Summary

The "Lato-67" ("Summer-67") command post exercise, conducted in Poland from 27 May to 5 June 1967, is described as an unopposed, large-scale, multilevel and multistage "skeleton exercise" of the higher staffs and commands of five Warsaw Pact armies (three Polish, one Soviet and one East German). During the exercise, about 20,000 Soviet, East German and Polish troops from headquarters and support units and more than 4,000 vehicles were deployed to the field over an area of more than 400,000 square kilometers in East Germany and Poland. For the first time, directing elements of the Polish National Defense Ministry were deployed to field command posts and performed as the Military Department of the National Defense Committee. The exercise's seven goals are described in paragraph 2; its participants in paragraph 6. The exercise was evaluated as a "great step forward" in perfecting unified defense action of Polish, East German and Soviet armies and their readiness for combined action on the external front.

The exercise was intended to examine the problems created by one of probable variants of the growth, outbreak and development of a military conflict in Europe and was based on the assumption that hostilities had broken out in Europe initially on a limited scale involving conventional weapons and later developed into nuclear warfare. Hostilities were preceded by a period of increasing inte-
national tension during which West Germany unleashed a violent political campaign aimed at justifying the absorption of East Germany, and, having gained US support for its policies, by combined NATO exercises. During the first stage of "Lato-67", the "East" forces were mobilized. The second stage began on 31 May when the "West" launched mass air attacks with conventional weapons and began an invasion of East Germany. The "East" then launched counter operations. The third, and final, stage began when the "West", faced with the possibility of losing the strategic initiative and thus the war, launched a mass nuclear attack on the "East" forces. The "East" countered with a series of nuclear attacks of its own. After a series of additional operations, the exercise was terminated on 7 June.

The exercise was evaluated as a "great step forward" in perfecting unified defense action of Polish, East German and Soviet armies and their readiness for combined action on the external front. It revealed that many elements, particularly at the Front and wartime district levels, still did not constitute well-integrated and skilled groups capable of efficiently accomplishing assigned combat missions. Shortcomings evident in the exercise included the unskilled use of available nuclear weapons, inadequate exploitation and evaluation of incoming information, ineffective antiaircraft support of operations, unsatisfactory aviation command and airport mobility, an overestimation of enemy capabilities, a lack of standardization of basic military documents, and a continuing language barrier in such vital multinational activities as staff work and communications (the "East's" armies were formed from divisions of different nationalities).

In addition to senior Polish Party and government officials, and representatives of the Warsaw Pact Combined Armed Forces Command, observers of the exercise included the East German Defense Minister, General of the Army H. Hoffman, the Soviet Deputy Defense Minister, General of the Army I. Pavlovskiy, and the Czechoslovak Minister of National Defense, General of the Army Bohumir Lomsky together with members of their staffs. The exercise was directed by the Polish Minister of National Defense,
Marshal Marian Spychalski; his deputies for matters relating to the Soviet and East German troops were Major General V. Lazutin of the Soviet Army and Major General M. Bleck of the East German Army.

Comment

The attached report is a translation of an official Polish critique of the "Lato-67" ("Summer-67") command post exercise prepared by the Polish Ministry of National Defense. The original document was classified Secret. Four charts entitled "Composition of the opposing sides and the relation of forces" and containing information on the Front zone of operations, formations comprising the Jutland axis, the 12th Army Zone of operations, and the 21st Tank Army Zone of operations were disseminated previously.

The five maps in this report have been reproduced directly from the original (numbers 2, 3, 4, 5 and 5a; number 1 was not received). They are preceded by glossaries of the military terminology and abbreviations which appear on them.

For convenience, the paragraphs of this report have been numbered, although they were unnumbered in the original. Interpolations in the text are identified by brackets.
TRAINING GOALS, OBJECTIVES OF THE OPPOSING SIDES, AND THE COURSE OF THE EXERCISE

1. An unopposed, multilevel, and multistage command post exercise -- literally a "skeleton exercise" (cwiczenie szkieletowe) -- under the codename "Lato-67" ("Summer-67"), was held from 27 May to 5 June 1967 under the command of the Polish Minister of National Defense. The themes of the exercise were as follows: a) deployment of the entire armed forces and command elements of the National Defense Ministry, that is, the Military Department of the National Defense Committee (KOK); b) organization and conduct of a Front offensive operation in conjunction with air and amphibious landing operations; and c) organization and conduct of the territorial defense of Poland during conventional and nuclear warfare.

2. The goals of the exercise were:

a. to test the degree of preparedness of the central institutions of the Ministry of National Defense [MND] in fulfilling tasks in the period preceding the outbreak of war;

b. to test the newly introduced plan for the systematic withdrawal of MND central institutions to field command posts, as well as the degree of preparedness for an orderly direction of staff functions of the armed forces during periods of threat and war;

c. to gauge the skill and efficiency with which wartime operational commands (Front, armed services, combined-arms armies, military districts) are formed during an alert, their changeover to field command posts and their transfer across great distances are accomplished, and to test their performance under field conditions;
d. to verify the validity of the recently revised basic organizational forms of MND central institutions, especially the part assigned to the appropriate command posts, as well as to verify the validity of current plans for the command structure at the operational level and the new organizational disposition of their support units;

e. to increase the preparedness of Front commands and armies to plan operations in a limited period of time, to organize combined operations on a broad scale with the allied forces, thus forming a single Front, and to conduct operations during hostilities initially waged with conventional weapons and then rapidly growing into nuclear war;

f. to test and revise the functioning of the National Air Defense (OPK), the Navy, and the wartime military district staffs during their own operations and those of allied operational forces on Polish territory; and

g. to test the correctness of the guidelines of the over-all plan adopted in the exercise for organization of the rear and rear support in deployment of the armed forces and their operations in the initial period of war, and also to test the guidelines for organization of technical support units of the transportation network on Polish territory.

3. The "Lato-67" exercise was marked by its exceptionally great size. The commands, staffs, and their support units were deployed and actually operated not only throughout Polish territory but also through a considerable part of the German Democratic Republic. The exercise covered an area exceeding 400,000 square kilometers. The operational command elements moved a distance of 700 kilometers; moreover, the first phase of this movement was accomplished with exceptional speed.
4. Participating in the exercise were 19,895 men, including 4,842 generals and officers, and 14,463 warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men, in addition to 590 civilian employees. Moreover, a total of 4,131 vehicles of various types, 36 planes and helicopters, and 554 radio and radio relay stations were used in the exercise.

5. The supervisory staff of the exercise consisted of 1,978 men, including 590 generals and officers, grouped into 12 organizational teams which were interlinked with the central control exercised by the National Defense Minister and with the simulated enemy staff and umpire groups (map 1.). The Defense Minister's control base was dependent on mobile command posts subject to Military Department No. 1 and organized according to the "W" time ["Wartime"] structure.

6. Participants in the exercise were as follows:
   
   a. In the first phase of the exercise - the General Staff of the Polish Army which planned and directed the deployment of the armed forces and their placement in a state of increased readiness, in collaboration with representatives of other central institutions of the National Defense Ministry.

   b. In subsequent days - the central command organs of the National Defense Committee's Military Department, which were detached from the General Staff and other institutions and moved to Command Posts Nos. 2, 3, 4 and at one ZMR [abbreviation unknown].

   c. At the operational level:
      - the Maritime Front Command of the Training Inspectorate and other central institutions of the National Defense Ministry;
      - the Combined-Arms Army Command of the Soviet Forces in Germany, in the role of the 21st Tank Army Command;
- the 5th Military District Command of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic, in the role of the 12th Army Command;

- combined -arms army commands of military districts (Pomeranian Military District - in the role of the 3rd Army Command; Silesian Military District - in the role of the 5th Army Command; Warsaw Military District - in the role of the 7th Army Command);

- the Operational Air Force Command, in the role of the 2nd Air Army Command;

- the "Baltic" Operations Group Command, which consisted of officers of Defense Ministry central institutions and armed services commands.

d. At the territorial defense level:

- the National Air Defense (OPK) Command and OPK corps (1st Corps Command - in the role of the 4th Air Defense Corps; 2nd Corps - in the role of the 5th Air Defense Corps; and 3rd Corps - in the role of the 6th Air Defense Corps);

- the Naval Command;

- commands of wartime military districts; and

- elements of other National Defense Committee departments (groups representing the political, planning and economic, internal, transportation, industrial, public defense, and supply departments). [Comment: A breakdown of the internal structure of the National Defense Committee is given in the chart attached to entitled "Polish Council of Ministers Directive on the Holding of a Command Post Exercise in the Territorial Defense System in January 1968"]
7. The initial situation of the exercise characterized by a presumed expansion of American aggression against Vietnam, accompanied by conflict in the Middle East, fascist incidents in Greece, and provocations against Cuba. These actions resulted in further intensification of aggressive West German policies directed mainly against the German Democratic Republic. Using the approval of the imperialist powers to equip the Bundeswehr [West German Armed Forces] with nuclear weapons in case of war, the government of the German Federal Republic unleashed in the first half of May a violent political campaign aimed at justifying the absorption of East Germany and afterwards the revision of the borders established after World War II. West Germany, having gained U.S. support of her aggressive policy, joined the military demonstrations on 15 May by organizing joint NATO exercises under the codename "Unity-67" ("Jednosc-67"). Simultaneously an integration of forces and an increase in their combat capabilities were achieved in the "Unity-67" exercise. Moreover, it was believed that fear of a conflict which would expand to all-out nuclear war would enable NATO states to achieve given political-military aims and would induce the Warsaw Pact countries to accept the accomplished facts, primarily the conquest of East Germany.

8. The political warnings of the Warsaw Pact countries did not curb the dangerous activities of the NATO nations. In the latter part of May, they still continued measures which attested to their preparations for war. They increased the numerical status of the armed forces, raised the level of their combat readiness, and began to shift various equipment and armaments from the United States to Europe. By 27 May, NATO air and ground troops in Europe had, to a certain degree, improved their position.

9. The aggressive policies and actions of the "West" compelled the Warsaw Pact states to undertake necessary political and military measures. On the strength of the decisions of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact, the Polish National Defense Committee (KOK) issued a directive to its Military Department and the other KOK departments to introduce, as of 27 May 1967, a state of increased defense readiness in the armed forces and the entire country. A directive was also issued by...
the High Command of the Armed Forces of the participating Warsaw Pact countries to update the missions confronting the troops of the Combined Armed Forces.

10. Consequently, the Western Front forces began to increase their combat readiness in East Germany; moreover, part of the Front's forces conducted exercises near the staging areas for operations. In Poland, meanwhile, efforts were made gradually to bring all armed services to full combat readiness. In the western part of the Soviet Union, preparations were made to shift new forces through Polish territory.

11. According to the emergent political situation, the strategic-operational objective of the opposing sides was as follows:

- The "West", after having created a political provocation, planned to destroy the Western Front forces and capture Berlin by launching surprise attacks with the forces of the Central and Northern Groups, among which the Bundeswehr was to play a leading role. The "West" also planned to seize East German territory by establishing a beachhead on the seacoast and on the east bank of the Oder and Neisse Rivers, especially at their lower reaches, before the arrival of new "East" forces, which were delayed deep within the theater of operations by intensive air strikes, particularly in the regions of the Bug, Vistula, and Oder Rivers, as well as by air and amphibious landings and diversionary activity. The "West" then planned, depending upon the way the situation developed, either to take [positions of] defense on the confines of the Oder River in order to consolidate the annexation as an accomplished fact or to expand offensive actions in Poland and Czechoslovakia by using new forces mobilized mainly in West Germany or shifted from other continents. The "West" planned to use weapons of mass destruction only in a critical situation when confronted with decisive counteraction and
the superiority of the "East", and as an element of intimidation to force peaceful negotiations after achieving the objective of its military operations.

- The "East" planned the following in case of aggression by the "West":

A. On the external front: to shift immediately to decisive offensive operations, [designed] to destroy the troops of the Northern and Central Army Groups, as well as the new enemy forces which would eventually be shifted to the continent, and to seize the territories of the European NATO countries. The Western Front was to achieve this objective initially in a limited way. Forces of the four following Fronts would follow up this action: the Western Front and the fronts moved from within the theater of the Maritime, Central, and Southwest Fronts. According to the plan, weapons of mass destruction would be used in case of a clear, direct threat of their use by the "West" or in a pre-emptive attack.

In accordance with this matter:

- The Western Front (14th, 21st, 26th Tank Armies, 22nd Army of the Soviet Armed Forces, 12th Army of the East German People's Army, and 1st Air Army) was to attack in two directions: a) a main attack - in the direction of Leipzig and Chalons-sur-Marne with forces of the 1st, 20th and 22nd Tank Armies, whose mission was to destroy the forces of the Central Army Group; b) a secondary attack - in the direction of Rathenow and Krefeld with forces of the 12th Army and the 21st Tank Army, whose mission was to destroy the southern grouping (zgrupowanie) of the Northern Army Group, thus halting the attack and the joining of forces by the northern grouping of this army group prior to the approach of the Maritime Front forces.
The Maritime Front (3rd, 5th, 7th Armies, 2nd Air Army, and "Baltic" Operations Group), within one and one-half to two days after the outbreak of war, was to move the main forces (3rd and 5th Armies and 2nd Air Army) to the staging area and, in the second or third day of the war, to enter battle from the march by attacking in two directions: a) a main attack - in the direction of Ludwigslust, Ostend with forces of the 5th and 7th Armies whose mission was to destroy the northern grouping of the Northern Army Group; b) a secondary attack - along the Jutland Peninsula with forces of the 3rd Army in conjunction with the landing operations of the "Baltic" Operations Group in the region of the Danish Straits. The mission was to destroy the armed forces of Denmark and the West German forces cooperating with them in this region.

B. On Polish territory: to provide support for the Territorial Defense Force (OTK) (mostly for the efficient conduct of mobilization of the entire national defense system and the armed forces), to provide effective cover for vital rear area targets and installations against air strikes, and to assure freedom of movement by Polish and allied operational troops. During the nuclear war phase, the "East" planned to give particular attention to the implementation of mass, efficient elimination of the effects of nuclear attack and to the restoration of a national system of direction and command, including communications, transportation, and support of troop movements, especially in the vicinity of the Vistula and Oder Rivers.

First Stage of the Exercise (Morning of 27 May to 0500 Hours of 31 May)

12. During the period 27 to 29 May, the National Defense Ministry (Military Department of the National Defense Committee) introduced many mobilization and operational
measures gradually to raise the combat readiness of the armed forces and other elements of national defense. The measures undertaken were based on multilateral estimates made on an operational (and correct) basis at the General Staff and other central institutions of the National Defense Ministry.

13. At 2000 hours on 27 May, the participating Chief of the General Staff made the following proposals: a) to bring the priority units of the National Air Defense (OPK) Forces, some first-echelon tactical formations (zwiazek), missile units, and other forces of special operational importance to a state of full combat readiness; b) to complement by partial covert mobilization some military units, including the auxiliary units of the OPK and the Operational Air Force, a number of district units, some naval units, and units used to support the deployment of command posts of the Front, the army, the Military Department and the control zone of the National Defense Committee; c) to expand cadre units with the number of drivers, specialists, and mechanized vehicles necessary to undertake the next sequence in all-out mobilization; and d) to undertake other measure to streamline mobilization operations for the deployment of the national defense system.

14. At 1700 hours on 28 May, the Chief of the General Staff presented a draft of the successive plan which aimed at the continuation of operational and mobilization measures and called for the following: a) an additional phase of covert mobilization primarily to expand that part of the armed forces whose commitment to operations was expected in the first stage, including units supporting the transportation network and the control of troop movement on Polish territory; b) a revision in the disposition of operational forces, under the pretext of interdistrict exercises, by moving part of them -- within the framework of these exercises -- in a westward direction; c) dispersal of ships; d) placement of an increased number of air and missile artillery units of the OPK in a state of Combat Readiness No. 2; and e) mobilization of units located beyond the regions of the main garrisons, for example the 13th Tank Division, which would be shifted directly to the operational most advantageous region.
15. Meanwhile, the Chief of the General Staff proposed to the National Defense Committee the activation of a state of increased defense readiness.

16. Because these proposals were recognized as correct and basically consistent with the current growing threat and with the capabilities for smooth deployment of all the armed forces, they were confirmed by the Minister of National Defense. Also adopted were additional proposals of the Chief Training Inspector in regard to forward advancement of units necessary to support the operational unit command posts anticipated for deployment in a subsequent stage. The Director of the exercise also informed the General Staff that at 2045 hours on 28 May the National Defense Committee introduced a state of increased defense readiness of the nation.

17. In accordance with these decisions, the General Staff participating in the exercise proceeded to implement successively the adopted proposals.

18. Further intensification of the international situation occurred on 29 May. The "West" continued to place the strategic rocket forces and the strategic air force in a state of full combat readiness. In the West European Theater of Operations, the main NATO ground forces were moved—within the framework of military exercises—in an eastward direction and naval units were prepared to head out to sea. In the evening hours of 29 May, intensive preparatory operations were undertaken to mobilize NATO national army units anticipated for the next stage.

19. The General Staff participating in the exercise observed increasing signs of inevitable aggression by the "West" and estimated that the enemy would start military operations in a matter of hours. The Staff also took under consideration the need to forge ahead in combat readiness and to move the troops away from [possible areas of] nuclear strikes. Consequently, at 1800 hours on 29 May, the General Staff proposed to announce a state of direct threat to the security of Poland, and, at the same time, to introduce a state of full combat readiness in the armed forces. This action meant the withdrawal of troops to alert areas, the transition to full mobilization, and the application of additional measures to rectify the situation of the operational troops, including the shifting of the 3rd and 5th Armies to western areas of Poland, the 7th Army to the west bank of the Vistula River, and part of the first-echelon divisions and transport services with basic supply materiel to East Germany.

20. The above proposals were approved and at 2200 hours on 29 May the Polish National Defense Committee, in agreement with the other Warsaw
Pact countries, ordered all KOK departments to implement the defense measures anticipated for the period of direct threat to the security of Poland. This included the change-over of state organs to a military organizational structure and withdrawal in alert status to field command posts.

21. In view of the above decision, at 2200 hours on 29 May, the director of the Military Department ordered a combat alert for the central institutions of the National Defense Ministry and all Polish armed forces.

22. As a result, Command Post No. 2 immediately assumed responsibility for the combat readiness of the Polish armed forces. Command Posts No. 3 and 4 were deployed to field command posts and were ready to operate at the scheduled time. Since full combat readiness was achieved, the commands and staffs of the Maritime Front, the 3rd, 5th, and 7th Armies, the 2nd Air Army, the "Baltic" Operations Group, and the military districts were detached; they occupied field posts and assumed command of the troops.

23. The above-mentioned elements of command were deployed efficiently and, in most cases, in less than normal time, because much thought was given to the concept of action after the declaration of an alert and to the well-functioning operational-control service. The deployment, however, was not always conducted with sufficient consideration given to camouflage, secrecy, and cover.

24. The staffs of the East German 12th Army and the Soviet 21st Tank Army of the Western Front were also alerted and were ready to direct the troops in a short period of time. On the night of 29-30 May, units of these armies occupied the alert areas, and part of the forces approached the western border of East Germany. At the same time, a great majority of Polish Army units also reached the planned alert areas and the situation was finally improved on 30 May.

