SPECIAL REPORT

on Communist Propaganda

SOVIET PROPAGANDA ON THE WARSAW PACT:
NEW STRESS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF SOCIALIST UNITY
This report reviews Moscow propaganda treatment of the Warsaw Pact in the new climate of assertiveness on the part of the Soviet Union's East European allies. It compares recent with past treatment of Pact anniversaries, meetings, and maneuvers, and it examines propaganda uses of the Pact in the context of Moscow's increased general stress over the past half-year on the importance of shoring up socialist unity against what is viewed as a heightened threat of ideological subversion from the West.

The basic themes of propaganda on the Pact as such have remained constant: insistence that it is a purely defensive alliance, forced on the socialist states by NATO, with the corollary that if NATO were liquidated the Pact, too, could disband. The declaration on European security adopted by the Bucharest meeting of the Pact Political Consultative Committee in July 1966 reaffirmed the Pact members' long-standing profession of a desire to eliminate both military alliances. The 1966 statement introduced the further stipulation that if the West was not prepared to disband NATO now, the military organizations of NATO and the Pact could be liquidated as a first step toward creation of a European security system. The 1966 statement continues to be recalled for the record in propaganda on the Pact, qualified by the standard line that if the NATO allies persist in posing a military threat, the Pact allies have no choice but to build up their joint defenses.

The emphasis on European security, however, has declined in Soviet propaganda as Moscow's preoccupation with the problems in its own European domain has grown. Problems with the independence-minded Rumanians have been compounded by the advent of the new regime in Czechoslovakia. Against this background, stress on the importance of unity—ideological, political, and military—has been an increasingly prominent feature of Moscow propaganda on bloc relations generally and has extended into propaganda relating to the Pact. Unity and vigilance
are pictured as the more important today because the military threat from NATO, spearheaded by the "Bonn-Washington axis," has been complemented by subtler, more insidious efforts at "bridge-building" which threaten the fabric of socialist society.

The new stress on these themes dates from the early, ebullient period of the Czechoslovak "democratization" in late February and early March when the Prague radio and press, in the first flush of freedom from censorship restraints, aired bold elaborations of areas into which a new "realistic" Czechoslovak foreign policy might extend. While regime spokesmen were careful to pledge unswerving allegiance to the Warsaw Pact, Prague radio commentaries and press articles, particularly in organs of the noncommunist parties, called for a reappraisal of Czechoslovakia's role in the Pact and for wider contacts with Western Europe. Moscow, in warning against the blandishments of "bridge-builders," made clear the targets of its warnings in references to credulous, "immature" people as well as to "nationalist" and "revisionist" elements in "socialist countries."

Recent Soviet propaganda on the Warsaw Pact, concerned ostensibly with its military necessity, betrays at least as much concern with its political symbolism; and ostensible reassurances to the Czechs that the powerful forces of the Pact stand guard over their security have transparent double edges which, it is clear from Prague media, have not been lost on the Czechs.

Moscow propaganda has clearly reflected the pressure on Czechoslovakia represented by the June Warsaw Pact joint exercises on Czechoslovak territory. An exceptional Soviet propaganda buildup for the 20-30 June exercises began in May, and Czechoslovak media amply reflected the edginess in Prague over the prospect of Soviet troops entering the country. Moscow, while publicly decrying Western "slanders" about any intention to intervene militarily or to station troops there permanently, tacitly fanned Czechoslovak apprehensions by failing to unequivocally scotch speculation that the exercises would be of wider scope than originally announced. In the event, they covered more territory and included the armies of more countries than had been first announced. After the exercises were over, when Prague media evinced concern over the continued presence of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia, Moscow made no unequivocal statement on when the troops would leave.

Radio Moscow's broadcasts in Czech and Slovak continue in July to include commentaries tailored exclusively for Czechoslovak audiences decrying Western "slanders" about the exercises and emphasizing the Pact's importance.
I. BASIC PATTERNS IN PROPAGANDA ON THE PACT

The Warsaw Pact has not normally been a major continuing subject of Soviet radio and press comment over the years. It has been brought up, routinely, as one element of comment on the problem of European security and as one example, in comment on bloc relations, of the ways in which unity is manifest. But as a topic to which full commentaries are devoted it has accounted for less than one percent of Moscow's radio comment and for a meager amount of press comment except in periods surrounding Pact meetings, maneuvers, and anniversaries. In terms of volume of propaganda attention to Pact meetings and anniversaries, the pattern has not altered significantly this year. The basic themes on the Pact's reason for existence have also remained substantially unchanged. These constant elements are described below. The new dimensions relating to the Pact's role as an instrument of unity against disruptive tendencies fostered by the Czechoslovak liberalization—and as an instrument of pressure against the Czechs—are examined in Part II of this report.

