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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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20 SEP 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
(Special Operations)

SUBJECT : "Elimination of the Lag in Operational and Tactical
Intelligence", by Lt. Gen. M. Kochetkov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article entitled
"Elimination of the Lag in Operational and Tactical Intelligence"
by Lt. Gen. M. Kochetkov which appeared in a special TOP SECRET
issue of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military
Thought).

2. This article was acquired by a Soviet official who has
provided reliable information in the past.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

Richard Helms

RICHARD HELMS

Enclosure

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cc: Military Assistant to the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Headquarters, U. S. Air Force

Director of Special Investigations
Inspector General, U. S. Air Force

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

Director, National Security Agency

The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : Elimination of the Lag in Operational and Tactical Intelligence", by Lt. General M. Kochetkov

DATE OF INFO: 1960

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT : Documentary

SOURCE: Reliable Soviet source (B) who has access to this type of document.

Following is a verbatim translation of an article entitled "Elimination of the Lag in Operational and Technical Intelligence", written by Lieutenant General Mikhail A. Kochetkov, who has long been associated with the Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU), and in 1958 was Chief of its Operations (Transborder) Directorate (see also Headquarters Comment No. 2).

The article appeared in the 1960 Second Edition of a special version of Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought) which is classified TOP SECRET and is issued irregularly. The month of publication of the 1960 Second Edition is unknown. According to the preface, this edition contains articles never before published and some speeches which have been delivered prior to being published in this form. It is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander.

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Elimination of the Lag
in
Operational and Tactical Intelligence¹

by

Lieutenant General M. Kochetkov

Vast changes in the nature of armed combat, caused by the appearance of weapons of mass destruction and, especially, of missiles of varying designation, necessitate the development of new intelligence (razvedyvatelnaya) techniques and their introduction into large units (soyedineniye) and groupings (obedineniye) of the branches of the armed forces and arms of troops, a re-examination of the organizational structure of operational and tactical intelligence from top to bottom, and the development of new forms and methods of combat activity of operational and tactical intelligence in peacetime and wartime. Naturally, the solving of all these questions must take into account the nature of a future war.

There is no need to prove the importance of operational and tactical intelligence. Its importance is adequately stated in the article of Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade V. I. Chuykov in the first issue of the Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" (Voyennaya Mysl) for 1960. It would be useful to refer to the statement of the Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovskiy, made by him at the 6 July 1956 critique. He pointed out: "Under modern conditions intelligence takes on extraordinary significance; it has never been as important as it is now and will be in the near future. It is impossible to count on victory if one does not have reliable information about the enemy. If we talk about operational intelligence - its importance is simply enormous. To know the plans of the enemy, the concentration of his forces, means, and formations (gruppirovka) and react to them accordingly - this is half the victory over the enemy."

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It is known that the missile troops have moved up to assume first place among the other branches of the armed forces. There are missile troops of strategic designation which are the means of the Supreme High Command (V GK). On the successful operations of the latter depend the seizure of the strategic initiative in the initial period of a war and its retention during the war until the enemy is completely destroyed.

The missile troops of the V GK are capable of solving tasks at great strategic depth for eliminating from a war entire countries and other great strategic objectives, as well as destroying, in coordination with the ground forces, enemy targets in the theater of military operations (TVD) in the operational depth, beyond the range limits of the missile means of a front.

The operations of other branches of the armed forces - antiaircraft (PVO) troops of the country, the ground forces, the air forces (VVS) and the naval forces, are dependent on successful operations of the missile troops, which create conditions favorable for the operations of the others in the theater of military operations.

In examining the role and place of the branches of the armed forces in a future war, with the purpose of establishing their interrelationship and degree of independence, we come to the conclusion that even in peacetime the missile troops have to be provided with exhaustive, precise data on all objectives subject to destruction in the first counterblow of the missile troops against the aggressor. Naturally the missile troops must be targeted against these objectives in advance and be in a state of maximum readiness for an instantaneous counterblow.

In connection with this, we feel that, on behalf of the missile troops of the V GK and fronts, an appropriate body composed of operatives (operator) and intelligence officers (razvedchik) should be created in the General Staff. Its task must include the collation of intelligence data on strategic and operational objectives of the countries of the imperialist camp, and the determination, depending on the importance of these objectives and their influence on the course of a war, of the order in which they will be subjected to nuclear strikes.

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This body should have an accurately worked out card index encompassing all strategic and operational objectives in both the strategic and the operational depth. The cards for each objective should specify: its characteristics, precise geodetic and topographic location (priyazka), the size of the nuclear charge, the type of burst (ground, air), the method of delivering the nuclear charge to the target, the amount of time needed to deliver the strike after the command is given, and other new data on the listed objectives, and reports on newly appeared objectives.