25. Simultaneously with the deployment of the mobilized forces, the staffs of the operational forces, in accordance with the directives of the Combined Command of the Armed Forces and General Staff of Poland, revised the plans for the first operations; moreover, the staffs of the military districts and of the National Air Defense (OPK) implemented the objectives of the operational defense plans for Poland, taking under consideration necessary corrections dependent upon the way the situation developed.
26. In addition, plans were specified and updated for cooperation of the OPK with air defense forces and resources of other armed services participating in a uniform system of air defense of installations and troops. Second Stage of the Exercise (0500 Hours of 31 May to 0500 Hours of 1 June).

27. The External Front. At 0500 hours on 31 May, after mass air attacks with conventional weapons, the "West" began military operations by crossing the state border with forces of the Northern and Central Groups. The Northern Army Group, using forces substantially superior to those of the 12th Army and 21st Tank Army, achieved success in the first encounter by penetrating 10 to 15 kilometers into East Germany in several directions in the morning hours.

28. On the other hand, the Central Army Group's first-echelon tactical formations, which did not achieve success in the battles encountered on their line, shifted to delaying actions because of attacks by the left flank of the Western Front.

29. Simultaneously with the attack on land, the "West" expanded amphibious and airborne operations. The enemy took advantage of peace-time conditions and under the pretext of exercises moved three landing groups by sea. Moreover, at 0500 hours, in the areas of Rostock and east of Swinoujście, an amphibious landing in brigade strength was made by the West German 6th Motorized Division. Active support by the tactical air force and the warships of West Germany, Denmark, and other NATO nations in the Baltic Sea at this time assured the success of the landing operation. Meanwhile, the West German 25th Airborne Brigade (1st Airborne Division), using U.S. means of transportation, landed under strong air cover in the areas west of Gryfino, west of Schwedt, and north of Bad Freienwalde; the 26th Airborne Brigade (1st Airborne Division) landed in the region of Gerlitz.

30. At the outbreak of hostilities, the first operational echelon of the Maritime Front began the next phase of movement to a staging area. The moving tactical formations and staffs of the Maritime Front were attached by the enemy's tactical aviation, mainly at the crossings. However, the delays and losses resulting from these attacks were relatively light because of the well-organized air defense, particularly of the Front command posts, the main crossings, and the missile artillery grouping.

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31. The operational forces of the Polish Navy, after beginning military operations, continued reconnaissance of the enemy naval forces and, in joint operations with the Soviet Baltic Fleet and the East German Navy, engaged the "West" naval task forces penetrating from the region of the Danish Straits to the Baltic. Detached naval groups participated in the battle against the enemy's amphibious landing in the Swinoujscie area.

32. In the resultant situation, the Combined Armed Forces Command, which reviewed the situation in the European Theater of Operations and the development of the first border battles from the morning of 31 May, proceeded to fulfill its objective of destroying the enemy by making the necessary revisions to the missions of the Fronts as dictated by the actual situation. At 1100 hours on 31 May, the Western and Maritime Fronts received new operational directives. Both Fronts were ordered to continue to achieve the previously outlined aims of the troops of the 12th Army and the 21st Tank Army which temporarily operationally subordinated to it. Moreover, the Maritime Front was directed to shift to offensive operations in a wider zone, to destroy the forces of the Northern Army Group and the Danish armed forces, and to seize the northern part of West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark in a 10-day to 12-day operation (without the use of nuclear weapons, 14 to 18 days). The fulfillment of this mission required the Maritime Front to conduct operations in a zone 200 to 270 kilometers wide and 600 to 700 kilometers deep. In addition, the operation called for an average rate of advance of 60 to 70 kilometers per day (without the use of nuclear weapons, 30 to 50 kilometers per day).

33. At 1200 hours, the commands of the 12th Army and the 21st Tank Army received extracts of the Western Front directive assigning them to the Maritime Front.

34. In the afternoon hours of 31 May, the Front's staff began planning an offensive operation. Meanwhile, the Northern Army Group continued to be successful, especially in two directions: A main attack—in the direction of Luneburg and Wittstock, with forces of the 1st Infantry Corps (West German) and the 6th Mechanized Division (West German); a secondary attack—in the direction of Braunschweig and Frankfurt, with forces of the 1st Infantry Corps (British) and 1st Infantry Corps (Dutch).

35. In this situation, at 1600 hours on 1 June, the commander of the Maritime Front decided to commit to battle the 3rd and 5th Armies.
and to shift to offensive operations by exploiting the advantage in
strength of four armies in the Front's zone of operations and launch-
ing a main attack in the direction of Neuruppin, Hannover, and Ostend.
A secondary attack was to be launched along the Jutland Peninsula in
conjunction with landing operations in the zone of the Danish Straits.
The initial objective was to destroy the forces of the Northern Army
Group in the regions of penetration and the northeast part of West
Germany as well as the German-Danish forces in Schleswig-Holstein. The
subsequent objective was to crush the enemy reserves mobilized in the
northeast part of West Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands and to
seize the territory of these countries in the Front's zone of operations.

36. To achieve its goal, the Front received 246 nuclear warheads
with a total yield of about 7,000 kilotons and 137 chemical warheads.
The Front commander planned to use nuclear warheads as follows: During
the first strike—74 nuclear warheads with a yield of about 2,500 kilo-
tons; to fulfill the initial objective—88 nuclear warheads with a
yield of about 2,600 kilotons; for the subsequent objective—56 nuclear
warheads with a yield of about 1,200 kilotons; during landing opera-
tions—16 warheads with a yield of about 450 kilotons, plus a reserve
of 12 nuclear warheads with a yield of about 220 kilotons. In addi-
tion, 57 strategic strikes with a yield of 3,200 kilotons directed from
the Combined Armed Forces Command level were expected to be made in the
Front's zone of operations.

37. At 2200 hours on 31 May, a directive defining the missions
of the particular armies was issued to the armies in accordance with
objectives of the Front commander. The army commanders' decisions,
which properly corresponded to the objectives of the Front commander
on an army scale, were drafted on the basis of this directive. The
operational methods defined in these plans corresponded to the exist-
ing operational situation.

38. Staff papers and estimates drafted by individual officers
and staff groups provided the commanders with necessary initial data,
conclusions, and proposals supplemental to drafting decisions. Cer-
tain shortcomings, however, did occur, for example, in planning nuclear
strikes by the Air Force. The Front's staff did not update, according
to current needs, the targets for nuclear strikes made by one of the
subordinate Soviet air divisions but planned them according to the al-
ready outdated objectives of the commander of the Western Front.

40. The command organs of the Military Department of the National
Defense Committee concentrated their effort in this situation on undertakings connected with direction and support of the movement of Polish and allied operational forces and with the conduct of basic mobilization procedures. At this stage, Command Post No. 3 performed the main role, whereas Command Posts No. 2 and No. 4 accomplished the tasks assigned to them.

41. National Air Defense Forces, together with the operationally subordinate aviation of the Air Force Inspectorate, the Operational Air Force, the Northern Group of Soviet Forces, the forces and resources of the Air Defense Troops of the Maritime Front, and the Central and Southwestern Fronts' resources moving since the morning hours, provided cover for the operational forces, as well as for the more important transportation, administrative, and economic installations in Poland. In the period 0450-0730 hours, National Air Defense Forces repelled a mass raid of 385 aircraft in 95 groups, of which about 40 per cent operated at low altitudes. The decisions made by the commander of the National Air Defense Forces for repelling the raids were generally correct.

42. The military districts concentrated their main effort on supporting the movement of operational forces, combating diversionary-reconnaissance groups, and dispersing the population. Decisions for eliminating the effects of the air and diversionary landing attacks were adopted on an adequate operational basis (except for the action to eliminate the landing in the area of Swinoujscie).

43. The rear service units of the zone of interior operated the transportation network and continued to shift rail transportation to the western shore of the Oder River. By the end of 31 May, 59 per cent of all fuel supplies, 30 per cent of the ammunition supply, and 40 per cent of the food of the Front field depots, were shifted to the northern area of East Germany. Transportation support units were fully ready to carry out their tasks. Moreover, an Advanced Base of the Zone of Interior (Wysunieta Baze Obszaru Kraju-WBOK) was organized.

Third Stage of the Exercise Including the Nuclear-War Phase (0500 Hours of 1 June to 1300 Hours of 7 June, the End of the Exercise)

44. External Front. By dawn of 1 June, the left flank of the Western Front destroyed the advance formations of the Central Army Group in border conflicts and expanded its operation into West Germany.
to a depth of 50 to 70 kilometers, by finally taking the initiative in this direction. The 3rd and 5th Armies of the Maritime Front occupied staging areas for operations with most of the forces and continued preparations for commitment to battle in the afternoon hours on 1 June, while the Central and Southwestern Fronts crossed the Vistula River with advance tactical formations. In this situation, faced with the possibility of losing the strategic initiative and consequently losing the war, at 0500 hours on 1 June, the "West" decided to use weapons of mass destruction on an unlimited scale.

45. The enemy made 54 strikes with a total yield of 3,500 kilotons against the operational group of the Maritime Front in the first mass nuclear attack and an additional 40 strikes with a total yield of 1,100 kilotons by the end of the day. The strikes inflicted the following losses in people and equipment: In ten mechanized and tank divisions, from 15 to 40 per cent; in three army operational-tactical missile brigades, 20 per cent each; in the 2nd Air Army, 22 ground-attack fighter and reconnaissance planes; in the remaining armed services units and rear units of the Front, from 10 to 30 per cent.

46. Moreover, the nuclear strikes by the "West" caused the destruction of the transportation network and the radioactive contamination of large areas, especially in the vicinity of the Oder and Vistula Rivers, thereby delaying the approach of rear units and materiel to the staging area of the Front.

47. In this situation, the commander of the Maritime Front made the following decision: To order an immediate nuclear attack in order to hold the enemy to the presently occupied perimeters, to accelerate the commitment of the 3rd and 5th Armies to battle, and to shift to decisive offensive operations throughout the zone.

48. However, the Maritime Front launched its first mass nuclear attack about 10 to 20 minutes late and with fewer resources than planned, despite available data attesting to the enemy's preparation for attack. This delay prevented the formation of sufficient superiority and recovery of initiative from the enemy on the operational line of the Front.

49. As a result, in the afternoon hours efforts were made by the 12th Army, the 21st Tank Army, the 15th Mechanized Division of the 3rd Army, and the 7th Mechanized Division and the 8th Tank Division of the 5th Army, to resist the enemy. Their aim was to halt
the enemy's attack and create advantageous conditions for the commitment to battle of all forces of the 3rd and 5th Armies which were still moving. These efforts did not achieve the expected results. By the morning hours of 2 June, the Northern Army Group, taking advantage of its nuclear strikes and bringing in a second-echelon corps, deepened the penetration within the territory of East Germany to 60 to 70 kilometers in some directions.

50. The internal front. The aim of the enemy was to paralyze the functioning of the entire state system of Poland, especially the movement of operational forces. Thus the enemy, from 0515 to 0610 hours on 1 June, launched the first mass attack and then additional nuclear attacks, totalling 77 strikes with a total yield of about 8,200 kilotons and including 23 surface strikes, on the territory of Poland. The enemy strikes were concentrated particularly along the eastern border of Poland (on transshipment stations and transportation centers) and the crossings of the Vistula and Oder Rivers. Moreover, nuclear strikes (mainly air) were made on Polish road and railroad junctions and industrial, political, and administrative centers, especially in the central and northern parts of Poland.

51. As a result of these strikes, the entire state system was seriously disabled. The losses among the population were estimated to be over 1.6 million, including about 600,000 fatalities. As a result of the strikes in the area of the main field command posts, the political, internal, and supply departments of the National Defense Committee were partially disabled. A total of 36 bridges on the Vistula and Oder Rivers (including 16 railroad bridges) and 29 transportation centers were destroyed. Moreover, many army and state depots, including those of the Advanced Base of the Zone of Interior in the immediate rear of the Front, were destroyed. As a result of the surface strikes, most dangerous zones of contamination emerged in the regions: Nowy Dwor Gdanski, Bytow, Stargard Gdanski, Grudziadz, Rogozno, Trzemeszno, Aleksandrow Kujawski, Police, Templin, Strasburg, and Chojna.

52. In order to eliminate the effects of the enemy nuclear strikes and assure the continuity of movement of Polish and allied forces through Polish territory, the participating Chief of the General Staff decided: (a) To build eight urgently-needed bridges with forces of the territorial defense road, railroad, and ponton-bridge units, in participation with militarized units of other ministries; (b) to remove the devastation on the marching routes of the operational forces and to prepare marches detouring the areas of contamination; (c) to withdraw the units from the contaminated areas and decontaminate personnel and
equipment; and (d) to assist the civilian population as much as possible in eliminating the effects of the nuclear strikes.

53. In anticipation of further enemy attacks with nuclear weapons, proposals were made: (a) To restore the system of crossings over the main water obstacles; (b) to accelerate the mobilization of additional militarized units; (c) to mobilize supply loading areas on the eastern border of Poland and temporary transshipment areas on the Vistula and Oder Rivers and organize interzonal rail transportation traffic between the Vistula and Oder Rivers; and (d) to support the movement of operational forces, according to the previously established plan, with priority for transporting the heavy equipment of the 7th Army.

On 2 and 3 June

54. The external front. On 2 June, the situation of the Central Army Group of the "West" grew worse. Enemy progress was also partially checked on the strategic maritime axis. In this situation, the "West" intended to launch strikes with weapons of mass destruction in order to accelerate the commitment of operational reserves of the Army Group and to break the growing crisis in the zone of the Central Army Group. The "West" then planned to accelerate its attack on the axis of the Northern Army Group to restrict the maneuverability of "East" forces present in the area west of the Oder River and to defeat them before reactivating crossings over this water obstacle. At the same time, the "West" planned to form a Danish-German corps for operations on the Jutland axis, consisting of a new Jutland Infantry Division and the West German 6th Mechanized Division.

55. The enemy plans, however, were partially thwarted, because of successive, powerful nuclear strikes by the "East" against the approaching reserves of the Northern Army Group and also because of the commitment to battle of the main forces of the 3rd and 5th Armies. In the morning hours of 2 June, the forces of the Northern Army Group were driven back and had to shift to delaying defensive operations in some directions, primarily in the zone of the 5th Army and 21st Tank Army.

56. In this situation, the commander of the Maritime Front made the following decision: To launch, in the wake of nuclear attacks, powerful offensive operations throughout the front's zone with forces of the 3rd, 5th, and 12th Armies and the 21st Tank Army; to destroy the main forces of the first echelon of the Northern Army Group; and to carry the action over to enemy territory. Moreover, the commander planned to draw up the second-echelon of the 7th Army and continue to...
move the operational rear units on the salient axes of troop operations. The commander of the Front anticipated making 35 nuclear strikes with a yield of over 1,000 kilotons to support the planned operations.

57. In the situation thus developed, the 3rd and 5th Army main forces, approaching the zone of immediate combat operations, were deployed over a large area. The above decision enabled the rapid commitment to battle of divisions moved from the interior, the operational formation of new striking forces for selected directions of operations, and the change-over to offensive operations throughout the Front's operational zone. In addition, the decision provided for the shifting to offensive operations by all armies, without a complicated movement of forces. However, in regard to this matter, the East German 12th Army and the Soviet 21st Tank Army, which up to this time were engaged in heavy combat to break the enemy attack, basically did not have the opportunity for an independent shift to offensive operations.

58. As a result of the implementation of the aforementioned decision, by the end of 2 June, the Front's forces drove back the enemy in the zone of the 12th and 5th Armies and 21st Tank Army. During the day, the enemy penetrated only the 3rd Army zone with forces of the West German 5th Mechanized Division. In the evening, however, the 19th Tank Division, which was correctly brought in, moved to the rear of the 5th Mechanized Division. This made the situation much worse for the enemy also in this area. On 3 June, the attack against the rear of the West German 1st Infantry Corps was expanded and the reserve 1st (Dutch) Infantry Corps was crushed in a meeting engagement with the 5th Army. Thus, in the zone of the Northern Army Group, the advantage radically turned in favor of the "East".

59. On 2 June, the Navy maintained favorable operational command of its zone of responsibility and carried out sea transportation services for the Maritime Front with resources of the Ministry of Shipping. However, the Navy, in conjunction with the Soviet Baltic Fleet and the East Germany Navy, was assigned the main task of supporting the landing of the "Baltic" Operations Group on Zealand Island.

60. The "Baltic" Operations Group commander's decision, based on special analysis and calculations, anticipated the necessity of moving forces to the embarkation areas for a landing to be carried out in two basic landing waves on the southeast shore of Zealand. The amphibious landing was preceded, at 0230 hours Greenwich Time, by an airborne landing of the 9th Airborne Division which, taking advantage of the results of the nuclear attacks, used part of its

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forces to isolate the coast against infiltration by enemy forces from the interior of the island. Another part of its forces was used for operations in the direction of the beach to seize landing sectors for the amphibious landing. In order to carry out the landing operations, the Navy commander detached 56 landing ships, 32 troop ships, 16 landing cutters, and 99 ships for protection, cover, and fire support.

61. In the afternoon hours of 2 June, the embarkation of the first landing wave of the 10th Assault Landing and a tank regiment of the 11th Mechanized Division was accomplished on landing craft which formed two landing groups. The sea crossing began at 2000 hours. Because of intensive enemy tactical air activity and mine obstacles, the landing was delayed by 40 minutes and losses suffered amounted to 30 per cent of the landing forces. As a result of the losses suffered and the commitment of numerous territorial defense forces to battle on Zealand Island, the amphibious landing operations did not achieve the planned rate of speed. The northern part of the island was not yet seized by the end of the seventh day of the way. The shifting of the 14th Airborne Brigade (British) to this island intensified this difficult situation. Moreover, it was difficult to solve many combat and supply problems without the capture of the airport by the landing forces on the island.

62. The internal front. On 2 June, the enemy launched a total of 13 nuclear strikes with a total yield of about 600 kilotons against Poland. Disturbances in all sectors of national life were increased still further. In this situation, the participating Chief of the General Staff and commanders of the military districts concentrated their main efforts on the restoration of the control, command, and transportation systems, primarily the crossings over the Vistula and Oder Rivers; the maintenance of continuity in the supply of the Maritime Front forces and territorial defense forces; and the elimination of effects of the nuclear attacks, especially by giving every assistance to the stricken areas. Moreover, partial restoration of necessary production, especially for the needs of the armed forces, was planned.

63. On 3 June, the enemy made five additional strikes against Poland and landed another wave of diversionary-reconnaissance groups to disrupt the command and transportation system already damaged in previous days and to hamper the movement of allied operational forces. Decisions made in this situation by the participating staffs corresponded to the requirements and were rightly made.

64. Also on 3 June, Command Post No. 3 of the National Defense
Committee's Military Department was disabled as a result of enemy nuclear strikes. Its functions and ensuing special operational jurisdiction were passed to Command Post No. 4.

65. [Comment: At this point 14 illegible lines of the Polish original are omitted.] The "West" immediately put its plan into operation and moved those reserve divisions recently mobilized in the northern part of West Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium to the area northwest of Bremen. Their mission was to launch a strong counterattack in the direction of [three place names illegible] and to strike with two West German divisions in the direction of [two place names illegible]. At the same time, the "West" created an intense zone of radioactive contamination, destruction, and fire by launching numerous surface strikes against the front of the 7th Army which had been brought up from the interior. In addition, the "West" anticipated that the hard-hit 21st Tank Army, which had seized a large beachhead on the western shore of [placename illegible] by successfully deploying at a considerable pace, would be destroyed and the commitment of the 7th Army would be delayed considerably or disorganized to permit the "West" to check the attack of the Maritime Front and expand operations to the east under favorable conditions.

