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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

Problems in the Persian Gulf

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
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
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NIE 30-1-73

PROBLEMS IN
THE PERSIAN GULF

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PROBLEMS IN THE PERSIAN GULF

PRÉCIS

Much of the old political framework in the Persian Gulf area, site of two-thirds of the world's oil reserves, has gone, opening the way for new patterns of development.

- The end of British political and military responsibility for the smaller states, whose leaders and institutions will be hard pressed to cope with demands for change, leaves them vulnerable to external subversion, internal discord, and the vicissitudes of regional politics.
- The Soviet Union, having established an important political influence in the Arab world and a significant military presence in the Mediterranean area, shows a growing interest in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf—on its own and as patron of the radical regimes in Iraq and South Yemen.
- The increasing importance of Gulf oil, coupled with Arab frustration over the impasse with Israel, raises the specter of oil being used for political purposes—something occasionally threatened but not attempted on a large scale before.

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The relationship of Saudi Arabia and Iran is of key importance to the Western position in the Gulf. Relations between the two are good, but not likely to become close. Both seek to resist the spread of revolutionary forces. The Shah, with a large and growing oil income to pay for an expanding military establishment, has embarked on an activist, forward policy in the Gulf—reflecting Iranian apprehensions about radical Arab power and the Shah's ambitions in the Gulf. This bothers Saudi Arabia, which aspires to a position of leadership among the smaller Arab states of the Gulf.

Given the fragility of the smaller states, the crosscurrents of rivalry between the regional powers, and external support for radical subversion, important change appears inevitable.

Certain developments would be of little consequence either for oil or political relations in the area, e.g., the replacement of one ruler in a smaller state by another. Even a radical regime replacing an incumbent conservative in one or another of the lesser states would not *necessarily* interfere with oil, though dealing with radical regimes on access to oil is marked by special difficulties and political complications.

Other developments could endanger US interests.

- Turmoil in one of the lesser states could lead to Iranian intervention, which in turn would set the Arabs, including Saudi Arabia, against Iran. This could badly erode US relations with both Saudi Arabia and Iran.
- The unlikely contingency of an upheaval led by revolutionary forces in the larger oil-producing states would be difficult or impossible to reverse and would threaten the US position in the Gulf as a whole.
- A recrudescence of Arab-Israeli hostilities would be likely to lead some Gulf states to embargo oil shipments to the US for a time and perhaps to nationalize or otherwise hit at American firms. It would not be as easy for the US to ride out this kind of storm as in the past.¹

¹ The likelihood of hostilities in the near term is discussed in NIE 30-73, "Possible Egyptian-Israeli Hostilities: Determinants and Implications," dated 17 May 1973, ~~SECRET~~

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THE ESTIMATE

1. The already great importance of the Persian Gulf region as a source of oil for the industrial world is certain to grow. Gulf states control nearly two-thirds of the world's proved oil reserves and currently produce about one-third of the oil consumed in the non-communist world. This paper assesses local pressures for change, the interests and actions of forces from outside the Gulf, the aims and policies of the USSR, the consequences of the large Gulf states' efforts to fill the vacancy left by the end of the British protectorate, and likely developments over the next few years flowing from the interaction of these elements. Finally, it assesses the implications for the US.

I. RADICAL CHALLENGE IN THE GULF

2. Almost all the Gulf states are conservative societies governed by traditional monarchical regimes. Only Iraq has succumbed (15 years ago) to revolution. After several violent changes of regime, Iraq is now ruled by the socialist Baath Party.² In some of the

²The Baath Party of Iraq—in power since July 1968—is part of a pan-Arab ideological movement founded over a quarter century ago in Syria. Baath means resurrection or rebirth in Arabic.

other states of the Gulf, the growth of the oil industry has provided vast financial resources. Foreign workers, administrators, and teachers—including many Palestinians—have brought in social and political ideas at odds with traditional attitudes. Generally speaking, the leadership and institutions of these states will be hard pressed to cope with demands for change.