THE MARCH SOFIA MEETING

The 6-7 March meeting in Sofia of the Pact's Political Consultative Committee drew 9.5 percent of Radio Moscow's comment to all audiences in the two weeks ending 16 March. Much of the propaganda consisted of publicity for the meeting's documents—on Vietnam and nuclear nonproliferation. The 9.5 percent for the two-week period was comparable to 9 percent of total Moscow radio comment devoted over a two-week period to the Warsaw meeting of the Pact's Political Consultative Committee on 19-20 January 1965. The volume of propaganda on the Sofia meeting was considerably smaller, however, than the publicity for the 4-6 July 1966 Bucharest meeting of the Committee,* which was tied in with a

* Article VI of the Warsaw Pact treaty provides for the establishment of the Political Consultative Committee as a means of "carrying out consultations" among the participating states. Article III says member states "will consult with each other without delay at any time when, in the opinion of any of them, there may occur the threat of an armed attack on one or several states participating in the treaty, in the interests of a resolute joint defense and the maintenance of peace and security." The first meeting of the Committee took place in Prague in January 1956. Eight meetings have since been publicized: in May 1958, February 1960, March 1961, June 1962, July 1963, January 1965, July 1966, and March 1968.
new propaganda ploy on European security—the proposal that if the NATO powers were unwilling now to disband both NATO and the Pact entirely, the military organizations of both bodies could be liquidated as a first step toward a system to guarantee European security.

THE MAY PACT ANNIVERSARY

Pact anniversaries are normally marked in a very moderate volume of Soviet radio comment—from less than one to around two percent of total comment on all subjects. Commemorative propaganda ordinarily spans roughly a two-week period, featuring press articles by military spokesmen picturing a continuing military threat from NATO and emphasizing the Pact's defensive nature. The 13th anniversary on 14 May this year drew slightly over two percent of Moscow's radio comment, spanning roughly a two-week period. More than half of the volume in the first week consisted of publicity for a commemorative article in PRAVDA by Pact Commander Yakubovskiy. Two previous anniversaries, the second in 1957 and the decennial in 1965, drew somewhat more propaganda attention.

STOCK THEMES

Propaganda surrounding the Sofia meeting played the usual dual themes of the need for united defense against a Western threat and the role of the Pact as an instrument of unity. A CPSU-Council of Ministers statement on the meeting concluded that the work done at the conference would "serve the cause of strengthening security in Europe and the further strengthening of the cohesion and fraternal cooperation of the socialist states." An 11 March PRAVDA editorial on the meeting, broadcast nearly 90 times worldwide by Radio Moscow, warned of the threat posed by "the forces of imperialist reaction and war..., acting ever more angrily and aggressively, [who] intensify the escalation of the war in Vietnam, increase their provocations on all continents, intensify the arms race, and endeavor to keep loopholes leading to nuclear weapons open," requiring "the strengthening of unity and cohesion of all the peace-loving forces and, first of all, the socialist countries." An article in PRAVDA by Mayevskiy the same day stressed the importance of "unity of action" against "the growing adventurism of imperialist circles, most of all the United States and the German Federal Republic."

Moscow's major comment on the Sofia meeting did not repeat the position that the Pact members' ultimate hope is for the disbandment of the opposing military alliances in favor of a system of European security. But this standing position was reaffirmed in
the propaganda surrounding the 14 May Pact anniversary. The major press article on the anniversary, by Yakubovskiy, included a lengthy review of the events which "forced" the socialist states to create the Pact in response to the "aggressive military grouping" in NATO. Yakubovskiy stated that as long as the "imperialist states continue to make military preparations and to threaten the socialist countries, the Warsaw Pact will be preserved and grow stronger." Other, routine propaganda spelled out the corollary that if and when the Western imperialist threat was removed the Pact, too, could be liquidated.

This theme has recurred sporadically in scattered routine comment on the Pact. An article in NEW TIMES (No. 25 for 1968)—reviewed by TASS on 20 June—said that the socialist states do not favor the division of the world into military blocs and invoked as evidence the July 1966 Bucharest declaration "which reaffirmed the readiness of Warsaw Pact countries simultaneously to disband the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic pact." Recalling the statement adopted at the April 1967 Karlovy Vary meeting, an IZVESTIYA article on 18 May said that Warsaw Pact member states are ready "for the simultaneous liquidation of the military alliances." There have been other, more explicit recollections of the terms of the 1966 Bucharest declaration, as in an 8 April domestic service talk which recalled that "the USSR and other socialist states put forward proposals for the simultaneous disbanding of the military organizations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact."

