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
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
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Copy #
25 July 1961

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS CONCERNING THE BERLIN SITUATION
SINCE 27 JUNE 1961*

Late
May



28 May

In a speech at Freiburg, Saxony, the authoritative East German radio commentator Karl Eduard von Schnitzler said that, at the moment the GDR concludes a peace treaty with the USSR, the Soviet controller will walk out of the Berlin Air Safety Center in West Berlin. If West Germany and the Allied powers do not accept an East German controller, "no more air traffic to Berlin would be possible." 

* Several items of information dealing with occurrences prior to 27 June that were not available for inclusion in Berlin Report dated 27 June have been added to this chronology.

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Early
June

[redacted] summer leaves for members of the ward-level East Berlin central district were cancelled on the grounds that the international situation is such that all party officials are required to remain at their posts. [redacted] similar instructions were sent out to all the higher level SED party organizations in East Berlin. [redacted]

8-9
June

[redacted] Soviet Marshals Malinovsky and Grechko met at Potsdam with Ulbricht, Acting Premier Willi Stoph, Karl Maron, General Hoffman and the East Berlin prefect of police to discuss measures to be implemented in order to effect a blockade of West Berlin. Disposition of air defense units and anti-aircraft missiles to interfere with Allied air access reportedly were discussed, and plans were laid for a military alert along the Zonal frontier. Plans for putting East German and Soviet fighter planes in the air corridors to block Western flights reportedly were also discussed, and there was some mention of mobilizing Warsaw Pact forces--including the Czechs and Poles--at some point in the buildup of a Berlin crisis. [redacted]

17 Jun

At a Bonn "Day of German Unity" rally, Adenauer reaffirmed his 1957 joint declaration with President Eisenhower that reunification would not be used to achieve military advantage and that the US and Federal Republic were prepared to enter a European security arrangement which would provide assurances of non-aggression to the Soviet Union. [redacted]


19 Jun

Meetings of the SPD executive council and election campaign leadership reportedly revealed divergent opinion on Western countermeasures to the Soviet pressures on Berlin. Brandt's proposal that the SPD councils lay some groundwork for Berlin negotiations was rejected by Deputy Chairman Wehner, in the interests of election campaign strategy. The SPD leadership is said to have agreed that the party should make no public proposals for negotiations lest they invite Adenauer to attack SPD "weakness." Party chairman Ollenhauer reportedly stated that the Berlin crisis might cause President Luebke to try for a postponement of the 17 September national election. [redacted]

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Mid-
June

[redacted] USSR Presi-
dent Brezhnev told a group of Greek Communists
visiting Moscow that there will be no war, that
the USSR will sign a separate treaty, that there
will be "free elections" and Berlin will become a
self-governing city and that the Soviets gradually
will turn over access controls to the GDR. Brezhnev
reportedly told the Greeks that free elections at
the present time would result in the election of
Western-oriented candidates; however, he said,
signature of a separate peace treaty would force
the West to deal with the GDR--even though Moscow
would not suddenly relinquish controls to the East
Germans and thus permit the West to provoke a
conflict. [redacted]



20 Jun

A decree scheduled to go into effect 1 August,
published in the official East German gazette, the
Gesetzblatt, #36, made it compulsory for foreign
aircraft to register with a GDR air safety center

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on entering or leaving the state's territory. The text of the decree provides that foreign aircraft are permitted to use radio equipment in the GDR "if this rests on reciprocity or is called for by agreements." Where neither is applicable, aircraft must obtain permission of the Ministry of Post and Communications to operate radios in GDR airspace. Radio communications must be limited to messages involving flight safety.

[redacted]

An American correspondent, married to a former Soviet citizen and a regular visitor to the USSR, told the US Embassy in Moscow that his in-laws were more pessimistic than usual about the international situation and feel that the danger of war has increased. He also reported speculation that current shortages of foodstuffs, particularly milk and meat, can be traced to stockpiling by the Soviet government.

21-27
June

3,021 refugees, including 510 young men of military age, were processed at Marienfelde--an increase of 42 over the preceding week and 709 more than during the corresponding week of 1960, when East German farmers were fleeing collectivization.

22 Jun

[redacted] at some time during its plenum of 22 June, the Czech central committee met with Prague journalists to inform them that the USSR will sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany and seal off Berlin in September.

West German Foreign Ministry Under-Secretary Carstens told a number of correspondents [redacted] that a separate peace treaty would constitute a violation by the Soviets of the Potsdam Agreement, of the "principle of international law" of self-determination, and of the directives of the 1955 Geneva Conference. He emphasized that an earlier statement by a government press spokesman to the effect that the GDR, as a puppet, could sign a treaty with USSR was false and a "bad mistake." He also said the treaty would be valid only if negotiated and signed by all former belligerents, and that it should be made clear to the USSR that a separate treaty is unacceptable to the West which is prepared to consider a wide range of diplomatic, political,

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economic and military countermeasures. He noted, however, that the possibility of severing diplomatic relations between Bonn and Moscow in retaliation for a separate treaty "had been abandoned." He thought a partial or total trade embargo possible, although it would work only if the West were united, and considered any appeal to the UN useless.

The Soviet controller at the Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC) protested that an American C-47 on a local flight was overflying Oranienberg airfield at 100 meters, interfering with flights, and requested corrective action. The US Mission concluded after investigation that the C-47 had not violated quadripartite safety rules and so notified the Soviets.

[redacted] that there exists in his office the impression that Defense Minister Strauss is profoundly "depressed" over the recent turn of events, even though in public appearances Strauss has been his usual ebullient self. [redacted] suggested Strauss acts like a man with a "feeling of impending crisis," which is something quite different from his former confidence that the Soviets were unwilling to take great risks. [redacted] also implied that Adenauer's optimism following the Vienna talks may have been more apparent than real.

Analysis [redacted] confirmed two additional GSEFG SAM sites at Halle and Dessau in East Germany (total now 12).

23 Jun

[redacted] in Copenhagen noted indications that local "high level" discussion of the Berlin problem had included speculation that the West might "live" with a Soviet-East German peace treaty, provided that the GDR refrained from impeding access to or travel within Berlin and recognized other Western rights within the city. The Embassy's impression was somewhat strengthened by a 24 June editorial in usually well-informed newspaper Information--occasionally used to float trial balloons--which advocated that the Western powers consider the merits of negotiating the issue of Berlin and seize the initiative by presenting Khrushchev with new proposals, possibly along the line suggested by Senator Mansfield.

