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

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SPECIAL ARTICLES

SOVIET TACTICS IN THE BERLIN CRISIS

Soviet leaders were confident that Khrushchev's meeting with President Kennedy at Vienna last June would open the way for a new round of East-West negotiations on Berlin and Germany. They embarked on a program designed to induce the West to take the initiative in proposing negotiations and to create the most favorable conditions for extracting Western concessions.

In speeches on 15 and 21 June, Khrushchev moved to sharpen the sense of urgency surrounding the Berlin question by declaring that the USSR would sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany if there were no East-West agreement by the end of 1961. He also warned that the Soviet Government might be obliged to increase defense allotments and strengthen its armed forces. To lend substance to this warning, he announced on 8 July the suspension of force reductions planned for 1961 and an increase of over 3 billion rubles in defense allocations. Soviet officials stated privately at this time that Khrushchev's new deadline was aimed only at overcoming the West's "delaying tactics" and forcing it into negotiations by the end of the year.

Moscow's attempts to impress the West with Soviet strength and resolution produced extreme alarm in East Germany which was registered

in a sharp increase in the number of refugees fleeing to West Berlin. The July figure of 30,444 was the highest for any month since 1953. The refugee flow reached near-panic proportions in the first week of August and sent Ulbricht off to the USSR for hurried consultations.

Soviet leaders previously had been reluctant to sanction East German action to halt the refugee flow because they realized this would advertise the weakness and vulnerability of the Ulbricht regime and damage the Soviet position in negotiations on Berlin and Germany. Sealing of the borders around West Berlin had long been planned as one of the consequences of a separate peace treaty with East Germany. The flood of refugees, however, forced the hands of the Soviet and East German leaders and compelled them to alter the timing of this action. They recognized that the only way to salvage some vestige of authority for the East German regime and possibly to avert its eventual collapse was to apply extreme measures to close the sector border.

It seems likely that these measures--as well as subsequent Soviet military moves, including the resumption of nuclear tests--were formally set forth at the meeting of the first secretaries of the Warsaw Pact Communist parties in Moscow from 3 to 5 August.

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strongest possible position to carry out the long-threatened action to sign a separate peace treaty in the event the West refused to enter negotiations or rejected Soviet terms for a settlement.

Moscow sought to enhance the effect of the testing announcement by stating on 1 September that military exercises using advanced modern weapons would be conducted by the Northern Fleet, jointly with the Rocket Troops and the Air Force, in the Barents and Kara seas in September and October. The Warsaw Pact defense ministers followed this with an announcement on 10 September of their decision to work out "practical measures" to strengthen bloc defense. On 25 September, Moscow announced that Warsaw Pact forces would conduct exercises in October and November.

Moves to End Impasse

After setting in train this bloc-wide series of military demonstrations, Khrushchev began to shift his political line back to a more flexible and positive attitude toward negotiations. He appeared to recognize the dangers of a situation in which both sides might feel confronted with the alternatives of a humiliating retreat or a showdown which could escape control. Khrushchev now is seeking to work his way out of this impasse.

In a speech at Stalingrad on 10 September, he went to some lengths to attribute to each of the Western leaders a willingness to begin negotiations and concluded that "glimpses of hope

now have appeared" for "peaceful talks." In private talks with free-world leaders, including Indian Prime Minister Nehru, Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio, and Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak, Khrushchev stressed the USSR's willingness to accommodate the West by providing some form of Soviet guarantee of Western access to West Berlin in connection with a bloc peace treaty with East Germany.

Khrushchev suggested to Subandrio that Western access rights to West Berlin might be guaranteed in documents signed by the USSR and East Germany which would be attached to the treaty. This approach was spelled out in greater detail in a speech on 6 October by Ulbricht, who proposed that both sides agree on "special arrangements" for a Berlin solution and on "declarations containing guarantees before the conclusion of a peace treaty." These arrangements, he said, would then be incorporated in the peace treaty with East Germany.

