticism for failing to detect and prevent the 9/11 plot. Later, the failure to find evidence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq after the toppling of Saddam Hussein brought increased scrutiny on the Agency and Tenet. WMD had formed the basis of the case to invade Iraq.

Tenet’s tenure—the second longest in the Agency’s history—ended on July 11, 2004. The CIA, like America, had changed as a result of the attacks on 9/11. Tenet led the Agency to adapt, to continue seeking the truth, and to make the tough decisions to protect our country.

“We will always call it as we see it … We cannot afford an environment to develop where analysts are afraid to make a call, where judgments are held back because analysts fear they will be wrong. Their work and these judgments make vital contributions to our nation’s security … We constantly learn and improve. And at no time will we allow our integrity or our willingness to make the tough calls be compromised.” DCI George Tenet’s remarks at Georgetown University, February 5, 2004.

“This is a time for all of us to come together, to bring all our talents to bear in a steely determination to do what we are called to do—protect our fellow citizens. It is our turn again to step up to the challenge, and to meet it as we meet all challenges: with commitment and courage. Put some spirit in your step, square your shoulders, focus your eyes. We have a job to do.”

- DCI George Tenet’s message to CIA employees on September 12, 2001
Porter Johnston Goss

Tenure:
• Director of Central Intelligence, September 24, 2004 – April 21, 2005
• Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, April 21, 2005 – May 26, 2006

President Served:
George W. Bush

Appointed:
August 10, 2004, by President George W. Bush; confirmed by the Senate, September 22, 2004; sworn in, September 24, 2004

Deputy Director:
• John E. McLaughlin, until November 12, 2004
• No Deputy Director from November 12, 2004 – July 15, 2005

Born:
November 1938, Waterbury, Connecticut

Education:
Yale University, B.A., 1960

Career Highlights:
• US Army intelligence officer, 1960-62
• Clandestine Service Officer, Central Intelligence Agency, 1962-72
• Small-business owner, newspaper founder; member of the city council and mayor, Sanibel, Florida, 1974-83
• Commissioner, Lee County (Florida) Commission, 1983-88; chairman, 1985-86
• Member of Congress, 14th District, Florida, 1989-2004
• Chair, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 1997-2004
• Co-chair, Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001
In the years following 9/11, management of the Intelligence Community (IC) came to the forefront. Integrating intelligence capabilities was now a critical priority. Just as Pearl Harbor led to the creation of the CIA, 9/11 prompted the US Government to reassess the effectiveness of the intelligence structure.

President George W. Bush nominated Porter Goss to be the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) following DCI George Tenet’s resignation in July 2004. Goss’s career in intelligence began when he served as a US Army intelligence officer at age 22. Two years later, Goss began working for the CIA as a case officer, mainly in Latin America. He left the Agency in 1972 when a serious illness forced his resignation.

Goss moved to Florida, founded a newspaper and became active in local politics. In 1989 he was elected to the House of Representatives, where he served 15 years. Throughout Goss’s time in Congress, he consistently defended the CIA. He chaired the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for much of his time on the Hill. After 9/11, he helped lead the joint Congressional inquiry into IC activities, seeking to identify gaps in America’s defense. Some members of Congress expressed concern that Goss was too politically partisan to lead the Agency, but in August 2004 he was confirmed as DCI.

Goss brought in personal staff from outside the Agency to assume senior positions at the CIA. CIA officers—especially veterans—were not eager to accept outsiders, and some clashed with Goss’s advisors. Several senior officers departed, including Deputy Director of Central Intelligence John McLaughlin and operations director Stephen Kappes (who later returned to serve as Deputy Director under Director Michael Hayden).

Goss’s tenure marked the beginning of a time of rapid growth for the CIA. President Bush asked him to increase CIA personnel across all directorates by as much as 50 percent; new analysts, case officers, engineers and foreign language-proficient officers joined the ranks. Goss also emphasized research and development to identify new approaches to combating terrorism.

On December 17, 2004, President Bush signed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act (IRTPA) to institute the changes recommended by the 9/11 Commission. The goal of the Act was to narrow the divide between foreign and domestic intelligence organizations, to create more effective management of the entire IC, and to promote intelligence sharing between organizations. The Act split the duties of the DCI and abolished that position; it created the positions of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to take over the management of the IC and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (D/CIA) to manage the Agency’s functions. Thus, Porter Goss became the last DCI and the first D/CIA.

Goss’s remarks at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, March 2, 2005:

“There is no contradiction between intelligence and freedom. America must acquire the secrets of its enemies if it is to remain free, and our skill and dedication in that calling are second to none.”