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- 24 Jun The West Berlin Senat informed the Western powers the Berlin Chapter of the Expellees' Federation plans to hold its annual observance of "Tag der Heimat" in West Berlin on 1-3 September, causing US Mission Berlin to note that the GDR may again, as in 1960, attempt to restrict West German access to Berlin. [redacted]
- 24-25 June Dr. Alfons Dalma, deputy editor-in-chief of the pro-Adenauer Muenchner Merkur and a good friend of Defense Minister Strauss, argued in a published article that a nuclear retaliatory capacity for the Federal Republic and covert agitation directed against the GDR are two means by which the West could deter Khrushchev from provoking a Berlin crisis. [redacted]
- 25-Jun CBS correspondent Daniel Schor reported from Berlin that Communist sources had alerted him to "an important move early in September," when it is believed the East German regime will clamp permanent, rigid controls on the sector borders to prevent East Germans and nationals of other East European countries from entering West Berlin. Schor reported that the pretext for the clampdown will be the 1-3 September refugee rally in West Berlin--which last year resulted in a "baby blockade." [redacted]
- 26 Jun In a speech at Buna, Ulbricht charged that Secretary Rusk had "let the cat out of the bag" by acknowledging at a press conference that US interests in Berlin are directly related to "US national interest." Ulbricht retorted that if US interests warrant the maintenance of RIAS in West Berlin, then East German interests demand the establishment of a GDR radio in Washington. Ulbricht challenged the Secretary's statement that the US had concluded a treaty with Japan because the latter had a "representative government," arguing that the Japanese Government "represents only finance capital." He contested what he said were US efforts to act as an arbiter of International Law and to determine what constitutes "representative government," sarcastically referring to the fact that the US recognizes the governments of "Fascist" Spain and Portugal and "semi-feudal" Iran as "representative." Ulbricht also said that the "peace treaty will have such content that it can apply to

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all of Germany, i.e., that thereby the West German Federal Republic can have the possibility of attaching itself to this treaty later on." He also noted that the GDR would apply for admission to the United Nations immediately after conclusion of the treaty. [redacted]

28 Jun

Khrushchev's speech at a Moscow rally in honor of the North Vietnamese premier contained the usual mixture of threats and inducements which he still hopes will bring the West to make concessions on Berlin and Germany at the bargaining table. He served notice that urgings of Western "hotheads" for mobilization and other military measures will not deter the USSR from signing a separate peace treaty with East Germany and warned that Moscow is "taking the necessary measures" to counter any Western moves to declare a mobilization. Khrushchev, on the other hand, complained that the West is distorting his proposals on Berlin and Germany and stressed his readiness to reopen negotiations. He contended Soviet proposals would protect West Berlin's right to choose its own social and economic system under international guarantees. He also sought to minimize the consequences of a separate treaty by again stating "there will be no blockade of West Berlin of any kind" and no "restrictions" on access, provided that interested powers reach an agreement with East Germany. Khrushchev also hinted that a second meeting with President Kennedy might be "useful," although he did not link this directly to the Berlin question. [redacted]

In reply to a parliamentary question, Prime Minister Macmillan reiterated "we and our allies have certain obligations in Germany and we do not intend to abandon them. Among these obligations is the preservation of the freedom of the people of West Berlin. The Soviet Government must come to realize that we intend to defend this and that we cannot countenance proposals inconsistent with it." [redacted]

Bundestag deputy Fritz Erler, the SPD leadership's military affairs expert, told General Norstad that there is a growing consensus in the SPD and CDU that in the event of interference with non-military traffic to West Berlin Bonn should immediately sever economic ties with the GDR and subsequently--if necessary--with

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the USSR. He also indicated that the government of the Federal Republic is leaning toward the idea of a Berlin airlift--if only to buy time for negotiations--and cited a blockade of Soviet shipping in the Baltic as a last resort. Erler predicted that neither Bonn nor West Berlin would object to the development by the West of a flexible and wide-ranging tactical approach to the Berlin problem, so long as the tenet of German reunification was not jeopardized. [redacted]

Ambassador Dowling reported that working-level officials of the West German government regard financial-commercial countermeasures as the Federal Republic's trump card in the event of a Berlin crisis but feel it should be played only in the case of "serious provocation," such as a denial of civilian access, and not with the "mere conclusion" of a separate East German peace treaty. The officials were also said to argue that credit and trade cutoffs cannot be effective unless the NATO Allies participate. [redacted]

Forster of the West German Foreign Office told the US, French and British Embassies in Bonn that Mayor Brandt wrote Bundesrat President Meyers on 27 June, urging that the Bundesrat hold a session in Berlin before the close of the legislative period which ended on 14 July. Brandt told Meyers that he appreciated the fact that Foreign Minister Brentano did not agree with his view, but argued that the possibility of a Berlin meeting of the Bundesrat had been in "the public arena" since April and failure to hold it would suggest to the East Germans that the West was succumbing to Communist pressures. [redacted]

28-30
June

[redacted]

28 Jun-
4 July

3,714 refugees, including 609 military-age males, were processed at Marienfelde during the week of 28 June - 4 July--693 more than during the previous week and 1,262 more than the corresponding week of

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1960. The Federal Refugee Ministry in Bonn registered 17,791 refugees during the month of May, and 19,198 in June. A total of 103,159 registered during the first six months of 1961; 88,506 had registered by the same time last year. [redacted]

29 Jun

In a 3-hour interview with American writer Leon Uris, East German agitprop boss Gerhard Eisler banged on the table and vehemently denounced the Radio In the American Sector (RIAS), shouting "RIAS must go!" Pressed by Uris for some explanation, Eisler conceded that RIAS was the "most effective Allied instrument in West Berlin" and complained that it has forced East German authorities against their will to reveal a great number of developments in the GDR. [redacted]

Couve de Murville told Ambassador Gavin that, in addition to impressing the FLN of France's determination to solve the Algerian problem, the DeGaulle government hopes that the recall in mid-July of the 11th Infantry Division from Algeria to Lorraine would evidence their concern over the Berlin situation. The 11th Division will constitute France's contribution to the contingency planning force available for use in the area of Berlin. [redacted]

