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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT

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HR70-14

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SOURCE: A reliable source

Appraisal of Content: 3.

1. According to informant, in granting full sovereignty to the German Democratic Republic, the Soviets made a political move designed to present to the world a picture of normal relations between the Soviet Union and the DDR. He pointed out that the replacement of Vladimir Semenovich Semenov by Georgiy Maksimovich Pushkin was consistent with the Soviet policy of granting sovereignty to the DDR and withdrawing many Soviet troops from the country.¹ For, despite his official position, Semenov was considered by informant as essentially a military man.² Pushkin, on the other hand, is a career diplomat and his appointment was intended as a manifest exchange of ambassadors between two sovereign states. These moves were made by the Soviets in a deliberate attempt to disrupt the creation of EDC.
2. The Soviet proposal for a conference to discuss an all-European security pact was also interpreted by informant as an effort to prevent the realization of EDC. Informant also thought that such a conference would find the Soviets willing to agree on almost any point except the rearmament of Germany; at the same time, disarmament would be the main theme of the Soviets. As a member of an all-European security organization, the Soviets would not feel compelled to maintain a large armed force. So long as the Soviets are not a member of such an organization, however, they feel it can be directed against them. It is their purpose, therefore, to exert every effort to prevent the formation of EDC.
3. Informant opined that the most "poisonous" issue confronting the Soviets is the settlement of the German problem. He further stated that he could not see how it could be resolved in a peaceful manner. He felt that, should the U.S. agree to withdraw from West Germany, the Soviets might be willing to make concessions on an Austrian peace treaty. Two reasons were advanced for doubting that the Soviets would consider free elections in Germany. The vote in West Germany would be overwhelmingly against them and, because of considerable opposition toward the Soviets in the country, the vote in East Germany might

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likewise be unfavorable to them. The Soviets learned from the Austrian elections just how disastrous free elections could be to them.

- 4. Inasmuch as the Soviet Union feels that the U.S. could not possibly agree to withdraw her troops from West Germany, informant believed that Soviet concessions on an Austrian peace treaty would be their strongest argument in any conference on Austria. Informant admitted that the USSR could not validly defend her position on Austria should that country be discussed as a separate issue. By linking the Austrian question to the German issue, the Soviets feel they are in a good position in any discussion of an Austrian peace treaty; they are positive that the U.S. will not agree to withdraw from West Germany and will therefore counter any U.S. demands with their own demand for such a concession by the U.S.

- 1. [] Comment: No general withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Germany has occurred.
- 2. [] Comment: There is no indication that Semenov is a military man; so far as is known, he has always been a career foreign service officer.

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