The D/CIA also assumed responsibility for overseeing the collection of human intelligence abroad by IC agencies and, under the guidance of the DNI, to coordinate the relationships between US intelligence agencies and their foreign counterparts. The new legislation also established the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, later renamed the National Counterterrorism Center, to integrate IC analysis of terrorist threats and to develop strategic operational plans related to counterterrorism.

The reactions to the changes were mixed. While understanding the need for reforms after 9/11, many at the Agency perceived the new structure as a loss of prestige for the CIA. Almost from the beginning, the relationship between D/CIA Goss and DNI John Negroponte was strained as both sought to define their new roles. Goss lost the president’s confidence and resigned in May 2006.
Tenure:
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, May 30, 2006 – February 13, 2009

President Served:
• George W. Bush
• Barack Obama

Appointed:
May 8, 2006, by President George W. Bush; confirmed by the Senate, May 26, 2006; sworn in, May 30, 2006

Deputy Director:
Stephen R. Kappes, July 24, 2006, through the remainder of Hayden’s tenure

Born:
March 17, 1945, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

Education:
Duquesne University, B.A., 1967; M.A., 1969

Career Highlights:
• Air Force intelligence officer, 1970-84
• Air Attaché in Bulgaria, 1984-86
• Political-Military Affairs Officer, Air Force Headquarters, 1986-89
• Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, National Security Council, 1989-91
• Chief, Secretary of the Air Force Staff Group, 1991-93
• Director of Intelligence, US European Command, 1993-95
• Commander, Air Intelligence Agency, and Director, Joint Command and Control Warfare Center, 1996-97
• Deputy Chief of Staff, UN Command and US Forces Korea, 1997-99
• Director, National Security Agency, 1999-2005
• Principal Deputy Director for National Intelligence, 2005-06
• Retired from the US Air Force on July 1, 2008 while serving as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
• Visiting Professor at George Mason University

Michael Vincent Hayden
General, US Air Force
In 2004, President George W. Bush signed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act (IRTPA), mandating a major reorganization of the Intelligence Community (IC). The law meant that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (D/CIA) would no longer oversee the coordination of the IC or provide daily briefings to the president. This role was given to the new position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI), leaving the CIA to focus on foreign intelligence collection, analysis and covert action.

After the departure of Porter Goss, the task of managing the CIA during this transition went to Air Force General Michael Hayden, who was appointed D/CIA by President Bush in May 2006. The selection of an active-duty military officer for the Agency’s chief worried some—as did General Hayden’s previous assignment as Deputy Director of National Intelligence—but Hayden made a relatively easy transition, perhaps because of his long and distinguished career in intelligence. Beginning in 1970, Hayden served as an Air Force intelligence officer for 14 years and later became the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA), where he served for six years—the longest tenure of any director in that agency’s history.

Agency officers welcomed Hayden’s management style, which promoted integration of the Agency’s directorates without interfering with their internal operations. Hayden further unified the workforce by developing a Strategic Intent—with the theme of “One Agency, One Community”—that focused on integration, leadership and building a 21st century infrastructure. As part of that plan, Hayden centralized communications to the workforce by developing an internal director’s website that provided a central repository for his speeches and workforce messages. The website also allowed officers to submit comments directly to him.

Hayden believed in investing in the workforce, promoting diversity and encouraging officers to engage in joint-duty assignments that gave them experience in other elements of the IC. When he left the CIA, Hayden explained to his successor, Leon Panetta, “You’re inheriting the best leadership team in the federal government. If you give them half a chance, they will not let you fail, the way they would not let me fail.” Hayden’s leadership team included the Deputy Director of the CIA, Stephen Kappes—a former Director of Operations whom Hayden asked to return after his resignation during DCI Porter Goss’s tenure—and the Associate Deputy Director of the CIA, Michael Morell.

Hayden inherited controversial issues tied to counterterrorism, notably the CIA’s detention and interrogation program for terrorist suspects. While Hayden understood the internal and public debates surrounding the program, he also believed that there were risks in ending it, and he discussed those views candidly with the public at the time.

Hayden also thought it was important to educate the public about the Agency’s mission. For example, he advocated the public disclosure of the role that intelligence played in detecting a nuclear reactor in Syria, arguing that the story would help Americans appreciate the value of CIA contributions to national security.