66. At the same time, the "West" launched a decisive counterattack on the Jutland axis, where an airborne landing was made by the 16th Airborne Brigade (British). The enemy also shifted a British infantry division by sea to the port of Hamburg and vicinity in order to attack and then to eliminate the bases of the extended strike groupings of the 3rd Army and its access to the rear. In order to hold the Danish Straits, the "West" conducted an airborne landing by the 44th Airborne Brigade (British) to reinforce this important area; naval units blocked the "East's" access to the North Sea.

67. In this situation, the Maritime Front commander made the following decision in order to achieve the general objective of defeating the Northern Army Group: To form a suitable force to resist attacks by enemy reserves; to accelerate the commitment of the 7th Army to battle in the direction of Hannover and Ostend, by maneuvering it to the periphery of the radioactive zones; to make a forced march from the Rhine River with the 21st Tank Army; then to seek engagement on another front, which would permit an advancement averaging 40 to 50 kilometers per day; and to continue to speed up the pace of operations along the Jutland Peninsula. In addition, the commander, in conjunction with operations of Polish and allied naval forces in the Baltic, planned to seize the Danish Straits in order to improve the
conditions for the allied fleets and to facilitate movement in the North Sea by forces of the 3rd Army and "Baltic" Operations Group (GO).

68. The decisions of the army commanders and the "Baltic Operations Group were in accord with existing operational conditions and the Front Commander's objectives.

69. The final stage of the operation was marked by preparation of plans by the "Baltic" GO and the Navy for the capture of southern Norwegian areas adjacent to the Skagerrak Straits and the establishment of operational conditions in the North Sea. An evaluation of the situation indicated that this was an unusually difficult operation requiring further preparations, primarily for the seizure of the Jutland Peninsula. This seizure would permit the use of Jutland coastal sections situated next to the landing areas, and the joining of the "Baltic" GO with 3rd Army forces, with a possible prospect of forming a special group which could fulfill the designated tasks after receiving additional reinforcement and air and naval support.

70. After the commanders and staffs reported their proposals, the National Defense Minister ordered the termination of the exercise at 0700 hours operational time on 7 June. [Comment: The following three pages of the original Polish document are missing.]

71. The "Lato-67" exercise constitutes an important stage in the operational process of perfecting the higher elements of command in the Polish armed forces. By its magnitude, this exercise differed quite clearly from previous integrated command post exercises conducted by Poland. For the first time, directing elements of the National Defense Ministry not only were deployed at the field command posts but also performed as the Military Department of the National Defense Committee. The involvement of elements of other departments of the National Defense Committee in the exercise permitted the Military Department to undertake problems on a broad scale by considering its wide contacts and connections with political and economic defense problems.

72. The all-embracing exercise simultaneously included all remaining higher elements of command: Front command; commands of armies and armed services; and commands of wartime military districts and national air defense corps.

73. At the same time, in accordance with the training plan of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact, the exercise, because
of participation by both the Soviet and East German army commands, was enriched by improved battle efficiency of higher staffs in the skill of commanding combined operations of friendly armies. This was the first time that such a broad base was formed for improving teamwork at an operational level between Poland and her allies in the fulfillment of Combined Armed Forces tasks.

74. The great size and organizational structure of the exercise permitted the practical performance and testing of many basic guidelines for operations, organization, and mobilization. The conclusions resulting from the exercise and based on actual practice are particularly valuable. These conclusions concern: Means and methods for achieving preparedness; organizational and spatial deployment of a wartime system of armed forces command; organization, methods, and means of cooperation and the assumption and exercise of temporary command over subordinate units of allied forces; and evaluation of the usefulness of the presently introduced new organizational structure of some central institutions of the National Defense Ministry, operational commands and staffs, and their support units.

75. Equally valuable are the conclusions obtained during the exercise with regard to the methods and scope of work of the control system of the National Defense Committee's Military Department in the planning, organization, preparation and direction of mobilization, and the area deployment of the armed forces, which is wholly connected with the process of defense readiness of the state, the national economy, and society.

76. Aside from this, the exercise was a special and undoubtedly very useful occasion for positive and general consideration of a number of theoretical and practical problems of command, operations, organization, and mobilization of the combined armed forces of three brotherly countries.

77. We were guided by the valid principle of considering the realities of actual political and military situations in preparing the strategic-operational background and drafting the content of the "Lato-67" exercise. This principle, so it seems, was strongly manifested in the present exercise. The simulated enemy, in respect to the initial situation, composition and state of combat readiness, grouping of forces and, also to a large degree, operational procedure, was, in essence, actually a foe threatening us. Possibly, the greatest realism was produced, in equal measure, by both the Polish and allied troops participating in the exercise, which logically
resulted in a mutual relation of forces. In this "Lato-67" exercise we actually tried to perform and re-examine the problems of one of the probable variants of the growth, outbreak, and development of a military conflict in Europe.

78. With regard to the actual political and military international situation, this exercise, by taking the current situation as a general starting point, pertinently reflected the state of its projected development, which could and can emerge if events progress toward a very serious intensification of the situation and especially if political conditions favorable for imperialism to take the risks of aggression were created in Europe, primarily for West German imperialism supported by the United States.

79. In the exercise, we took under consideration two particularly dangerous and relatively constant features of the actual political-strategic situation; the escalation of American intervention in Vietnam, accompanied by a general increase in American imperialist aggressiveness in various areas of the world and the growing tendency of militarism and of West German revanchism to change the status quo in Europe in order to settle their political and territorial claims.

80. On the international scene, about which we have already spoken several times, there are noted strong trends favoring relaxation and coexistence but the American war of intervention directed against all the Vietnamese people hangs ominously heavy. This war, which morally, politically, and militarily compromises the strongest imperialist country, without any prospect for a quick peaceful solution in view of the previous escalation by the Johnson group, proves that the international situation is becoming ever more complicated and intensified.

81. In Greece, in the presence of the growing forces of democracy and peace, a fascist coup d'etat was carried out with considerable U.S. participation. In the Middle East, in view of the steadily weakening position of American and British imperialism, a grave military action was taken against the Arab countries in collusion with Israel; this action threatens a transition to a new level of escalation—the frontal expansion of local wars. We recorded this opinion day before yesterday and today Israel continues her military aggression undertaken yesterday against the United Arab Republic, Syria, and Jordan. An unmistakable relation exists between the general political atmosphere created by the continuation of the
Vietnamese conflict and the character, aims, and methods of policy and strategy pursued by American imperialism and this new, highly peace-threatening act of imperialist aggression, accomplished this time directly by militant, aggressive Israeli nationalism. Israeli aggression in the Middle East discloses a new change in the strategic plan of imperialism, or more accurately, American imperialism; this change is aimed at achieving global domination by intensifying escalation and by the expansion of aggressive interventions and limited wars.

82. The U.S. war of intervention in Vietnam and, presently, the war in the Middle East most clearly demonstrate the general aggressiveness of imperialist policies of the United States and other capitalist countries, expose its true nature and aims, and drastically reveal the real meaning of the so-called "policy of building bridges" and "selective coexistence". This policy, in conjunction with steadily intensified psychological warfare, aims to weaken the cohesion of the states of the socialist camp, to create a state of disunity in our activities, and, primarily, to loosen the allied bonds between the USSR and other socialist countries. This policy also thrives on the great-power, nationalist policy of that part of the Chinese party and government leadership which directs the Chinese people's dissatisfaction—resulting from the crisis [created by] Mao Tse-tung's political and economic doctrines—against the Soviet Union.

83. American imperialism expects, in this manner and under these conditions, to obtain greater freedom and security for gradual aggressive action. American imperialism also hopes for a weak and ineffective reaction by our countries to successive acts [stemming from] its policies, which are being conducted from a position of strength, and to acts of armed intervention and interference in various parts of the world.

84. The crises and local military conflicts in other parts of the world are seriously complicating the international situation and can further complicate it in the future. Under current conditions, the threat of general war is inherent in each conflict to a major or minor degree. Furthermore, it is still correct to say that the situation in Europe has an exceptionally important and special significance for world peace and security because of the distribution of forces and international relations. A local war in Europe almost inevitably would mean a world conflict.
85. At present there is no immediate crisis in Europe. A definite majority of the European capitalist states, relying on a realistic evaluation of power alignments and the effects of unlimited nuclear war and rejecting the thesis of a military threat by the USSR and other socialist states, are inclined ever more to accept the principle of peaceful coexistence. At the same time, the aspirations of these states to obtain greater independence from the policies and strategy of the United States are growing stronger. The security of Europe, however, is constantly threatened by the general aggressive policy of American imperialism and, primarily and directly, by West Germany's policies, which are most strongly linked with American policies despite various mutual frictions and tactical maneuverings.

86. The American political and military presence in Europe and, especially, the American nuclear shield, arouse the aggressive ambitions of renewed West German militarism and revisionism and favor the advancement of West Germany to the foremost, and an independent, position in the North Atlantic Treaty system in Europe.

87. It must be said that the linking of American policy and strategy with West German policy and strategy recently became more pronounced than ever before. The so-called "eastern policy" of West Germany is essentially the counterpart of the American policy of "building bridges" to the East. With regard to military strategy, the two partners lean ever more clearly toward the concept and possibility of a local, limited war in Europe in their aggressive plans. The United States apparently convinced West Germany that this strategy not only assures it greater security and freedom of action but also may create for West German imperialism a somewhat realistic chance under certain circumstances, to attempt to achieve West German political goals through armed provocation.

88. The recent acceptance of the strategy of flexible response as the official NATO strategy represents a confirmation of this thesis. West Germany's reservations and fears with regard to the strategy of flexible response and its practical acceptance of this strategy are almost exclusively aimed at obtaining a full guarantee that the American nuclear shield and its direct military support will be effective in assuring West Germany conditions for the most advantageous action through NATO, in which it would play, after the United States, the leading role to an ever greater degree, especially in Europe, by subordinating NATO essentially to its goals.
89. The extreme political aspirations of West German militarism as represented, among others, by Strauss and his advocates go still further. By maintaining ties with the United States on the basis of an almost equal partnership, these aspirations aim at obtaining full independence for West Germany and, primarily, at the possession of nuclear weapons and the so-called political union of Europe, obviously under the hegemony of West Germany.

90. The so-called new eastern policy, publicized as proof of the peaceful intentions of the Kiesinger-Brandt government, clearly interplays with the strategy of flexible response and the concept of local war. In the final analysis, if political pressure and blackmail are unsuccessful, this policy aims at creating favorable conditions for military aggression. The policy strives for a political reaction by the states of our camp which would make aggression possible and assure its success.

91. The main goals of this policy are: The political and military isolation of East Germany; the creation of a situation of divergency, discord, and distrust among the socialist states; the attainment of conditions under which our counteraction to an attempt to violate the western border of the commonwealth of socialist states and the eventual rapid annexation of East Germany by West Germany would be uncoordinated and ineffective. According to NATO terminology, the succeeding stages of this limited war would undoubtedly involve the western and northern regions of Poland and the territories of Czechoslovakia, USSR, and other socialist countries.

92. For these reasons also, most European socialist states emphatically oppose the "new" eastern policy of West Germany. In substance, we exposed its true character. In view of the potential threat inherent in this policy, we find it advisable to strengthen the allied bonds which result from the Warsaw Pact membership and which unite us by a system of bilateral alliances. It is also advisable to make it clearly comprehensible to the Bonn militarists that all their efforts to change the status quo in Europe and all encroachments upon the independence and integrity of the socialist countries will be met with our determined and concerted resistance. In this sense, the "Lato-67" exercise was concluded on a very timely basis.
93. The new eastern policy of West Germany does not have any chance of success under the present distribution of forces. It is impossible, however, not to see the prevailing trend toward the achievement of this policy. We must maintain increased vigilance with regard to this policy, which is evident in the trends and system of West German military preparations and in the development of the Bundeswehr.

94. As a result of the continuous build-up, the Bundeswehr has become the main ground strike force within the integrated armed forces of NATO. The West German Army was intensively re-equipped in recent years with new armored equipment and now forms the core of NATO ground forces for the Central European Theater of Military Operations. With the exception of the United States, West Germany has the largest number (690) of tactical nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. Just last year, the number of 203.2 mm howitzers in corps and divisions were increased by 50 per cent. At present, 155 mm cannons using nuclear projectiles are being introduced in the brigades. The Bundeswehr Air Force comprises 30 per cent of the NATO air strength in the Northern and Central European theater of Operations and it has over 80 nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. The development of the West Germany Navy is also intensive. Particularly noteworthy is the rapid increase in landing craft (15 vessels during 1966).

95. Qualitative improvement continues in all the armed services. In the development of the West Germany armed forces, it is necessary to observe the growing capability for rapid and significant expansion—practically a twofold increase in the covert or even overt form of mobilization—in the combat strength of the troops. Today the Bundeswehr has at its disposal the necessary material reserves for mobilization and about one million reservists; this number will increase by half in 1970. Besides the regular forces, the Bundeswehr is intensively increasing the forces of the so-called territorial defense and regional defense, especially the active forces. The presently existing forces comprise the cadre for about a tenfold larger wartime establishment amounting to over 300,000 men. Moreover, consideration is given to the formation of territorial brigades and divisions with a structure approximating the regular tactical formations which, in case of necessity, could be subordinated to the Bundeswehr and used on the external front.
96. Because of the previous intensive quantitative and qualitative development of the Bundeswehr, whose personnel strength in 1966 increased by 21,000, it is becoming a military force which is capable of playing a leading wartime role within the joint NATO armed forces. Moreover, if West Germany should create certain favorable conditions, the Bundeswehr is capable of undertaking independent aggressive actions.

97. The degree of combat readiness of the West German armed forces is comparable to that of the American forces deployed in the European theater and clearly surpasses the armies of other NATO states. The deployment of the West German armed forces is also assuming the ever-clearer character of an offensive disposition. All these matters create conditions favoring military actions by surprise, obviously on the fixed premise that favorable political and military circumstances will emerge in this regard.

98. An analysis of the policy and military preparations of West Germany permits the assumption that the Bundeswehr has numerous variants to operational plans for drawing the NATO forces into war against the socialist states and also, more or less, for independent action with NATO cover, primarily the cover of the American strategic nuclear forces.

99. One of the possible variants of the operational plan of West Germany is an independent surprise attack with conventional forces aimed at the capture of East Germany. This variant takes as its starting point a situation clearly advantageous to West Germany but lacking realism, in which the withdrawal of Soviet forces from East Germany would occur in exchange for the withdrawal of NATO forces from West German territory. It must be said that in the policies of many Western states it is possible to observe attempts to bring about an eventual withdrawal of Soviet forces from the territory of the German Democratic Republic and to create in Europe a strategic situation considerably more convenient for imperialism, especially West German imperialism.

100. In essence, the discussed plan would depend on the launching of two surprise attacks with ground forces—north of the so-called Berlin ridge and south of the Nurnberg "pocket"—in conjunction with extensive use of amphibious and airborne landings and wide use of diversionary groups. According to West German adventurist

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plans, these operations, together with close air support, should result in the occupation of East Germany in a very short period of time and open the way to the western borders of Poland. It is then calculated that the attempt of our countries to counteract the aggression will be paralyzed by the threat of the use of atomic weapons or even by the use of them as a deterrent. Briefly, it is calculated that the American nuclear shield will operate effectively and that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries will submit to the atomic blackmail and accept the accomplished facts.

101. It is also possible to alter this variant by anticipating a West German operation in more or less an integrated system on condition that Soviet forces remain in Germany. The objectives of the operation and the swiftness of action would basically remain unchanged. The main operational objective would be to achieve maximum success in the primary directions and decisive areas in order to force definite concessions from us later through negotiations under threat of escalation with the use of nuclear weapons. In case the intended objectives are impossible to achieve or the aggression fails and a critical situation emerges for NATO forces, the possible use of tactical and tactical-operational nuclear weapons, or even strategic nuclear weapons, is anticipated.

102. Without taking under consideration the degree of probability and possibility of accomplishing the presented adventurist theories of war, we must say that these theories are manifested even more frequently in the statements of atomic strategists of the West, including the works and declarations of the American atomic theoretician Kahn, and find expression in the official doctrines and exercises conducted by NATO. These theories are becoming the basis of future imperialist strategy for Europe. Therefore, we took the basic elements of these theories under consideration in planning the present exercise.

103. Specifically, we presumed a gradual rise in tensions and the existence of a period of threat, as well as the covert deployment of NATO forces at this time under the pretext of large-scale exercises, visits, trade deliveries, fishing operations, et cetera. We also assumed the role of West Germany in initiating and provoking aggression, the "West's" limited initial operational objectives bringing about the annexation of East Germany and the conventional war phase consistent with these objectives, and the enemy's rapid change-over to the use of nuclear weapons in case the aggression failed or was decisively counteracted.
Moreover, we considered the variant of the initial mass nuclear strike as more probable but, at the same time, more difficult. However, we cannot completely exclude attempts to adapt a method of shifting from conventional to nuclear warfare in which the use of nuclear weapons would be limited at the very outset.

On the other hand, we did not consider, for the most obvious reasons which certainly do not require any explanations, one of the basic assumptions of potential opponents, namely, the assumption of weakness or, frankly, the lack of unity of action among our brotherly peoples, states, and armies. We are completely and deeply convinced that this unity, which underlies our joint political and defensive strategy, determines its effectiveness and constitutes for imperialism an impenetrable barrier against its adventurist and aggressive intentions.

The general strengthening and improvement of our fraternal bond in all its facets, manifestations, and aspects is unalterably and categorically decreed. This includes the important defense aspect of adequately and incessantly instilling into imperialism the conviction that all its efforts to undertake even the most limited aggressive and belligerent actions are doomed to failure and that they will be met with broad, coordinated, and necessarily strong resistance, to whatever extent the situation will demand.

We well realize that Poland as well as other socialist countries can assure the effectiveness of their offensive and defensive operations only within the framework of a coalition, whose best answer to the existing conditions in Europe is the Warsaw Pact and our combined armed forces with their chief and leading member, the armed forces of the USSR.

Our exercise was undoubtedly an important display of unified defense action of three fraternal armies and was another great step forward in perfecting their skill and readiness for combined operational actions on the external front.

The internal defense front, national territorial defense of each of our countries, is being prepared and strengthened, to a large degree, within the framework of national concepts and guidelines and in accord with our specific conditions and capabilities; however, all of the national internal defense fronts also form a
joint allied internal front. The resistance and effectiveness of action of each national element of this joint front very substantially and universally influence the effectiveness of the whole allied defense system, the entire socialist rear area, and are closely connected in many ways with the action and support of the external operation of the allied defense front. In Poland, the linking of the internal and external fronts plays a special role. One of the main tasks of basic strategic significance to the internal front is to provide support for the free movement and deployment of our own forces as well as the allied Soviet forces advancing from the interior.

110. In considering this well-understood joint problem, we have been concentrating our defense efforts for many years on an adequate, harmonious expansion of the two defense fronts and integration of their operation in a uniform, systematic state defense system. The exercise, in which for the first time we were able to undertake on such a broad scale the problems of operation and cooperation of two defense fronts within the military system, reflected the stage of development attained in this sector.