The first priority targets will be the individual, most aggressive, and dangerous countries, large political, economic, and administrative centers, military-industrial objectives, and mainly the depots with stockpiles of nuclear weapons, industry for the production of nuclear weapons delivery, air and naval bases, and the means of control and command of the missile troops and armed forces in the theaters of military operations.

Thus, it seems to us that only as a result of a successful, welltimed strike by the missile troops of the V GK can one count on an entree to the large-scale operational employment of all the other branches of the armed forces.

In peacetime conditions, strategic intelligence provides the V GK with the necessary intelligence data on the above-mentioned objectives. It should be pointed out, however, that these objectives are on the whole stationary, non-mobile, and, in place for a long time, which affords the opportunity for their exhaustive reconnaissance and study. Operational intelligence participates in these efforts to a limited extent.

As soon as the first atomic strike is inflicted and a war is unleashed, the situation, above all for intelligence, will undergo a tremendous change. The armed forces of the enemy will start moving, their large-scale movements will unfold, as well as dispersal to the theaters of military operations, and the nuclear-missile troops of the enemy, and other delivery vehicles of nuclear weapons, including aviation, aircraft carriers, and the missile-carrying fleet, will start maneuvering in the theaters of combat operations.

Under these circumstances new tasks will arise for intelligence, the significance of which is hard to overestimate.

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First of all, it will be necessary to clarify the results of our nuclear counterblow delivered by the missile troops, to continue intelligence operations against the nuclear weapons preserved by the enemy, the means of control and command, nuclear industry, the nature of the formations of the armed forces in the theaters of military operations and their plans and intentions. All new, mobile objectives must be discovered quickly by intelligence operations, so that a blow can be inflicted at once, and thus keep the strategic initiative in our hands.

In such a situation it is unlikely that we can count on the volume and timeliness of receipt of intelligence data as in the peacetime network, and it is all the more unlikely that it will be possible to avoid multistages in the levying of these tasks on the appropriate organs of intelligence. The time element will acquire extraordinary significance.

It appears to us that the missile troops of the VGK must now have their own means of long-range intelligence (manned and unmanned reconnaissance planes, radiotechnical reconnaissance, and other means) in order to carry out independent reconnaissance and re-reconnaissance of objectives, and react to any changes in the situation immediately.

Our armed forces, and mainly our missile troops, have first-class equipment, while operational and tactical intelligence and their technical equipment lag seriously. A certain gap between the means of destruction and the means of intelligence has developed.

Our intelligence does not have dependable technical means of detection of weapons of mass destruction. Reconnaissance planes are not yet able to find the launching pads of nuclear weapons and transmit the information acquired from aboard the aircraft directly to a control point. Aerial photography and the processing of photographs are done extremely slowly and are late in providing their results.

The technical means of radiotechnical reconnaissance also lag in their development. We still do not have dependable ultra-shortwave (UKV) band direction finders, communications intercept equipment is poorly developed, troop reconnaissance still does not have television equipment, there are a few infrared

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reconnaissance instruments, and photographic reconnaissance has not been perfected. The technical means of artillery and engineer reconnaissance have limited depth of operation, in that they can be used only in the tactical zone, which excludes the possibility of reconnaissance of the atomic means of divisions and corps of the potential enemies.

The time has come for a thorough investigation of the technical equipment of operational and tactical intelligence and to bring about the order needed. We consider that the serious fault which led to the lag in the technical equipment of operational and tactical intelligence is the absence of one central organ for operational and tactical intelligence in the General Staff which would occupy itself with questions of developing and providing technical equipment to intelligence units (chast) and subunits (pdrazdeleniye) of all branches of the armed forces, just as it did at the end of the last war and during the period of existence of the reconnaissance corps (korpuz razvedki). The Chief Intelligence Directorate does not deal with these matters at the present time, because it has been relieved of such work.

To the extent that their powers and capabilities permit, the staffs of the branches of the armed forces and their intelligence departments (otdel) are dealing with these matters. Therefore, it is not surprising that there is a lack of unity of views concerning the development and supply of intelligence equipment that in many cases there is parallelism and duplication, and that requirements of the General Staff and the Armed Forces as a whole for technical means of intelligence are not taken into account for appropriate orders to industry and planners. Every branch of the armed forces looks out for itself in the field of technical equipping of intelligence.