This formula for a separate four-power agreement on Berlin and a Soviet guarantee of East German performance in executing access controls is clearly designed to meet Western objections to a unilateral transfer of controls by maintaining an outward appearance of the status quo and continuing Soviet responsibility for Allied access. Khrushchev probably hopes thus to persuade the West that negotiations could lead to a compromise which would protect the Western position in Berlin but at the same time allow the Soviet Union a free hand to proceed with a peace treaty with East Germany. He probably

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feels that incorporation in a separate treaty of a four-power agreement and a Soviet guarantee of access would greatly reduce the risks of signing a separate treaty and could even be represented as at least tacit Western consent to this treaty.

This formula would also allow the bloc unilaterally to declare West Berlin a free city after the signing of the separate treaty but at the same time permit the West to interpret the agreement as an endorsement of the existing status. Khrushchev's proposed compromise, however, would in fact require the Western powers to concede the USSR's fundamental demand for a change in the status of West Berlin and an end to the Western "occupation regime."

Position on Separate Treaty

Khrushchev is personally deeply committed to signing a treaty with East Germany, which he desires not only as an important step toward general international recognition of the East German regime but also to establish a better legal basis for the definitive acceptance of present German frontiers. He can therefore be expected to press hard for any arrangements with the West which he judges will free his hands for proceeding with the separate treaty.

While it is too early to exclude the possibility that Khrushchev, as a fallback position, might again defer a separate treaty and settle for some form of interim agreement that placed a definite time

limit on existing Western rights in West Berlin, his present program apparently calls for going through with a separate treaty unless he should come to believe that the Western attitude would pose unacceptable risks of war for such a course. He is now much more deeply committed to signing a treaty with East Germany than he was in the earlier phases of his Berlin operation in 1959 and 1960. He would find it difficult to represent as a major victory in 1961 an interim solution along the lines of Soviet proposals at the Geneva foreign ministers' conference in 1959.

Soviet View of West's Intentions

The Soviet leaders appear confident that the recent exchanges between Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko will open the way for formal East-West negotiations before the end of the year. They are still relying, however, on the combination of pressures and inducements to bring the West to the bargaining table under conditions favorable to the USSR. At a public lecture in Moscow on 26 September, the speaker stated categorically that the Rusk-Gromyko talks would be followed by negotiations. He expressed optimism that a peaceful solution would ensue and cited the US-Soviet agreement of 20 September on a statement of principles for disarmament negotiations as an indication that the Berlin question would be resolved peacefully.

Soviet spokesmen are also still expressing confidence that the West will eventually agree to a Berlin settlement rather than face the risks of an East-West conflict to maintain the

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status quo in Berlin. Khrushchev told Yugoslav Foreign Minister Popovic in July that the chances of war were not more than 5 percent and that when the Western powers discovered that the separate treaty would not introduce any really substantive changes in access procedures, "they will swallow it." In his interview with New York Times correspondent Sulzberger on 5 September, Khrushchev again predicted that the West would not go to war over the signing of a peace treaty and remarked that America's Western European allies are, "figuratively speaking, hostages to us and a guarantee against war!"

Gromyko, in his speech to the UN General Assembly on 26 September, expressed skepticism in regard to Western willingness to resort to force, saying, "There is a great difference between statements about readiness to use force and the actual use of force, if account is taken of what such a use of force would mean"

Despite these continuing expressions of confidence that the West can be pressured and induced to make negotiated concessions, it seems likely that the US attitude on Berlin has caused Khrushchev to raise his estimate of American willingness to defend the Western position and of the risks carried by unilateral Communist actions. The firm US position has sharpened Khrushchev's dilemma in managing his Berlin policy. He can have no illusions that he could escape serious damage to his personal prestige and authority in the Communist bloc, the international Communist movement, and throughout the world if he should retreat or abandon his Berlin demands. Khrushchev is under heavy pressure to achieve a success on Berlin which he can use to demonstrate the

effectiveness and correctness of his entire strategic line in dealing with the West.

