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HR70-14

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Berlin

I. Urgent Matters

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HISTORICAL COLLECTION
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1. Access. A decision is needed as to whether we will allow East German paper stamping, so that we can communicate this decision to our allies in the consultation which Foy Kohler leaves on Thursday to undertake. The President might ask the Secretary of State for a recommendation on this point by close of business on Monday. (The Secretary has already made up his mind that he is ready to accept paper stamping, according to Mr. Acheson.)

2. Quiet Approach to the Soviets. The US memorandum to the other three allied powers speaks of the possibility of an early quiet approach to the Soviet leadership. The object of this approach, while the Kremlin is still feeling the effects of our \$3 billion announcement and fearing more of the same, would be to try to work out an understanding with the Soviets before we are both locked into intransigence by a deepening crisis, that the East Germans will maintain present access procedures after a treaty. This proposal has met with approval in the State Department but is all too likely to die of bureaucratic anemia if it is not encouraged. The President might early in the week indicate his interest in this possibility to the Secretary of State, and ask the Secretary to report to him directly from Paris about allied reactions to it.

II. Other Matters

3. a comprehensive proposed program of preparations for creating turmoil in East Germany. The State Department (notably Chip Bohlen) has serious misgivings as to whether this program does not go too far (i. e., whether the recommended actions might not get out of our control prematurely). Henry Kissinger is following this one. His object will be to get State to come up with a recommendation to the President as to what should and should not be done in the way of preparations.

4. Long-Term Military Buildup. McNamara and the Chiefs are still wrestling over the amount and composition of such a build-up. The President might indicate his continuing interest in having DOD come up with some proposal for a long-term buildup which focuses on the main need -- expanding the non-nuclear combat forces -- instead of the kind of "balanced"

military

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No additional material released as a result of this review.

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military buildup the Chiefs are proposing, which would assign only about 10 percent of a \$11 billion program to the ground forces. Such an expression of Presidential interest might be helpful to McNamara in his dealings with the Chiefs.

5. How We Would Fight. The whole question of military courses of action in the event access is blocked needs to be studied more effectively than it has been to date. There are all sorts of problems involved in getting such effective study. For example, the Joint Chiefs now say that they can't study a substantial non-nuclear ground action in Europe until Basic National Security Policy has been revised, since present (Eisenhower) NSC policy prohibits such action. It may be useful to discuss ways and means of getting on with these studies with Secretary McNamara. One possibility would be to charge a select State-DOD group with this task under the leadership of General Taylor. There are some useful precedents for this. The Group might function nominally as a sub-committee of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group. It might remand the more detailed studies to SACEUR. McNamara may have different ideas. An early discussion of the subject with him seems indicated.

6. Basic Political Proposals. State should be asked to come up with concrete proposals as to our basic negotiating positions on Germany and Berlin within at least a month. Since the Secretary of State and EUR will be tied up with consultations for the next two or three weeks, it might be useful to suggest to State that the Policy Planning Council get into the act.

7. Nuclear War

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7. Nuclear War: How To Make It More Flexible. Paul Nitze suggests that an early discussion between the President and the Chiefs on this issue is necessary. Questionnaires and directives will, he feels, accomplish nothing.

8. Reserves. It might be useful to tell Secretary McNamara that the President will want considerable advance notice before DOD makes any proposal to call up large scale reserves. The Interdepartmental Coordinating Group could then study the political and military pros and cons. Depending on the outcome of that study, the President could indicate to McNamara whether he would be receptive toward the proposal. It would not be good to have the proposal formally made, and on the records, until the President has decided whether he would be receptive.

9. Arms Control. A task force should be set up to study safeguards against war by miscalculation which could be prepared or adopted during the next six months. Such measures will never be more needed than during a Berlin crisis. This might be put to McCloy as a matter of urgency upon his return to Moscow. Henry Kissinger is interested in the problem and would be a good man to follow up on it from the White House. (There are other Berlin-connected disarmament problems, which will be treated in a separate memorandum.)

10. Custody and Control of Nuclear Weapons in Europe. Against the background of a Berlin crisis, it is essential to strengthen U.S. custody of nukes in Europe, so that they won't go off by themselves under the stress of tension and heavy fighting. This was in one of the recent White House directives to DOD. Secretary McNamara is going to look into this on his current trip to Europe. State is also planning to propose to DOD a joint State-DOD group to come up with needed improvements. It may be useful to keep on reminding McNamara of White House interest in this question and to support the State proposal for a joint State-DOD working group. DOD and JCS have been studying this question since the Acheson report and have so far only succeeded in neutralizing each other.

11. Increased Atlantic Cohesion. A Berlin crisis - with the attendant felt need for greater interdependence - should provide an opportunity for bold moves in this direction. A group has been set up with the State Department to study these possibilities. It might be useful to remind the Secretary of State from time to time of White House interest in the matter.

12. Congressional Consultation. It should be made clear to the Secretary of State that basic responsibility for continuing Congressional consultation on Berlin lies with him. He should undertake such consultation, ask other cabinet officers to do so as appropriate, and propose Presidential action when it is needed.