111. Organization and mobilization for the deployment of all the higher elements of command within the military system of the National Defense Committee and the entire armed forces were some of the fundamental problems of the exercise. These problems dealt essentially with direction of the process of increasing the combat readiness of the armed forces to the extent of their complete deployment for operations on both the external front, within the framework of the combined armed forces, and on the internal front in national territorial defense. At the same time, these problems involved, for the first time on a full scale and in conformity with our doctrine for directing the state during war, the activation of a recently-organized command system of the national defense forces within the National Defense Committee at the central and district levels; the testing of the principles for detaching from the entire state system of Poland the commands and forces designated for operations on the external front; and the performance of the Front and army elements of command under the new organizational structure.

112. Accordingly, we undertook the testing of extensive problems essential to national defense, especially in the period of
threat and initial phase of war; the National Defense Ministry, as the Military Department of the National Defense Committee, is directly responsible for these problems. Moreover, it must be emphasized that the complete deployment of forces and resources of the system of society and state forms the basis of national defense readiness, according to the guidelines we have adopted and that this readiness is increasing within the system of society and state. These problems were outlined only generally and in the conduct of the exercise did not represent the basic substance of the exercise; therefore, they will not be examined in the discussion.

113. We are forming a peacetime command structure which will assure the exercise of command over the entire armed forces under a uniform system. This structure will also enable the National Defense Ministry, acting as the Military Department of the National Defense Committee, to initiate and coordinate operational defense measures throughout the state, economic, and social system.

114. The National Defense Minister directs the entire armed forces under a uniform system. The system's main elements of command at successive levels are the General Staff, commands of military districts and armed services, and commands of tactical formations. The elements of staff administration are the offices of the chiefs of the various arms and services, inspectorates, and other special institutions.

115. The deployment of the armed forces command during mobilization is based primarily on the detachment of the higher elements of command (Front and army commands designated for operations within the combined armed forces) from the uniform peacetime system of the National Defense Ministry and the military district commands. Moreover, this deployment is based on the transfer of the Ministry of National Defense, representing the KOK Military Department, and the suitably organized military district commands to definite command posts, in order to obtain the greatest possible efficiency in the system under wartime conditions. In addition, we are observing principles whereby our structure of command and administration, being adapted for the best fulfillment of peacetime tasks, will assure, at the same time, an efficient shift to the wartime structure.

116. During the exercise, we tested new guidelines for the organizational structure of the command system of the KOK Military.
Department. These guidelines revealed their basic usefulness. The conduct of the exercise permitted particularly accurate defining of the role and functional and jurisdictional division among the particular command posts of the KOK Military Department. Each of these posts, although somewhat specialized in particular fields (the correctness of such differentiation of posts requires, moreover, still further analysis in view of the present exercise), should have the capability of basically exercising full command, including control, over the deployment of the National Defense Committee to field posts. One command post, the selection of which is based on actual circumstances, fulfills the role of the main command post; usually the command post from which the director of the Military Department issues orders is chosen. The other command posts fulfill similar tasks assigned to them and are in readiness to assume, if necessary, the functions of the main post. It is necessary to emphasize that under this system, the previous [peace-time] post should basically fulfill its main functions as long as it is able to do so. At the same time, on the basis of experiences gained in the exercise, it is necessary to study the bases for operationally establishing clearly the need to drop the operating command post from the command system and, furthermore, for setting a time for other command posts to assume its tasks. In the exercise, the assumption of the functions of a disabled main command post by a reserve command post basically permitted the maintenance of continuity of command; however, exercising the command in practice would be difficult because the staffs of the reserve command post are insufficiently oriented in all the problems of command and cooperation, especially in problems of the KOK departments.

117. The highly complicated process of deploying the armed forces for operations and mobilization requires centralized control by one of the special centers. In our situation, the General Staff and the military district and armed services commands, operating in conformity with General Staff guidelines, are responsible for the complete deployment of the armed forces and the control of moving forces in Poland.

118. Against this background, a review of the conduct of deployment of command elements during this exercise reveals that certain irregularities did occur. Even before the activation of a state of direct threat and the withdrawal to field command posts under the still continuing peacetime system of armed forces command,
it was possible to observe a tendency of participating staffs to overstep the planned guidelines provided for a given situation. This tendency created a tense situation and could have disrupted the established course for achieving combat readiness by including non-designated elements in the uniform process of command.

119. As a positive attempt at a complete solution to the joint problems of the operational and territorial defense forces, it is necessary to evaluate the exercise's plan drafted by the Quartermaster General for organizing the rear services and logistical support of the armed forces in the initial period of the war. Moreover, a concept was developed for decentralized support of forces in Poland by means of regional logistic centers organized on the basis of the multibranch district, the central depots, and the state distribution warehouses.

120. The exercise showed that if a state of direct threat should occur at the time when the main forces of the second-echelon army are not completely mobilized (in contrast to the first-echelon army), it is advisable to alert and shift only the staff's operational group to its future assembly area. The staff's operational group should then assure conditions for the gradual assumption of command of the approaching forces. At this time, the basic core of the future army command should still operate within the military district command, giving direction to the main and then most difficult task, the deployment of the army during mobilization. The decision made by the 7th Army command to move the command post to the anticipated area before the deployment of the army during mobilization was therefore premature.

121. In the exercise we subjected to experimental testing, with generally good results, the recently drafted new organizational structure of commands of the Front and combined-arms armies. We intend to introduce this structure as mandatory for mobilization plans and to maintain it for a period of at least several years. With respect to quantity, the structure is characterized by a considerable reduction in personnel strength: As much as 65 per cent in the Front and 38 per cent in the army. This reduction was already accepted four years ago. The new structure, with respect to functions, basically preserves the tested chain of command of particular special elements and, at the same time, strengthens the coordination of the echelons.
122. Of particular note under the new structure is the appointment of a deputy commander for technical affairs and his organizational command of the detached technical echelon. After appropriate changes are made at headquarters, this echelon will incorporate [each command] level down as far as the division. The technical echelon will handle the problems of the joint automotive and tank-equipment service, as well as the ordnance service, and will coordinate the activity of all the other technical services, including the technical elements of the armed services' headquarters.

123. We consider the formation of the technical echelons in the organizational structure of the particular levels of command as a correct development and the result of the growing application of technology to the armed forces. The formation is reflected thus far, by the very imperceptible but highly essential objective development of two basic organizations within the uniform rear structure: The traditional but modernly conceived quartermaster rear echelon and the increasingly significant technical rear echelon.

124. The exercise produced the first experiments in the operation of the technical echelon under field conditions, although all commands underestimated the importance of this problem and did not create favorable conditions for drawing more scholarly conclusions. The exercise also indicated the need to examine and establish the basic relations emerging in the rear area between the quartermaster, who is the area director of transportation and communications and is responsible for the organization of the rear area as a whole, and the technical affairs deputy, who is responsible for the technical sector of the rear area.

125. The plan for perfecting the military command system recently included units supporting the operations of the command posts. Instead of a number of independent special units, we are forming, according to a new concept, combined units capable of assuring complete support and protection to the command posts. Elements of units reorganized in this manner have been tested for the first time in our exercise. We confirmed the usefulness of their organizational structure and, at the same time, uncovered the possibility of more economical solutions, without damaging the effectiveness of the service.

126. In as much as the army is inaugurating the important phase of mechanization and automation in the command and administr-
tion processes, and in consideration of the weaknesses exposed in the exercise with regard to the present system of circulation and dissemination of information, it is necessary to emphasize the absolute need for continuous development of communications. In conjunction with meeting the requirements for communications equipment, it is necessary, at the same time, to upgrade communications to the level of a skillfully organized, complete, and uniform system having durability, mobility, transmission capacity, and secrecy. The activation of a new and highly effective system of warning and alerting the armed forces and also the installation of crypto-equipment and cipher-code machines (urzadzen utajniajacych i szyfrowo-kodowych) are the main tasks of this program.

127. In the exercise, a period of several days of gradual increase in tensions and threat of war was purposely assumed in order to permit, for the first time to such great extent, the undertaking of the problem of stage-by-stage achievement of full combat readiness by the armed forces and their deployment for mobilization and operations.

128. The experiences gained in periods of continued crises, primarily the Berlin and Cuban crises, and also other crises, indicated that rarely is it ever known in time whether or not an armed conflict is a foregone conclusion. Therefore, our response to situations of tension should be, on the one hand, decisive, in order to prevent us from being overpowered or taken by surprise or from leaving any doubts as to our readiness to resist aggression, and, on the other hand, it should be based on a very thorough analysis of the situation, deeply thought out and discussed.

129. In this light, it is also necessary to study the activity of the General Staff participants and other MND central institutions during a period of increasing tensions prior to the outbreak of hostilities. It is the responsibility of the General Staff to initiate definite actions and coordinate them not only on an armed forces scale but also within the framework of state defense readiness.

130. The situation in which defense readiness was directly undertaken had not yet indicated the inevitability of war, although undoubtedly there was an increase in tensions. Therefore, it was necessary gradually to increase, according to the growing threat,
the combat readiness of the armed forces by proposing a gradual and uniform increase in national defense readiness.

131. Consequently, the General Staff was confronted with the following tasks: To designate correctly, in conjunction with other MND central institutions, the units to be secretly expanded and brought to full readiness during the earlier stage; to define the estimated further deployment of the armed forces; and to designate the successive units for full combat readiness in the later stages, without resorting to a state of general mobilization but rather carrying this out in a routine military manner. Generally, the mobilization system should be very flexible and permit the expansion of units of various composition. The units should be activated or recalled in sequence or by groups, depending on the dynamic changes in the degree of threat. Such a system, based on a potential secret mobilization of various groups of units, undoubtedly meets contemporary requirements more than today's unsuitable and stiff general mobilization plan. In determining the composition of the discussed groups, various combinations can obviously emerge. Therefore, it is desirable to draft correspondingly variable plans during peacetime, together with an estimate of their effects on the national economy.

132. From the above deductions, it must be said that the initial and limited scope of armed forces deployment, as proposed by the General Staff participants, corresponded to the situation which developed. This proposal enabled, in case of need, the rapid deployment of the entire armed forces and, at the same time, assured the achievement of a state of full readiness by the units comprising the core of the strike force, air defense units, and units supporting the deployment of the military command and state leadership. Such limited actions were also the result of the recommendations contained in a directive of the National Defense Committee. The call-up of the anticipated second group of units assured the deployment of the entire first-echelon of the combat front with the necessary rear elements and also assured the deployment of the communications support units on Polish territory.

133. The solution discussed consequently had a clearly marked, gradually attainable, and effective goal: Air cover; formation of a strike force capable of immediately undertaking the operational
missions without waiting for the deployment of the entire armed forces; and assurance of field command conditions. Yet it seems that it would have been still more effective if the support units most necessary for the movement were already included in the first group of mobilized units.

One of the proposals not adopted called for a drastic, single operation to expand the armed forces by one-third of the strength anticipated for general mobilization. Such a variant for the deployment of the armed forces obviously is just as possible as the variant for a single, fully activated mobilization. However, both variants must be regarded as rather exceptional, for it is difficult to accept that a sudden situational change of this kind, which requires the immediate activation of large-scale mobilization, would occur under conditions of peace and actions designed to preserve political peace.

In our exercise, we adopted with full awareness a situation the dynamic development of which led the participating staffs to increase the readiness of the armed forces in successive stages. We regarded this method of conducting the exercise to be more instructive and to furnish more material for discussions and conclusions. We basically achieved this goal. At the same time, we gained experience in improving the methods of conducting the exercise under discussion. Consequently, the situations created by the leadership were better perceived by the participating staffs and gave a complete picture of all the factors affecting their decisions.

It must also be emphasized that during the initial attacks the National Defense Ministry, acting as the Military Department of the National Defense Committee, was confronted with the need to link the deployment of the armed forces closely with corresponding actions of other KOK departments. Moreover, the exercise revealed the need to define the powers and duties of these departments in accomplishing suitable tasks while the nation is in the process of achieving defense readiness. The handling of this problem by the simulated enemy group contending against the other KOK departments permitted a test of the reality and correctness of certain solutions concerning the fulfillment of army needs by the national economy during a period of threat.
137. Simultaneously with the start of mobilization efforts, the General Staff made preparations for the operational deployment of forces and assured the performance of preliminary actions facilitating its implementation, which was manifested mainly by an improvement in the situation of some units. Tasks were initiated with reference to the dispersal of material supplies and their transportation by rail to East Germany. This action later permitted the shifting of 35 per cent of the Front field depot supplies to the Oder River before the moment of first exchange of nuclear strikes.

138. The decisions taken in these matters by the General Staff participants and the Quartermaster General, with consideration, moreover, of the highly essential problem of camouflage of operational mobilization and troop movements, must be evaluated positively. Other proposals presented at this time for the abandonment of the careful, stage-by-stage improvement of the deployment and rather large-scale movement of operational forces were premature, according to the guidelines of the exercise, and could have produced unfavorable economic effects. It should also be noted that the premature concentration of forces, especially in the limited area beyond the Oder River, would have risked the disclosure of our intentions to the enemy and exposed the forces to attack. On the other hand, the proposals for camouflaging the deployment of forces under the pretext of exercises in the area were topical and deserved consideration. Thus, it is concluded that the complicated mission of camouflage, especially of combat troop units, should be taken under consideration in planning the deployment of the armed forces. At the same time, it is worthwhile to add that in order to improve the situation of the forces it is necessary to consider the planned axis of later troop movements. Therefore, the objective of a preliminary concentration of units which were to join the 7th Army in the area of the central provinces was also unjustified. This action removed these units from the proper course, lengthened the marching routes, and, moreover, made the later movement of these forces difficult, because they were compelled to cross additional water obstacles.

139. The accomplishment of the movement and shifting of forces to improve their deployment required not so much a large quantitative commitment, but more an immediate commitment of forces and means of transportation, mainly rail transport drawn up
immediately to the designated indicated embarkation points. Moreover, there was an apparent need to obtain information on the current railroad rolling stock and its technical characteristics, quantity, and distribution points. There was also the apparent need to standardize the principles for the rapid formation of trains (particularly those with heavy platforms and tanks) and drawing them up for the urgent military transportation immediately required in a peacetime system of railroad operations. A similar requirement involves certain types of motorized rolling stock, especially tankers, and also inland shipping barges engaged at field river crossings.

140. The commitment of the Maritime Front to battle and the undertaking of its operational missions occurred under a highly dynamic, tense, and generally disadvantageous situation for Polish front-line combat forces. Our forces faced a definitely superior enemy striking from the front and, at the same time, harassing the approach of the Front's forces over a wide area by means of landing operations. The atomic threat increased from hour to hour. On the one hand, the threat dictated the undertaking of necessary defense measures against weapons of mass destruction and, on the other hand, demanded a shifting of Polish atomic weapon delivery means for use in the first nuclear strike even before the commitment of the combined-arms formations to battle. The subordination of two allied front-line armies to the Front's command confronted the command with additional and difficult requirements that widened the scope of its duties. Therefore, the Front's command had to perform two tasks, i.e., to assume command and direct the armies involved in battle with the enemy and, at the same time, to assume command of the organic forces in their crossing the Oder River and to direct their further movement and commitment to battle. All these actions occurred under conditions of field deployment of the same command planning the ground operation in conjunction with the landing operation.

141. It is necessary to regard a situation of this kind as typical for our forces. Therefore, it is worthwhile, in discussing the situation, to throw more light on essential problems such as operational planning, assumption of command over allied armies, participation of the Front's forces in the first nuclear strike, and commitment of forces to battle.
142. Under operational conditions of the Maritime Front, the drafting of the operational plan became a continuous process of proceeding from general guidelines to precise details until the commitment of the main forces to battle. These circumstances were fully considered in our exercise. Development of the operational situation during the first day of war and the resultant directive of the High Command of the Combined Armed Forces compelled the Front’s command to draft a new version of the plan. This version was improved and upgraded in the following days and basically differed from the plan drafted in the period preceding the outbreak of armed conflict. Only the previous basic concept of the operation was preserved; on the other hand, the method of implementation of the concept was essentially changed.

143. The decision expressed in the plan concerning the time and directions for committing the Front’s main forces should be regarded as correct. There are doubts, however, concerning the intentional delay in commitment of the 7th Army to battle until the Front fulfilled the initial objective of deploying the acquired command. The formation of the main forces of the Northern Army Group, the enemy's shortage of strong strategic reserves, and the Front’s superficial subsequent objective, clearly indicated the need to make preparations for quickly bringing in the second-echelon army to crush the enemy's main troop groupings. The attempt to plan missions for the armies without clearly defining the content of their initial and subsequent objectives also produces reservations.

144. Thus far we have not dealt with the specific and broad problem of assuming command over allied armies and interallied cooperation at the operational level. The conditions created in this connection were difficult and, at the same time, gave the participating staffs of the Front and army commands great freedom in the selection of procedural methods. We have considered the fact that this typical Combined Armed Forces problem still requires, despite the apparent progress from year to year, additional joint research and practical solutions and testing.

145. In the exercise, the question of interallied cooperation appeared at many levels, ranging from the subordination of two allied armies to the Polish Front to the irregular inclusion of tactical formations of other national armies within the particular armies, and from problems of procedure for the assumption and
exercise of command to the complex problems of ordnance and material-technical supply and equipment. This matter disclosed with greater preciseness than ever before that to solve successfully the problem under discussion, aside from the obvious and resolved combined doctrinal principles, the following conditions should first be achieved:

- Institution of methodologies and principles for establishing communications of command and combined action, followed by the unification of communications equipment at definite levels and within the required scope, and also the preparation of adequate combined communications documents;

- Basic uniformity in work methods and disposition of staffs and the formation of similar staff organizational structures within the basic elements;

- Precise definition of principles for the supply and technical support of units temporarily subordinate to other national armies;

- Mutual knowledge of our languages, primarily Russian as the common language of command, not only in the staff elements but in the support elements, especially communications.

146. The exercise proved that our armies are capable of meeting the requirements for interallied cooperation in basic matters. The main method used for the assumption and exercise of command was the exchange of operational groups furnished with adequate communications equipment and operational orders. This exchange is one of the most effective methods but does not exhaust all possibilities; moreover, is quite costly. Therefore, it may be necessary to improve the methods for this combined action mainly by perfecting the principles for maintaining combined communications, personal contacts, et cetera, and to strive for those solutions which would make the command of allied units very similar to the command of the national forces.

147. These undoubtedly broad capabilities were not fully demonstrated in the exercise. Because of the lack of sufficient practice and precise and adequate principles, the assuming and
maintaining of command occasionally appeared to be improvised and, moreover, limited in scope; language difficulties exerted an additional negative influence. For example, at the Front command level there were, among other things, insufficient personal contacts of the command with subordinated allied commands, especially in the initial period. Another example may be found at the army command level at which the armies, in the period of their commitment to battle, established combined action, at best, with the nearest divisions of the allied armies. Lack of interest in allied missions and operations, a dim view of our own missions against their background, and insufficient desire to grasp the substance and method of combined action with allied operations, were generally apparent in the work of the staffs. Therefore, it is necessary to speak about the negative aspects which must be quickly eliminated. Moreover, it is necessary not only to make a practice of acquiring a sound and permanent knowledge of allied operations but also to demand and organize combined operations with initiative.

148. Interalled combined-action experiences acquired in previous combined exercises should be theoretically generalized in the form of principles adequately comprehensible to all armies of our Pact and should stimulate further coordinated organizational and technical actions with a definite purpose. This issue deserves to be raised at the Combined Armed Forces command level.