It was this strategy which produced the bitter collision with the Chinese Communists, because Khrushchev's policy of limited detente and negotiations in 1959 and 1960 cut directly across Peiping's interests, which demanded unremitting hostility to the West. The Sino-Soviet dispute has substantially narrowed Khrushchev's field of maneuver and has created constant pressure on Moscow for bolder, more militant actions in the foreign policy field. Any suggestion that Khrushchev's tactics on Berlin and a separate peace treaty were mere bluff or that he was backing down in the face of Western demonstrations of military power would inflict irreparable damage to his position as leader of the Communist bloc.

Khrushchev's actions appear to be strongly motivated by an awareness that time is running out on his Berlin operation and that considerations of personal prestige and authority will rule out any further prolonged delays in bringing the whole matter to a head. Under these circumstances, Khrushchev probably would not hesitate to undertake even more threatening and increasingly risky tactics should he be confronted with further manifestations of Western strength and firmness on Berlin. If his recent gestures toward working out a compromise Berlin accord along the lines of his remarks to Spaak failed to draw a favorable Western response, he would almost certainly feel compelled to intensify the war of nerves in a final effort to prevent the West from forcibly opposing unilateral Communist action following the conclusion of a treaty with East Germany.

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REACTION IN EASTERN EUROPE TO THE BERLIN CRISIS

Most of the East European peoples appear to have reacted nervously to the East-West crisis over Berlin. The Communist regimes have taken steps, with only limited success, to reassure the public.

Because of the governments' support for the USSR's position on Berlin, long-dormant popular attitudes and fears have come to the surface. Czechoslovaks and Poles, in particular, doubt that they would survive an East-West conflict, especially the fall-out from nuclear weapons used in Europe. The regimes also face the problem that their populations are basically hostile to the Communist cause.

In the first two weeks of September, the Polish and Hungarian regimes, admitting for the first time the existence of a war scare, sought publicly to stem manifestations of it. Polish Foreign Trade Minister Trampczynski on 5 September admitted to US Embassy officers that Poles in certain outlying districts had been scare-buying, and added that the sale of sugar and flour had been limited to two kilograms per customer. Embassy officers, while noting no such restrictions on sales in Warsaw, reported evidence of scare-buying in several other areas in Poland.

A near riot ensued in a Warsaw district when police on 9 September attempted to arrest suspected black-marketeers near a market crowded with hoarders. Wide-scale bank withdrawals were also reported. Polish party leader Gomulka, in an attempt

to cap the situation, told the Polish people on 10 September that although military preparations were necessary, there was no reason to hoard.

War fears and panic buying apparently began quite early in the Hungarian countryside. A local paper on 24 and 29 August denounced panic-mongers who cause hoarding of foodstuffs. Similar indications have also come to light in at least two other provinces. Central committee member Szakasits, just returned from East Germany, spoke over Radio Budapest on 13 September reassuring the Hungarian people that no one in East Germany is buying up salt, kerosene, candles, or canned goods. He denounced the apparently widely held view that saline baths are an effective antidote to atomic radiation.

US Embassy officers in Czechoslovakia have concluded from reports reaching them that there has been a war scare in that country since the first days of the Berlin crisis. This may be due in large part to the early and rather extensive Czech military preparations. According to a report of early September, fear of war was greatest along the West German border, where Czechs believed that the West Germans would reclaim real estate formerly German owned in the event of a successful Western invasion. Hoarding and a general war scare that were hampering the harvest had become so marked by the end of September that politburo members fanned out over the country on 1 October

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to "explain" the Berlin crisis to the people.

There are several reports of poor morale in Bulgaria due both to rumors of mobilization and to food shortages. Flour and sugar allegedly are in short supply, and bread is being rationed in the countryside. The US Legation commented, however, that the shortages may be due to stockpiling rather than to scare-buying.

All of the regimes in East Europe have undertaken campaigns in which party agitators have gone out among the people to deal with these problems. The Hungarian daily Nepzabadsag, for example, on 21 September called for youths, women, and candidate party members to be pressed into service along with full members in the indoctrination task. Some activists,

however, apparently have oversold their case and succeeded only in antagonizing rather than persuading those "whose intentions are good but who do not see clearly on a question of policy."

