

State Dept. review completed

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DIA and JCS reviews completed.

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MEMORANDUM  
State Dept. review completed

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN...

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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May 1, 1973

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE  
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:


HENRY A. KISSINGER HK

SUBJECT:

Information Items

Situation in Indochina: The number of Vietnam cease-fire violations increased somewhat, with 15 major and 82 minor incidents reported. A railroad was mined and a hamlet chief was assassinated in Military Region 3.

In Cambodia, continuing enemy attacks on friendly defensive positions have forced the army to suspend at least temporarily all operations aimed at reopening Route 5 northwest of Phnom Penh. At Takeo, however, Communist pressure eased somewhat. Fighting continued along the Mekong River north of Neak Luong, where Cambodian naval units clashed briefly with an enemy force while trying unsuccessfully to resupply army units operating along the river. South of the ferry crossing, two army battalion positions along the river were attacked and surrounded early this morning. No details are available. In other developments, the President's brother, General Lon Non, departed Phnom Penh for Paris. U.S. pilots flew 175 attack sorties, including 12 gunships, and 58 B-52 sorties.



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South Asia -- Mr. Rush's Visit: Deputy Secretary Rush has sent you a report on his recent meetings in South Asian capitals. Rush felt in the wake of the recent India-Bangladesh

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proposal on POWs and related problems that there were good prospects for further progress.

In India he found Mrs. Gandhi to be cordial, desirous of improving relations, and appreciative of your initiatives toward big-power detente. Although she voiced no criticism of U.S. policies, Rush detected "below the surface (her) lingering suspicion and self-righteousness, a preoccupation with the U.S." His conversations with other high Indian officials revealed their "underlying uncertainty bordering on suspicion regarding our policy in South Asia." Rush feels that we should not pay too much attention to these concerns right now.

In Pakistan Rush was very favorably impressed with the progress being made on all fronts under Bhutto's leadership. He found Bhutto flexible and accommodating on India-Pakistan-Bangladesh issues. Bhutto spoke of his warm regard for you and his eager anticipation of his visit in July. He also voiced his apprehension about Soviet intentions toward Pakistan and Iran and his fear that we might overlook this in the present period of detente. He said the Soviets were exerting pressure on him to forsake the CENTO alliance for a Soviet-sponsored Asian security system. He looks forward to getting your views on these matters in July.

Rush found U.S. relations with Afghanistan and Nepal "excellent." He also found a "basically warm feeling" toward the U.S. among Bangladesh leaders. He said Mujib expressed warm appreciation for U.S. assistance and voiced no sour notes regarding our policies toward the subcontinent in 1971.

Iran -- Mr. Rush's Visit: Secretary Rush met with the Shah last week while in Tehran for a meeting of our Ambassadors and Charges in the Middle East and South Asia. Rush emphasized that we continued to attach great importance to our warm bilateral relations, to the maintenance of Iranian strength, and to our reliance on Iran as a major element in the stability of the Persian Gulf. The Shah, Rush reports, intends Iran to play a "major role" in the Gulf and elsewhere in the region. The Shah spoke at some length about his country's internal progress, his concern about Soviet intentions, and his high regard for you personally and your policies. He is looking forward to meeting with you in July.

The Shah expressed concern for Pakistan's internal cohesion. He was critical of India's "sanctimonious attitude" and "double standard" toward other countries. On the Middle East, he said

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something must be done to improve the current atmosphere; he felt that the Rogers Plan would be a good starting point. On oil, the Shah said he would not try to push the price of crude up too high, reasoning that to do so would push up prices of Iran's imports from the U.S. and Europe.

Egyptian Strategy: Egyptian strategy during the recent UN Security Council debate on Israel's Beirut raid provides one more indication of President Sadat's intentions. Egyptian Foreign Minister Zayyat initially took a very hard line that would have forced us to veto the proposed resolution. At the last moment, however, the Egyptian tactics shifted, in part out of deference to Lebanese requests, but perhaps also as a signal to us that a full-scale confrontation was not desired at this point. Zayyat also wanted to be certain of accomplishing his primary task of scheduling a Security Council review of the entire Arab-Israeli conflict in May, which required our support.

That Egyptian strategy suggests that President Sadat may want to see pressure on the U.S. build steadily over a sustained period rather than to provoke a confrontation prematurely. He is concurrently laying the groundwork for a political effort to parallel his widely advertised preparations for war. The question after that will be whether Sadat will choose to use later political developments -- the U.S.-Soviet summit, plans for Egyptian-Libyan merger, and the Israeli elections -- as further excuses to delay military action.

Some military preparations have already begun, but as yet no one here sees a pattern of planning for a specific operation at a specific time. Although it does not now appear that Sadat has made a final decision on his future strategy, he is clearly engaged in an effort to convince others that he has a realistic military option. For the moment, he seems to be trying to use it to force political progress, but the more he raises tension, the greater will be the immediate danger of hostilities if he decides political efforts are at a dead end. This estimate assumes that Sadat is still operating primarily on the basis of rational calculation; more and more of his Arab contacts, however, have come away from recent conversations with him persuaded that he is in a frame of mind to "do something foolish."

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

April 30, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - Evening Report

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Session - My appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this morning was marked by concern over U.S. military activity in Cambodia.

I presented the Committee with both our legal justification for bombing in Cambodia, and the basis for our conclusion that it is part of the effort to bring adherence to the ceasefire agreements. Senators Fulbright, Case, Mansfield, Symington, Muskie, and Javits all took issue with our position, but the discussion was less shrill than might have been expected.

Senator Javits linked the Cambodia issue with that of war powers legislation. I did not get into the series of hypothetical questions he put about possible future activity in Indochina, but did point out that we would not re-introduce ground troops into Vietnam. I also agreed to appear before the Committee again on the constitutional and legal bases for U.S. military activity in Cambodia if the Committee so desired after studying my presentation today.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "W. P. Rogers".

William P. Rogers

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