The Bucharest Pact meeting's stipulation that the NATO and Pact military organizations might be liquidated as a first step toward eliminating both blocs came against the background of de Gaulle's decisions earlier in 1966 regarding France's relationship to NATO, and in the wake of Romanian First Secretary Ceausescu's discourse on the undesirability of military blocs in his assertive speech of 7 May 1966. Ceausescu called the existence of military blocs and the sending of troops to other countries "an anachronism incompatible with the independence and national sovereignty of peoples and normal relations between states." He has since emphasized the view that there should be "concomitant abolition of NATO and the Warsaw Pact." He used this phrase most recently in his 16 May 1968 speech at Craiova, during President de Gaulle's visit to Romania; and in this context he also repeated the language of his May 1966 speech, calling again for "liquidation of the anachronism of a Europe divided into military blocs."
Soviet media, in publicizing Ceausescu's speeches, have not quoted his provocative references to the "anachronistic" nature of the two military groupings. They have acknowledged his position in more palatable terms as one favoring eventual liquidation of both the Pact and NATO, with the onus on the West to withdraw the military threat—the position to which Moscow and the Pact are formally committed.

II: NEW PROPAGANDA DIMENSIONS

While Moscow sustains its posture vis-a-vis both the West and the USSR's restive East European allies with respect to the Pact as a defensive alliance forced on the socialist bloc by NATO, it has focused greater—and growing—efforts in recent months on portraying the Pact as a necessary instrument to preserve the socialist system against disruptive alien influences.

BACKGROUND: THE STIRRINGS IN EASTERN EUROPE

An increase in the frequency of Soviet propaganda warnings on the dangers of succumbing to the blandishments of "bridge-builders" in Europe dates from the period of late February and early March, during and after the Budapest consultative meeting of the communist parties, when the new Czechoslovak regime's aspirations to a more independent foreign policy line were surfacing.

Rumania reasserted its independent stance during this period, through its walkout from the Budapest meeting and in subsequent public censure of Soviet behavior at the 23 March Dresden meeting of European bloc leaders (in which Rumania did not participate) and at the Sofia meeting of the Pact Consultative Committee. The Rumanian complaints brought into sharp relief a situation in which Moscow, faced with Rumanian dissent, was simply ignoring or going around the Rumanians. Thus the 26 April 1968 Rumanian party plenum "decision" on international affairs, echoed in Ceausescu's speech to the Bucharest party aktiv the same day, said that Rumania had not been invited to Dresden because criticism of Czechoslovakia was planned, which ran counter to Rumanian principles of nonintervention; in fact, the decision said, the meeting also discussed Warsaw Pact and CEMA matters that should not have been broached without Rumania present. In his Bucharest speech, Ceausescu also complained that at the Sofia Pact meeting he had been presented with a fait accompli in the form of the Pact statement endorsing the nonproliferation
treaty: Rumania had not been advised in advance that the statement, which it declined to sign, was to be introduced.

Czechoslovak propaganda through the spring made clear an affinity for Rumanian attitudes. A Prague international service commentator remarked on 10 March, for example, that "Rumania's fears of the great-power nuclear monopoly being preserved by" the nonproliferation treaty endorsed at the Sofia meeting "are certainly not unfounded."

Prague media also exhibited an affinity for the Rumanian view of the Warsaw Pact as a temporary and undesirable phase of progression toward a broad European security system. Thus an article in the party organ RUDE PRAVO declared on 14 May—the date of the Pact anniversary—that Czechoslovak policy aimed at "overcoming the split in Europe and installing an all-European system of security and cooperation" could "under existing conditions only be in alliance with the other Warsaw Pact members," but that the "fundamental task" was to "successfully exert efforts so that the entire alliance really strives" for an all-European security system. On the preceding day, a Czechoslovak Defense Ministry statement duly pronounced the Czechoslovak army "a firm part of the allied armed forces [which] will honorably fulfill the tasks placed before it by the allied command side by side with other fraternal armies, especially the Soviet Army."

While statements from top-level Czechoslovak spokesmen were scrupulous in assuring Moscow of the regime's unswerving dedication to the bloc alliance, both official and unofficial comment in Prague media during the early, ebullient stages of the Czechoslovak "democratization" drive made clear the dimensions of the threat posed by the advent of the reformist regime. First Secretary Dubcek, in a 21 February PRAVDA article marking the 20th anniversary of the communist takeover of Czechoslovakia, went out of his way to point out the "practical" grounds on which relations with the Soviet Union were based; and Prague radio and press commentators, in the first flush of freedom from the restraints of censorship, elaborated boldly on some of the areas—including the Warsaw Pact—in which the regime's new "pragmatic" and "realistic" foreign policy dictated a searching reexamination.