West German interzonal trade chief Leopold told the Berlin Mission that he does not feel GDR trade policies reflect any expectation of a Berlin crisis in 1961. Although he found disturbing the paucity of long-term purchases through interzonal trade, Leopold minimized the extent to which the GDR has shifted trade from Western European countries. [redacted]

30 Jun

Bundestag President Gerstenmaier presented a formal bi-partisan declaration favoring negotiations leading to a peace treaty based on self-determination by all Germans. Rejecting Moscow's proposal for talks between East and West Germany, the statement called for negotiations which would "predetermine" the military and political status of a reunited Germany and pledged that West Germany would give any reasonable guarantee that a reunified Germany would be "a reliable partner of all their neighbors." [redacted]

[redacted] got the impression that both were concerned about the Berlin situation. In

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reply to a question from [redacted] admitted to feeling discouraged and depressed, at which she replied without elaborating that it is necessary to be "sensible." [redacted]

30 Jun-
1 July

[redacted] urged the west to begin as soon as possible a "peaceful counteroffensive," rather than relying solely upon technical-military preparations to meet the threat of bloc action against Berlin. He claimed to have information that neither the Soviets nor the East Germans intend significant military action. He revealed his plan to propose that the West call a peace conference on Germany. [redacted] that the Soviets would welcome a Western proposal to discuss the military status of a reunited Germany and remarked that it was his impression that Washington was prepared to discuss several aspects of the German question. [redacted]

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1-2 July In reply to a question allegedly submitted to the editors of Junge Welt, GDR agitprop specialist Gerhard Eisler denied that the Ulbricht regime plans to use force to expell the Western powers from Berlin if they refuse to sign a peace treaty. "No one has considered this and no one thinks of it." But, he warned, "despite our peaceful spirit and our warm desire to come to an understanding... under no circumstance will we tolerate a disregard of our sovereignty or threats against the GDR and an attack by water, land or in the air."

2 July A US Military Liaison Mission officer and driver were detained, harangued, photographed, denounced in front of troops as "spies" who "should be hanged" and had their papers confiscated by a Soviet colonel near a non-restricted assembly point at Belzig in East Germany. The chief of the Soviet External Relations Branch (SERB), anticipating a protest from the Chief USMLM, requested the latter to call on 4 July. During their 2 1/2 hour meeting the SERB chief said that the next time an American officer was apprehended in any improper activity, he would order the offender held on the spot until he and the Chief USMLM could arrive on the scene to investigate--a new procedure, if implemented.

Adenauer cautioned against interpreting the Gerstenmaier declaration "too extensively," indicating the Chancellor's displeasure with the 30 June "bipartisan" statement--especially with the implication that it represented a common foreign policy between the CDU and Brandts' Socialists. Foreign ministry officials also objected to the declaration--especially its suggestion that the political and military status of a reunited Germany be determined by the Four Powers, thus resulting in an inferior status and military limitations--on grounds that it had not been cleared with them and did not reflect "official" West German policy.

Berliner Zeitung, the party daily in East Berlin, commented that "we don't think anything, anything at all" of Senator Mansfield's Berlin

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proposals. "We cannot allow anyone to meddle in the affairs of our state, and consequently we cannot let anyone detach our capital from the body politic." [REDACTED]

3 July

The Canadian Ambassador told Ambassador Thompson that, during a National Day reception at his embassy, Furtseva replied to a statement of his expressing some concern over Berlin by saying that it is necessary to settle the problem this year or next year. [REDACTED]

In a report to the party central committee, published on 9 July, politburo member and party secretary Erich Honecker said that the GDR must adjust its economic plans even though this "will burden our development for some time." The report hints at hard-line measures to counter the continued shortages of quality food, inadequate supplies of industrial raw materials, and a lag in the rate of growth of industrial production. In addition, it may be necessary for the bloc to underwrite the East German economy for some time if a treaty results in Western restrictions on trade with East Germany. The economy, he revealed, has not been able to achieve even the reduced rate of growth set for 1961. [REDACTED]

The day after posters advertising the Kirchentag were posted on East Berlin church bulletin boards, police ordered their removal on one hour's notice. The West German press reported that the East German Reichsbahn had denied a request of the West German Bundesbahn for 11 special trains to carry passengers to the Kirchentag. [REDACTED]

The first reports since mid-1959 on East German locomotive coal reserves indicated that on 28 May reserves on hand were sufficient to operate for only 4.8 days; on 2 June the reserve was 5.3 days. Recent refugee reports have indicated low coal reserves in several East German railroad centers. [REDACTED]

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4 July

Die Welt reported that in a background discussion with West German journalists Brandt described the Berlin question as only a "secondary consideration" in Soviet plans, which really aim at freezing the division of Germany. Brandt reportedly argued that the Soviet aide memoire contained points Moscow might be willing to discuss; therefore, he felt that the West should not concentrate exclusively on contingency planning at the expense of political preparations which would influence international debate.

The reorganization of one regiment of the East German Security Alert Police (SAP) into a motorized brigade reportedly is under way and may be completed by the end of September, probably resulting in the stationing of stronger security police forces in and near East Berlin. After many postponements, deactivation of the District Alert Police (DAP) probably began on 1 July; enlisted men reportedly are to be transferred to the East German Army, SAP, or the East Berlin Civil Police, unless they volunteer for the Customs Police. Former DAP installations in and near East Berlin reportedly are to be occupied by the more reliable and better trained Security Alert Police. The security guard regiment in East Berlin, charged with protecting high-level party and government officials, reportedly is to be augmented by a company equipped with mortars and anti-tank weapons.

5-11
July

The refugee flow into West Berlin for the week of 5-11 July totaled 5,379, the highest weekly figure for this year and 1,665 more than the preceding week. Over 1,000 refugees a day registered in West Berlin on 8, 9, 10, and 11 July.

Early
July

[redacted] who recently attended a UN-sponsored seminar in Bucharest and travelled through Rumania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria, told a [redacted] [redacted] that he had found absolutely unanimous belief on the part of bloc officials that the United States would

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give in on the Berlin issue and not wage war to preserve its rights in the German capital. [redacted]

[redacted] briefcase, desk and safe inspections were held twice without warning in all offices located in the Council of Ministers' Building in East Berlin between 8 and 17 July. A central committee member allegedly told lower-ranking party officials that the inspections had been carried out in accordance with a directive of the 3-4 July 13th central committee plenum.