In order to close the gap between the means of destruction and the technical means of operational and tactical intelligence, it would be advisable to create an appropriate body in the structure of the Chief Intelligence Directorate capable of coordinating and planning the development of technical intelligence means on behalf of all the armed forces, working in close cooperation with the Scientific-Technical Committee of the General Staff and the Operational Directorate.²

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The organizational structure of military intelligence from regiment through front needs serious re-examination.

The question of bringing order to the organizational structure and technical equipping of military intelligence, and increasing its penetrating capability, ties in directly with the decision of our government to reduce the Armed Forces without jeopardizing the overall security of the country. Obviously, the smaller the Armed Forces, the stronger and better organized must be the organs and means of intelligence, which is called upon to provide essential information to the VGK and to the command of all levels, both in peacetime and wartime.

It seems to us that the fundamental principle which should be used as the basis for the organizational structure of operational and tactical intelligence must be the creation of greater intelligence independence of divisions and armies from the higher staffs. The divisions and armies must provide themselves independently with the required intelligence information in the entire depth of an operation (battle), using their own means.

To be sure, in modern operations the army and division will be operating in much wider zones and at greater depth. Under the conditions of enemy employment of powerful nuclear and thermo-nuclear (vodordnyy) charges, divisions, with gaps of 20-40 km or more between them, whereupon large units that are moving ahead successfully are always obligated to be ready to assist a neighbor who has encountered a stronger enemy, which can cause a change in the direction of an offensive.

Besides, it is scarcely likely that, in the next war, one can expect to carry out classical offensive operations with breakthroughs of a previously prepared defense or the conduct of defensive engagements under conditions similar to the previous ones. The meeting battle (engagement) will probably become the basic form of combat operation, and it will begin with the approach, and not upon direct contact with the enemy. Consequently, the intelligence operations of large units, using their own means, must ensure the collection, analysis, and collation of the intelligence data required by the commanders (komandir) of large units and the commanders (komanduyushchiy) of groupings in order for them to make decisions, with these units leaning primarily upon their own forces and means.

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Thus, the intelligence forces and means of large units must provide intelligence to a depth on the order of 50-60 km, and groupings up to 300 km. In regard to a front, intelligence must embrace a depth of at least two front operations, so that at the end of the current operation, excluding any operational pauses, it would be ready to report full information about the enemy, his plans and intentions, for making a decision on the follow-up operation.

Along with the conduct of intelligence operations for themselves, the large units and operational groupings must perform a series of very important intelligence tasks on behalf of the higher staff, operational groupings, and the General Staff; in return, the General Staff and the staffs of the higher groupings, using their intelligence means, are obligated to service the lower intelligence organs and staffs.

Therefore, the next principle of organizational structure of operational and tactical intelligence must be the centralization of operational and tactical intelligence of the branches and arms of the armed forces, and the subordination of intelligence organs of lower combined-arms staffs to the higher ones, from the intelligence standpoint, with the General Staff playing the dominant role. In turn the intelligence organs of combined-arms staffs consolidate in themselves the intelligence operations of the arms of the armed forces.

The higher intelligence organs must direct, supervise, and assist their subordinates with the organization and conduct of intelligence operations, with the provision of intelligence equipment, with selection of personnel, and with the combat training of intelligence units and subunits, always maintaining the combat preparedness of the latter.

It is necessary to examine the questions of organizational structure along two lines: the structure of the intelligence organs proper, from the Center down to the regiment, and the structure of intelligence units, subunits, large units, and groupings subordinate to these organs.

The following structure of operational and tactical intelligence seems most expedient to us.

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In the Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff there should be a Directorate of Operational Intelligence. This directorate should be assigned the following tasks:

--Unifying the coordinating the intelligence operations of all branches and arms of troops;

--Planning and conducting intelligence activities of the intelligence departments of the branches and arms of troops on behalf of the large units and groupings of the branches and arms of troops and the General Staff (concentrating the intelligence efforts of the armed forces in a theater of military operations in the main directions);

--Working out the orders and directives of the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff concerning the status of operational and tactical intelligence, and the direction of its development;

--Guiding the intelligence work of the intelligence directorates of the staffs of military districts, especially the border districts, and the fleets, by all types and means of intelligence as a whole, not separating the latter for subordination according to the various echelons of command (air, agent, naval, radiotechnical);³

--Working out, for design bureaus and scientific-research institutes, the tactical-technical data of the technical means of intelligence for all branches of the armed forces in order to eliminate duplication and parallelism in the work, coordinating this work with the intelligence departments of the branches of the armed forces;

--Publishing bulletins about current questions of operational and tactical intelligence of the branches of the armed forces, and also manuals and instructions on operational and tactical intelligence;

--Direct participation of the Directorate in working out large exercises and maneuvers carried out by the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, and the staffs of the branches of the armed forces, in order to accumulate experience in intelligence, and to study and work out questions in its planning and conduct, collect intelligence data for use by the troops, and also to develop informational work in all elements of the intelligence organs;

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--Participating in tests of appropriate intelligence and special equipment;


--Carrying out experimental and demonstration exercises in intelligence;

--Participating in the instruction, posting, and training of intelligence personnel from divisions of all branches of the armed forces up to chiefs of intelligence directorates of military districts (fronts); and other questions.