Comment surrounding the Sofia Pact consultative meeting suggested that the regime should take a hard look, on the basis of national self-interest, at its role in the Pact organization. A 6 March domestic radio talk by Radio Prague's Moscow correspondent,
alluding to "certain changes which Soviet military doctrine has undergone," went so far as to state:

If the creators of Soviet strategic concepts today no longer consider it necessary to reply to an attack on one of the socialist countries with a nuclear strike causing wholesale destruction, the Warsaw Pact member countries might ask some questions similar to those which some time ago caused de Gaulle to quit NATO.

The author granted, at the same time, the "weakness" of such an analogy with "capitalist" relations, which, he said, ignore the fact that—as demonstrated at the July 1966 Warsaw Pact summit meeting in Bucharest—differences among socialist countries "can be successfully bridged."

On 9 March in the international service, another Prague commentator remarked on the "new approach in the country's domestic and foreign policy,...coinciding with the national interest" and in the context of present world "realities," citing Dubcek's role at the Sofia Pact meeting as an example of "realism" in action. The commentator said Dubcek had appealed for realism in connection with Rumanian opposition to the nonproliferation treaty; he had argued, according to the commentator, that "it was no good demanding the maximum, however justified the demand might be." The commentator expressed approval of such an expedient approach.

He granted the wisdom of strengthening ties with the Warsaw Pact—"with countries that can "truly guarantee" Czechoslovakia's state independence—but he also declared that Czechoslovakia "does not rely only on its allies." He added that Czechoslovakia "wants to make an active contribution to solving all the fundamental world problems."

Accordingly, Prague commentators throughout the spring spoke of prospects for an "active" European policy, starting with a reassessment of traditional postwar relations leading toward recognition of both German states. Official spokesmen and commentators pointed to persisting obstacles to normal relations with West Germany, first and foremost its claim to sole representation of the German people. But the People's Party organ LIDOVÁ DEMOKRACIE on 24 April pointed out that the Rumanians, in establishing relations with West Germany, were "not frightened" by Bonn's claim to sole representation.
Prime Minister Cernik, outlining the regime's aspirations to an "active European policy," set as a goal "the widening of all-European cooperation" in all spheres and stated a conviction that the time had come to free European "material and manpower resources" now expended for military purposes for improvement of the continent's well-being. As for the Warsaw Pact, Cernik's pledge of allegiance to the bloc alliance was preceded by a reference to international solidarity "based on the democratic principles of equality, noninterference, and mutual respect"; and it was followed by the statement that in supporting the Pact's "defensive power" Czechoslovakia "will apply within the framework of this treaty democratic principles in accordance with the interests of the republic."

Rumanian-Czechoslovak affinity was reasserted during Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Hajek's Bucharest visit in June. On 12 June, the Bucharest domestic radio reported Hajek as stating that while Czechoslovak foreign policy was based on participation in the Warsaw Pact and CEMA, respecting these alliances does not mean that we will not rid ourselves of the formality and rigidity in foreign relations which are a consequence of the errors of the past period of dogmatism. We must bear in mind that it is not necessary for us to copy the policy of the Soviet Union, which, as a world socialist power, has one scope of action while the policy of a smaller state such as Czechoslovakia has a different scope of action. Czechoslovakia will give priority to the problems of central and southeast Europe.

THE SOVIET RESPONSE: WARNINGS AGAINST WESTERN SUBVERSION

Moscow has responded with a major, sustained propaganda effort casting in urgent terms the need to preserve the ideological identity of the socialist world against Western subversive inroads—an effort pointed internally, at Soviet intellectual ferment, as well as at the European bloc—and with warnings clearly aimed at the East Europeans about the threat inherent in U.S. "bridge-building," Bonn's "new Eastern policy," and the notion of a central European confederation.
BRIDGE-BUILDING

The Administration policy of establishing bridges to the countries of Eastern Europe through a liberalized trade policy and closer contact at the cultural level was a target of only isolated attack in Soviet propaganda during the four years following its introduction at the beginning of 1964. President Johnson's 23 May 1964 speech at Lexington, Virginia, which elaborated the policy went unmentioned in Soviet media at the time.

Subsequent major Presidential pronouncements on bridge-building were in some cases assailed, in other cases dismissed perfunctorily in Soviet comment. The 1965 state of the Union address drew an atypically sharp Soviet response, with a Commentator article in IZVESTIYA declaring that "the suggested 'bridges' are rotten" and denouncing the policy as a "perfidious imperialist scheme." More typically, the President's 3 May 1966 speech, in which he announced that he had directed the State Department to draw up a bill abolishing tariff restrictions on U.S. trade with Eastern Europe, drew a mild Soviet propaganda response. TASS' brief report of this speech observed that the President made clear a U.S. intention "to use trade with the East European countries for purposes far from compatible with the established practice of normal commercial interchange among countries."