Hayden hoped to remain D/CIA after the 2008 presidential election, but President Barack Obama replaced him with Leon Panetta. The turmoil that had surrounded the Agency in the years after 9/11 quieted during Hayden’s tenure. He understood that the CIA had seen enough change, and he became a strong advocate for the Agency’s mission and its people.
Tenure:
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, February 13, 2009 – June 30, 2011

President Served:
Barack Obama

Appointed:
January 9, 2009, by President Barack Obama; confirmed by the Senate, February 12, 2009; sworn in, February 13, 2009

Deputy Director:
• Stephen R. Kappes, until May 5, 2010
• Michael J. Morell, May 6, 2010, through the remainder of Panetta’s tenure (served as Acting Director, June 30, 2011 – September 6, 2011)

Born:
June 28, 1938, Monterey, California

Education:
Santa Clara University, B.A., 1960; Santa Clara University Law School, LL.B., 1963

Career Highlights:
• Volunteered for active duty as 2nd Lieutenant, US Army, 1964
• Legislative assistant, US Senate, 1966-69
• Special Assistant to Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, and Director of Office of Civil Rights, 1969-70
• Executive Assistant to New York City Mayor John Lindsay, 1970-71
• Private law practice, 1971-77
• Member of Congress, 16th District, California, 1977-93
• Director, Office of Management and Budget, 1993-94
• White House Chief of Staff, 1994-97
• Co-Director, Panetta Institute for Public Policy, 1998-2009
• Secretary of Defense, 2011-13
The theme of change rippled throughout the government as Barack Obama took office as the 44th President of the United States. The new president moved quickly to fill the job of Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (D/CIA), nominating Leon Panetta, a choice that initially drew skepticism because of Panetta’s lack of experience in the intelligence field. Concerns quickly evaporated as Panetta won the loyalty of the Agency workforce, smoothed relations with Congress and established himself as a key member of the president’s national security team.

Panetta, the son of Italian immigrants, decided at an early age to commit his life to public service. He served in the US Army from 1964 to 1966 and then became a legislative assistant to US Senator Thomas Henry Kuchel (R-CA). In 1969, Panetta joined the Nixon Administration as the director of the Office of Civil Rights. When the administration instituted the so-called “Southern strategy” in an effort to reduce civil rights enforcement, putting pressure on Panetta to back off from enforcing Brown v. Board of Education, Panetta resisted and lost his job. Reflecting upon this experience, Panetta said, “I don’t think you are a good public servant unless you are protecting what you believe in. If you compromise, then you’re not worth much.”

Panetta was elected to the House of Representatives and served 16 years as a member of Congress from Northern California. Elected to a ninth term, Panetta relinquished his seat in 1993 when President Bill Clinton selected him to be the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. A year later, President Clinton asked Panetta to become the White House Chief of Staff, a position he held until the end of Clinton’s first term. In 1997, Panetta and his wife, Sylvia, co-founded the non-partisan Panetta Institute for Public Policy. Panetta resigned from the Institute after a decade there to begin his tenure at the CIA in February 2009.

Panetta emphasized strengthening “global coverage”—expanding the CIA’s ability to anticipate and respond to events across the entire globe—even while pressing the Agency to remain aggressive in its effort to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qa’ida. The campaign against al-Qa’ida was not without sacrifice: on December 30, 2009, seven CIA officers were killed and several others injured in a suicide bombing in Khowst Province, Afghanistan. The day after the attacks, Panetta said, “Those who fell yesterday were far from home and close to the enemy, doing the hard work that must be done to protect our country from terrorism. We owe them our deepest gratitude, and we pledge to them and their families that we will never cease fighting for the cause to which they dedicated their lives—a safer America.”

Not long after the tragedy at Khowst, the CIA developed promising leads in its search for al-Qa’ida’s founder, Usama Bin Ladin, and on May 2, 2011, bin Ladin was killed in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Nearly a decade after the September 11th attacks revealed the need for government organizations to work across bureaucratic lines, the operation showcased the benefits of close collaboration among intelligence agencies, as well as between the CIA and the military.

In his strategy for the Agency through 2015, Panetta emphasized the importance of a diverse workforce, the need to bolster foreign language capabilities, and the imperative of maintaining a global presence that would allow the Agency to respond with speed and agility to events anywhere in the world. Beginning in December 2010, this need for agility became especially acute, as a wave of revolutionary demonstrations starting in Tunisia rippled through the Arab world in what became known as the Arab Spring. The tumult forced the CIA to quickly reallocate resources to ensure the president and policymakers remained informed about the rapidly changing political landscape in the Middle East.

