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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ~~GROUP~~ AGENCY
2430 E STREET NW.
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

7 July 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The following information has been transmitted [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)(5)
to the Central Intelligence Agency.

1. The Austrian Government is convinced that at this time the Soviet action against Yugoslavia will not change the situation in other areas. [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)(5)

[redacted] in their opinion, the Kremlin will not compromise with Tito. Tito, although the Serbs are tending to give in, is in too strong a position with the Croats in Yugoslavia. [redacted] Austrian officials believe that the Soviets are delaying only while seeking a device similar to the Markos movement in Greece to enable them to conceal the true nature of their action and to give the impression of a popular reaction in Yugoslavia.

2. [redacted] the Soviets are massing troops in important numbers in Rumania and Hungary. [redacted] since the Kremlin cannot permit Tito to undermine the stability of the entire Eastern block [redacted] the Soviets will move into Yugoslavia but [redacted] Tito will offer the strongest resistance to such a move. [redacted] recommended that the United States offer Tito secret, diplomatic and economic assistance at present and, if the Jugs fight seriously, overt military aid. 1.3(a)(4)(5)

3. It is also believed that the Soviets are aggravating Albanian-Yugoslav relations in order to permit the Soviets action against Yugoslav ports and to seal the Yugoslavs off from Trieste.

R. H. HILLENKOETTER
Rear Admiral, USN
Director of Central Intelligence

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
20 OCT 1992

cc - Executive Secretary
National Security Council

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