But Soviet propagandists seldom brought up "bridge-building" gratuitously, confining their treatment of the subject for the most part to reactions to specific U.S. statements. The subject now is pervasive, and the tenor is alarmist, in contrast to the pro forma counterattack represented by the earlier propaganda. A 24 May RED STAR article this year used the President's 23 May 1964 Lexington speech as a point of departure for an elaborate broadside against bridge-building as a U.S.-inspired plot to "disunite the socialist countries and to direct support to antisocialist forces," to "loosen the system existing in Eastern Europe, split the socialist community, and restore the capitalist way of life."

RED STAR concluded with the pervasive plea for stronger "friendship and cohesion" among the socialist states.

Other Moscow comment similarly excoriated bridge-building as a device, in the words of a domestic service commentator on 26 May,

to exploit manifestations of nationalism in certain countries and the desire to develop economic relations; to achieve the maximum weakening of relations with the socialist camp; and to favor the growth of centrifugal
tendencies, having, of course, the objective of undermining the friendship between the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Warnings that the United States counts in this effort on "nationalistic and revisionist" elements in socialist countries have appeared in speeches by top-level leaders, including Brezhnev's 29 March address to the Moscow City CPSU organization conference. Brezhnev referred to "bourgeois ideologists'" appeal to "nationalism and individualism" in his 3 July speech, again warning of efforts to "export anticommunism into the world of socialism." Grishin, in a 22 April speech, had warned in a similar vein of imperialist reliance on "revisionist, nationalist, and politically immature elements" in the socialist world in "plans for the so-called erection of bridges to socialist countries."

BONN'S "NEW EASTERN POLICY"

The "new Eastern Policy," a product of the West German CDU/CSU-SPD "grand coalition" formed in December 1966, has from the outset been a target of Soviet carping. But with one notable exception prior to the Czechoslovak liberalization this spring, the criticism was largely perfunctory and was devoid of any suggestion that the policy represented a serious threat to socialist unity. The exception appeared in Brezhnev's 18 April 1967 speech to the SED Congress in East Berlin. Brezhnev told his East German audience that the leaders in Bonn make no secret of their view of "diplomatic strategems in the field of 'relations with the East'...as a weapon in the struggle against the socialist countries of Europe, as a means of splitting their ranks and, above all, isolating the GDR." Three days later at the Karlovy Vary conference, however, Brezhnev took the more typical line of impugning the sincerity of "West German ruling circles" and accusing Bonn of seeking through the "new Eastern policy" of "deluding European public opinion."

Moscow propaganda issued no warning of a threat to bloc unity in reacting to the first fruition of Bonn's policy—the establishment of West German-Rumanian relations on 31 January 1967. While the East German propaganda machine bitterly attacked both Bonn and Bucharest, Moscow assumed a largely neutral stance. Indirectly, it sought to assure the Ulbricht regime of Soviet vigilance by publicizing a Soviet Government statement decrying "neo-Nazi trends" in the FRG. Moscow followed a similar tack in reacting to the resumption of West German-Czechoslovak trade talks on 20 July 1967.
In recent months, attacks on Bonn’s “new Eastern policy” have accompanied the propaganda assault on bridge-building, with both policies pictured as twin prongs of an effort by the “Washington-Bonn axis” that controls NATO to subvert the socialist system.

Central Europe

Although not as pervasive or as sustained an element in the propaganda, attacks on the notion of a central European confederation have similarly responded to the new attitudes enunciated in Eastern Europe. Plans for confederation set forth by Columbia University Professor Brzezinski and by the West German publication DER STERN came under attack by PRAVDA commentator Yuriy Zhukov on 10 April, in an article warning against “chimerical plans to tear away some of the East European countries from the socialist community.” On 16 April a Radio Moscow commentary decried notions disseminated by “Bonn propaganda” about “the so-called special situation of the central European countries...the singular character of the policy these countries must apparently follow, and the advantages to them of the policy of ‘neutrality.’” The commentator attributed to West German Finance Minister Strauss a plan for confederation which represented “ideological sabotage...to separate Czechoslovakia and other central European socialist countries from the socialist community.” The “rotten idea of a ‘transition of Czechoslovak policy to a neutralist line,’ being spread by reactionary propaganda,” was “rejected by the Czechoslovak people,” the commentator said.