Panetta led the Agency during a time of profound loss and great achievement. He had never been an operations officer or an analyst at the CIA, but he nevertheless understood the Agency’s mission and had a deep appreciation for the needs of the men and women he led.
Tenure:
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, September 6, 2011 – November 9, 2012
President Served:
Barack Obama
Appointed:
April 28, 2011, by President Barack Obama; confirmed by the Senate, June 30, 2011; sworn in, September 6, 2011
Deputy Director:
Michael J. Morell through the remainder of Petraeus’s tenure (served as Acting Director, November 9, 2012 – March 8, 2013)
Born:
November 7, 1952, Cornwall-on-Hudson, New York
Education:
US Military Academy, B.S., 1974; Princeton University, M.P.A, 1985; Ph.D., 1987
Career Highlights:
• Commissioned into US Army, 1974
• Chief of Operations of the UN Force, Haiti, 1995
• Executive Assistant for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997-99
• Chief of Staff, XVIII Airborne Corps, 2000-01
• Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations of the NATO Stabilization Force and Deputy Commander of the US Joint Counterterrorism Task Force, Bosnia, 2001-02
• Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division, 2002-04 (Including Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003-04)
• Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq and NATO Training Mission–Iraq, 2004-05
• Commanding General, Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2005-07
• Commanding General, Multi-National Force–Iraq, 2007-08
• Commander, US Central Command, 2008-10
• Commander, NATO International Security Assistance Force Commander, US Forces–Afghanistan, 2010-11
• Retired from US Army, August 31, 2011

Retired
General, US Army (Retired)
David Petraeus was sworn in as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (D/CIA) five days before the 10th anniversary of 9/11. During his 14-month tenure, the Agency remained focused on the long campaign against al-Qa’ida, but it also stepped up global coverage to address an increasingly diverse set of challenges to the nation’s security, especially those arising from the political turmoil in the Arab World.

Petraeus served in the US Army for 37 years, beginning with his graduation as a “distinguished cadet” from the United States Military Academy in 1974. In the decade following the 9/11 attacks, Petraeus held six consecutive general officer commands, five of which were in combat. In addition to being in the vanguard of the fight to Baghdad in 2003, he also led the “surge” of troops into Iraq that began in 2007. He then became the head of the US Central Command and later took charge of the NATO International Security Assistance Force and US forces in Afghanistan, his final military assignment before leading the CIA. He retired from the Army to take the position of D/CIA.

As D/CIA, Petraeus developed several initiatives to prepare the next generation of Agency leaders, creating the Chief of Corporate Learning position and launching the Director’s Scholars Program, designed to help promising officers attend graduate school and improve the CIA’s overall mission performance. Petraeus also focused on improving the CIA’s technology infrastructure and upgrading operational tradecraft to ensure that Agency officers were equipped to take advantage of the latest changes in technology.

In 2012, the CIA celebrated its 65th anniversary and the 50th anniversary of the Original Headquarters Building (OHB). In January 2012, during a ceremony commemorating the OHB anniversary, Petraeus referred to the Biblical quotation that is fixed in stone in the OHB lobby: “It is in these marble walls,” he said, “that our Agency honors its past and proclaims its fundamental mission in words borrowed from the Gospel according to John: ‘And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.’”

On September 11, 2012, militants attacked the US consulate and a nearby annex in Benghazi, Libya, killing four Americans, including the US Ambassador to Libya. This event prompted a series of reviews and investigations by the US Government near the end of Petraeus’s tenure.

Petraeus encouraged a spirit of innovation across the Agency, and his leadership skills, relationships with foreign leaders, and understanding of international affairs ensured that the CIA had a prominent seat at the table whenever the president faced important decisions on national security.

“I HAVE FOUND THROUGH HARD EXPERIENCE THAT, FOR ANY ORGANIZATION, THERE IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR CONTINUALLY LEARNING, ADAPTING AND IMPROVING.”

- D/CIA David Petraeus announcement to the workforce on December 21, 2011
Tenure:
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, March 8, 2013 – Present

President Served:
Barack Obama

Appointed:
January 7, 2013, by President Barack Obama; confirmed by the Senate, March 7, 2013; sworn in, March 8, 2013

Deputy Director:
Michael Morell, until August 9, 2013
Avril Haines

Born:
September 22, 1955, North Bergen, New Jersey

Education:
Fordham University, B.A., 1977; The University of Texas at Austin, M.A., 1980

Career Highlights:
• Various posts in CIA, 1980-1999
• Chief of Staff, Director of CIA, 1999-2001
• Deputy Executive Director, CIA, 2001-03
• Director, Terrorist Threat Integration Center, 2003-04
• Interim Director, National Counterterrorism Center, 2004-05
• President and CEO, The Analysis Corporation, 2005-08
• White House Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, 2009-13
“IT IS INCUMBENT ON US NOT ONLY TO ANTICIPATE THE CHANGES THAT LIE AHEAD BUT ALSO TO ADJUST OUR TRADECRAFT, CAPABILITIES, PRIORITIES, AND WORK PROCESSES ACCORDINGLY AND TO LEVERAGE OPTIMALLY THE TREMENDOUS TALENT AND ENERGY THAT RESIDE WITHIN OUR WORKFORCE.”

- D/CIA John Brennan’s message to CIA employees on March 18, 2013