Rumanians have exhibited little concern. The US Legation in Bucharest has noted no hoarding and has reported only "desultory" discussions of civil defense and "the dangers of West German militarism." There have been no reports on the reaction of the Albanian people to the international situation.

The success of regime countermeasures in East Europe has been mixed. Overt expressions of popular reaction in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary appear to have diminished in the last two weeks; in Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria they appear to be continuing. 25X1

SUSPECT ELEMENTS MOVED FROM EAST GERMAN BORDER ZONE

On 3 October, hand-picked teams of party stalwarts, aided by the People's Police and units of the armed workers' militia, evacuated the five-kilometer-wide East German border zone of residents and their families deemed politically unreliable by the Ulbricht regime. The evacuation proceeded smoothly and was completed for the most part in one day under the on-the-scene supervision of central committee functionaries and district party officials and the

over-all direction of Erich Honecker, party secretary for security affairs.

There were only isolated incidents of overt resistance from the intimidated population. There are no estimates of how many were affected or reliable indications of how far into East Germany they were transported. The deportees and their household goods were moved by truck 25X1

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CONFIDENTIAL**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****EAST-WEST DEVELOPMENTS**

The bloc has maintained a reserved attitude on Berlin, probably pending an assessment in Khrushchev's report to next week's Soviet party congress on Gromyko's talks in the US and the UK. The statements of Soviet and East German officials during the celebrations East Germany's 12th anniversary on 7 October were notable for the failure to reiterate the year-end deadline for the conclusion of a German treaty. While bloc pronouncements maintained a sense of urgency and threatened a separate East German treaty, the terminology employed was purposely ambiguous.

The Soviet party's message of greeting to East Germany stated that the treaty would be signed in the "very near future," but First Deputy Premier Mikoyan, who headed the Soviet delegation to the celebrations, merely asserted that the bloc was "vigorously pressing for a treaty." In impromptu remarks at Karl-Marx-Stadt on 8 October, Mikoyan went so far as to say, "We are not in a hurry, but we do not wish to delay the signing of a peace treaty." In his major address Ulbricht also omitted any mention of a deadline.

However, the Czech and Polish delegates both used the usual warning of a separate treaty "before the end of the year," and Erich Correns, president of East Germany's national Council, stated that the celebrations were being held "a few weeks before the conclusion of a German peace treaty." Gomulka

on 8 October said a separate treaty would be signed "this year."

Although Soviet press coverage of the East German anniversary was considerably heavier than last year, the speeches and editorials printed by Moscow also omitted any time limit. A Pravda editorial of 7 October mentioned the "immediate conclusion" of a German treaty, and presidium member Suslov said that the question is not whether a treaty will be signed, but only whether both German states will sign it.

The implication that the deadline may be withdrawn has also been accompanied by continued suggestions that the Berlin issue can be resolved through negotiations. One of the main themes of Soviet press reporting on the East German anniversary was that Gromyko's talks in the United States represented an initial step in a process which would lead to a peaceful resolution of the Berlin problem. Mikoyan, in his major speech in East Berlin, picked up this theme by stating that world opinion was urging talks between East and West on a "peaceful adjustment of pressing international problems," and that the Soviet Government is ready to take part in such talks. Gomulka in a speech on 8 October stated that formal negotiations should follow the talks in the US.

Bloc acceptance of the US willingness to participate in

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constructive negotiations, however, is qualified. Pravda stated on 7 October that in the "governing circles of the Western powers the desire to consider the question of a German peace settlement does not exist." Ulbricht took a similar line, stating that while "we positively assess" President Kennedy's readiness to negotiate, "he avoids the main question" of a German settlement. On the other hand, both the Soviet and East German press assert that the West is becoming increasingly aware that the two German states exist and must be recognized.

In his informal remarks upon arriving in London for talks with Prime Minister Macmillan and Lord Home, Gromyko told the press that as a result of his talks in the US, "there is a possibility of a peaceful Berlin settlement." Moscow's only direct comment on Gromyko's talks with the President took the form of a TASS report in Pravda quoting Secretary Rusk as having said that Gromyko's talk with the President was conducted in a good, constructive atmosphere, although there was still no indication of what possibilities existed for reaching agreement on the conditions of formal negotiations.