3. The rulers use varying means to keep frustrations and hostility under control.³ The Shah of Iran has sought with some success to deflect political pressures by leading a so-called "White Revolution". But at the same time he vigorously represses dissent. The Amir of Kuwait has established a parliament and permits a relatively free press. King Faisal has not permitted such free expression of ideas in Saudi Arabia's very conservative society, but makes cooperation with the regime advantageous in many ways. Moreover, the oil boom has provided such extensive social services and opportunities for personal gain that

³At annex is a more detailed description of revolutionary and subversive elements in the Persian Gulf area and a discussion of security conditions in certain individual countries.

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few have thus far been inclined to risk dangerous or radical means of expressing dissatisfaction. But in time, discontent seems likely to grow, especially where regimes do not satisfy the demands of the increasingly educated and politically aware elements of the population.

4. Antiregime revolutionary forces are active in the smaller Gulf states⁴ and are supported by the radical regimes in Iraq and in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY)—also called South Yemen. Both aid the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf (PFLOAG), an umbrella group dedicated to the overthrow of all monarchies in the region. Iraq also supports branches of its faction of the Baath Party in Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE and backs a variety of other dissidents. Syria does something along these lines, but has few supporters. Socialist splinter factions which are even smaller and which are not backed by any Arab state (e.g., the Arab Nationalists Movement and the National Liberation Front of Bahrain) are also active.

5. The radical regime in South Yemen has concentrated its subversive activity on the adjacent Dhofar Province of Oman. It is offering materiel, financial assistance, and a safe-haven to the rebels, now under PFLOAG, who have been fighting the Sultan's forces in the hinterland for 10 years. The leaders of the PDRY regime are also encouraging PFLOAG dissidents in Bahrain and elsewhere along the Gulf in hopes of facilitating the establishment of revolutionary governments in the Gulf proper.

6. Most Palestinian fedayeen groups have representatives in the Gulf states. Although they are there primarily to raise money, the

⁴These states include Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—itself composed of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ras al-Khaimah, Umm al-Qaiwain, Ajman, and Fujairah.

sheikhdoms, as a sign of support for the Arab cause, accord the fedayeen a degree of freedom which has increased the latter's influence. The fedayeen have some potential for terrorist activity against Western interests, including American oil installations, and also against conservative regimes. In the event of an outbreak of major Arab-Israeli hostilities, their presence would increase pressure on the Gulf states to act against US interests.

II. EXTERNAL FORCES

The Oil Consumers

7. Britain abandoned its historic role as protector of the smaller Gulf states at the end of 1971, but it has not disengaged entirely. British seconded and contract officers remain the backbone of the security services and defense forces in Oman and the former protected states. The Royal Air Force (RAF) maintains a detachment at Salalah in accordance with an agreement imposed by Oman in exchange for the right to maintain the RAF station on the island of Masirah. In 1972, sales of UK military and civilian goods and services to the Gulf states amounted to \$820 million, while the US sold them \$1.1 billion worth of goods. Together this comprised over a third of the imports of the Gulf regimes. British companies retain a large share of oil production in the Gulf and US oil companies produce and market somewhat over half of production from this region. The US and UK are the principal sources of arms for the Gulf states (except for Iraq, which relies on the USSR). The small US Navy presence (MIDEASTFOR) in the Gulf symbolizes US interest in the area. Japan and some large West European states consume sizable quantities of Gulf oil and are expanding commercial activity to pay for it. None of these countries plays an important political or security role in the Gulf, but government level contacts

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with oil producers are growing. France, however, is becoming increasingly active in efforts to sell arms in the Gulf.