6 July

Ulbricht in a speech to the People's Chamber stressed: "There will be no shooting, but negotiations...Everything will proceed peacefully, nothing else has been proposed...We shall never resort to non-peaceful means unless we are attacked." He did, however, reiterate the standard bloc demands for a peace treaty on Soviet terms, a "neutral free city" of West Berlin, and recognition of his regime's "sovereignty." Asserting that the GDR will make no attempt to meddle in the internal affairs of West Berlin and that the city's communications in all directions can be guaranteed, Ulbricht reaffirmed that West Berlin must be converted into a "free, demilitarized area," thus ending its alleged role as a base for sabotage of the GDR. Ulbricht averred that a peace treaty regulating the status of West Berlin would be signed this year. [redacted]

A twin-engine Soviet jet, tentatively identified as an IL-28, appeared in the vicinity of West Berlin's Gatow, Tegel and Tempelhof airfields several times between 1430 and 1500 hours, flying at close to the minimum distance altitude limits established by quadripartite flight safety rules. It was not possible to ascertain whether a violation did occur. The sightings ended and the plane withdrew after the US controller at BASC advised his Soviet counterpart that the aircraft constituted a flight hazard. Two hours later Berlin traffic control reported that a PanAm plane 5½ miles outside of Tempelhof was forced to descend to a lower altitude because of the

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presence of a twin-engine jet with Red Star markings. This also was reported to Soviet controller, who acknowledged the complaint that the jet posed a hazard to flight safety and immediately communicated with Karlshorst. No further sightings were reported. [REDACTED]

A resolution of the Peoples' Chamber called on the Federal Republic to agree to discuss relations between the "two German states" prior to and in connection with peace treaty negotiations, as well as in the period following conclusion of a treaty. [REDACTED]

GDR Minister of Interior Karl Maron told the Peoples' Chamber, the East German legislature, that "the Radio in the American Sector (RIAS) must disappear like the 83 other espionage organizations...the peace treaty will make this a reality." Communications Minister Fredrich Burmeister told the parliamentarians that henceforth he would be solely responsible for authorizing the use of radios by civil aircraft flying into East Germany. Burmeister did not mention the use of radios by planes in the Berlin Air Corridors, nor did he mention quadripartite operation of the Berlin Air Safety Center--which regulates all flights in the corridors. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] six East German Army "bases" have been required to provide 6,000 men each for the purpose of encircling Berlin by 1 September. [REDACTED]

7 July

East Berlin municipal authorities reminded the more than 50,000 East Berliners and East Germans who work in the Western sectors that they must comply with a 1953 regulation requiring "border crossers" (Grenzgaenger) to obtain permission from East Berlin labor office before accepting work in West Berlin. The East Berlin officials claimed to have received complaints that Grenzgaenger benefit from lower Soviet Sector prices for food, rent, electricity and gas, while working for the

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"capitalists" in West Berlin. East Berlin party boss Paul Verner charged that the Grenzgaenger, who benefit from the current West Berlin currency exchange of one West mark to five East marks, are living on dishonestly earned money. East Berlin officials followed up the 7 July announcement by requiring East Berliners to present a certificate showing where they are employed before buying certain scarce consumers goods, such as television sets and washing machines. [REDACTED]

Mayor Brandt suggested during a press conference that the West consider calling a peace conference of the 52 "anti-Hitler coalition" nations--the majority of whom would be pro-Western. He stated that armament reduction or establishment of an "atom free zone" would be negotiable if mutually acceptable and not injurious to the security of East or West. He also supported Gerstenmaier's demand that the future status of a reunited Germany be agreed upon in advance of a peace treaty. [REDACTED]

8 July

The East Berlin police formally banned meetings of the All-German Evangelical Church Congress (Kirchentag) in the Soviet sector, on grounds that the West German "military" church circles intended to convert the Kirchentag into a "cold war operation." Simultaneously, East Berlin authorities summoned the Evangelical church's superintendent for the East Berlin district where such meetings would normally take place and officially informed him that the Kirchentag was forbidden, instructing him to deliver this information to a member of the Kirchentag preparatory committee. [REDACTED]

Khrushchev served notice in the most forceful terms he has used to date that the USSR will not be deterred from carrying out its declared intentions on Berlin by any military measures by the Western powers to demonstrate their resolution to maintain their position in Berlin. He announced suspension of force reductions planned for 1961 and an increase of 3.14 billion rubles in defense allocations. Khrushchev also sought to establish the initiative in the present maneuvering on Berlin by renewing his

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-17-

call for a negotiated settlement which would protect the freedom and communications of West Berlin and by rebuking the West for its alleged reliance on the "language of threats and intimidation." The Soviet premier reaffirmed the USSR's willingness to consider proposals made by other governments and suggested that renewed attention be given such schemes as the "Rapacki Plan" for a nuclear-free zone in central Europe, the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of other countries, a non-aggression pact between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, measures to prevent surprise attack, and the "Eden Plan" for a zone in Europe of mutual inspection and aerial photography on both sides of the line dividing NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. Khrushchev again stated that the USSR has no desire to interfere in the internal affairs of West Berlin, to obstruct Western access, or to damage the prestige of the US, Britain, and France. Khrushchev appealed to Presidents Kennedy and De Gaulle and Prime Minister MacMillan to "display wisdom" in settling the German problem and to agree to negotiations along with "other peace-loving states" to conclude a peace treaty. These efforts to appear flexible and constructive were coupled with criticism of the "threatening notes" in recent speeches by Western leaders and by a renewal of previous warnings that the USSR cannot allow the Berlin question to "drag on for years." Although Khrushchev did not explicitly reaffirm his 1961 deadline, he said the West's alleged reliance on the "language of threats and intimidation" does not contribute to a "businesslike atmosphere for negotiations" and that, under these circumstances, the conclusion of a separate treaty with East Germany "may prove to be the only way out of the present situation." [REDACTED]

During a Christian Socialist Union convention in Munich Defense Minister Strauss scornfully dismissed all plans for a "solution" of the German problem as "hocus pocus" and asserted that conferences with the Soviets had proved detrimental or worthless. He also spoke out strongly against Western recognition of East Germany in any form. [REDACTED]

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9 July Addressing a political rally in Munich, Adenauer scoffed at Brandt's call for a "super 52-nation conference" with the comment: "For heavens sake, what would come of that?" He stated that Brandt's mention of an "arms-free" zone in central Europe recalled the Rapacki Plan, "which we have discussed and which does not provide security for anyone and only makes us a second-rate nation." Adenauer also rejected Khrushchev's statement that a peace treaty with both parts of Germany is the most important problem, and asserted that controlled disarmament should come first. []