The Warsaw Pact

For the most part by implication, but at times directly, the Warsaw Pact emerges in the propaganda as an instrument of unity against the new Western threat represented by bridge-building and the “new Eastern policy.” The threat is repeatedly characterized as “more refined” and more subtle, and therefore more insidious, than a military menace, requiring redoubled unity and resistance. Brezhnev warned in his 29 March speech to the Moscow City CPSU conference that imperialism, “not daring to engage in a frontal clash with the world of...”
"socialism," seeks to weaken socialist unity through ideological-political subversion. Routine propaganda has specifically attacked bridge-building and the "new Eastern policy" as devices contrived by Western ideologists who appreciate the futility of trying to crush the socialist states "by a frontal assault."

Typifying routine-level propaganda, a 16 June article in IZVESTIYA by doctor of historical sciences Sanakoyev described bridge-building as "ideological sabotage" and commented that Bonn's leaders are forced to mask their real aims under the "new Eastern policy" only because of the existence and growing strength "of the military and political alliance of the European socialist states, and primarily of the Warsaw Pact." The Sciia and Dresden Meetings have been cited in other comment as attesting to bloc solidarity in the face of Western attempts at subversion.

Pictured most often as an instrument of unity against subversion, the Pact is also described as itself a target of the alleged subversive efforts. A 30 March article in RED STAR warned that imperialism, recognizing "the invincible power represented by the...Warsaw Pact," has sought to drive a wedge into the alliance "by hook or by crook." The bridge-building policy, RED STAR said, has been developed "with solely this shabby aim in view." At an authoritative level, Pact Commander Yakubovskiy, in his 14 May keynote article on this year's Pact anniversary, warned against ideological subversion directed toward undermining the unity and solidarity of Warsaw Pact countries "and the combat alliance of their armies." And Brezhnev on 3 July, in a speech at a friendship rally for the visiting Hungarian First Secretary Kadar, warned that "our enemies, in their attempts to weaken" socialist unity, "resort to ideological sabotage that is also aimed at the armed forces of individual socialist countries."

The long discourse in Yakubovskiy's 14 May Pact anniversary article on the dangers of ideological subversion to bloc unity represented a new element in propaganda on the Warsaw Pact. Calling for "a high degree of revolutionary vigilance," Yakubovskiy said that imperialism, primarily U.S. imperialism, "is devoting more and more effort toward the subversive political and ideological struggle against the socialist countries and the communist and entire democratic movement." The "unmasking of anti-Marxist and various kinds of antisocialist elements and the relentless work toward strengthening fraternal cooperation between the peoples and armies of the socialist countries," he declared, "are now acquiring primary significance."
This approach was echoed in other anniversary comment, as in IZVESTIYA's 14 May anniversary editorial which warned of "insidious schemes" nurtured by the enemies of socialism to weaken bloc unity, "disunite the leading forces of modern times, and undermine socialist unity from within."

THE PACT AS AN INSTRUMENT OF PRESSURE

Moscow has exacted from the new Prague leadership, and received, vigorous assurances that the Czechoslovak "democratization" will not affect Czechoslovakia's solid place in the Pact alliance. Prague propaganda has reflected, at the same time, acute awareness of the potential uses of the Pact. Such awareness was expressed dramatically on 9 May, as reports of Soviet troop movements in southern Poland began to circulate, when a Prague domestic radio commentator pleaded that "for God's sake" there be "not even an implication" of a repeat performance of the Hungarian events of 1956.

Other Czechoslovak comment set out to assure a nervous public that Soviet military intervention was unthinkable. A domestic radio commentator on the 12th was candid in stating that "most commentators all over the world...today agree that the USSR would have to have some provocation for intervention," such as "the withdrawal of Czechoslovakia from the Warsaw Pact." Unstated, but in the background of such comment, was the history of the Soviet intervention in Hungary, when Moscow acted within the framework of the Pact to put down the Hungarian revolt.

Moscow has played on this background in underscoring, in its press and radio propaganda, the Dubcek leadership's repeated avowals of dedication to the alliance with the Soviet Union and the Pact. It has also at times pointedly brandished the Pact's strength before the Czechs. Marshal Konev in Prague on 9 May, heading a Soviet military delegation to the Czechoslovak liberation anniversary celebration, could hardly have produced a sanguine reaction among his Czechoslovak listeners--nervous over the rumors of Soviet troops moving toward the country through Poland--when he assured them that "the mighty forces of the Soviet Union" were standing guard "over the security of the frontiers" of Czechoslovakia, "always in a state of full combat readiness...."
The pressure represented by the 20-30 June Pact exercises this year was clearly reflected in Soviet propaganda, which differed markedly from propaganda surrounding past maneuvers. There was, first of all, an unusual propaganda buildup for the exercises. They were mentioned in Soviet comment on the 14 May Pact anniversary, including Yakubovskiy's anniversary article. While the anniversary as such drew a roughly normal amount of propaganda play for such an event, commentaries devoted to the impending exercises began to be aired as the observance of the anniversary ended, with the net effect of sustaining attention to the Pact more or less continuously through May and June. The volume of Moscow radio attention was not large—it did not exceed two percent of total radio comment in any single week, even while the exercises were in progress on Czechoslovak territory—but the steady, prolonged attention to the subject was atypical. The Vltava maneuvers in September 1966, which also drew just under two percent of Moscow radio comment in the week they were in progress, received only a bare mention in the propaganda in the week before they began.

