**ATTENTION:** This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA, and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REPLIED TO</th>
<th>RECEIVED</th>
<th>RELEASED</th>
<th>SEEN BY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFFICE</td>
<td>SIGNATURE DATE TIME DATE SIGNATURE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTICE OF DETACHMENT:** When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DOWNGRADED</th>
<th>DESTROYED</th>
<th>Dispatched (outside CIA)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TO</td>
<td>BY (Signature)</td>
<td>TO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BY (Signature)</td>
<td>WITNESSED BY (Signature)</td>
<td>BY (Signature)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>OFFICE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FORM NO. 26 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.**
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Testimony on ICBM, Symington Committee

18 April 1956
pp. 42-43:

Mr. Dulles: We also estimate that an intercontinental ballistic missile (Soviet I.S.), with a range of 5,500 nautical miles, could be ready for series production in 1960-1961. That is our best estimate, and that would be subject to check as we get further intelligence, and that date may be altered one way or the other as we get firmer intelligence . . . . as to their progress in the missile field.

This, of course, assumes certain technical breakthroughs on which we are working and on which they are working, and we can't predict with firmness the date when those will be achieved, but this is the best estimate that we have, and we think it should be accepted for planning purposes.
Page 100

Mr. Dulles: By mid-1959, we estimate that . . . some large-yield warheads would be available for use in ballistic missiles . . .

23 April 1956

pp. 205-208:

Gen. Watson: Now, further, in the propulsion field, in the liquid rocket motor field, they have pioneered in the 100-metric-ton variety, having had a degree of success in these 100-metric-ton fields around the period 1953 . . .

Mr. Hamilton: Would research and development in that field contribute to the development of a larger power unit for an intercontinental missile?

Gen. Watson: Oh yes, any research and development on the use of liquid propellants and fuel of that size would help . . .

24 April 1956

pp. 231-286:

Mr. Hamilton: When, in your opinion, did they first start emphasising as a high priority the development of an intercontinental missile?

Mr. Dulles: Well, I think we have testified as to that. We have given you the German experiment that the Soviets took over in part, very substantial part, in 1945, and the
fact that since that time they have been developing their capability; and obviously anybody in this field has the intercontinental missile as his final objective.

Mr. Hamilton: But you have mentioned, for example, as I recall it, in the case of systems, you have used the phrase "redoubled their effort." Has their work in the very long range ballistic missile been characterised by one of steady emphasis, or has there been a time during the period in which you have had the impression that they, so to speak, started hitting the problems much harder than they had heretofore?

Mr. Dulles: When you have developed a nuclear capability your ballistic missile takes on greatly increased value, and when you establish a thermonuclear warhead, then your ballistic missile goes up greatly in the scale. (Soviet demand on German engineers to develop IRBM, Spring 1949, used as example: H.S.)

pp. 291-292:

Mr. Hamilton: Mr. Dulles, how would you characterise the extent of effort the Soviets have expanded upon development of the IRBM? . . . .

Mr. Dulles: I would assume that they would put high priority on the intermediate missile, because it would be quite effective vis-a-vis overseas bases, and it would obviously also...
be an effective weapon to back up their diplomatic activities vis-a-vis the states of Europe and NATO.

(Note political implications of release: H.S.)

I cannot answer how they would rate that priority as against the ICBM . . . .