It is known that operational intelligence was not prepared at the beginning of the last war. Therefore, while the war was in progress, a search was made for organizational forms and working methods, and not until 1943, 23 months after the start of the war, did operational intelligence acquire an acceptable organizational structure in troop units and in the General Staff, in which was created the Reconnaissance Directorate.⁴

Under modern conditions we consider it impractical to create such an independent directorate, but it is quite necessary in the structure of the Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff. It is unlikely that, in the next war, we shall have as long (23 months) for working out the structure of operational intelligence as a whole, and in the General Staff in particular, and for the accumulation of experience in the combat activity of operational intelligence. All this work should be carried out long before the war. The lessons of history must be taken into consideration. In the postwar period, when the reconnaissance corps was in existence, there was such a directorate in the GRU of the General Staff and it did a lot of work, but then, instead of developing it and improving operational intelligence, it began to lose its importance and then ceased to exist. This deficiency should be eliminated quickly. This will not require a large number of personnel.

It is advisable to enlarge somewhat the intelligence departments of the branches of the armed forces. These departments must fully guide the operational and tactical intelligence of their branch of the armed forces and organize and carry out combat training of intelligence subunits and units, in accordance with the orders and directives of the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff, with the coordination and guiding role in this


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work performed by the GRU of the General Staff.

It is necessary to restore to duty the chiefs of intelligence of the arms of troops, providing them with a small organization, 2 or 3 persons, and giving them the responsibility for carrying out the guidance of intelligence in their arm of troops.

It is necessary to examine the intelligence directorates of military districts and fleets, and bring them into line with modern requirements, taking into account the fact that in the first operations of the initial period of a war, the border military districts will have to operate with the forces and means on hand. Therefore, it is advisable for the intelligence organs, units, and sub-units of these military districts to be close to the wartime table of organization and equipment even in peacetime.

It is advisable to strengthen the intelligence departments of armies so that they can fulfill the tasks facing them. It is necessary to do the same regarding the intelligence sections (otdeleniye) of divisions (large units).

It is absolutely necessary to raise the authority of intelligence and the chiefs of intelligence at all levels, in fact, not just paying the latter lip service as deputies to the chiefs of staff, and to relate them more closely to the chiefs of the operational sections, departments, and directorates, and demand that they perform creative and active work. In regard to the structure of units and subunits of intelligence, supplying them with intelligence equipment, as well as the question of what means, units, and subunits the large units and groupings of the ground forces should have at their disposal, we have at this time nothing to add to that which is stated in the article of Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade V. I. Chuykov. The implementation of his proposals will permit a sharp improvement of operational and tactical intelligence.

We have touched upon only a few of the important questions. Obviously, in the future it will be necessary to discuss these problems of operational and tactical intelligence more fully in the pages of this Collection.


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1.3(a)(4)Headquarters Comments:

1. According to other reliable sources, the GRU is charged with the collection of strategic intelligence (strategicheskaya razvedka), so-called operational intelligence (operativnaya razvedka, information bearing on opposing armed forces in one theater of operations), and so-called military intelligence (voyskovaya razvedka, information supporting unit commanders in the furtherance of immediate, localized combat missions). Apparently the term tactical intelligence (takticheskaya razvedka) has supplanted the term military intelligence.
2. This is the Operational Directorate of the General Staff, concerned with military operations, and should not be confused with the now-defunct Operations Directorate of the GRU. Many of the functions proposed by Kochetkov for the "Operational Intelligence Directorate" (see page 9, first paragraph) were formerly performed by the GRU Operations Directorate.
3. The responsibilities for both agent operations and radio-technical (communications and electronics intelligence) activities are known to have been held by the Intelligence Directorate of the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG) as of 1958.
4. This term (Razvedyval'tel'noye upravleniye) can also be translated as Intelligence Directorate, but from the context Reconnaissance Directorate appears more accurate. It is not clear how the GRU is able to distinguish between the two designative concepts, intelligence and reconnaissance.

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