149. The present exercise very emphatically confirmed and permitted us to develop and elaborate the conclusions derived from previous exercises with regard to the problem of change-over from the preliminary conventional phase of armed conflict to nuclear war. It is at that moment that the war radically changes and is followed by a rapid transition of wartime conditions, under which other operational means and principles determine its success; moreover, the development of the situation not only on an operational scale but conceivably on the widest strategic scale can be determined literally in a matter of minutes. Therefore, this is a problem of high strategic importance, and the initial and predetermined decisions should be made at the highest level of the political and military leadership.

150. This problem also extends to operational levels in the army—Front element and pertains to the participation of nuclear-delivery missile and tactical air forces in the first strategic
nuclear strike. All further development of events in a given operational direction depends directly and to a large degree on the results of this strike in the Front zone. The strike is the ultimate action in active combat for seizing and maintaining the initiative and making a breakthrough in the situation. The outcome of the operation is then essentially determined. If by this time the shortcomings in the exercise of command and in the use of forces are in many cases still not corrected, they later could become hopeless. For this reason also, our elements of operational command must adopt a firm principle, which is imperative during conventional warfare, for concentrating the utmost and undivided attention on general preparedness for an almost immediate changeover to nuclear operations. The following special problems arise here: Constant, intensive reconnaissance of the enemy; continuous operational classification and determination of nuclear-strike targets; maintenance of our own missile and air forces in suitable disposition and areas and in the highest state of readiness to strike; and finally, constant and very thorough investigation of all signs indicating increased enemy preparations to make a strike, in order not to be delayed even by one minute and even, in some cases, to anticipate the enemy.

151. The moment of the enemy’s use of nuclear weapons generally should be, and can be, evaluated better at the command level of the Front than at higher levels, since that command level is in contact with the enemy. All signs of threat of a nuclear attack should be immediately reflected in action by higher staffs and in their initiative and proposals designed to counteract the anticipated enemy nuclear strike.

152. The participation of the Maritime Front in the first strike occurred under conditions which we have not experienced in our training thus far. In its zone, the Front’s command had to prepare for and coordinate the use of the missile forces of its two fully subordinate front-line allied armies with the strike of the Polish missile component which was moving to regroup and deploy. It must be said that the conditions were difficult, but it should also be considered that these conditions can be typical for our forces.

153. The Front and army commands duly appreciate and understand the problem in general and are quite capable of planning and
implementing the necessary undertakings satisfactorily. In con-
consideration of this condition, it is all the more necessary to eval-
uate negatively and critically the deficiencies and shortcomings
which nevertheless appeared in the exercise, primarily at the Mar-
time Front Command, whose forces made the first strikes 10 to 20
minutes late and were ten nuclear units below the previously
planned strength. Of particular note was the weak concentrated
effort of the Front's command on the morning of 1 June in exploit-
ing and evaluating the incoming information which irrefutably indi-
cated that at any moment the enemy would make the first strike.
Therefore, this strike was, to some degree, a surprise to the Front
command. There were also cases in which the planning and assign-
ment of missions to missile units, especially to tactical rocket
units moved forward from the interior, lacked full insight into
their real status and capabilities; therefore, some missions were
not fulfilled.

154. It is necessary to regard as completely justified the
maneuver applied in the exercise for the earliest forward movement
of the missile components of the armies not yet committed or par-
tially committed to battle in order to assure the largest possible
first-strike force. However, it is necessary that special treat-
ment be given to the problem only generally treated thus far in
regard to the scope and principles of centralized, simultaneous,
and fully effective use of all allocated resources under such condi-
tions. Here it is primarily a matter of the capability, in a cen-
tralized system, to exercise command over the first strike by those
tactical rocket battalions which, literally in the last hours, are
moved forward from the interior under the cover of detached units
and join another army and actually operate for its benefit.

155. From the moment of the first strike, the success of the
mission is primarily determined by the skillful use of the full
power of the available missile and air weapons systems, the nu-
clear weapon delivery vehicles. In comparison with previous years,
there is some apparent, though still unsatisfactory, progress in
our command with reference to knowledge of planning principles and
use of nuclear weapons in operations and also assessment of the ef-
ects of the weapons. This progress also pertains to the elabora-
tion of concepts on the use and distribution of the required supply
of nuclear weapons, the methods and effectiveness of command over
the missile forces, the concern for their high combat readiness, and the knowledge of the actual state of combat readiness. However, it is necessary to regard and counteract certain emerging signs of a new negative aspect which could be discerned in the exercise. This development is reflected by our treatment of nuclear weapons as the main and decisive means of combat; however, we usually reduce the assessment and evaluation of the all-round, completely incomparable qualitative effects of the use of nuclear weapons to purely physical and essentially formal quantitative terms.

156. The large areas and targets disfigured by mass use of nuclear weapons received little attention in the evaluations of operational conditions. The effects of strategic strikes in the operational zone of a given operational formation were not recorded or considered by all the staffs. In many training elements of the commands, there was a lack of operational information, not only on the effects but on the conduct of nuclear strikes. We have also been unable thus far to consider fully and adequately express in this exercise and in simulated situations, estimates, and evaluations, the powerful psychological effects of nuclear weapons on the fighting forces and commands. As a result, a one-sided, limited view of an atomic battlefield has been formed. A thoroughly unsound and irresponsible opinion of the difficulties which the atomic battlefield will create could also be formed on this basis.

157. Therefore, the difficult task of drafting and carrying out exercises requires a positive and quick solution in order that the substance and methods of conducting the exercises take into consideration the anticipated operational conditions. The solution must also induce the training staffs to make comprehensive analyses and evaluations of the full effects of the use of our own and enemy nuclear weapons, including evaluation of the effects which will be felt by our own forces in seizing the areas disabled by our own nuclear weapons. Among other things in exercises, it is worthwhile to create situations whereby entire divisions are destroyed on both sides and it will be necessary to form immediate forces from their remnants.

158. It is also necessary to follow the development of nuclear weapons.
warfare weapons and methods of their use, for example, atomic mines. Our knowledge of the application of this powerful weapon is still negligible and the drafting of principles for overcoming atomic mine barriers is only in an embryonic stage.

159. The improper selection of nuclear air or surface bursts suitable for the emerging combat situation was noted in the use of nuclear weapons. It is vitally important to have a capability of delaying the approaching enemy reserves and of creating a barrier of surface bursts against enemy counterstrikes, with the most advantageous relation of forces against the enemy. It is also vitally important to use air bursts to open the roads for our own attack aimed at achieving superiority by our forces in the direction of their offensive operations.

160. To accomplish the mission assigned to the Maritime Front, it was necessary to make a breakthrough in the situation created in the first days of the war and, therefore, to shift from a border conflict being waged with varying success to decisive offensive operations. This action could be assured only by camouflaging, at a definite time and in a selected direction, the necessary nuclear weapon strike force and by executing a skillful maneuver. On the other hand, all the efforts connected with this action had to be accomplished under conditions typical of the initial period of war and of operations of the higher tactical formation brought into battle under cover of the forces waging the border conflict. The situation of both sides on the Maritime Front axis was characterized by the following: The effects of the first nuclear strike, which did not predetermine the outcome of the encounter but caused losses reaching 20 to 30 per cent; an increase in the gap at the front line and the dislocation of troop command and troop movements.

161. The situation of the "West" in the Maritime Front zone was marked by its superiority, which it intended to consolidate in order to predetermine the outcome of the first encounter in its favor before the approach of fresh "East" forces.

162. The scenario of the Maritime Front consisted of battles waged with variable success by two allied armies deployed at the border with their second echelons still disengaged, the approach to the front line of two armies (organic to the Front) extended from the battle line to the Oder line, and the readiness to march of the second-echelon army deployed on Polish territory.
163. In this situation, the Maritime Front had to fulfill two basic missions:

a) To annihilate the most powerful enemy force, that is, the Bundeswehr corps and a component of the British corps;

b) To annihilate the approaching reserves (Dutch corps) in a meeting engagement before they reached the front line, and then to destroy the Belgian-British force on the left flank.

164. The missions of the Maritime Front required, on the one hand, concentration of effort and the formation of a force capable of carrying out the most powerful and simultaneous strike, and, on the other hand, the selection of the most effective form of maneuver and overtaking the enemy in time. In a true situation, all of these factors would have to be closely coordinated.

165. The basic dilemma to be resolved here was to determine the form of maneuver and the direction of commitment of a 12th Army second-echelon division as well as the time and method of commitment of the main forces of the 5th Army.

166. The Front command's decision, which placed emphasis on massing maximum forces at the center of the Front's position to make a leading, simultaneous, severing strike, clearly gave priority to the strike force factor over the factor of time and maneuver. It seems that in the existing situation of our own and the enemy's forces, the decision adopted for the performance of the mission was most appropriate. The decision called for maneuvering the second echelon of the 12th Army to outflank the 1st Army Corps of the Bundeswehr in the north and for committing the main forces of the 5th Army to the center of the Front's position as they approached. Consideration was given to the need for not only intensifying the strike but also for overtaking the enemy reserves before they deployed and reached the battlefield.

167. In the final phase of the operation, the Front was compelled to conduct offensive operations under conditions of increasingly heavy losses and destruction. Various obstacles, such as extensive zones of destruction, contamination, fires, et cetera, which prevent troop operations and active counteraction by the enemy, can lead to
situations in which available battleworthy second echelons and reserves cannot be used according to plans.

168. The Maritime Front forces found themselves in such a situation. The enemy strengthened the defense of the Weser River in order to gain the necessary time to make a strong counterattack on the Front's right flank with forces approaching from the interior. This action resulted in checking the attack by the Front's forces on the central axis. On the other hand, the enemy made a landing to the rear of the forces on the Jutland axis in order to cover the left flank of the counterattacking force. At the same time, the enemy formed a broad and powerful atomic barrier covering almost the entire marching zone of the second-echelon 7th Army on the left flank of the Maritime Front, where relatively the greatest success was noted. In this way, the enemy prevented any further success by the forces of this army on the left flank of the Front. Moreover, the enemy considerably restricted the freedom of maneuver of the second-echelon army and the reserves of the first-echelon army by starting numerous fires in a large area.

169. In this situation, the Front's command had to decide in what manner and in which direction to commit to battle the Front's first echelon, which entered the radioactive contamination zone with the leading columns of the first-echelon divisions. The first echelon's further movement in the direction of the planned line of commitment to battle was practically impossible. Two highly probable solutions were feasible.

170. First, an active solution, which called for the formation of an immediate strike grouping with forces of the 5th Army and the divisions marching in the second echelon of the 7th Army's operational disposition. After achieving a powerful atomic neutralization of enemy forces deploying to counterattack, this strike force would then be used to increase the successes in the 5th Army zone by proceeding in the direction of the 21st Tank Army which is subordinate to the Western Front. At the same time, the 12th Army would be assigned to repel the eventual enemy counterattack.

171. Second, a passive solution, which called for the 7th Army to halt at the contamination zone until the radiation diminishes and for the 12th and 5th Armies to repel the enemy counterattack.
172. The decisions of the Maritime Front Command were basically consistent with the first solution. The only difference was that the capabilities for moving the 7th Army in a new direction of action were not too realistically evaluated. Moreover, this decision did not include the decisive factor of fire and maneuver with atomic weapons in a drive to flank or surround the enemy preparing to counterattack.

173. In the process of preparedness of our forces, because of Poland's geo-political position, the problem of joint landing operations cannot be excluded from the organization and conduct of a Front operation on the strategic coastal axis of attack. Therefore, we have been devoting much attention to this problem for a number of years. This effort is reflected in the qualitative as well as the quantitative preparedness of forces especially for landing operations and in the improvement of adequate naval forces and facilities. Experiences gained in previous years both by us and by the allied armies, which are accomplishing similar tasks, have also become the basis for perfecting the elements of command in operations of this type.

174. In a certain sense, the qualitative change in the accepted present state of affairs was the assumption that the command and staff of the "Baltic" Operations Group was prepared ahead of time in terms of organization, mobilization, and operations as well as the assumption that it was formed relatively early. Although the acceptance of such a solution seems correct, some special problems of joint action by the commands concerned must be defined more precisely.

175. The conduct of the exercise once more confirmed that the Front, attacking along the coast and absorbed in operations on its main axis, frequently is not in position to devote sufficient attention to the landing operation, as well as to operations on the Jutland Peninsula, and to detach sufficient forces for cover, support, security, and service, as well as to assure an effective landing operation by the forces. This creates additional difficulties in accomplishing these naturally complicated missions. Continuation of general studies to improve and perfect the organizational methods and operational guidelines we applied in this sector is an absolute necessity under these conditions.

176. The starting point in these studies should be the already clearly stated interdependence between landing operations and the attacking forces in the interior of Jutland. This interdependence
should essentially cause these operations, which are initially waged in two separate but mutually fixed axes, to merge later into a single operation.

177. During the exercise, we had the opportunity to revise thinking stemming from our estimates with reference to the various possibilities for developing the situation and from the evaluation of geo-military characteristics and importance of the Danish Straits area. This area, together with Jutland and the southern coast of Norway, constitutes a single region. This condition was not sufficiently considered in the discussions and decisions of the participating staffs of the commands.

178. It seems that it should have been anticipated that in case of success during the first offensive operation, favorable conditions could emerge for the rapid seizure of the southern coast and ports of Norway and, therefore, the Straits of the Skagerrak and Kattegat also. The Maritime Front and the naval forces were basically capable of making this seizure. Delay in taking advantage of this situation could permit the enemy, duly appreciating the significance of these Straits, to strengthen their defense. Therefore, it should have been obvious that the quick seizure of Jutland was more important than that of Zealand, because the forces of the armies attacking within the peninsula could be released and used to undertake a landing operation on the southern shores of Norway from the most convenient, northernmost staging and embarkation areas.

179. A landing operation of this kind, which is prolonged by an alternate mission and which could be an uninterrupted continuation of the operations in Denmark, would require reorganization of the command system. The divergent operational axes, along which the Maritime Front operation was developing, would have prevented the Maritime Front from exercising command in this operation. Therefore, it would have been absolutely necessary to subordinate all the forces of the 3rd Army, the "Baltic" Operations Group, the Navy, and particularly the detached Air Force, to the independent operational command.

180. The conduct of the exercise indicates the need to give special attention to the problem of rapid seizure and use of enemy airports, landing areas, and ports, together with the means of
transportation and ferry service, fuel supplies, et cetera, and also to the matter of proper selection of staging areas and troop embarkation sectors for the landing craft.

181. On the basis of contemporary weapons, reconnaissance capabilities, and the relatively long-term process in accomplishing a landing operation, it is necessary to assume that the forces in operations of this type, more than in other operations, are exposed to detection and appropriate enemy counteraction aimed at blocking and even disrupting the operation. In the situation presumed in the exercise, it was advisable to transfer the landing forces of the 11th Mechanized Division to the west and nearer to the landing area; this transfer was based on the aforementioned reasons, the need to return the landing craft twice in order to transfer the landing forces—since it was possible to use the East German coast, and the need to maintain the capability of joint support by the "Baltic" Operations Group and the 3rd Army. Such a solution not only assured a reduced landing time with accruing benefits but was also more flexible and permitted, in case of absolute necessity, the use of both this division and the 3rd Army reserve.

182. Another problem of landing operations is the precise solution to and the establishment of detailed organizational methods for effective air defense of the operations. This problem was not completely solved in our exercise. In view of the necessity for simultaneous use of the forces and facilities of the National Air Defense Forces (OPK), the air army, the Navy, and the organic air defense troops (OPL) of the landing operation, the application of specific solutions for harmonious joint action of these forces is indispensable. The problem here concerns the precise distribution of duties and principles of command and requires further study.

183. The main mission of the Navy, which was strongly reinforced by allied units, was to give general support to the operations of the "Baltic" Operations Group and naval coastal transportation. In view of the many problems connected with naval missions, note should be taken of the following problems.

184. The possibilities for an amphibious landing in the area of the Straits are very dependent on the actual mine situation. The threat of mines, especially the wide use of underwater mines, requires particular treatment and application of well-planned measures. There-
fore, there is the need for early reconnaissance of the disposition of mine depots and for undertaking measures for their early destruction. It is also necessary to organize well-planned action for the rapid destruction of minelayers and for systematic combat operations against other enemy surface forces used to mine the Straits and approaches.

185. A special commission has been assigned to undertake the problem of landing units rapidly overcoming obstructions consisting of a varied combination of underwater mines and underwater landing obstacles. According to plans, the commission will present proposals for a complete solution to the problem by the end of the current year.

186. The conducted exercise once again confirmed the need to solve, in the near future, the many problems of aviation command. In the conduct of operations on the northern maritime operational axis, the command should provide efficient direction of aviation operations to the particular armies operating in various directions and to the operational group commanding both the landing and the air offensive and defensive operations; in any case, the command should be able to provide massive aviation effort to carry out the main mission in a given situation.

187. In the exercise, a command system was used in which air command organs basically resembled those troop command levels which are most concerned with a given air action. It is necessary to regard plans of this type as correct, provided that the main forces and facilities of the air command are located in the area where the command directs its concentrated effort.

188. The organizational structure of the air operations command adopted by the 2nd Air Army command and staff appeared too complicated and ineffective in practice, because the above principles were not observed. Among other things, this became apparent when the status of the air army command post was minimized and too much meaning was attached to the role of the air operational group at the command post of the Front commander. These matters affected the efficiency and work quality of this army's command and staff.

189. It must be said that the work on the final establishment of an air command system, especially in the organization and direction of air cover for the troops of the Front, is taking us too long,
despite the preparation of a number of concepts which were partially tested. The experiences gained from this and other exercises are furnishing us with adequate bases for the final planning of an aviation command system. It is also necessary to consider that this system should be adequately unified with the systems of the allied armies. Under existing conditions, work on this problem should end this year.

190. The exercise showed that the problem of airport mobility still has not been solved satisfactorily. The problem is highly important, because airport mobility determines the degree of aircraft dispersal for their protection against mass losses from enemy strikes. Moreover, airport mobility determines the effectiveness of air action in combat operations.

191. This problem should be solved by making preparations for the rapid construction of field landing areas and airports, mainly by improving the organization and supply of airport construction battalions and using engineer construction units. The capture of landing areas and airports and the ability to rebuild them rapidly or to put them into operation and the capacity to adapt installations such as highways to aviation needs would contribute greatly to airport mobility. This task requires the drafting of an adequate concept for combat and technical repair operations. Finally, in view of the difficulties in basing aircraft, the efficient management of available airports, where priority is given to nuclear weapon delivery aircraft, becomes vitally important.

192. The situation on the internal front was closely interrelated with the developing events on the external combat front.

193. The exercise showed that problems of military territorial defense during wartime as well as peacetime must be resolved within the framework of a uniform command system of the entire armed forces and in accordance with a uniform concept, objective, and operational plan, which involves the entire command and liaison system of the Military Department of the National Defense Committee (KOK).

194. During the initial phase of operations in the national territorial system, the major problem in basic military defense undertakings was the full mobilization and operational-technical support of the movement of Polish and allied armed forces.
195. The movement of forces, especially under conditions of mass enemy counteraction with nuclear weapons, necessitates continuous operational coordination, movement control, and support; this requires central control of the entire process of movement of forces on Polish territory by a single command post of the KOK Military Department, in accordance with a uniform plan for moving operational units of several fronts on designated axes of movement.