The USSR

8. The USSR in recent years has shown a growing interest in Gulf affairs. Soviet moves have been probing and exploratory. Despite their efforts, diplomatic relations have yet to be established with some states. Moscow sees the Gulf as part of its overall policy in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean areas, and seeks to expand its influence there. Not only do the Soviets wish to buttress their relations with radical Arab states, but they want access to shore facilities to extend the deployment duration of their naval forces.⁶ Western dependence on Gulf oil resources and the growing importance of the Gulf to the US further attract Soviet attention to the region. If one or more area state on its own should undertake to limit or stop production, the USSR would be in a position to lend political and propaganda support, perhaps

⁶ The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believe that the ability to influence, control, deny, or disrupt Western and Japanese access to energy resources of the Persian Gulf—especially in time of crisis—or for diplomatic-economic leverage—is fundamental to Soviet long-term strategic goals in that part of the world. The Soviet Union will likely continue to exploit every feasible, low-risk opportunity to attain the above goals. While it is doubtful that an accurate assessment of Soviet techniques of subversion, bribery, and clandestine support to radical elements can be projected, there can be little doubt that such means will continue to be employed in concert with rapid delivery of arms and profferings of limited economic assistance. While Soviet success to date has been limited, the USSR has nevertheless contributed much to the region's growing instability, to uncertainty about futures, and to conditions which make for miscalculation. It is believed that the current estimate understates the increasing threat to Western interests represented by Soviet efforts in the Persian Gulf and its periphery.

even using naval ships to make a demonstration. But the USSR will not, for many years to come, have the financial resources, the transport, or the marketing mechanism to broker any large quantity of oil.⁶

9. In seeking to establish themselves in the Gulf, the Soviets frequently find their interests and objectives in conflict. The objectives of good relations with Iran, continuing military support to Iraq, and establishing a presence in the lesser Gulf states are pursued, although they are not always compatible. The USSR gives political support to national liberation movements both directly and through Iraq and PDRY. The Soviet position is also complicated by divisions and antagonisms among Arab revolutionary groups who seek Moscow's aid, by lack of control over such groups, and by rivalry with the People's Republic of China. The Soviets are providing weapons, and the Chinese provide arms and training directly to the rebel movement in Oman.

10. Beyond this, the national interests of the Persian Gulf states impose limits on what the Soviet Union is likely to seek or to be able to accomplish in coming years. The Soviets are unlikely to gain much influence in Saudi Arabia, Iran, or the lesser Gulf states, at least so long as the present anticommunist regimes remain in power. For the moment, Moscow's progress in establishing diplomatic relations with the smaller states is blocked by the latter's deference to Saudi and Iranian objections. Moscow is likely to make slow headway at best in increasing its influence in Iraq. It will probably get rights to greater usage of port facilities at Umm Qasr, which it now uses intermittently. The Soviets have now established an almost continuous naval presence on the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Aden, and they could attempt to do the same in the

⁶ This matter is addressed in greater detail in NIAM 3-73, "International Petroleum Prospects," dated 11 May 1973, ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~.

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Gulf. On balance, despite limitations and possible temporary setbacks, the overall Soviet position in the Gulf area can be expected gradually to improve.

11. Knowing how critical the resources of the area are to the West and Japan, the Soviets would no doubt like one day to be in a position to be able to control or deny the flow of these resources. Were they able to do this, the balance of power in the world would be drastically changed in their favor. But they are a long way from achieving such a position, and the self-interest of the states in the region will remain a considerable obstacle. Moreover, the Soviets know that an attempt to affront the vital interests of all the advanced industrial states in this manner would entail the highest risks.

Regional States

12. Some of the larger and richer states in the Middle East and South Asia view the Gulf as an arena in which to exercise their nationalist ambitions. Egypt, which once had pretensions to leadership in the Gulf, is no longer particularly active there. President Qadhafi of Libya aspires to take part in the defense of Arab interests against Iran. Qadhafi used British acquiescence in the Shah's 1971 occupation of three small islands in the lower Gulf as the occasion for nationalizing the British Petroleum Company in Libya. He strongly supports the fedayeen and encourages them to act against US interests in the Gulf. At the same time, his strong anticommunist convictions led him to promise Sultan Qabus of Oman \$30 million in military aid to assist in the fight against the PFLOAG guerrillas.

13. Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Yemen (Sana), and Sudan have all sought and received financial aid from the smaller Gulf states. Jordan, which is also seeking political allies, is providing military supplies and technicians, security advisors, and some technical assistance

to economic projects. Less directly concerned with money, but worried by the potential for turbulence in the area, the Pakistani regime is providing similar services to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and, on a smaller scale, to various Gulf states. India is concerned about oil supplies and countering Pakistani maneuvering in the Gulf. It is establishing closer relations with Gulf states, especially Iraq. India has recently signed a 12-year oil agreement with Iraq and is supplying advisors and training to the Iraqi Air Force. However, this association has created strains on India's relations with Iran due to Iranian hostility to Iraq and its closeness with Pakistan.

III. PROSPECTS FOR THE GULF

14. The Gulf states have weathered the 18 months since the withdrawal of British forces rather better than was generally expected. Iran has drawn Arab criticism of its self-declared mission as guardian power, but it got away with the occupation of three islands near the Strait of Hormuz with little more than verbal abuse. Bahrain held its first general election in an orderly fashion. The UAE has hung together. But there remain many problems and uncertainties in the Gulf situation, and disquieting and potentially destabilizing events continue to occur. The rebellion in Dhofar Province of Oman persists; an extensive network of antiregime elements has been turned up in Bahrain; Iraq attacked a Kuwaiti border post to reinforce a territorial claim. Over the next four or five years, the key questions in the Gulf system are the durability and adaptiveness of the several regimes and whether conflict and difference among the larger ones upsets—or only modifies—the present pattern of relationships.

The Individual States

15. The Shah of *Iran*, a strong and effective ruler, has coopted or suppressed internal political opposition. Even if succession arrange-

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ments do not prove lasting, a coalition of forces based on the military and the Shah's loyal subordinates is a good bet to run Iran for some time after he leaves the scene. There almost certainly will be changes in the distribution of power. But the chances of a radically different successor taking over are not great, given the wariness of the Shah and the effectiveness of his security service, SAVAK. Although nationalist feeling is on the rise, the dependence of any successor government on oil revenue, which has become central to Iranian hopes for development, would temper the desire to act rashly. If a more violently nationalist regime took charge, it might justify its takeover by loosening presently close political ties to the West. But its view of Iran's national interest and role in the region would probably not differ much from the Shah's.

16. The *Saudi Arabian* regime is more conservative and less efficient than that of the Shah. Moreover, Faisal is almost 70 and has some health problems. Arrangements for succession in the event of his death have been made and are likely to be carried out, although factional conflict within the royal family remains a possibility. If he should undergo an extended decline in health and mental capacity, there would be increasing prospect for intrafamily dispute over a successor. The large Saudi royal family has a number of capable individuals and probably would unite against outside threats. Princes serve in the army, and the national guard is closely controlled by the royal family. For the next several years, therefore, the chances seem reasonably good that the Saudi monarchy will survive.

17. The Baathi regime in *Iraq* has a firm grip on the reins of government. It faces continued opposition from the Kurds who have maintained effective autonomy for more than 10 years in the north, although they cannot operate successfully outside their mountain fastness. Other dissidents have been ruthlessly

suppressed. While military factions have the power to overthrow the present ruling group, the main facets of Iraqi foreign policy would probably be basically unchanged under new leadership. Any Iraqi regime would persist in antipathy to Iran, maintain designs on Kuwaiti territory, and attempt to influence Gulf affairs. Infighting, however, might distract the Iraqi Government from disruptive activity in the Gulf.

18. The durability of the regimes in the smaller states is less assured. *Kuwait* has managed to avoid revolutionary dissidence by a generous system of social welfare, high wages, and deportation of anyone who attempts to agitate against the regime. The loyalty of the immigrant population (about half the total) is suspect to many Kuwaitis, who solidly support the government policy of not granting citizenship or political status to immigrants, even to Arabs. Although there are some 200,000 Palestinian residents, most are there for the money and are politically passive; nonetheless, there is a small but growing number of fedaycen who present a potential hazard. Kuwaiti attempts to increase its security by buying friends abroad through loans and development have not secured the strong backing it sought among Arab states against such ever-present dangers as Iraqi territorial demands. The Kuwaitis keep tight control of all military and security services. They will have internal security problems, but dissidents are unlikely to find the means to overthrow the government.