10 July [] quoted a central committee member to the effect that the most important decision of the 3-4 July plenum was to take whatever action is necessary to render the cultural and economic life of the GDR immune to "disruptive action" by the West. Organs of the East German government reportedly are establishing special commissions for the purpose of identifying those areas of national life which are liable to western pressures. []

Arkady Sobolev told [] that if the US reply to the aide memoire were quite negative, the Soviets might speed up their proposed time schedule. []

Ambassador Dowling reported that in the face of an approaching Berlin crisis the West German populace has an extraordinary degree of confidence in Western firmness, particularly that of the US, and realizes, too, that Germans have no choice but to defend Berlin. He contrasted these attitudes with past uncertainties in both respects, noting that only a few, notably Free Democratic party chairman Mende, have spoken in favor of negotiations. []

Commenting on speculation that following the conclusion of a peace treaty the East Germans might participate in certain control functions and be acceptable to the Western powers as "agents" of the USSR, First Deputy Foreign Minister Otto Winzer told a press conference marking the inauguration of "Baltic Week" in Rostock that, "I do not characterize myself as an agent and I do

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not desire that we be looked upon as someone's agents. The GDR is a sovereign state. It is such before the conclusion of a peace treaty with states having an interest therein, and it is such, even more so, after the conclusion of a peace treaty. Whoever wishes something from a sovereign state is advised to enter into negotiations with it."

In Ulan Bator, CPSU Secretary Mikhail Suslov told the congress celebrating the 40th anniversary of the founding of the Mongolian Party that Moscow's proposals for a peace treaty with East Germany "will be carried out."

11 July

[redacted] that during a recent talk with Gromyko he had found the Soviet Foreign Minister alarmingly complacent over Berlin. Gromyko told [redacted] that there would be no important Western reaction to Moscow's proposals and that if there were no negotiations Moscow would simply conclude a separate treaty which would abrogate Western rights in Berlin.

Pan-American airways advised the US Embassy in Bonn that the West Berlin Senat requested fifty charter flights from Hannover to Berlin on the night of 18-19 July if the GDR stopped buses bound for the Kirchentag. BEA and Air France reportedly would also be approached, since Pan-American could mount only twenty special flights.

As "clarification" of the 30 June Gerstenmaier declaration the West German Christian Democratic party executive committee adopted a formal proposal advocating "a reunited Germany with a free democratic constitution, integrated in the European community."

12 July

The Soviet press denounced Adenauer's visit to West Berlin for "secret talks with Senat officials," as a "provocation" and part of a Bonn plot to increase international tensions.

In its reply to the Soviet note of 17 February on Berlin, Bonn declared that a German peace

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treaty hinges on the USSR's readiness to allow free elections in East Germany and asserted that a separate treaty with the GDR "would violate the right of self-determination of peoples." The West German memorandum stated that a peace treaty with a single German government constituted by free elections would settle all German problems, including the questions of Berlin and the frontier. After reading the note, Foreign Minister Gromyko told West German Ambassador Kroll that he regarded it as negative and expected the same type of response from the US, UK and France. Gromyko said that the West had no lessons to give the Soviets in self-determination; he said that it was not difficult for the West to make statements to the effect that it would stand firm, but that ultimately the Federal Republic, US, UK and France would be faced with the necessity of translating this firmness into "steel and fire." If the USSR could not reach satisfactory arrangements with the West, Moscow would sign a treaty with the GDR and station troops on the border of the Federal Republic and the Soviet Zone, where "force would be met with force" and the West could have war if it desired.

In a nationwide speech, French President DeGaulle devoted only one short passage to the problem of Berlin but gave the Soviets clear warning that he holds them responsible for whatever "grave consequences" follow from any unilateral action, "as if the three great powers have no rights there...and as if the Berliners ought not to be masters, themselves." While declaring that there was no chance that the West would accede to such unilateral action, DeGaulle nevertheless said that if the Soviets would cease their threats and make some effort toward a real detente, then the German problem could be negotiated in a calm atmosphere and "objectively considered" by the interested powers.

During Adenauer's visit to West Berlin, a joint Federal Republic and Berlin government communique reaffirmed support for the five point Berlin declaration of January 1960, which underlined the legality of the Western presence in Berlin and access rights, the necessity of preserving West

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Berlin's ties with West Germany, the right of West Berliners to participate in any agreement on their city's future, and the maintenance of Berlin as a meeting place for all Germans. [redacted]

All-German Affairs Minister Lemmer stated that Adenauer hopes that at a suitable time the people of Berlin will be called upon to indicate in a plebiscite the conditions under which they want to live. Adenauer believes that such a vote would publicize the feelings of the Berliners and further strengthen the "legal" position of the Western powers. [redacted]

[redacted] at the quadripartite meeting stated that there were "few prospects" for a West German-USSR cultural agreement, negotiations for which broke down last May over the question of the inclusion of West Berlin. He added that even ad hoc cultural contacts outside the terms of a formal agreement would be difficult since the Bonn foreign ministry was determined to insist on "Berlin conditions." [redacted]

12-13
July

Neues Deutschland warned that since the Kirchentag was not taking place "in the capital of the GDR," but rather in West Berlin, travel to it by East Germans could not be countenanced. [redacted] The first bus carrying West German students from Darmstadt to the church congress passed through the Soviet Zone to Berlin without interference. [redacted]

13 July

Information recently obtained from refugees arriving in West Berlin indicated that shortages of foodstuffs in the GDR had not been alleviated appreciably during the first two weeks of July, with a lack of butter and potatoes most critical, according to the US Mission. Although seasonal food supplies through the summer months, including early potatoes, will ease the situation to some extent, the outlook for long-range improvement is not bright. [redacted]

[redacted] the Senat was prepared to provide air passage for Kirchentag visitors turned back at the zonal border; Pan American airways reportedly had agreed to provide

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equipment and personnel. []
[] Adenauer and the Senat had agreed to "react vigorously" to any harassment of Kirchentag travel to Berlin. Bonn's interzonal trade negotiator reportedly received assurances from his East German counterpart that no interference with West German access to the church congress was contemplated, although every effort would be made to prevent East Germans from attending Kirchentag meetings. []