196. Therefore, this process can be regarded as a special type of strategic support for a Combined Armed Forces maneuver on a theater of operations scale, mainly because of the great size and character of the accomplished undertakings which include, among other things, air, counterdiversionary, and counterlanding cover, a broad system of engineering-technical and material support, the numerical strength of the moving forces, and the forces and resources allocated for their service and support.

197. The skeletal organization of the "Lato-67" exercise did not permit a thorough drilling in all organizational, operational, and technical-material problems concerning the movement of forces. However, the exercise did indicate a need to perfect numerous principles of command in the movement of forces, especially in the successive conduct of forces through areas of certain military districts and traffic control zones. The principles for the transfer of moving forces to Front and army commands must also be defined. Therefore, there is a definite need to continue organizational work and training in this sector in order to formulate, in due time, the precise guidelines defining the structure of the system and the duties of all traffic control elements, the principles of jurisdiction and allocation of forces and resources for combat and technical support, and the traffic regulations and procedures for the successive transfer of troops on the march. Thorough training is also needed in the operation of the entire movement system with regard to the chain of command in the system: Command post of the Military Department of the National Defense Committee; military district commands and zone commands; lower executive elements and levels, that is, levels of joint operations of adjacent zones with military districts as well as levels of joint operations of commands of the moving forces with traffic control and support elements.

198. The enemy made wide use of nuclear weapons and diversionary-reconnaissance groups in order to block the movement of "East" forces
approaching the battlefield from the interior of the theater of operations. It is necessary to emphasize that during this phase of operations the wartime military district commands correctly handled the support of moving forces as their primary mission. At the same time, it must be regarded as correct to assign primarily the territorial elements to fight enemy landing forces and special groups and to assign, in case of need, operational groups to conduct counter-diversionary and counter-landing operations.

199. A group such as the above, consisting of a Frontier Guard brigade and a regiment and battalions of the Kośalin provincial territorial defense system, was organized, among others, by the Pomeranian Military District command to cover and support the staging areas and the landing forces air center organized within the "Baltic" Operations Group.

200. In the exercise, the commands of the districts introduced a number of new and worthwhile proposals on the capabilities and extent to which territorial forces were used to fulfill the following missions: Deception and camouflage, embarkation, and disembarkation operations, and service of and support to the traffic control zones and airports.

201. The correct use of territorial forces and resources for missions of national defense also requires the most accurate analysis of the defense organization and the defense of important economic, transportation, and military installations, et cetera. The defense of these installations should be considered a part of the counter-diversionary operations that comprise one of the basic functions of the territorial system. Therefore, to protect and defend the installations, it is necessary to make maximum use of this system's forces, including the self-defense units of the areas and enterprises. Moreover, it should be taken under consideration that these forces remain at the immediate disposal of the territorial elements and should operate primarily in their own area.

202. Following are several basic proposals emerging from the exercise in regard to National Air Defense cover of landing operations:

- prevent or greatly impede air reconnaissance of troop concentration, staging, and embarkation areas for the landing operation;
-give timely warning to the landing forces on the threat of air attack; and

give cover to the landing forces in the troop concentration, staging, and embarkation areas and during the sea and air movement along the coast.

203. The above air defense forces should accomplish the missions in close support with the air defense troops (OFL) system and the air forces of the Navy and the Front.

204. Maintaining the functional continuity of the chief organs of power and the state system is of decisive importance for the effective fulfillment of defense missions in all elements of the state and social system under conditions of armed enemy counteraction against Poland.

205. During the exercise, we examined only some of the organizational problems of support for the transfer of the National Defense Committee and its departments to field command posts and also the problems of protection and defense of the leadership at these posts.

206. A number of interesting conclusions were drawn with reference to the organizational location of KOK support units, the further improvement of their structure and principles of command, the methods of organization and support of command post areas, and the organization of communications and camouflage. Transportation and engineering requirements and some aspects of joint action with forces of the territorial system were also analyzed. Many new situations also emerged in connection with the necessary emergency transfer of the top leadership to new command posts.

207. Centers of mass destruction and extensive zones of radioactive contamination emerged as a result of the enemy's mass strikes with nuclear weapons on Polish territory. Thus, a new situation was created, radically changing the previous economic and demographic structure of the country as well as the mass psychology. The capabilities of the transportation system decreased by about 80 per cent and inland shipping was disrupted. Breakdowns occurred in the far-reaching and interprovincial power and communications network. During this phase of the operation a distinct distribution of defense assign-
ments was apparent on the internal front. On the one hand, it was necessary to restore the most important transportation routes and crossings for the purpose of moving the main concentration of allied and Polish troops, and, on the other hand, to coordinate on a national scale undertakings for eliminating the effects of the nuclear strikes and for restoring the most important elements affecting the operation of the state and social system. Thus, it is concluded that at least in the initial stage, the control of these missions will be decentralized. The provincial military staffs, representing the provincial defense committees, will undoubtedly be the main coordinators for removing the effects of nuclear strikes in the provinces. The role of the military districts will be to integrate the efforts of the district forces with the operations of the forces of the state and territorial system.

208. In the existing situation, the goal of the participating commands to assure the quickest and most efficient withdrawal of the operational forces to the combat operations area, where the outcome of the battle on the external front was then being decided, was fully justified.

209. Although this objective is correct, the importance of joint action with the KOK and WKO departments to eliminate the effects of nuclear attacks cannot be diminished.

210. The decisions of the commanders did not adequately take under consideration the need to give assistance to operational forces under enemy nuclear attack. In evaluating the situation, the destruction of crossings was acknowledged as a basic factor in paralyzing the process of moving the forces. On the other hand, the paralyzing effect of destruction of control zones, extensive fires, and blockade of routes in the transportation centers, especially in the urban centers, was hardly considered.

211. The exercise made it possible to examine more thoroughly the problems of joint action of National Air Defense forces with particular elements of the national territorial defense system. The exercise showed the urgent need to inform territorial military staffs more effectively of the air situation and the threat of enemy air attack. On the other hand, in updating the principles of joint action, it will be necessary to define more precisely the methods of support

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of operations of the National Air Defense forces by territorial forces, including support of supply and transport routes, camouflage, and protection and reconstruction of some important National Air Defense installations. It is particularly urgent to draft principles for joint operations of antiaircraft artillery units of the territorial system with the general national air defense system.

212. The possibility of fulfillment of the extensive and varied missions in the national territorial defense system requires the use of a considerable number of various forces with respect to designation, specialization, equipment, and organizational subordination. In order to solve this problem completely and successfully, it is necessary to equate precisely the capabilities of all the forces remaining on Polish territory with the anticipated missions. This equation is determined by the current operational and organizational guidelines. Accordingly, principles of jurisdiction, mission, and organizational structure should be specified for training, sentry, garrison, Military Internal Service (WSW) units, et cetera.

213. In the course of the aforementioned work, it is especially vital to specify the mobilization mission of the Frontier Guard Forces, in view of their important role in the ground defense system of the frontier zones and also to consider the capability of these forces to fulfill certain missions in joint actions with the operational forces on the external operational front. In addition, the question of maximum firepower, not only of the territorial defense units operating within a military framework but also the self-defense units, requires consideration.

214. In deciding upon the participation by the General Staff and central institutions of the National Defense Ministry in the exercise, we wanted to test the capability of the KOK Military Department's central elements deployed at the field command posts to control the deployment of the armed forces, to organize the military operations of the internal front forces, and to organize the effort at the external front.

215. The basic achievements at this sector must include the skill of MMD central institutions to achieve readiness while on alert in the military structure and adequate efficiency in their deployment to field command posts. The particular staff teams of the command post directed by Major General Adam Czaplewski and Brigadier General
Tadeusz Hupalowski were generally able to fulfill these basic tasks. At the same time, a general future requirement for the further improvement of the skill of these elements will be to draft proper work methods and accurately define the jurisdiction not only of the particular teams but also of the personnel, taking into consideration the fact that not all MND institutions are included in the staff structure of these command posts but that groups or individuals are detached from the institutions. All these undertakings should result in the formation of a proper wartime model, which differs during peacetime, for the efficient and effective operation of the central elements.

216. In the Pomeranian Military District, the mobilization of the armed forces developed according to plan. The distribution of command with the assignment of the 3rd Army to Major General Jozef Kaminski and the wartime Pomeranian Military District to Brigadier General Jozef Kolasa occurred virtually without any hindrance. The participating teams were equal to the support tasks for the movement of Polish and allied forces, especially during the crossing of the Vistula and Oder Rivers. However, it is necessary to point out that, thus far, not all command-staff elements are in full readiness as collective groups capable of effective action on the wartime district level.

217. The decisions defining the efforts to eliminate the effects of strikes with weapons of mass destruction corresponded to the developing situation. The Pomeranian Military District command also devoted much justifiable attention to the support of the embarkation of an amphibious landing, with a generally exhaustive assessment of the scale and scope of the undertakings.

218. In the Silesian Military District, combat readiness was achieved quickly and efficiently. The distribution of the peacetime command to two wartime operational commands, the 5th Army under the command of Major General Eugeniusz Molczyk and the wartime Silesian Military District under the command of Brigadier General Mieczyslaw Mazur, was soundly arranged. Meriting attention are the procedural methods, defined on the basis of the district's own experiences in this sector.

219. The decisions adopted for the mobilization and support of moving operational forces do not raise any reservations. Furthermore,
the decisions for eliminating the effects of strikes with weapons of mass destruction and for combatting the enemy's special forces were correct.

220. The tasks of mobilization and achievement of troop combat readiness in the Warsaw Military District were accomplished under a central control. However, the control center was undesirably weakened as a result of the assignment of the peacetime district to the 7th Army under the command of Major General Czeslaw Waryszak and the wartime military district under the command of Brigadier General Aleksander Jankowski. The distribution was premature for conditions in the Warsaw Military District. The departure of the WOW command to field command posts took place efficiently and without interruption in the continuity of command.

221. The undertakings conducted to support the movement of Polish and allied operational forces were appropriate and based on good knowledge of the terrain and Polish capabilities. The method of combined rail and motor transportation was correctly applied for moving the 7th Army forces.

222. The level of operational planning demonstrates that the participating teams already have certain experience in this field. The decisions taken to eliminate the effects of strikes with weapons of mass destruction and to combat diversionary groups were justified.

223. Staff shortcomings, especially with reference to skill in organizing and maintaining cooperation with other military districts, and also periodic difficulties in the circulation of information among the particular elements, were noticeable in some stages of the exercise.

224. In operations of the National Air Defense Forces command under Brigadier General Jan Stamieszkin, the conventional means of establishing contacts for joint action with commands and staffs of other armed services, whose forces participate in a uniform system of air defense or use the protection of the National Air Defense Forces, merit attention.

225. The performance of the staff was generally characterized by good organization. However, a negative aspect of the staff's activity was the fact that it devoted too much attention to trivia,
frequently leading to the displacement of the lower levels of command and thereby restricting their initiative.

226. The participating staffs of the naval landing force under the command of Rear Admiral Ludwik Janczyszyn concentrated their primary effort on the main mission of organization and support of the landing and showed great initiative in solving these problems. However, the participating staffs did not overcome such shortcomings as the inadequate circulation of information within the staff and the mishandling of some combat and technical-material support missions. It seems that insufficient time was assigned to the planning of these complicated operations. It can be generally said that the Main Staff of the Navy already comprises a group of people who properly understand their duties and are capable of quick and efficient work.

227. The Maritime Front staff and command, directed by Lieutenant General Jerzy Bordziłowski, Major General Tadeusz Tuczepski, and Brigadier General Jan Czapla, displayed a satisfactory degree of preparedness for the exercise. Staff training conducted before the exercises by the MND Training Inspectorate, in which officers of the Front's staff participated, contributed to the achievement of combat readiness in the scheduled time and to the urgent measures for the integration of the collective group, whose members frequently cooperated with each other for the first time.

228. Even in the initial period of operations, the Front's staff faced many complicated tasks, the solution of which was made even more difficult by the fact that the main part of the staff was moved at that time. The staff was basically able to fulfill the mission for this stage of operations, despite certain incidents of confusion and organizational shortcomings.

229. The evaluation of enemy forces and capabilities was generally accurate. Occasionally, however, the evaluation tended to be less analytic and somewhat detached from the course of action, as a result of which some conclusions were inadequate. It appears that the conclusions were hasty and overestimated enemy capabilities. In particular, these conclusions concerned an evaluation of the capability to achieve combat readiness and the termination time for the operational development of the Northern Army Group forces. Enemy air capabilities were too vaguely evaluated; therefore, planning of cover for the Front's forces and installations became difficult.
230. The Front's staff showed that it was basically able to prepare the necessary materials to enable the commander to make decisions. However, its work methods, effectiveness in examining and evaluating the situation, and capacity for accurate conclusions, still must be improved. Attention should have been paid especially to the substance and form of the reports, which were lengthy and too detailed and did not stress the most vital problems in a given situation.

231. The planning of nuclear strikes was generally competent, although the lack of an effective analysis of the situation resulted in a delay of the first strike. At times, poor awareness of the existing situation of our own forces and those of the enemy resulted in a very vague designation of targets. Furthermore, interruptions in communications, particularly with the chief of the rocket and artillery forces of the 12th Army, contributed to this situation. However, it must be generally asserted that the Front's command and staff were knowledgeable in the use of these most important weapons.

232. Organization of internal and long-distance communications was not always on a suitable level. For example, the forwarding of data on the effects of enemy nuclear strikes to pertinent headquarters and directorates took several hours. Data on twelve missile launchers and two enemy troop formations reached the Front's staff several hours late. In addition, not all the Front's command posts were informed concerning the outbreak of war and the landings on the Oder River.

233. The documentation drawn up was very clear and corresponded to the requirements and adopted decisions. However, there is an apparent need to standardize the basic documents according to the standards of the combined allied armies.

234. The quartermaster service of the Front, under the command of Brigadier General Mieczyslaw Obiedzinski, efficiently took charge of the rear units approaching from the interior. Moreover, the service properly planned the deployment of these units in the course of the operation and simultaneously adjusted the plans to the changing operational missions. The quartermaster service also correctly took into consideration the specific forms and methods of organization of the rear, which was necessary because of the operational subordination of two allied armies to the Front.
235. The command and staff of the 3rd Army displayed a high level of preparedness for the exercise. However, it is necessary to judge critically its decision to assign officers without army mobilization assignments to many staff elements.

236. The army's command and staff correctly used the period of threat to gradually increase the combat readiness of the 3rd Army.

237. During the army movement, tendencies toward optimistic estimates of the march were noted and methods for improving the organization of the march were not sought.

238. In the course of the operation, an overestimation of enemy capabilities caused certain staff indecision concerning the effectiveness of the rapid commitment of the 19th Tank Division to battle. During the commitment of the 15th Mechanized Division, there was a practical need to be briefed on the capabilities of the East German territorial defense system, which, however, was not taken under consideration.

239. The army's command and staff generally resolved the problems confronting them. It is necessary to point out that some army staffs were incapable of concise and synthesized reporting of estimates and decisions.

240. The army's Quartermaster operated effectively, particularly in the organization of command and joint action. The participating staff had considerable insight into the troop situation and the necessary knowledge of the supplies in the theater of operations to accomplish the supply missions. However, some units and services were not competent in their assigned missions.

241. The command and staff of the 12th Army of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic displayed great skill in quickly making sound and valid decisions. Major General K. Lange, the army commander, set high requirements for the staff and the chiefs of arms and services and directly influenced their work. The army staff proved to be a well-integrated team; it skillfully planned the combat missions under difficult conditions and efficiently exercised command of the forces during the operations. The staff focused particular attention on the following problems: Combat security of the state border; cover for the approach and deployment of the army's
main forces; surmounting the nuclear mine belt; conduct of offensive and defensive operations with tactical formations and units of the army; and support of the commitment of the Maritime Front operational formations to battle. Combat orders, which were thoroughly thought out and effective, were distinguished, moreover, by great refinement of staff work. The performance of the army's political branch, which initiated and accomplished many political projects within society, also merits attention. These projects contributed to the strengthening of brotherhood-in-arms and the further deepening of socialist internationalism.

242. The command and staff of the 5th Army were well-prepared for the exercise. The staff was generally able to concentrate its main effort on solving difficult and decisive problems in a given situation. In the initial phase of the exercise, however, a fundamental mistake was made of not sending representatives to the staffs of the 21st Tank Army and 12th Army; this was especially important in support of the commitment of a first-echelon division into the zone of operations through a point between two allied armies.

243. During the further conduct of the exercise, the performance of the army's command and staff proceeded without greater difficulties. Meriting attention was the decision to organize a command center by adequately solving the technical problem; the center facilitated the effective exercise of command by the commander and his colleagues.

244. The performance of the quartermaster service of the 5th Army was marked by efficient planning. It correctly organized the movement of the quartermaster units; however, shortcomings occurred in establishing and maintaining joint action with territorial organs.

245. The command and staff of the 21st Tank Army of the Soviet Armed Forces under the command of Major General VI. Govorov comprise a well-organized and experienced group capable of making proper decisions and commanding forces. The performance of the staff was marked by a thorough knowledge of the theater of operations and the enemy, great operational ability, and correct evaluation of the situation. The staff was efficiently integrated into the Maritime Front command system. Moreover, the staff rapidly established communications and coordinated its actions with other armies of the Front.
246. The proposals and decisions on the use of nuclear weapons, particularly in the initial period of operations, took into consideration the emerging situation and our own capabilities. The proposals and decisions were worked out in a relatively short time. The staff of the rocket troops and artillery acquired accurate data in preparing the nuclear strikes on 16 targets in 32 minutes. During the operation, data for launching the nuclear attacks were currently updated by maintaining close communications with the Front's command.

247. The ability to concentrate on basic problems must be considered as an additional assignment of command and staff. This task was accomplished specifically in the acquisition of data on the enemy. During the entire exercise, the army's command and staff officers showed maximum initiative and great skill in resolving contemporary battlefield problems with the joint effort of all the armed forces and services. The chiefs of the army's various arms and services in the exercise properly planned and used all available forces and resources. During the exercise, the officers of the 21st Tank Army expanded the action by close liaison and mutual understanding with officers of the Polish and East German Armies.

248. The command and staff of the 7th Army displayed a considerable degree of preparedness and also novel work methods in gathering and processing data for decisions and exchange of information.

249. The staff's performance was marked by its activity in the collection of data on the situation, in the planning and execution of an atomic counteraction, and in combined action with the first-echelon armies of the Front. The exercise of command during the operation corresponded to the prevailing conditions; however, not all decisions can be regarded as fully valid.

250. The army's quartermaster service operated efficiently. During the movement of forces, however, there was inadequate cooperation with the territorial organs.

251. Various shortcomings that lower the efficiency of command and effectiveness of air operations still appear in the work methods of the command and staff of the 2nd Air Army under the command of Brigadier General Franciszek Kaminski. However, an improvement in correct decision-making can be noted. For example, the jurisdictional division of command among the particular command posts, organizations,
and air operations control centers in the systems of air defense, airport mobility, and operational camouflage, has been treated too superficially. Various possibilities for the operational use of the air army have not been analyzed.

252. The army's office of the chief of supply has increased its work skill under field conditions; however, shortcomings still appear in establishing joint action, particularly with transportation organs, and in equalizing the transportation requirements with transport capabilities.

253. It is necessary to consider the work of the command and staff of the "Baltic" Operations Group, under the command of Major Zygmunt Husaczka, as a positive aspect of this exercise despite the fact that both the command and staff were quickly formed of officers, of whom only about 20 per cent had actual experience in problems of joint landing operations. The team of participating officers fulfilled their assignments; this achievement required great effort by the entire group. Actually there was no wide range of assignments, and the time to fulfill them was quite long; however, it must be considered that the organ functioned, although it was not specially trained in planning and conducting a landing operation.