19. *Oman* is the sole state in the area experiencing active rebellion. The war stretches the regime's financial and manpower resources, taking more than half the budget. Thanks to continuing British assistance and aid from Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Pakistan, and Iran (which has sent a military contingent to Oman), Sultan Qabus has been able to contain the rebellion in Dhofar Province, far from the

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capital and from the oil producing areas of the Gulf. The promised Libyan aid, if it materializes, will also help. Yet the recent series of arrests in northern Oman indicate that a subversive threat persists there as well, and it will be difficult in any case to eliminate small guerrilla bands from Dhofar's rugged terrain. The war is likely to continue as long as the rebels find safe haven in neighboring South Yemen. In this situation, the prognosis for the Oman regime remains uncertain.

20. *Bahrain* is also potentially unstable, but at the same time its more educated, sophisticated population has perhaps the best chance of the smaller Gulf states of developing political and economic institutions that can meet its needs. Oil production is slowly declining and jobs and money are growing tighter. The population is also divided between Sunni and Shia Muslims, many of the latter of Iranian origin. The presence of British officers in charge of its security service is important to the regime's chances of survival.

21. The other sheikhdoms are challenged more by traditional tribal factionalism than by dissidents seeking to change the orientation of the regimes. The UAE remains a collection of small, traditional communities largely lacking central governmental institutions. With a total population of 225,000 and area roughly the size of West Virginia, there are still two ministries of defense, five armies, eight police forces, one navy, one helicopter force, and one air force. While the states of the UAE are slowly learning to work together, it will be a long time—if ever—before they speak with one voice.

22. Replacement of any one of the UAE's rulers by a tribal or dynastic rival would probably have little effect upon either the larger alignment in the Gulf or upon US interests. The UAE could probably cope with a small band of revolutionaries if it has some warning.

Nonetheless, these regimes are fragile and could be overthrown suddenly by relatively small forces.

23. While the chances that the smaller Gulf regimes will survive appear fair, there are always unforeseeable events—the accidental death or assassination of a key figure, the carefully hidden coup plot—which could bring a revolutionary regime to power in one state or another. Even if such a government were short-lived it would have great potential for making trouble among the Gulf states.

Regional Conflicts

24. Enmity between Iraq and the principal monarchies—Iran and Saudi Arabia—is not likely to moderate as long as the Baath regime in Baghdad survives. Each side frames its policies in response to the success or failure of the other in expanding influence in the area. Iraq continues to receive Soviet arms, but Iran is the stronger power, and, with its program of purchasing the most modern weapons, primarily from the US, is almost certain to remain so for many years to come. Despite their arms buildups, both sides are reluctant to engage in all-out hostilities. The Shah would respond to Iraqi thrusts if he saw them as a major threat to Iran. Otherwise he would be inhibited from responding forcefully, as in the case of the recent Kuwaiti border incursion, by fears for Iran's oil installations and by concern at arousing a strong negative reaction among Arabs generally. And the Iraqis would probably draw back if they felt they were provoking a major confrontation with the Shah.

25. Although they have a common interest in opposing the spread of revolutionary forces in the region, Saudi Arabia and Iran are uneasy associates. The Shah is using Iran's rising oil revenues to expand Iranian military power and will continue to exploit American (and

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Western Europe's) need for oil to assure support for Iran's ambitions. King Faisal is disturbed by the Shah's pretensions to dominate the Gulf and also by Iran's ties to Israel. Faisal looks to the US to discourage the Shah from actions that would embarrass Saudi Arabia in the Arab world or challenge its leadership. The Saudis believe that they should be not only the pacesetters for oil matters, but spokesman for the Arab interest and the country to which the smaller Arab states of the region look for guidance.

26. Relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia appear good on the surface, but are not likely to become close. While Faisal and the Shah both seek to cooperate in maintaining stability in the Gulf, their capacity for cooperation is limited. The pervasive suspicions raised by the deep incompatibilities of Iranian and Arab nationalism will not be easily overcome and neither ruler has confidence in the long-term stability of the other's regime. And the Saudis' effectiveness in dealing with Iranians is not high; they resent being pushed toward action by the latter. The Shah and Faisal generally act independently in opposing radical threats, e.g., in providing assistance to Sultan Qabus of Oman. Some improvements in consultation between the two governments may nevertheless be effected.