Public statements by various bloc spokesmen have begun to reflect the position taken by Gromyko in his talks in the US. Ulbricht on 6 October acknowledged that the Western powers have a "certain interest" in the Berlin question and that the bloc was interested in arranging "the gradual transformation of West Berlin into a demilitarized free city, as far as possible in agreement with the Western powers." He said that both sides had an interest

in agreeing on "special arrangements" for a solution of the Berlin problem and in arranging the "requisite declarations" containing guarantees before the conclusion of a peace treaty --such arrangements then becoming a part of a peace treaty and thus attaining "validity under international law." Ulbricht's reference to "declarations" to be incorporated in a peace treaty suggests that the bloc may be prepared to accept something less than East German signature of an accord on Berlin.

In addition, the reference to a "gradual transformation of West Berlin into a demilitarized free city" suggests that the bloc will bargain over the question of a time limit on Western presence in Berlin. In this connection a West German newspaper quoted Soviet sources in East Berlin as stating that the USSR would give permanent guarantees for Berlin only if the West agreed to recognition of the division of Germany and the creation of a thinned-out military zone in Germany.

Ulbricht also stated that if West Germany refused to sign a treaty, a separate bloc treaty would nevertheless still be open to Bonn's accession at a later date. While the original 1959 draft treaty included this provision, Ulbricht's mention of it at this time suggests that Moscow may be moving toward a short or truncated treaty which would leave open certain military questions for future negotiations. This would be in line with the renewed emphasis on the question of partial disarmament steps in Central Europe and the stress on agreed prohibition of the possession or manufacture of nuclear weapons by either German state.

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

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THE FORTHCOMING SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS

On 17 October the Soviet Communist party will convene its 22nd congress--the third such meeting since Khrushchev became first secretary of the party in 1953. Essentially a policy-propagating organ--one that gives formal approval of the programs of the leadership--the congress will hear reports on foreign and domestic policy and the status of the party. It will also elect a new central committee, the composition of which will already have been decided by higher authority.

Khrushchev apparently sees this congress as the high point of his career, and he will certainly dominate its proceedings. He will deliver the major speech, the report of the central committee; he will also present the new party program--a broad policy outline supposedly to be followed over the next 20 years. For the short run, however, the most important aspect of the congress is that it will give Khrushchev ample opportunity to expound Soviet foreign policy and may give the West a better idea of the course of action he plans to take on the Berlin problem.

Functions of the Congress

The congress, described in Soviet literature as the "indisputable authority of party power," is the formal apex of the party's hierarchical organizational system. Composed of delegates ostensibly elected in a democratic manner at regional convocations of delegates from district meetings, the congress is supposed to express the wisdom, will, and experience of the whole party.

During the early years of the Communist regime the congress

did participate actively in policy making; it acted as a consultative and ratifying body and supreme arbiter of disagreements on policy. However, Stalin convened only four congresses after 1927, and the body degenerated into a rubber-stamp organization with the primary function of clothing the acts of autocratic dictatorship with an aura of democratic legitimacy and to propagate the broad lines of regime policy. Although the party leaders after Stalin observed the statutory requirement that the congress meet at least once every four years, its role and operations have not perceptibly changed.

Nevertheless, the convocation of a party congress is an event of great importance in Soviet political life. It is the occasion for summing up and distilling the experience gained and for authoritatively defining and highlighting the basic elements in regime policy. The congress thus serves as a primary reference point in Communist development. Pronouncements issued through the media of the 20th congress in 1956 and the 21st congress in 1959 are still used as basic guides in the execution of policy.

