

**SECRET****ARAB STATES**

52 Talk of war from Cairo has abated somewhat as Egypt continues its diplomatic maneuvers in preparation for the forthcoming UN Middle East debate, scheduled to begin on 4 June. The Egyptian UN representative has been in Cairo this week discussing strategy for the debate, and Egyptian officials are active in attempts to buttress their position with other nations. Presidential adviser Hafiz Ismail returned on 21 May from a one-week visit to Paris and Madrid, and Foreign Minister Zayyat will travel to Moscow for a two-day stop on 27 May. President Sadat will attend the summit conference of the Organization of African Unity this weekend in Addis Ababa, where he apparently hopes for a resolution on the Middle East that will further aid his position at the UN.

53 The Egyptians have not yet given a clear idea of their strategy in the Security Council—particularly, whether they will urge a re-interpretation of Resolution 242 or will press only for further UN mediation. They apparently wish to avoid a US veto, however, and thus will probably steer clear of provocative debate. A Foreign Ministry official has noted that Egypt is interested in maintaining US "neutrality" as far as possible and will work for a positive, non-condemnatory resolution.

54 Israel will go along with the debate as a necessary evil and professes confidence that Egypt will not attack the US for fear of ultimately weakening its position by arousing a crisis atmosphere without achieving conclusive results. The Israelis are on guard, however, against a resolution that redefines Resolution 242 or expands the UN mandate in the Middle East dispute. The Israeli press has expressed some misgivings that the UN secretary general's Middle East report, issued this week, will lead to just that.

**LEBANON: ARMED TRUCE**

60 On 17 May, the Lebanese Government came to terms with the Palestinian liberation organizations. The "protocol," as the agreement is called, reflects Beirut's tougher policy in regulating fedayeen activity and is, in effect, a statement of the sovereignty of Lebanese law over Palestinians residing in Lebanon.

60 The agreement stipulates that:

- fedayeen units will not be permitted in refugee camps situated near populated areas;
- fedayeen patrols are responsible for security inside the camps;
- criminals within the camps must be turned over to the Lebanese police;
- heavy weapons are to be removed from the camps;
- military training is to be restricted to Syria and eastern Lebanon.

Earlier restrictions that continue in force are a prohibition against the fedayeen entering the area near the Israeli border and a ban on fedayeen cross-border operations into Israel.

60 While there has been no serious effort thus far to sabotage the accords, the real test is yet to come. Further trouble would not be long in coming if the fedayeen attempt to block army efforts to follow through with full implementation of the agreement. The army seems likely to try to remove from the camps at least some of the rocket launchers and mortars that fired on army positions during the fighting earlier this month. There would be considerable sentiment in fedayeen ranks, especially among the extremists, to oppose such an effort.

**OIL AND POLITICS**

63 Libya, Kuwait, and Iraq took part in a brief oil stoppage on 15 May as a gesture backing the Arab struggle against Israel and protesting US support for Tel Aviv. The three states were responding to a call by a conference of Arab professional unions for a one-hour oil-pumping stoppage and a one-day boycott of US interests by all Arab states.

65 The call met little other response, and even the three respondents did not follow the call to the letter. Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi refused to participate, and Algeria despite press reports to

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
part, signifies that the political climate is increasingly favorable for efforts of this kind.]

JORDAN: KINGLY WORRIES

69 [King Husayn is worried that Jordan will be caught in the middle if another Middle East conflict breaks out. His advisers have told US officials that the King is beginning to take Sadat's talk of war more seriously and that the King believes Syria may be planning military action against Israel along with Egypt. Although Husayn would like to remain a spectator, he fears Jordan would be dragged into the fighting—if Syrian forces cross Jordan to attack Israel.]


70 [Husayn is especially concerned right now about his relations with Damascus. He is afraid that President Asad will again close the Syrian border to commercial traffic and take other steps in conjunction with Cairo to isolate Jordan. At present, these worries seem exaggerated.]

73 [Husayn faces some real economic problems. Jordan is having its usual difficulties making ends meet and has been hit by one of the worst droughts in recent memory. Government spending is threatening to spiral out of control. The defense budget alone is already as large as—and is growing faster than—total government revenues, excluding foreign aid. Husayn has shown no inclination to apply the brakes. In fact, his appetite for more and better military equipment seems to have grown since his return from Washington last March.]



66 the contrary—failed to join. Although Libya extended its participation to 24 hours, it did not boycott all US interests and it only stopped loading operations into oil tankers; pumping was not affected, and damage to oil company interests was minimal. Kuwait stopped loading operations for one hour in what amounted to a symbolic move. No oil tankers were scheduled for loading on 15 May, and the Kuwaiti action had no tangible effect. Despite the minimal damage and the failure of many large producers to take part in the boycott, the gesture, particularly on Kuwait's

72 [The council of ministers has also failed to come to grips with the problem; indeed, the ministers recently added to it by raising their own salaries. Husayn is aware that the government is drifting and that popular discontent with its "do-nothing" policy is on the rise.]



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79 Ultimately, the Jordanians are likely to turn to the US to bail them out.

Jordanian hand wringing—although a reflection of genuine concern—is probably also intended to elicit assurances of continued US support.

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Desert Police

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