27. In this atmosphere the ouster—or threat of imminent ouster—of a ruler in a smaller Gulf state by revolutionary forces would strain the present tentative cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Iran has the military force and command structure to intervene rapidly. The Shah is not spoiling for a fight, but would probably react quickly if he judged that only urgent action could foil revolutionaries. Such action would raise serious problems for Faisal, who tends to respond more cautiously to external events. Saudi Arabia, whose military forces would require longer reaction time than Iran's, would


prefer that only Arab troops be used on the western side of the Gulf. Hence, the prospect of Saudi-Iranian misunderstanding or even confrontation would be high if Iran should unilaterally send troops to an Arab state. Indeed, all Arab states of the region would be concerned in face of a serious confrontation; pressures of Arab nationalism might compel even Gulf states directly threatened by the prospect of another revolutionary regime in the area to oppose Iran.

28. Relations between Saudi Arabia and the smaller Arab states of the Gulf also are uneasy, largely because of Saudi Arabia's paternalist approach and certain unsettled territorial claims. Faisal will probably not renounce his demands to Abu Dhabi territory, though he is unlikely to press them vigorously. Similarly, while Saudi Arabia's dispute with Oman is now in abeyance, it has, at least until recently, been a constraint against closer Saudi-Omani relations. At the same time, other small states will seek to enlist Saudi support in their own petty dynastic rivalries; such involvement will make an effective Saudi role in the Gulf more difficult.

IV. ALTERNATIVE PATTERNS OF DEVELOPMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

29. The present situation in the Gulf is relatively favorable to the US. The traditional regimes there provide oil, mostly through US and other Western companies, offer rapidly expanding markets, and provide important communications and transit facilities. There will continue to be mutual interest between the producers of oil, who want to sell it, and consumers, who want to buy it. Likewise, the states of the Gulf want the military and commercial goods that the industrialized oil consumers produce. The outlook in the near term is not for political upheaval, but there are uncertainties in the situation and over time these could evolve in several different ways.



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Sovereignty Issues in the Persian Gulf Area

June 1973

-  Demarcated boundary: determined by treaty and laid out on the ground by pillars or other physical means
-  Delimited boundary: determined by treaty or otherwise and defined in written or verbal terms
-  Undefined boundary: no bilateral agreement. All boundaries declared unilaterally are in this category
-  Town
-  Well
-  Boundary terminus
-  Oilfield



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30. It is, of course, possible that something like the *status quo* will continue in the Gulf for some time. This is not to say that there would not be change, but that overall it would not be sufficiently great to alter the general alignment of forces or affect major US interests. For example, one dynastic rival might replace another in one of the smaller states without changing its political complexion. The UAE might even split in two or more parts. The Amir of Bahrain might delegate more authority to elected institutions. But the sum and substance of such changes would not cause wide reverberations in the Gulf.

31. A second possible line of development would be the overthrow of one of the smaller states by revolutionary forces. This would not necessarily have serious consequences for the US, though dealing with radical regimes on access to oil is marked by special difficulties and political complications. But as long as neighboring states could agree either to intervene to expel the revolutionary regime or to tolerate it, the ouster of the government in one of the minor sheikhdoms would have little significance.

32. A more serious challenge to US interests would arise from the confrontation of Iran and Saudi Arabia over ways to handle a revolution—or the threat of revolution—in the smaller monarchies of the Gulf. Iran enjoys such a commanding military advantage over Saudi Arabia that King Faisal would be unlikely to initiate military action to assert his position. But each party would press the US to support its stand. The US probably has considerable power to restrain both contenders, though it might have little ability

to restore the *status quo*. But this would be a painful process and could badly erode US relations with both Saudi Arabia and Iran.