Adenauer expressed confidence that the West would fight for Berlin but said he believed the question of Berlin's future would be subject to international negotiations before the end of the year and hoped for a "reasonable solution." []

According to a report based on more than one [] observation, an SS guided missile unit is located in the Eighth Guards Army area in southwestern East Germany. There is evidence that the unit, probably of battalion size, consists of three batteries, each with two firing sections. []

14 July

Gerhard Grueneberg, the SED party secretary with over-all responsibility for agriculture, declared that "no peasant must consider leaving" a collective farm. Grueneberg ordered party members to visit the villages and "discuss" what he called "complication and troubles over inadequacies" with the farmers. []

At the French Bastille Day reception in Bonn, Soviet Ambassador Smirnov sought out Ambassador Dowling ostensibly to inquire when the US reply to the aide memoire could be expected. Smirnov told Dowling that the US and USSR should endeavor to avoid conflict over Berlin, that it was an issue which could be talked about and that the US should submit counter-proposals if it didn't agree with the current Soviet offer. Later in the evening, the Soviet Minister sought Dowling out at an Iraqi reception to argue the "reasonableness" of the Soviet offer and that Moscow could no longer tolerate the present situation--referring specifically to the refugee flow. He urged negotiations, including the submission of western counter-proposals. []

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[redacted] the UK is no longer pressing for a Paris meeting of high-level representatives of the chiefs of state on military aspects of Berlin contingency planning because British military leaders believe after Air Marshal Hudleston's conversation with General Lemnitzer that Berlin planning involves political-military factors which would make any planning along purely military lines singularly inappropriate. The British believe that military planning, as such, cannot be carried further until clear political directives have been enunciated.

15 July Writing in Junge Welt, Gerhard Eisler said that Soviet troops will not be withdrawn from East Germany until a peace treaty has been signed with all of Germany or Western troops are pulled out of Berlin and the Federal Republic. [redacted]

The US, British and French embassies in Bonn agreed that, with respect to Western participation in the quadripartite operation of the Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC), they will maintain the long-standing policy of dealing case-by-case with alleged "violations" of the Berlin Air Corridors and Zonal Frontiers, rather than apologize in advance of anticipated Soviet protests over violations which have come to the attention of the Western controllers. The three embassies concurred in the view that there will occur at some time "deep" violations which the Soviets or East German authorities will identify positively and for which the appropriate Western controller should communicate with the Soviet controller, since no purpose would be served by not doing so. On the other hand, where violations are minimal or doubtful, the embassies agreed that no statement should or would be made in advance. [redacted]

15-17 July More than 4,000 refugees were registered in West Berlin during the three-day period with daily figures of 1,284, 1,240 and over 1,500. During the previous week-end of 8-10 July, 3,644 refugees were registered. Between the two week-ends, the daily average varied between 700 and 900. The refugees apparently are taking advantage of summer week-ends to pose as sightseers and vacationers in order to escape detection by East German security

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authorities. Press reports of stricter controls between East and West Berlin remain unconfirmed.

15-18
July

Czechoslovakia and Hungary are blocking through tourist traffic by West Germans in private autos, according to two separate sources who recently applied for visas for trips to the USSR and were told to go via Rumania or Finland (SIC) or across Poland--presumably to encourage their transit of East Germany. Czechoslovakia reportedly has banned its citizens from travel to East Berlin, a procedure that has been followed in the past when defections were at a high level.

16 July

According to Western press reports, West German Defense Minister Strauss said in Washington that he believes that the USSR's immediate goal is not the seizure of West Berlin but to compel the West to recognize the East German regime. Strauss' view apparently conflicts with that of Adenauer who told an informal meeting of Western commandants and their deputies in Berlin on 12 July that Moscow's primary objective is seizure of the city.

The Social Democratic party leadership reportedly was worried that the East German regime might stir disorders in its own area and blame them on the West so as to deflect attention from internal economic difficulties and force the Soviet hand on the Berlin problem. SPD chairman Ollenhauer reportedly plans to approach other Socialist leaders in Copenhagen on 28 July to propose that the Swedish government informally warn the Soviets about the potentially explosive situation in East Germany.

The bi-weekly Neue Justiz, house organ of the GDR Ministry of Justice, reportedly claimed that at the conclusion of a peace treaty the East German regime will declare West Berlin a "free city" and undertake "the obligations of guaranteeing the maintenance of its status; this will exclude every provocative and peace endangering activity emanating from the territory of West Berlin." Neue Justiz allegedly avowed that the GDR would be obliged to "guarantee free communication of

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the city of West Berlin in all directions," but would be entitled by provisions of the peace treaty to bar all "militarist, Fascist, revengist and peace-endangering activities. Finally, the bi-weekly reportedly claimed that a treaty would invalidate all existing agreements on air traffic and extend GDR control to Allied flights. []

Chancellor Adenauer told a major CDU rally at Dortmund, that West Germany cannot be neutralized "because possession of Germany is decisive in the great struggle between East and West." He added that German neutrality would never be honored in any emergency. []

A Russian-built jet landed at East Berlin's Schoenefeld Airport to inaugurate a new 2-mile concrete runway. []

17 July

Gromyko glanced quickly through the text of the US reply to the aide memoire but told Ambassador Thompson that he did not wish to make any particular comments until the note had been studied. In a brief discussion which followed, Gromyko agreed with Thompson's observation that the US and USSR are heading into a difficult and dangerous situation but warned that the danger was all of the West's making. Gromyko told Thompson that it suits the West and NATO, particularly, to exacerbate the situation; he said that the USSR still thinks the question of a treaty and Berlin should be settled by the US and USSR and other "interested" powers. []

In Mainz, Free Democratic party chairman Mende rejected Brandt's idea of a 52-nation peace conference with the comment that it was enough to have four powers involved in the German problem. He recommended the "four-phase German plan of former Secretary Herter" as a basis for further negotiations. []

In a Bild-Zeitung interview Brandt called for a Western political counteroffensive to meet the Soviet challenge to Berlin. He reiterated his proposal for a 52-nation peace conference and also called for a conference of all parties represented in the West German parliament to study

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ways of insuring Berlin's security, self-determination for East Germans and a German contribution to disarmament. [REDACTED]

17-18
July

From 1 through 17 July, 14,279 refugees arrived in West Berlin, as compared with 19,198 for all of June. On 18 July 1,223 refugees were registered. According to Western press reports, two East German papers on 19 July took notice for the first time of the refugee flights, and one of them said that measures would be taken to halt the movement. [REDACTED]

