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HR70-14

Deputies' Meeting

HR70-14

Monday, 29 September 1952

PRESENT: General Smith, Messrs. Wisner, Wolf, Becker, Gen. Barber, Mr. Earman

General Smith:

a. Referred to the item in the Log for 26 September concerning Park Armstrong's proposed training plan and stated that (1) he approved CIA participation, and (2) we should employ qualified people who would take advantage of this proposal as a part of their initial training. Mr. Becker pointed out that there was a possibility that these "trainees", after completion of their tour of duty with State, might decide to remain with that Department on a permanent basis and, therefore, he intended to go over the program with Col. Baird in an attempt to insure their return to CIA. The Director said he recognized this fact; however, if the "trainees" in question could make a contribution to the Government as a whole he would not object to their remaining with the Department of State. In this connection, the Director said that if these people were properly indoctrinated in the beginning he believed they would return to us of their own "free will". After some further discussion, the Director also approved Mr. Becker's recommendation that certain selected CIA officers who had been with us for a period of time could also take advantage of this program provided they could earn their keep. Nevertheless, participation in this program would in the main be for newly selected career officers.

b. Referred to a letter he had received from [redacted] who had requested an appointment. After being briefed by Messrs. Wisner and Becker on [redacted] activity, the DCI asked Mr. Earman to advise [redacted] he would be unable to see him. However, if he had anything of importance to discuss he should get in touch with Mr. Wisner.

Mr. Wisner:

a. Discussed JCS action on the Balmer paper (control of CIA activities in a theater of war) and noted that (1) the Navy and the Air Force approved the recommendation that CIA be considered as a "Fourth Force", (2) the Army was against this concept and preferred that control of our activities be parcelled out to the various staff divisions of the theater commanders, (3) he understood that the Director had discussed this matter with Gen. Hull, (4) based on this discussion the Army had prepared

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Mr. Wisner: (Continued)

a new paper which indicated that such a position was in accordance with the desires of the DCI, (5) he had been advised in all probability a new paper embodying the revised position of the Army would be submitted to the Joint Chiefs, (6) this paper would then be approved by the Joint Chiefs and sent to the DCI for his views since from all intents and purposes it would indicate that our previous objections had been met, (7) Gen. Cabell had recommended that JCS consideration of this paper be held in abeyance until after the Joint Chiefs had received two briefings from CIA on the Far East and Europe. The Director stated that (1) he had briefly discussed the paper in question with Gen. Hull, however, he had not seen the original paper nor the proposed changes to be made by the Army; (2) he had advised Gen. Hull of the CIA position, i.e. "Fourth Force"; (3) if necessary, he would call Hull on this matter, however, if agreement could not be reached the matter would be placed before the NSC.

b. Reported that we had an opportunity to penetrate a [redacted] activity and we had a well-qualified officer who could do the job. The DCI approved.

[redacted]

and d. Requested and received the Director's approval to record the Merger ~~in~~ Reduction of Projects Briefing to be presented to the DCI on 30 September. In this connection, however, the Director stated that this was, by and large, an informal meeting and he did not desire anyone come to him at a later date with a statement that he (DCI) had said "so and so" at the above meeting.

Mr. Becker:

a. Referred to the item in the Current Intelligence Bulletin of [redacted] concerning [redacted] and noted that this information should be seriously considered.

b. Briefly discussed his conversation with Kingman Douglas on 27 September in regard to the Brownell Report.

c. Said that CIA comments on the paper, "Summary evaluation of the Capabilities of the USSR to Injure Continental United States" would be ready for the Director's consideration on 30 September.

[redacted]

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