33. The unlikely contingency of an upheaval which brought revolutionary forces to power in Iran or Saudi Arabia would have serious consequences for the US position in the Gulf as a whole. It probably could not be reversed and would inevitably entail a major shift in power away from conservative forces.

34. A serious setback to the US position in the Gulf could also come from a major intensification of the crisis in Arab-Israeli affairs and particularly if another Arab military defeat ensued. Except for the Shah, who maintains friendly relations with Israel, the other Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, would all feel compelled to take actions against the US, which they regard as Tel Aviv's principal ally. In this situation some Gulf states would likely embargo oil shipments to the US for a time and perhaps would nationalize or otherwise hit at American firms. (US requirements for Persian Gulf oil are growing and the Arabs know it.) It would not be as easy for the US to ride out this storm as it was in the past.

35. In any event, the US will be far more intimately involved in Gulf affairs than in the past. Given the fragility of the smaller states, the crosscurrents of rivalry among the regional powers, growing Western dependence on Gulf oil, and external support for radical subversion, important change appears inevitable.

THE PERSIAN GULF STATES

	Ruler (And Date of Accession)	Area (Square Miles)	Approximate Population (Thousands)	Proved Oil Reserves (Million Barrels)	Oil Revenue (\$ Millions)		GNP (\$ Millions)	Armed Forces		
					1970	1972		Army	Air	Navy
MAJOR STATES										
Iran	Muhammad Reza Shah (September 1941)	636,000	31,000	65,000	1,093	2,400	14,200	165,000	50,000	13,000
Iraq	General Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr (July 1968)	172,000	10,000	29,000	521	1,000	3,800	90,000	10,000	2,000
Saudi Arabia	King Faisal (November 1964)	618,000	5,000	146,000	1,200	2,900	4,000	37,000 ^a	5,800	500
MINOR STATES										
Kuwait	Amir Sabah (November 1965)	6,200	1,000	73,000	895	1,700	3,200	8,000	375	35
Bahrain	Amir 'Isa (November 1961)	213	200	375	27	37	120	1,200
Qatar	Amir Khalifah (February 1972)	4,000	120	7,000	122	200	275	1,200	50	50
United Arab Emirates	President: Sheikh Zayd of Abu Dhabi	38,000	225	2,000
Abu Dhabi	Sheikh Zayd (1966)	32,000	65	21,000	233	600	..	10,000	200	375
Dubai	Sheikh Rashid (1958)	1,500	75	2,000	19	50	..	300 ^b
Sharjah	Sheikh Sultan (January 1972)	1,000	35	230 ^c
'Ajman	Sheikh Rashid (1928)	100	5
Umm al-Qaiwain	Sheikh Ahmad (1929)	300	5
Ras al-Khaimah	Sheikh Saqr (1948)	650	30	300 ^c
Fujairah	Sheikh Muhammad (1937)	450	10
Oman	Sultan Qabus (July 1970)	82,000	710	5,000	100	125	300	7,800 ^d	200	180

^a There is also a 33,000-man national guard.

^b There is also a 1,100-man police force.

^c These states have police forces ranging between 150 and 200 men.

^d There is also a gendarmerie of 1,000 men.

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ANNEX

REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF AREA
AND SECURITY CONDITIONS IN INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES

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REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF AREA AND SECURITY CONDITIONS IN INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES¹

I. DISSIDENT ORGANIZATIONS

1. A variety of insurgent movements threaten the traditional rulers of the Persian Gulf states. While over 30 organizations of varying size have been, or claimed to be, actively working against the established order in recent years, today only five groupings of significance remain in operation. The others have for the most part been swallowed up, renamed, or merged with the survivors. This reflects the fact that the lines between groups were never very sharp and that frequently the same personalities belonged to several organizations at once. It also stems from the fact that many of the transient organizations—even so-called popular fronts—were the work of one or only a handful of persons. The five principal groups are considered below.