18 July

The West German cabinet instructed its interzonal trade negotiator Leopold to offer 5000 tons of butter to East Germany via the Red Cross or philanthropic organizations, if the East Germans prefer. Bonn does not intend to demand payment, but it will extend an extraordinary \$8.5 million interzonal credit if GDR refuses to accept the butter as a gift. [REDACTED]

A Soviet German language broadcast to Germany called the conclusion of a peace treaty an "imperative necessity...if the smouldering remnants of World War II are to be liquidated...the situation stabilized and frontiers juridically confirmed." Commenting on the Western replies to the Soviet aide memoire, the broadcast pointed to an "unprecedented war hysteria" in the United States and warned that the "enemies of peace are answering the peaceful Soviet initiative by drafting plans for a special mobilization, stepping up the arms race and preparing military provocations." [REDACTED]

Contrary to recent press stories, there have been no reports from refugees or other sources pinpointing specific preparations for group action against the East German regime, according to American officials in Berlin. These officials believe, however, that the temper of the East German populace is such that a relatively sudden and acute sharpening of anti-regime feeling could occur, with an increasing possibility of spontaneous incidents. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
-27-

Soviet Ambassador Menshikov, [REDACTED] claimed that Khrushchev would neither alter his position on Germany and Berlin nor delay beyond the end of the year unless a "high-level" four-power conference were held to air all the issues at stake. Other Soviet spokesmen have hinted that Khrushchev's timetable was subject to revision if negotiations were begun, but Menshikov's remarks could be considered a more authoritative statement of the relationship between the Soviet deadline and possible negotiations. He sought to sharpen the choices confronting the Western powers by describing the present situation as the "most serious in my entire career" and asserting that despite the "threat of war," the USSR would stand by its position. Menshikov also stressed that the US Government failed to understand and appreciate fully Khrushchev's determination on Berlin. [REDACTED]

The US, British and French Ambassadors in Warsaw agreed in the absence of contrary instructions not to provoke any specific discussion of the Berlin situation with Polish government officials--who seem to share similar hesitations, at least with respect to Western diplomats. In a recent, informal conversation with the French Ambassador, Acting Polish Foreign Minister Winiewicz expressed his general belief that there will be some change in the status of Berlin this year and that it is necessary that the interests of all parties be taken into account at a time when possibilities for negotiation have never been wider. On the other hand, Winiewicz shocked the newly-arrived Japanese Ambassador during the latter's courtesy call by adhering "strictly and brutally" to the Soviet line on Berlin. Nevertheless, the Western consensus is that the Poles neither expect nor desire any progress toward German reunification and that they seek to give the appearance of moderation on the Berlin problem. [REDACTED]

West German buses headed for the Kirchentag in Berlin were detained for several hours at the Marienborn-Helmstedt check point by East German border police before being allowed to proceed. [REDACTED]

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921 refugees were registered in West Berlin. While this represents a drop of some 300 from the previous day's total, it is still 222 higher than the lowest day of the previous week. The general pattern suggests the flow is likely to rise Friday, Saturday, and Sunday and taper off during the week. [redacted]

19 July

Except for the tabloids, the London press reported at length and for the most part favorably on the Western notes. The Times high-lighted the West's willingness to negotiate with Moscow, urged a re-examination of the proposals made at Geneva in 1959 and predicted a "long period of the toughest bargaining seen since the end of the war." The Guardian characterized the notes as "entirely satisfactory" as "lawyer's briefs," but criticized their alleged lack of "constructive suggestions" and advocated "some form of 'package deal' by which the Western powers could obtain guaranteed freedom of access to Berlin in return for a limited recognition of Eastern Germany." [redacted]

The East German news agency ADN accused President Kennedy of "rattling the saber" at his press conference of the day before. "Once again Kennedy answered Soviet suggestions for a German peace treaty with military threats... Anyone who believes these threats must be abnormally naive." [redacted]

A GDR district court at Oranienburg, 20 miles north of Berlin, sentenced an East German husband and wife employed in West Berlin to jail terms of 18 months and one year, respectively, for "illegal import" of East German currency and goods from West Berlin. The couple reportedly acquired 27,000 East marks in the past 5 years by taking advantage of the five-to-one exchange rate in West Berlin, buying goods for West German marks in West Berlin and then reselling them for East marks. [redacted]

Initial East German comment on the Western notes was limited to short notices of their publication and only a few passing comments on their contents. Neues Deutschland, under the headline "Western

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Powers Oppose Peace Treaty," and Berliner Zeitung, "Peace Treaty Turned Down," said that while the three notes differed slightly in terminology, their contents were in accord. Berliner Zeitung found the US and UK notes "weaker" than the French. Neues Deutschland said that the UK note ignored the uneasiness of the British people over West German demands for military bases in Britain, and found that the French note actually rejects the idea of negotiations by demanding acceptance of "earlier, unrealistic Western proposals." [redacted]

20 July Mayor Brandt told a press conference in West Berlin that he does not believe there will be war, but added that it would be frivolous not to consider the possible consequences of the present situation. Referring to the flow of refugees, Brandt said he was afraid many more would come but, "We cannot sit here in safety and say: 'Don't come!'" [redacted]

In its first comment on the Western replies to the aide memoire, the Polish party daily Trybuna Ludu asked testily why it had been necessary to wait so long for answers which allegedly were a "repetition of old propoganda lines?" The Polish daily observed that the Western notes had rejected all of the Soviet proposals--except for the possibility of initiating East-West negotiations on Germany. US officials in Warsaw have the impression, based on conversations, that the populace is ill-prepared for serious Berlin crisis. The consensus is that Khrushchev has gone too far to back down. Most Poles feel that a separate peace treaty will be signed this fall, but that "business as usual will continue." Statements by the President and Secretary Rusk have been adequately reported by the Polish press. [redacted]

Ivan Maximovski, the TASS correspondent in Geneva, said that although the Berlin situation was "grave" and a solution "had" to be found by the end of the year, he did not believe anyone wanted a war. Maximovski said that he was willing to lay bets that the Berlin issue would be resolved by means of a Summit Meeting which would be held in October or November. [redacted]

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21 July Albert Norden, SED politburo member and party secretary charged with over-all responsibility for propaganda, told a Berlin meeting of the National Front that Western aircraft will need East German authorization to fly to West Berlin once a treaty is signed. []

