

APPROVED FOR
RELEASE -
HISTORICAL
COLLECTION
DIVISION-HR70-14
DATE: 05-17-2012

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26 September 1961

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HR70-14

C-48

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD :

SUBJECT : Conversation with Mr. Helms Re
[REDACTED] Report on Large-Scale
Soviet Military Preparations

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1. When Mr. Osborn and I were discussing the above report with Mr. Helms, upon its receipt yesterday afternoon, I told Mr. Helms we should expect renewed consumer questions about the possibility of deception. I pointed out that the [REDACTED] material had not only been accepted by most of our consumers, but that the material was: a) extremely costly in terms of Soviet security; and b) apparently inconsistent with any discernible Soviet policy purposes. However, I said we must face up to the fact that [REDACTED] was now in a key position to give us information vitally affecting our own reaction to recent Soviet moves. For example, [REDACTED] could assure us that all the preparations we would be seeing over the next few weeks were, indeed, part of the maneuvers already described, in which case the Soviets would be able to take aggressive military action without alerting our indications mechanism. On the other hand, at some critical juncture, [REDACTED] might tell us that the Soviets were now ready to strike unless we made significant concessions, even though, in fact, the entire Soviet effort was bluff.

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2. Mr. Helms agreed that such questions would probably arise, but that we should take the position that the consumers themselves would have to make up their minds as to the answer. He said all we could vouch for was that, from strictly an operational standpoint, we had been unable to fault [REDACTED] and could see nothing in the operational and CE aspects of the case which would cause us to question the validity of the information being supplied.

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE

31 MAR 1992

John M. Maury
JOHN M. MAURY
Chief, SR Division

JJM/r

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