254. In summarizing the evaluations of the participating Polish Army commands and staffs, it is necessary to confirm the general progress in the internal integration of staffs and the skill in commanding troops, especially at the army level. At the same time, however, many elements, particularly at the Front and wartime military district levels, still do not constitute well-integrated and skilled groups, capable of effectively accomplishing assigned combat missions. Here it is necessary most of all to acquire skill in extracting from the total data the main and most essential points in order to formulate the guiding concept of the operational objective. Briefly, it is a matter of increasing the capacity for operational thinking, which is an indispensable feature of a high staff officer. These matters must be treated as major assignments to be accomplished in perfecting our commands and staffs in the near future.

255. Definite progress in determining and evaluating the enemy's territorial forces is being made among the officers of our high commands in general; on the other hand, the knowledge of current data on the characteristics of the theater of operations, infrastructure, and
various resources, which at the same time are usually very important, is generally deficient and is often embarrassingly poor. A radical improvement in this sector is urgently needed. Studies of the theater of operations must be conducted by all high-ranking officers of high staffs, and knowledge of the possibilities and methods of using the local resources, equipment, and installations is an inseparable element of every evaluation of general and special operations.

256. The reorganization of our elements of command at the central and district levels ended the period of probing and discussing solutions to problems of organizational structure. The new organization of commands and staffs must be firmly established for a period of several years, whereas a major effort must be aimed at smoothly integrating the collective groups not only during the large-scale exercises but also by applying the whole spectrum of training methods, such as self-training, drills, staff exercises, etc. Firmly established and improved mobilization assignments are needed in conjunction with a stable organization in order to eliminate intolerable cases of immediate drafting of officers for exercises and their assignment to posts inconsistent with their mobilization assignments.

257. Moreover, sufficient staff effort must be exerted for the improvement and modernization of command methods and staff duties and also for a radical uplift of cultural and organizational work based on scientific principles. Here our academies and scientific centers, which should treat this problem as one of the major problems in their scientific activity, have considerable range for action.

258. The Military Internal Service organs provided support for the participating staffs and military units with regard to counterintelligence, operational control of the radioelectronic means of communications, and military police service. It was confirmed during the exercise that this support system was correct.

259. The military police of the Military Internal Service concentrated their major effort on providing security for the command post areas, troop bivouac areas, and the marching routes of the forces participating in the exercise. In general, a favorable situation was created. No cases of death or serious accidents were noted.

260. It is also necessary to assert that the Military Internal Service generally assisted in protecting the secrecy of the exercise and maintaining order and discipline.
261. A specific feature of our exercise was the fact that in its political activities the Party-political system closely combined theory and practice to solve problems which we would probably encounter during war. The work methods in periods of threat and war and the substance and course of ideological action determined by the political-military situation were both subjects for study in the "Lato-67" exercise.

262. Generally speaking, the Party-political organs participating in the exercise displayed readiness and adequate preparedness for action. Meriting attention was the efficient shift to direct Party work under the new wartime system and the linking together of Party work with the operational situation.

263. If the exercise is one of the successive stages for perfecting the Party-political organs of the operational forces, then in the internal system the exercise serves as a starting point for further experiences and training in operational procedures. These organs, confronted by entirely new tasks and situations, had to overcome numerous difficulties, including the exchange of information, cooperation among the political organs of the internal and external fronts, and the lack of elaborated methods of collaboration between the responsible elements of the provincial defense committees and the political directorates of the military districts and armed services.

264. The political directorate of the Front discharged its duties well. By promoting actual political work among the participants of the exercise, the political directorate fostered the formation of their attitudes toward involvement, sacrifice, and internal discipline. Of particular note were the experiences gained through cooperation with the allied Party-political organs and the joint conduct of broad ideological training among our forces and the East German civilian population. Within this framework, 23 meetings were arranged with residents of towns and large communities and 27 evening gatherings of servicemen for the purpose of ideological and military kinship. Numerous bilateral and trilateral meetings of Polish, Soviet, and East German servicemen were of unusual value from the training aspect. These meetings contributed to the deepening of mutual knowledge and strengthening of our cordial bonds of brotherhood and friendship. The unusually warm and immediate reception which the
East German people gave our troops on the marching routes was fully reciprocated by our soldiers.

265. The exercise produced a number of substantial problems which require thorough study and precise guidelines. The main problem is the frequently discussed subject of methods and courses of counteracting negative psycho-political effects which will accompany a war with both sides using nuclear weapons. The "Lato-67" exercise also revealed the need to perfect methods of counteracting enemy ideological diversion, especially in periods of threat and buildup of defense capability, and also methods of our simultaneous action against the enemy's forces and population.

266. The power and effectiveness of political activities depend on the offensive nature of the actions. Offensive activity must take into account, among other things, the mobilization of a civilian technical base for propaganda both on Polish as well as on conquered enemy territory. It is also necessary to work out specific methods for shaping attitudes through the use of operational groups supplied with adequate technical equipment which can be quickly shifted from one place to another.

267. The resolutions of the XIII and VIII plenary sessions of the Polish Party's Central Committee are highly important in strengthening the ideological-morale attitudes of the people and the armed forces and in tempering these attitudes during emergency and critical situations. The orders of the day are as follows: Maintain constant vigilance, counteract psychological warfare efforts, especially of American and West German imperialism, examine the educational processes in all aspects of capitalism's ideological battle with socialism, and vitalize the ideological life of Party organizations. These actions determine our readiness to face difficult and critical situations and are the basis for further all-round improvement of the general defense system of the nation.

268. The "Lato-67" exercise afforded us much new valuable organizational and methodological experience in conducting elaborate and large-scale operational exercises. The organizational handling of the exercise with its vast and full range of problems, its unusual size in respect to the territory used, and its large number of participants at various levels of Polish and allied operational commands, required the solving of a whole series of very complicated matters.
Some of these problems exceeded our previous organizational and methodological experience. The main problem was to organize the control and umpire system and to coordinate its work in order to assure effective control of all actions and at all levels of the participating commands, which were operating from a great distance.

269. The solution adopted, which was basically correct, was primarily marked by its distribution of control of the exercise to two teams at the time of transfer of the participating commands to field command posts. The first team, which was deployed at mobile field posts and controlled and coordinated the entire exercise, directly controlled the performance of the exercise on the external front; the second team, which was stationary, primarily assured the conduct of the exercise in its sector which embraced the military territorial defense system.

270. Since the above method of control in this type of exercise was recognized to be correct, it must be said that the principles, methods, and means of coordinating the work and mutual contacts of both teams should be improved. Moreover, it is not necessary to treat the solution adopted for this exercise as a precedent. The usefulness and effectiveness of this solution for operational exercises of less complicated structure appear to be doubtful, because it is mainly a matter of introducing and establishing a principle enabling the director of the exercise to fulfill his functions effectively from various areas and under field conditions.

271. In general, the performance of the control group, umpires, and simulated enemy staff units, despite certain organizational blunders and deficiencies in coordination, must be evaluated positively. The officers engaged in this group constitute operating teams which are ever more knowledgeable and efficient. Their skill in resolving real and organizational problems which arose during the exercise was increased. However, the best method for transmitting data in order to give the participants of the exercise the fullest scenario of the constantly and dynamically developing situation was not used. The work of the umpires and the directional activity of several special investigation teams produced valuable experimental material during the exercise.

272. Exercises conducted at the central level are becoming more
complex and their magnitude is increasing from year to year; the number of participating command elements and the number, scope, and importance of problems requiring solutions are also increasing.

273. We are perfecting the higher command elements of the armed forces according to basic long-range plans. The plans take under consideration both operational needs and changes occurring in the armed forces with regard to organization, mobilization, equipment and materiel, as well as needs and changes occurring in the development of the entire state defense system. Moreover, the integrated exercises conducted in recent years served as an indispensable research testing ground at which we acquired the necessary material and conclusions for developing a uniform, multistaged defense system for Poland and for improving the particular elements of the system. The exercises are steps in achieving the required operational efficiency and cooperation of these elements. The course selected for the development of defense training is appropriate and should be maintained, with special consideration of the need to integrate smoothly the forces of the Military Department with the particular elements of the state and territorial system.

274. We must, however, consider the fact that exercises such as "Lato-67" are complicated and difficult undertakings and require full, intensive and costly mobilization of our cadre, organizational and materiel capabilities. In any case, however, such mobilization must be highly profitable. There are many reasons why we cannot afford—should this operation be ineffective—a mobilization every year. The period between mobilizations must be longer, at least two or three years. The exercises should be more representative and devoted to improving and smoothly integrating the basic components of the Military Department and other departments of the National Defense Committee. An exercise of such magnitude as the present one must be treated, therefore, as a higher qualitative synthesis of an effectively combined series of exercises of narrower scope.

275. Comrades! This necessarily extensive discussion could not include or even exhaust all the essential problems of the exercise. The completed evaluations and deduced conclusions must be treated as an introduction requiring additional comprehensive analyses and work by all central institutions of the National Defense Ministry, military districts, armed services, offices of the chiefs of the various arms and services and the higher military schools. The proposals
resulting from these studies must be presented to the General Staff which, after analyzing them, will draft the general basic guidelines for improving the military system and a suitable plan for implementation. The General Staff will also hold a briefing with regard to capitalizing on the achievements of the particular KOK departments in their part of the exercise.

276. It can also be stated that some of the problems of the exercise were discussed, thoroughly examined, and solved at the liaison level of the appropriate command elements of our three fraternal armies. Obviously they were primarily problems of allied combined action at the operational level.

277. The "Lato-67" exercise was set forth in the 1967-68 training directive confirmed by the National Defense Committee of the Polish People's Republic. At the same time, the exercise was conducted within the framework of the combined training exercises of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact countries. Although control of the exercise rested in our hands, the deciding factors in the preparation and conduct of the exercise were the coordinated effort, harmonious cooperation, and mutual assistance of the group of Soviet Forces command in East Germany, the general staffs of the East German and Polish Armies, officers of the umpire system, and participating officers of our three fraternal armies. We were able to achieve the goals set for this difficult, elaborate, combined training exercise only as a result of considerable sustained effort by all officers involved in the exercise--those performing as well as those directing--by various methods at various supporting levels.

278. Although only the Military Department of the National Defense Committee participated in the exercise, other KOK departments will also take advantage of the achievements of this exercise. Representatives of the leadership of the Party, government, and KOK departments are interested in this exercise.

279. Some comrades endeavored to become directly acquainted with those parts of the exercise of interest to them. Party officials attending the exercise for this purpose were Stefan Jedrychowski, member of the Politburo and Director of the Party Economic and Planning Department, and Władysław Wicha, member of the Secretariat and Director of the Party Internal Department.
280. Attendance at the exercise by leading representatives of defense ministries whose armies were participants indicates the vital importance of the exercise in strengthening unity and cooperation and in developing ideological bonds and brotherhood-in-arms between the participating armies. This representation included the East German Defense Minister, General of the Army H. Hoffman, and the Soviet Deputy Defense Minister, General of the Army I. Pavlovskiy; both were accompanied by members of their respective defense ministries.

281. Attendance at the exercise by leading representatives of the Czechoslovak National Defense Ministry including General of the Army Bohumir Lomsky, the National Defense Minister, further attests to this very fact.

282. In extending sincere thanks to these comrades for their presence at the exercise and active interest in not only the conduct of the exercise but also our solutions, I especially would like to thank General of the Army H. Hoffman for creating the best possible conditions for conducting a part of the exercise on East German territory.

283. At the same time, I extend my sincere thanks to the comrades of the East German Party and government leadership and personally to comrade E. Honnecker for the great and friendly attitude and hospitality encountered by us on fraternal German soil.

284. I also wish to thank the representatives of Warsaw Pact Combined Armed Forces Command, Colonel General D. S. Zherebin and Major General P. B. Dukhnin, for active interest in the whole conduct of the exercise.

285. I extend my thanks to the deputy and assistant directors of the exercise: Major General Wojciech Jaruzelski, Major General Grzegorz Korczynski, Major General Jozef Urbanowicz, Major General Wiktor Zieminski, Vice Admiral Zygmunt Studzinski, Major General Boleslaw Chocha, Brigadier General Antoni Jasinski, Brigadier General Teodor Kufel, Brigadier General Wladyslaw Jagiello, Brigadier General Roman Paszkowski and also all who participated in drafting and conducting the exercise and the officers of the control, umpire, and simulated enemy staff system, for rendering me assistance in directing the exercise.

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286. I also sincerely thank my deputies for fraternal armies matters, Major General V. Lazutin of the Soviet Army and Major General M. Bleck of the East German Army.

287. On behalf of all exercise participants, including those not present in this hall, I extend my thanks to the following for their great contribution: Officers, junior command cadre, enlisted men, and civilian employees of the Soviet, East German, and Polish Armies.

288. We concluded the exercise with the deepest conviction that, in a situation of increasing imperialist aggressiveness, we have made a worthwhile contribution toward improving our defense capability for the security and integrity of our borders and the peaceful development of our fraternal countries.
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE DIAGRAMS

A - army (combined-arms) (armia (ogolnowojskowa))
ABROT - army operational-tactical missile brigade (armijna brygada rakiet operacyjno-taktycznych)
AL - air army (armia lotnicza)
APanc - tank army (armia pancerna)
(AR) - Soviet Army (Armia Radziecka)
art. - artillery (artyleria)
ASG - General Staff Academy (Akademia Sztabu Generalnego)
(B) - Belgian (belgijskie)
BBROT - combat operational-tactical missile brigade (bojowa brygada rakiet operacyjno-taktycznych)
bcz - tank battalion (batalion czołgów)
BD - landing brigade (brygada desantowa)
BDE - road-service brigade (brygada drogowo-eksploatacyjna)
BGP - infantry brigade group (brygada grupa piechoty)
BGPanc - armored brigade group (brygada grupa pancerna)
BL - communications brigade (brygada lączności)
BLB - aviation bomber brigade (brygada lotnictwa bombowego)
BM - mobile brigade (brygada manewrowa)
Bm - mobile brigade (brygada manewrowa)
BOP - submarine brigade (brygada okretow podwodnych)
Bosl - covering brigade (brygada oslony)
bot - territorial defense battalion (batalion obrony terytorialnej)
BP - infantry brigade (brygada piechoty)
bp - infantry battalion (batalion piechoty)
BPanc - armored brigade (brygada pancerna)
bpd - airborne battalion (batalion powietrznodesantowy)
BPont - ponton-bridge brigade (brygada pontonowa)
b pont "WK" - "wheeled vehicle" ponton battalion (batalion pontonowy "wozow kolowych")
(Br) - British (brytyjskie)
BROT - operational-tactical missile brigade (brygada rakiet operacyjno-taktycznych)
bsz - training battalion (batalion szkolny)
BT - transportation brigade (brygada transportowa)
BWK - railroad troop brigade (brygada wojsk kolejowych)
BWOP - Frontier Guard brigade (brygada wojsk ochrony pogranicza)
BWOW - Internal Defense Forces brigade (brygada Wojsk Obrony Wewnetrznej)
bz - mechanized battalion (batalion zmechanizowany)
BZ - mechanized brigade (brygada zmechanizowana)
CSD - central command post of the National Air Defense Forces (centralne stanowisko dowodzenia wojsk OPK)
CSK - central command post (centralne stanowisko kierowania)
D - division (dywizja)
D1 - first day of the operation (dzien operacji)
DA - artillery division (dywizja artylerii)
da - artillery battalion (dywizjon artylerii)
dar - rocket artillery battalion (dywizjon artylerii rakietowej)
DD - assault landing division (dywizja desantowa)
DDes - assault landing division (amphibious) (dywizja desantowa (morska))
des - landing (desant)
DLB - aviation bomber division (dywizja lotnictwa bombowego)
DLM - aviation fighter division (dywizja lotnictwa mysliwskiego)
DLMB - aviation fighter-bomber division (dywizja lotnictwa mysliwsko-bombowego)
DLM OPK (NRD) - aviation fighter division of the National Air Defense Forces (German Democratic Republic) (dywizja lotnictwa mysliwskiego wojsk OPK (NRD))
DLMSz - aviation ground-attack fighter division (dywizja lotnictwa mysliwsko-szturmowego)
dm - mobile battalion (dywizjon manewrowy)
DOPK - National Air Defense division (dywizja obrony powietrznej kraju)
DP - infantry division (dywizja piechoty)
"P" - "P" battalion /possibly "Pershing" missile/ (dywizjon "P")
DPanc - armored or tank division (dywizja pancerna)
DPD - airborne division (dywizja powietrznodesantowa)
DSK - present command post (dotychczasowe stanowisko kierowania)
DZ - mechanized division (dywizja zmechanizowana)
DZmot - motorized division (dywizja zmotoryzowana)
elm - aviation fighter squadron (eskadra lotnictwa myśliwskiego)
FBROT - front operational-tactical missile brigade (frontowa brygada rakiet operacyjno-taktycznych)
FN - Maritime Front (Front Nadmorski)
FOW - possibly front detached unit - frontowy oddział wydzielony
Fr. B - possibly Soviet front missile brigade - frontowa brygada rakiet
FSD - flag command post (flagowe stanowisko dowodzenia)
FSDMW - naval flag command post (flagowe stanowisko dowodzenia marynarki morskiej)
GDR - diversionary-reconnaissance group (grupa dywersyjno-rozpoznawcza)
GO - operations group (grupa operacyjna)
GPSK - main field command post (głowne polowe stanowisko kierowania)
GPU - search-strike group (grupa poszukiwawczo-uderzeniowa)
"H" - possibly Hawk missile
(H) - Dutch (holenderskie)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HJ</td>
<td>possibly Honest John missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISz</td>
<td>Training Inspectorate (Inspektorat Szkolenia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;J&quot;DP</td>
<td>Jutland infantry division (jutlandzka dywizja piechoty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k</td>
<td>company (kompania)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KA</td>
<td>infantry corps (korpus piechoty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KBOT</td>
<td>possibly quartermaster technical service base - kwatermistrzowska baza obsługi technicznej</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kcz</td>
<td>tank company (kompania czołgów)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KLM</td>
<td>aviation fighter corps (korpus lotnictwa myśliwskiego)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOK</td>
<td>National Defense Committee (Komitet Obrony Kraju)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kon</td>
<td>convoy (konwoj)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOPK</td>
<td>national air defense corps (korpus obrony powietrznej kraju)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kp</td>
<td>infantry company (kompania piechoty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>krozp</td>
<td>reconnaissance company (kompania rozpoznania)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KRZ</td>
<td>embarkation area command (komenda rejonu zaladowania)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ksap</td>
<td>combat engineer company (kompania saperów)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSD</td>
<td>quartermaster command post (kwatermistrzowskie stanowisko dowodzenia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBP</td>
<td>mobile infantry brigade (manewrowa brygada piechoty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mob.</td>
<td>mobilized (mobilizacyjny)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MON</td>
<td>Ministry of National Defense (Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MW - Navy (Marynarka Wojenna)
(N) - German (German Federal Republic) (niemieckie (NRF))
(NRD) - German Democratic Republic (Niemiecka Republika Demokratyczna)
(NRF) - German Federal Republic (Niemiecka Republika Federalna)
ODEs - landing unit (oddzial desantowy)
o.k. - approximately (około)
opch - chemical defense (obrona przeciwchemiczna)
OPK - National Air Defense (Obrona Powietrzna Kraju)
OSA - Artillery Officers School (Oficerska Szkoła Artylerii)
OSAPlot - Antiaircraft Artillery Officers School (Oficerska Szkoła Artylerii Przeciwlotniczej)
OSInz - Engineer Officers School (oficerska szkola inżynieryjna)
OSSam - Motor Transport Officers School (oficerska szkola samochodowa)
OSWPanc - Armored Troop Officers School (oficerska szkola wojsk pancernych)
OSWOP - Frontier Guard Officers School (Oficerska Szkoła Wojsk Ochrony Pogranicza)
OSWZm - Mechanized Troop Officers School (oficerska szkola wojsk zmechanizowanych)
OWOP - Frontier Guard Unit (oddzial wojsk ochrony pogranicza)
(P) - Polish (Polski)
pah - howitzer artillery regiment (pulk artylerii haubic)

pcz - tank regiment (pulk czołgow)

pd - assault landing regiment (pulk desantowy)

pl - air regiment (pulk lotniczy)

plm - aviation fighter regiment (pulk lotnictwa myśliwskiego)

plmn - [probably aviation attack fighter regiment - puck lotnictwa myśliwsko-nacierającego]

plmsz - aviation ground-attack fighter regiment (pulk lotnictwa myśliwsko-szturmowego)

plt - air transport regiment (pulk lotnictwa transportowego)

pm - mobile regiment (pulk manewrowy)

popbmar - regiment for defense against mass-destruction weapons (pulk obrony przeciw broni masowego rażenia)

pot - territorial defense regiment (pulk obrony terytorialnej)