The convening of a congress also serves to bring to a focus the crosscurrents of political maneuvering and policy disagreements which exist among the top leaders. With the periodic reconstitution of the ruling presidium (Khrushchev and his top aides), secretariat, and central committee in the offing, a reassessment of all individuals in the upper echelons of the party takes place. Rivalries tend either to come to a head or to subside temporarily. Efforts of the top leaders around the party first secretary to place their friends and protégés in positions of honor and influence are intensified, because a

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

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TOP ECHELONS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

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congress tends to solidify political relations, if only for a short time. These relations, however, are established in the months preceding the congress. Emphasis at the congress itself is on unity. Planning and controls are so rigid that a serious effort to alter political relations at the congress could be made only if the presidium were hopelessly divided.

The decline in the role of the congress in the Stalin period was accompanied by a steady increase in membership. In 1918, shortly after the party came to power, the congress consisted of only 104 delegates. About 1,400 delegates attended each of the three congresses held since World War II, however, and more than 4,000 delegates will attend this one. This latest sharp increase in number of delegates constitutes an attempt by Khrushchev to magnify his prestige and provide a fitting forum for the official launching of his new program for building Communism. A new conference hall with a seating capacity of over 6,000--largest in the Soviet Union--has been rushed to completion for the congress.

The lists of delegates available thus far indicate that an overwhelming number will be attending a party congress for the first time. Apparently fewer than a fourth of the delegates to the 21st congress (January 1959) have been re-elected to the 22nd, whereas over one third of those at the 20th congress (February 1956) were re-elected to the 21st. This sharp influx of new delegates is indicative of the wide changes which have taken place in the party in recent years, particularly the extensive purge of "incompetent" and "corrupt" officials which followed the central committee plenum on agriculture last January.

The full meaning of these changes for the balance of power among Khrushchev's lieutenants is not yet clear. The first clues will be provided by the lists of delegates on the standing committees of the congress. "Election" of these committees will be the first item of business.

Political Situation at the Top

Before the congress convenes, Khrushchev will already have approved the membership list of the new central committee and will have decided on any changes to be made in the composition of the presidium and secretariat. These then are the days of reckoning for some of the younger party careerists; these are also the days when the powers of the first secretary are probably strongest.

While the top rung of the party ladder is obviously strong, some of the rungs immediately below seem to have weaknesses. In the presidium, for instance, there is a group of old retainers--including Kuusinen and Shvernik--who seem to have outlived their usefulness. There are others--such as Aristov, Pospelov, and Pervukhin--who have gone out of favor. Actually, as many as ten full members and candidate members of the presidium may be removed.

There now are 22 full and candidate members, but only about four or five are given the heavy responsibilities of leadership. Of this latter group, the special favorites are Kozlov, Khrushchev's First Deputy in the party hierarchy; Kosygin, Khrushchev's alter ego in the government Council of Ministers; and Polyansky, 44-year-old premier of the Russian Republic (RSFSR).

The situation in the secretariat appears to be even more pressing. Here, where the top administrative work of the party is handled, the membership now is reduced to five. Kozlov

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seems to have the lion's share of the work in spite of a serious heart attack last spring.

Business of the Congress

The general state of the nation, as seen by the top leadership, will be taken up as soon as the business of electing standing committees is disposed of. As first secretary of the central committee, Khrushchev will deliver the customary "accountability report," which purports to justify to the party's theoretically highest body those actions taken by the central committee since the last regular party congress --since the 20th congress of 1956, in this case; the 21st congress was a special session.

The central committee's report, traditionally the keynote address at a party congress, reviews past developments and summarizes the Soviet Union's status. It is usually divided into three major portions; the international situation, domestic affairs, and the condition of the party. In order to maintain the facade of democracy, presentation of the report is followed by discussions which ostensibly determine whether or not the report is to be accepted. That the report is unanimously "approved" by the delegates is a foregone conclusion.

Khrushchev will probably use the final portion of the central committee report to set the stage for his presentation of the proposed new program for the Soviet party. This event, and the subsequent adoption of the program by the congress, is clearly to be treated as a milestone in the development of the USSR.