The elaborate propaganda surrounding this year's exercises was notable for a spate of articles by military men in the Soviet press, where normally Moscow discusses Pact maneuvers in commentaries by regular radio and press propagandists. During the 1966 Vltava maneuvers, for example, leading Soviet papers—including RED STAR—confined themselves to publishing correspondents' reports from the scene and Radio Moscow gave fairly wide publicity to six talks by regular commentators on the importance of the exercises. This time the commentaries publicized by Radio Moscow included articles by Lt. Gen. Makeyev in PRAVDA on 20 June, by General Batov in IZVESTIYA on 22 June, and by Pact Commander Yakubovskiy in RED STAR on 23 June. RED STAR devoted an editorial to the maneuvers on the 22d. Yakubovskiy and Czechoslovak President Svoboda hailed the exercises in Prague at their inception, and IZVESTIYA on 23 June published an article by Czechoslovak Defense Minister Buur entitled "Czechoslovakia, Firm Link in the Warsaw Pact."

Publicity for exchanges of views between "political workers of the Soviet and Czechoslovak armies" while the maneuvers were in progress was another atypical feature. The Prague domestic radio reported on 19 June that a "program of party-political work" was under way and noted the "great interest" displayed by Soviet soldiers "in current problems in Czechoslovakia."
Soviet propaganda took note of Western press suggestions that the maneuvers were being held to pressure the Czechs:

In his Pact anniversary article on 14 May, Yakubovskiy alluded to the uproar at the time over Soviet troop movements through Poland and commented that the "imperialist" press wanted to use the forthcoming joint exercises "for purposes of ideological sabotage and malicious provocation"; he underscored the "primary" importance of combating such sabotage and struggling to "expose anti-Marxist and various antisocialist elements."

On 23 May, the day before the first formal announcement that the exercises would begin on 20 June, a RED STAR editorial decried Western press "insinuations" designed to "present in a false light the concern of socialist states for strengthening their security" and to "split the unity of the Warsaw Pact countries."

And in his 23 June RED STAR article on the exercises while they were in progress, Yakubovskiy warned that "bourgeois propaganda... has raised a great hue and cry about these exercises with the aim of sowing strife" between the Pact countries and armies. The Pact commander also remarked pointedly that the main source of the Warsaw Pact countries' "might and invincibility" lay in "the leadership of the communist and workers parties in their development."

SCOPE OF EXERCISES

In the period leading up to the exercises, inconsistencies and evasions in propaganda media with respect to the scope of participation and territory covered were scarcely calculated to calm anxieties in Prague. Czechoslovak Defense Ministry press spokesman Cepicky, widely quoted in Prague media, was pressed at his news conferences for precise information on the exercises as rumors of their expanding scope circulated. The original 24 May announcement of the plan for the maneuvers, carried by both Prague and Moscow media, had said the exercises would take place only on the territory of "Poland and Czechoslovakia."

On 6 June, Cepicky stated in a Prague radio interview that the exercises would extend, in addition to Czechoslovak territory, "to the territory of several other" Pact member countries. He also specified that they would include four armies--those of the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland--and he repeated this statement on 14 June in an interview with the Slovak paper LUD. Three days before the maneuvers began, Moscow revealed that five armies, those listed by Cepicky plus the GDR army, would take part and that "the operational area covers, in addition to Poland and Czechoslovakia, also territory in the USSR and GDR." These details were divulged...
by Yakubovskiy on 17 June in an interview granted to the Moscow correspondent of RUDE PRAVO. It was publicized by both Moscow and Prague media.

Beginning in early June, Cepicky repeatedly stressed that the number of troops involved would be "smaller" than in the 1966 Vltava maneuvers. In his LUD interview on 14 June, he shifted to the formula that the number would "not be bigger" than in the Vltava maneuvers (which involved four armies, those of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the GDR, and USSR). Moscow media carried no clear statement on the subject. Yakubovskiy told the RUDE PRAVO correspondent the exercises would be "substantially different" from the Vltava maneuvers, "in which a vast number of troops took part."