Potk - territorial defense patrol - patrol obrony terytorialnej

POW - Pomeranian Military District (pomorski okręg wojskowy)

pp - infantry regiment (pulk piechoty)

ppd - airborne regiment (pulk powietrznodesantowy)

ppm - naval infantry regiment (pulk piechoty morskiej)

ppont - ponton bridge regiment (pulk pontonowy)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PPSD</td>
<td>auxiliary joint command post of the National Air Defense Forces (pomocnicze polaczone stanowisko dowodzenia wojsk OPK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prplot</td>
<td>antiaircraft missile regiment (pulk rakiet przeciwlotniczych)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>psc</td>
<td>parachute regiment (pulk spadochronowy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>field command post (polowe stanowisko dowodzenia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSU</td>
<td>regimental ordnance depot (pulkowy skład uzbrojenia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUK</td>
<td>/possibly national security patrol - patrol ochrony kraju/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pz</td>
<td>mechanized regiment (pulk zmechanizowany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(R)</td>
<td>Soviet (Radziecki)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radz.</td>
<td>Soviet (Radziecki)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RF</td>
<td>/possibly forming-up area - rejoin formowania sie/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RZ</td>
<td>embarkation area (rejon zaladowania)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBA</td>
<td>independent artillery brigade (samodzielna brygada artylerii)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sbrt</td>
<td>independent radio technical battalion (samodzielny batalion radiotechniczny)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>command post (stanowisko dowodzenia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD GO</td>
<td>operations group command post (stanowisko dowodzenia grupy operacyjnej)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDLT</td>
<td>air transport command post (stanowisko dowodzenia lotnictwa transportowego)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK i KRW</td>
<td>troop movement direction and control zone (strefa kierowania i kontroli ruchu wojsk)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOW</td>
<td>Silesian Military District (slaski okreg wojskowy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spa</td>
<td>independent artillery regiment (samodzielny pulk artylerii)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spar</td>
<td>independent rocket artillery regiment (samodzielny pulk artylerii rakietowej)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOS</td>
<td>local self-defense unit (terenowy oddzial samoobrony)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRP</td>
<td>temporary transshipment area (tymczasowy rejon przeladunkowy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W 1</td>
<td>first day of the war (dzien wojny)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAM</td>
<td>Military Academy of Medicine (Wojskowa Akademia Medyczna)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAP</td>
<td>Military Political Academy (Wojskowa Akademia Polityczna)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAT</td>
<td>Military Technical Academy (Wojskowa Akademia Techniczna)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WKO</td>
<td>provincial defense committee (wojewodzki komitet obrony)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WOW</td>
<td>Warsaw Military District (Warszawski Okreg Wojskowy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WOW</td>
<td>Internal Defense Forces (Wojska Obrony Wewnetrznej)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSD</td>
<td>advanced command post (wysuniete stanowisko dowodzenia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSMW</td>
<td>Higher Naval School (Wyzsza Szkola Marynarki Wojennej)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zcz</td>
<td>probably tank formation - zwiazek czolgow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZDes</td>
<td>landing team (zespol desantowy)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ZFSDMW - alternate naval flag command post (zapasowe flagowe stanowisko dowodzenia marynarki morskiej)
ZO - covering force team (zespol oslony)
ZOMO - motorized unit of the Citizens' Militia (zmotoryzowany oddzial Milicji Obywatelskiej)
ZPSK - alternate field command post (zapasoowe polowe stanowisko kierowania)
ZS GO - possibly operations group alternate headquarters - zapasowy sztab grupy operacyjnej?
ZSK - alternate command post (zapasoowe stanowisko kierowania)
ZSzp - unidentified?
ZU - strike team (zespol uderzeniowy)
ZWO - fire-support team (zespol wsparcia ogniowego)
Gpot - Gdansk territorial defense regiment (Gdansk pulk obrony terytorialnej)*
Kpot - Kielce or Koszalin or Krakow territorial defense regiment
Lpot - Lodz or Lublin territorial defense regiment
Opot - Olsztyn or Opole territorial defense regiment
Ppot - Poznan territorial defense regiment
Szpot - Szczecin territorial defense regiment
Wpot - Warsaw or Wroclaw territorial defense regiment
Zpot - Zielona Gora territorial defense regiment

* The letter preceding the abbreviation, for example S, K, signifies the localities, in which the battalions were formed.
A - 27.05 or A /27.05/ - probably air reconnaissance data obtained on 27 May

P - 30 KT
17.20 1.06 - nuclear missile strike of 30-kiloton yield at 1720 hours on 1 June (pocisk)

P - 30 KT
R-300 17.20 1.06 - R-300 nuclear missile strike of 30-kiloton yield at 1720 hours on 1 June (pocisk)

30 KT
R-300 17.20 1.06 - R-300 nuclear missile strike of 30-kiloton yield at 1720 hours on 1 June

30 KT
17.20 1.06 - nuclear strike of 30-kiloton yield at 1720 hours on 1 June

CH
17.20 1.06 - chemical strike at 1720 hours on 1 June (chemiczny)

PWD 30 KT
17.20 1.06 - submarine-launched nuclear missile strike of 30-kiloton yield at 1720 hours on 1 June (podwodny)

L - 30 KT
17.20 1.06 - nuclear air strike of 30-kiloton yield at 1720 hours on 1 June (lotniczy)
Brytyjskie Siły Powietrzne w NRF - British Air Forces in West Germany

CENTRALNA GRUPA ARMII - CENTRAL ARMY GROUP

FRONT NADMORSKI - MARITIME FRONT
3, 5, 7 A; 2 AL; 39 BBROT

FRONT ZACHODNI - WESTERN FRONT
1,20,21,22 APanc; 12A; 1 AL; 1 FBR0T

Jutlandzka DP - Jutland DP

Lotnictwo NRF "Polnoc" - West German Air Force "North"
Lotnictwo Taktyczne Holandii - Dutch Tactical Air Force

POLNOCNA GRUPA ARMII - NORTHERN ARMY GROUP

Rejon Formowania desanty na transportowcach - Area for forming-up landing forces on transports

Strefa Kierowania i Kontroli Ruchu Wojsk "Bydgoszcz" or "Plock" - "Bydgoszcz" or "Plock" Troop Movement Direction and Control Zone

Taktyczne Siły Powietrzne Belgii - Belgian Tactical Air Force

trzy BP - three BP

Wojska Wewnętrzne i Siły Ukladu Teryt. - Internal Troops and Forces of the Territorial System

ZAMIAR STRON I PRZEBIEG DZIALAN W CWICZENIU "LAT0-67" (planowany) - PLAN OF THE OPPOSING SIDES AND THE COURSE OF OPERATIONS DURING THE "LAT0-67" EXERCISE (planned)

2. three BP
3. Jutland DP
4. West German Air Force "North"
5. NORTHERN ARMY GROUP
6. Dutch Tactical Air Force
7. British Air Forces in West Germany
8. Belgian Tactical Air Force
9. CENTRAL ARMY GROUP
10. Maritime Front
11. WESTERN FRONT
   1, 20, 21, 22 A.Panc; 12 A; 1 AL; 1 FBROT
12. Area for forming-up landing forces on transports
13. Internal Troops and Forces of the Territorial System
14. SK i KRW "BYDGOSZCZ"
15. MARITIME FRONT
   3, 5, 7 A; 2 AL; 39 BBROT
16. SK i KRW "PLOCK"
CENTRALNA GRUPA ARMII - CENTRAL ARMY GROUP

Dyw. (Br) reservowe - British reserve divisions

Działania Pdywers. - Counter-diversionary operations
Silami 13 BWOW, 3 pm, 13 BWOP, Z Gora pot with forces of 13 BWOW, 3 pm, 13 BWOP, Zielona Gora pot.

Działania Pdywers. - Counter-diversionary operations with forces
Silami 16 BWOW, 18 BWOP, Kpot of 16 BWOW, 18 BWOP, Koszalin pot.

Działania Pdywers. - Counter-diversionary operations with forces
Silami 22 BWOP, Opot, L bot of 22 BWOP, Olsztyn pot, Lodz bot.

FRONT NADMORSKI - MARITIME FRONT

FRONT ZACHODNI - WESTERN FRONT

Legenda - Legend
- 1 June
- 3 June
- 2 June
- 31 May
- 31 May
- 27-29 May

Operacja Pdywers. - Counter-diversionary operation with forces of Op-Silami GO "Poludnie" Operations Group "South".

POLNOCNA GRUPA ARMII - NORTHERN ARMY GROUP

PRZEBIEG DZIALAN - COURSE OF OPERATIONS

Skład GO "Poludnie" - Composition of Operations Group "South"
- 6 BWOW
- 26 BWOP
- pot Rzeszow, Lublin, Kielce - Rzeszow, Lublin, Kielce pot
- boty zagroconych rejonow - bot of threatened areas
- ZOMO Lublin - Lublin ZOMO
- TOS zagroconych rejonow - TOS of threatened areas

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Copy No. ________
1. COURSE OF OPERATIONS
2. British reserve divisions
3. NORTHERN ARMY GROUP
4. CENTRAL ARMY GROUP
5. MARITIME FRONT
6. WESTERN FRONT
7. Legend - 1 June
   2 June
   3 June
   1 June
   31 May
   31 May
   27-29 May
8. Counter-diversionary operations with forces of 16 BWOW, 18 BWOP, Koszalin pot.
9. Counter-diversionary operations with forces of 13 BWOW, 3 pm, 13 BWOP, Zielona Gora pot.
10. Counter-diversionary operations with forces of 22 BWOP, Olsztyn pot, Lodz bot.
11. Counter-diversionary operation with forces of Operations Group "South"
12. Composition of Operations Group "South"
   - 6 BWOW
   - 26 BWOP
   - Rzeszow, Lublin, Kielce pot
   - bot of threatened areas
   - Lublin ZOMO
   - TOS of threatened areas
dlugosc kolumny 120 km - Length of Column: 120 kilometers

Kopenhaga - Copenhagen

PLAN OPERACJI DESANTOWEJ GO "BALTYK" - "BALTIC" OPERATIONS GROUP ASSAULT LANDING OPERATION PLAN

Pocz. 14.00 - Start 1400 hours
Zak. 17.00 - Finish 1700 hours

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pocz. Ladow.</th>
<th>- Embarkation Starting Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- sprzet: 20.00 2.06</td>
<td>Equipment: 2000 hours, 2 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- ludzie: 00.30 3.06</td>
<td>Personnel: 0030 hours, 3 June</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Koniec Ladow.</th>
<th>- Embarkation Finishing Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- sprzet: 00.30 3.06</td>
<td>Equipment: 0030 hours, 3 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- ludzie: 1.00 3.06</td>
<td>Personnel: 0100 hours, 3 June</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ppm A R z GO "Pcnoc" - Soviet Army ppm of Operations Group "North"

pz z GO "Rostock" - "Rostock" Operations Group pz

Rej. wyjsc. - Staging Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rej. zalad.</th>
<th>- Embarkation Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pocz. 17.00</td>
<td>Start 1700 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zak. 19.00</td>
<td>Finish 1900 hours</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rubiez odpowidz. 5 KOPK - 5 KOPK Zone of Responsibility

Rubiez Wykr. celow pow. H-500 m - Airborne Target Detection Zone H-500 Meters

spec. pododdz. - Special Subunit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zadanie bliszse</th>
<th>Primary Mission</th>
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<tr>
<td>D 1</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zadanie bliszse</th>
<th>Primary Mission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D 4-5</td>
<td>D 4-5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. "BALTIC" OPERATIONS GROUP ASSAULT LANDING OPERATION PLAN

2. Copenhagen

3. Primary Mission
   D 1

4. Primary Mission
   D 4-5

5. "Rostock" Operations Group pz

6. Length of Column: 120 Kilometers

7. 5 KOPK Zone of Responsibility

8. Soviet Army ppm of Operations Group "North"

9. Airborne Target Detection Zone H-500 Meters

10. Embarkation Area
    Start 1700 hours
        Finish 1900 hours

11. Staging Area

12. Start 1400 hours
    Finish 1700 hours

13. Embarkation Starting Time
    Equipment: 2000 hours, 2 June
    Personnel: 0030 hours, 3 June

    Embarkation Finishing Time
    Equipment: 0030 hours, 3 June
    Personnel: 0100 hours, 3 June

14. Special Subunit
A-27.05   -   A-27.05
grup srod przepr. Grouping of crossing means

A-30.05  -  A-30.05
org. BDes z zamierzeniem Organization of assault landing brigade
destantow w rej. Rostock for landings in Rostock area

BALTIC

cz. 11DZ - Elements of 11DZ
(czesc) - (elements)
czesc 16BZ - Elements of 16BZ

Dania - Denmark
8.00-11.30 - 0800-1130 hours
5.30 31.5 - 0530 hours, 31 May
bat 6pp - Battalion of 6pp

Kopenhaga - Copenhagen

LEGENDA

Troop Position at Following Time and Date:
2000 hours, 31 May
0800 hours, 1 June
2000 hours, 1 June
0800 hours, 2 June
1130 hours, 3 June
1600 hours, 3 June
2030 hours, 3 June
0700 hours, 7 June

Lotnictwo przebazowano do Kopenhagi - Change of Air Base to Copenhagen
moc. - Reinforcement

NRD - German Democratic Republic
NRF - German Federal Republic

-continued-
oslon. - Covering Force

pododdz. spec. - Special Subunit

PRZEBIEG DZIAŁAN DESANTOWYCH GO "BALTYK" (c.d. na schemacie 5A) - COURSE OF LANDING OPERATIONS BY "BALTIC" OPERATIONS GROUP (Elements of Operation on Chart 5A)

pulk (NRD) - Regiment (NRD)

Szwecja - Sweden

3.20 - 0320 hours
31.05  31 May

20 sam. Hunter F4 - 20 Hunter F4 Aircraft

2.00  1.06 - 0200 hours, 1 June

tyly - Rear Services

Zgr. des. - Assault Landing Group

Zgr. piech. - Infantry Group

Zgrupowanie operacyjne "Północ" - Operations Group "North"
1. COURSE OF LANDING OPERATIONS BY "BALTIC" OPERATIONS GROUP (Elements of Operation on Chart 5A)

2. Sweden

3. Copenhagen

4. Change of Air Base to Copenhagen

5. Denmark

6. A-27.05
   Grouping of crossing means

7. 1 JBP
   Covering Force

8. 3 JBP
   Reinforcement

9. A-30.05
   Organization of assault landing brigade for landings in Rostock area

10. 20 Hunter F4 aircraft

11. Elements of 16 BZ

12. German Federal Republic

13. 0800 to 1130 hours

14. Regiment (NRD)

15. German Democratic Republic

16. (elements)

-continued-

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CHART 5 (Continued)

17. Elements of 11 DZ
18. Infantry Group
19. Operations Group "North"
20. Assault Landing Group
21. 0320 hours
   31 May
22. 0530 hours, 31 May
   Battalion of 6 pp
23. 0200 hours, 1 June
24. BALTIC
25. Rear Services
26. **LEGEND**
   Troop Position at Following Time and Date:
   2000 hours, 31 May
   0800 hours, 1 June
   0800 hours, 2 June
   1130 hours, 3 June
   1600 hours, 3 June
   2030 hours, 3 June
   0700 hours, 7 June
27. Special Subunit
PRZEKÓDZENIE DZIAŁAŃ DEŚANTOWYCH
GO "BAŁTYK"
A 27-28.05
przegrupowanie sie przepr. Regrouping for crossing

CZ. 11DZ = 11DZ elements
CZESC 42PZ = 42PZ elements
CZESC PODODZ. 2BZ = 2BZ subunit elements
8.00 - 11.30 - 0800 - 1130 hours
8 samol. F-104G = 8 F-104G aircraft

ELM = Fighter aircraft squadron [patrol]
7-10 = 0700-1000 hours
2 = Flight of 2 aircraft

14.30 - 1400 hours
30.05 = 30 May

Kopenhaga = Copenhagen

Polozenie wojsk na: Troop Position at Following Time and Date:
2000 hours, 31 May
0800 hours, 1 June
1130 hours, 3 June
1800 hours, 3 June
2030 hours, 3 June
0200 hours, 7 June

Lotnictwo przebazowano do KOPENHAGI - Change of Air Base to Copenhagen

OBR. TERYT. = Territorial Defense

OK. EZ = Approx. EZ
OK. BZ 3 BP = Approx. BZ of 3 BP
OK. DWUCH KP = Approx. two kp

--continued--
**MAP 5A GLOSSARY (Continued)**

pozost. sily 42pz (ok. bp) - Remaining forces of 42 pz (approx. bp)

PRZEBIEG DZIALAN DESANTOWYCH GO "BALTYK" - COURSE OF LANDING OPERATIONS BY "BALTIC" OPERATIONS GROUP

sam. F-4 - F-4 aircraft

35pz bez 2/35 - 35 pz excluding 2bz of 35pz
1. COURSE OF LANDING OPERATIONS BY "BALTIC" OPERATIONS GROUP
2. Change of Air Base to Copenhagen
3. elm
   0700-1000 hours
   Flight of 2 aircraft
4. F-4 aircraft
5. A 27-28.05
   Regrouping for crossing
6. 0800-1130 hours
7. --------
8. Territorial Defense
9. Approx. two kp
10. 2BZ subunit elements
11. 35pz excluding 2bz of 35pz
12. Approx. bz of 3BP
13. Remaining forces of 42pz (approx. bp)
14. 42pz elements
15. 11DZ elements
16. 8 F-104G aircraft
17. LEGEND

   Troop Position at Following Time and Date: 2000 hours, 31 May
   0600 hours, 1 June
   1130 hours, 3 June
   1800 hours, 3 June
   2030 hours, 3 June
   0200 hours, 7 June

18. 1400 hours
    30 May
19. Copenhagen
20. Approx. BZ

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