The party program is essentially a statement of long-range objectives--political, economic, and social--to be achieved as the nation gradually moves toward the ultimate goal of

Communism. Khrushchev let it be known last spring that he personally would write most of the new program, and his working vacation during most of April was ostensibly devoted to that purpose. Certainly the draft was prepared under his close direction, and he intends that it be associated with his name. Just as Stalin is credited with building socialism, Khrushchev quite evidently wants to be remembered as the architect of Soviet Communism.

The proposed draft program was published for mass "discussion" on 30 July. Although it is not a timetable, it does combine the elements of a 20-year economic development plan with a sweeping doctrinal manifesto which maintains that, in general, the building of Communism in the USSR will have been completed by 1980. The attainment of this goal is predicated on a continuation of policies and practices instituted under Khrushchev since the 20th party congress and on a vast and rapid expansion of the Soviet economy.

The congress may elaborate on the economic measures contained in the draft program, but the basic outline is not likely to be changed. The program conveys promises of a grandiose welfare state based upon a high rate of industrial and agricultural development. Stripped of its propaganda, it continues to give primacy to the growth-producing elements of the economy--heavy industry--at the expense of the consumer, and amounts to a restatement of policies and programs already in existence.

The general context of Khrushchev's statements on foreign policy, except on current issues such as Berlin, has already been established by the international sections of the party program. Since the program does not contain any signs of a major shift from the main lines of Soviet policy

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laid down by Khrushchev at the 20th and 21st party congresses, it is unlikely that Khrushchev's report will develop any new doctrinal positions. On the contrary, his main purpose will be to underscore those general propositions which he considers the basic tenets of his foreign policy.

The program makes it clear that Khrushchev regards the achievement of his domestic program as closely tied to the successful implementation of his peaceful coexistence strategy, which the program reaffirms as the "main aim" and "central principle" of Soviet foreign policy. However, since the program's justification of this over-all international strategy is extremely general and is sufficiently flexible to accommodate either an aggressive or a conciliatory interpretation, it is unlikely that Khrushchev's report will provide a very clear guideline to any specific trends in Soviet tactics over the next several years. Although Khrushchev is bound by the general outline of the program, the variations in emphasis and the nuances which he chooses to develop may serve as an indication of the state of intrabloc relations, particularly Sino-Soviet affairs.

There have been a number of indications that the congress will mark a turning point of sorts for bloc maneuvering on Berlin and Germany. Khrushchev has privately assured Western diplomats that a separate peace treaty with East Germany would be deferred until after the party congress, and a number of Soviet spokesmen have stated that Moscow considered the six weeks or so preceding the congress to be a decisive period in which Khrushchev would have to make basic decisions. Khrushchev's general line on Berlin will probably be greatly influenced by his evaluation of Foreign Minister Gromyko's recent talks with Secretary Rusk and President Kennedy.

Other than Khrushchev, the only major speaker scheduled is central committee secretary Kozlov, who will deliver the report

on the proposed new party statutes --the bylaws which govern all party organizations and activities. The only significant change from previous years is the provision for systematic turnover in party bodies, which the draft statutes spell out in detail.

The last item of business at the congress is the election of the central committee, which, in the make-believe system of Soviet party democracy, is the body formally empowered to act for the congress when the latter is not in session. As in the selection of delegates to the congress, election of the central committee simply means formal approval of a slate already prepared by Khrushchev and the other top leaders.

The central committee is one of the major prestige bodies in the Soviet system. Nearly all the more important and influential officials at the time of the congress--leading government executives, military leaders, and provincial party bosses, as well as the national party leaders--are included. Its membership thus initially mirrors the relationships established in behind-the-scenes political maneuvering. With the passage of time, however, it becomes "out of date" as members die or lose their high political standing and new political relationships are established.

Over 40 percent of the 255 members elected at the 20th congress in 1956--no election took place at the special 21st congress--will probably be replaced at this congress. This is considerably higher than the replacement levels in 1956 and is well above the one-fourth turnover required by the renewal provisions of the new party rules.

The number of new members will be even higher than these figures indicate if an expected expansion in the size of the central committee takes place. If the increase is comparable to that of the provincial party committees since 1956, the total number of new faces on the central committee will be well over 200.

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