The announcement on 24 May had specified that the exercises were to be of a "command-staff" nature, but Cepicky at his press conferences responded to questions about rumors that they would be of wider scope and, particularly, that Soviet tanks would be involved. On 17 June Yakubovskiy said in the RUDE PRAVO interview that the participants would be "commanders and staffs of all arms of the services, forces, and means of communication and supply" from the five armies and that, apart from staff personnel, "there will be only communication troops." He did not mention tanks. The day after the exercises began, a Moscow radio talk in Czech and Slovak denounced a "provocative" headline in the London DAILY TELEGRAPH reading "Russian Tanks Enter Czechoslovakia." On the same day, CTK reported the arrival in Czechoslovakia of the first "marking units"—"motorized infantry units and a tank unit." On 23 June, CTK summarized an "official military communique" on the movement into position of these units, which included "a tank unit of the Soviet army, whose tanks were transported on trailers."

TASS transmissions in English and Russian on 30 June joined Prague media in announcing the end of the exercises on 30 June, but TASS subsequently instructed recipients of both the English and Russian transmissions to "kill" the announcement. The announcement was monitored once in a domestic service broadcast. Subsequent Soviet radio and press comment pronounced the maneuvers a success, but Moscow media refrained from responding to the concern expressed in Czechoslovak media over the continued presence of Soviet troops after the exercises had ended. On 21 June, Moscow had broadcast to Czech and Slovak audiences a commentary saying Cepicky had "refuted" reports in the New York TIMES and the Italian AVANTI that the exercises would be followed "by a dispersal of Soviet troops all over Czechoslovak territory." Cepicky's denial,
the commentator said, did not prevent the British DAILY TELEGRAPH's Prague correspondent from "trying to spread rumors that some specialist troops of the Soviet army are going to remain in Czechoslovakia after the end of the command-staff exercises." But there was no direct, unequivocal assurance from Moscow during the exercises that the troops would not stay on; and there was no statement from Moscow after the exercises ended concerning when they would finally leave.

WITHDRAWAL. On 9 July, Prague media reported Defense Minister Dzur as telling a Bratislava PRACA interviewer that "35 percent" of the "foreign" troops had returned home and that he expected the remaining 65 percent to be withdrawn "without delay." On the same day CTK quoted party Secretary Cisar as telling Prague plant workers that "the Soviet troops are about to leave" and "will leave Czechoslovakia in a few days." They would "definitely not," he added, "stay until the end of September"—when the Czechoslovak Communist Party's crucial congress is to convene. On 3 July, Cepicky had denied "rumors that new maneuvers would take place in the autumn" but told reporters, according to Radio Prague, that "in the autumn Czechoslovak units are to take part in maneuvers planned beforehand, which will be held in Poland."

Reporting a communique issued on 11 July by the general staff of the joint command of the Pact armies, Prague media noted that the communique said "further" units of the foreign troops "would begin" to withdraw from Czechoslovakia as of the 13th, according to a plan worked out by the commanding officers of the maneuvers with Yakubovskiy; CTK said Premier Cernik was so advised in a letter from Yakubovskiy. But TASS' version of the communique said nothing about withdrawal, and a Prague broadcast on 12 July pointed out that "TASS, reporting on the communique, did not include the scheduled departure date of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia."

On 11 July CTK quoted Defense Ministry press secretary Kudrna as ascribing the continued presence of the Soviet troops to "the internal political situation" as evidenced by the appearance of "leaflets attacking the Soviet Union," which "obviously aroused concern on the Soviet side." Kudrna said "the Soviet troops obviously wanted to leave, but the development of the internal political situation in this country—I mean the impact of the leaflets—delayed the departure, which has become complicated."

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTINUING COMMENT Radio Moscow's broadcasts in Czech and Slovak--heavily larded with comment on the importance of socialist unity--continued into July to include comment decrying Western "slanders" about the Pact exercises, with a commentary on this subject by Morozov broadcast twice in Czech and twice in Slovak and to no other audience on 5 July. A talk on the importance of the Pact was also broadcast exclusively to Czech and Slovak listeners on the 8th and was repeated in both languages on the 9th. Generalized warnings continued in these broadcasts, as in Soviet propaganda for domestic and other foreign audiences, concerning the dangers of Western ideological subversion and the aspirations of "enemies" who would like to divide the socialist countries.

RED STAR on 12 July, in an editorial reported by TASS under the headline "Indestructible Military Alliance of Fraternal Countries," pronounced the Pact exercises a success and "very useful" for "the entire socialist military alliance." The "warm reception" given the Soviet troops, RED STAR said, "was like a cold, sobering shower for the enemies of socialism, for those who try vainly to undermine our sacred friendship, our military alliance." It went on to assail "provocative" Western "propaganda" being spread "by those who dream of finding "splits" in the monolithic bulwark of the socialist community, the Warsaw Pact organisation."
This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in communist broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

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