US Mission Berlin reports that tighter controls were exercised at all East-West Berlin sector crossings and at S-Bahn stations adjacent to West Berlin. []

Ambassador Thompson reported that he is convinced that Khrushchev will try to reach agreement on negotiations over Germany and Berlin, before the upcoming CPSU congress even though the date set for such negotiations may well be set for after the congress. []

22 July West German Evangelical Church authorities estimated that approximately 11,000 of the participants in the closing sessions of the Kirchentag were from Communist-ruled areas of Germany. They did not indicate whether a majority of the 11,000 were from East Berlin, or the Zone. []

A Volksarmee article by GDR Defense Minister Karl Heinz-Hoffman confirmed that the Ulbricht regime will ask that Soviet troops remain after conclusion of a peace treaty "for as long as foreign troops remain in West Germany." Commenting on reports that the US, UK and French might use tanks to keep open the autobahn to West Berlin, Hoffman said "such plans are laughable and one does not need to occupy himself with them. It would be childish madness to believe that anyone in Europe is strong enough to force their way to West Berlin with tanks." []


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DAILY REFUGEE FIGURES

19 July	921
20 July	825
21 July	864
22 July	1,255
23 July	867
24 July	1,253



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**CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS CONCERNING THE BERLIN SITUATION
SINCE 27 JUNE 1961*
(SUPPLEMENT)**

5 June

[redacted]

Border Security Police (BSP) personnel are being transferred from the eastern frontier to the East-West German border. Civil police may be replacing border guard personnel on the eastern border.

[redacted]

23 June

In answer to a request by Erfurt officials for permission to use planes to drop propaganda leaflets in the countryside, an East Berlin official declared that "all flights, even those by helicopters," must be cleared in advance by BASC and indicated that the Soviets require the GDR to submit plans for every corridor flight to them for clearance through BASC.

**23-25
June**

[redacted]

* Several items of information dealing with occurrences prior to 27 June that were not available for inclusion in Berlin Report dated 27 June have been added to this chronology.

Late Jun-
Ear July

[]
several of East Germany's fourteen districts
[] the SED initiated a careful survey
of public reactions to the peace treaty pro-
posals prior to the 3-4 July central committee
plenum. Magdeburg District--the location of
some of the regime's most important industrial
plants-- [] "a series of
misconceptions" had arisen in practically all
areas, noting that party members were asking:
"Isn't this an inopportune time for the con-
clusion of a peace treaty? Wouldn't it have
been better to wait until we are economically
strong, above all until we have overcome cer-
tain supply difficulties and have reduced our
liability to outside interference?" In pre-
dominantly agricultural Neubrandenburg District,
[] the farm
population was outspokenly critical of the
regime, while party discipline in state and
economic institutions was "inordinately bad."
[]

5 July

5,12/13
19/20
July

Ear July

[redacted] Rostock, Neubrandenburg, Dresden, and Erfurt districts indicated that some farmers were attempting to leave the collectives. [redacted] a number of party functionaries are demoralized by local criticism and the regime's practice of blaming them for failure to stabilize the situation. [redacted]

7 July

[redacted]

Rostock officials were alarmed that a severe potato shortage on the eve of the opening of the important Baltic Sea Week celebrations on 8 July might lead to public demonstrations on the arrival of party boss Ulbricht to open the ceremonies. Officials reported that tourists were taking pictures of the long lines queued up for potatoes and that brawls had occurred in Stralsund, where the shortage was worst, necessitating police intervention. The shortage arose when 40 freight cars en route from Czechoslovakia were held up as a result of an unexplained decision of trade officials in East Berlin to halt all potato shipments. [redacted] the situation appeared to be under control, the 40 railroad cars would be arriving, and that Ulbricht was driving to Rostock. [redacted]

11 July

[redacted]

12-13 July

[redacted] regime officials were confident that East German Evangelical churchmen were succumbing to pressure and that only the churches of Berlin-Brandenburg and Goerlitz still were adamant about sending delegates to the Kirchentag. [redacted]

14 July West German Defense Minister Strauss told representatives of the National Broadcasting Company in New York that he is agreed "in principle" to meeting with Gromyko in a neutral city, such as Vienna or Geneva, to discuss Berlin. []

[]

20 July 825 refugees, including 43 "border crossers," were registered in West Berlin. In the second article on refugees in as many days, the party daily Neues Deutschland demanded the imposition of security measures to halt the flow, calling on party members to "come to grips with this human trade." []

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21 July

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22 July Intensified controls by East German security organs--customs, border and transportation police --were put into effect in Potsdam in order to "prevent further illegal departure from our republic." []

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

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train tickets from three suburban stations to Berlin increased 200-300 percent on 21 July. Presumably this reflected attendance at the closing sessions of the All-German Evangelical Church Congress Kirchentag, which ended in West Berlin on 23 July.

[redacted]

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
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[Redacted]

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threatening tone on Berlin have increased popular discontent and apprehension. These factors have been added to the usual preference of refugees to flee during the summer months. East German moves to curtail the flow of refugees and warnings to the populace that it can expect no improvements in living standards increase the possibility of spontaneous local outbreaks.

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CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB SUBCOMMITTEE
ON BERLIN SITUATION*

Period Covered:
27 June through
24 July 1961

1. During the reporting period, Khrushchev and other Soviet officials have used forceful terms in attempting to impress on the West that the USSR will not be deterred from its announced policy on Germany and Berlin by any Western moves. At the same time, the USSR's preference for early negotiations, apparently at a high level four-power conference, has been evident in Khrushchev's statements and in several private remarks by bloc spokesmen.

2. Despite hints that a separate treaty with East Germany might be signed as early as September, there is no convincing evidence that Khrushchev has altered his expressed intention to wait until the West German elections and probably until after the CPSU congress in October. Private remarks by Soviet officials provide further evidence that if negotiations are begun before the end of the year, Khrushchev's 1961 deadline would not apply.

3. Since our last report a combination of events have coincided to produce an increasingly serious internal situation for the East German regime. A further deterioration in the economic situation and the effect of the bloc's more


*These conclusions were approved by USIB
at its meeting of 25 July 1961.

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BERLIN REFUGEE FLIGHTS

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
COMPARISON OF 1960 AND 1961 BY WEEKS



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FLIGHTS PER DAY SINCE 8 JULY 1961

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