A. The Arab Nationalists Movement (ANM)

2. The ANM has become a cast of mind rather than a tightly organized political movement. Originally a small Marxist socialist organization, working in many Arab states, it split in 1968, and in 1971 agreed to establish separate country organizations. In theory the latter are subordinate to a higher executive committee, but in fact coordination of these groups has been haphazard and ineffectual. The ANM has profoundly influenced most of the other surviving revolutionary organizations of the Gulf area, including the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf (PFLOAG) and the Palestinian fedayeen movement. This facilitates the present loose

¹ For the security situation in Iraq, see NIE 36.2-72, "Iraq's Role in Middle Eastern Problems," dated 21 December 1972, SECRET.

cooperation that takes place between the major revolutionary groups in the region.

3. In Kuwait the ANM is overt and its principal leadership rejects violence as a means of achieving its aims. Though formally illegal, it operates discreetly and is tolerated by the Kuwaiti Government. It has a loose organization which works through the Istiqlal Sports Club, the Women's Cultural Society, and the National Union of Kuwaiti Students. There is no reliable information on its present membership size, but it apparently enjoys some popular support among labor organizations and the educated elite, including some sympathizers at high levels of the government. The small extremist wing of the ANM, known as the Popular Revolutionary Movement, however, is dedicated to violent overthrow of the regime and serves as a branch of the PFLOAG in Kuwait. It works underground and reputedly has close ties with the extremist fedayeen organization, the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

4. In Bahrain, the ANM works covertly. It draws its members from the Sunni Muslim population and was once the focus of Sunni opposition to the regime. It is now badly split, and since a series of arrests in 1965, apparently has had few members. However, it appears to have some sympathizers in the Arabi Club of Manama and the Writers and Literary Association. The Bahraini ANM has links with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and with PFLOAG.

5. In Qatar, where a cell of 23 members was active at the end of the 1960s, the ANM is now effectively controlled by the police force.

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B. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf (PFLOAG)

6. PFLOAG is the only subversive organization in the Persian Gulf actively pursuing military means to overthrow a traditional regime—the Sultanate of Oman. The successor to a series of revolutionary groups which have been in rebellion for 10 years, PFLOAG originated as a movement of Kathiri tribe men of Dhofar against Omani rule of their traditional areas. Later some Qarrawi tribal leaders were brought into the rebel command. These insurgents were supported initially for a time by Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

7. This tribal movement shifted somewhat in character after 1965 when it came in contact with an offshoot of the ANM active in South Yemen, and particularly after mid-1969 when radical extremists seized power in Aden. At this time, the Dhofari organization adopted the acronym of PFLOAG, connoting acceptance of Marxist-Leninism as its official ideology and its aim to oust the British from all their positions in the Gulf as a whole. For the first time, Chinese communists took a direct role in training, although PFLOAG also looks to Moscow and receives Soviet arms and equipment. Unlike the Soviets, Chinese trainers were willing to cross from South Yemen into Dhofar, and this increased their influence on PFLOAG.

8. After Sultan Qabus took power in Oman in July 1970, many of the Kathiris left PFLOAG to accept amnesty and cash subventions. This left Qarrawis as the core of the PFLOAG movement in Dhofar. This core can count on the general support of the Qarrawi tribesmen, whose control of the strategic Qarra Mountains in Dhofar is vital to the rebel cause.

9. PFLOAG is organized under a central committee, headquartered in Aden and comprising some 25 members, which formulates

policy. A 12-member executive committee is responsible for executing policy and oversees the activities of the political, military, organizational, economic, and information committees subordinate to the central committee. The organization is divided geographically into commands for Dhofar Province; northern Oman; the United Arab Emirates (UAE); and Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait. The relationship and subordination of these various commands is not clear.

10. The commands appear to consist of groups of action and organization cells of 3-10 persons. Action cells generally have had some sort of weapons training and are charged with receiving and caching arms and undertaking operations. Organization cells print and distribute pamphlets and recruit new members. In the UAE, PFLOAG had until a series of arrests in 1973 fairly sophisticated equipment for forging visas and a stock of stolen blank passports. Although compartmentation is attempted, security is generally weak. Organization cells have been rounded up in Bahrain and Muscat, while action cells have been uncovered in Oman and throughout the UAE.

11. The command in Dhofar is by far the largest and has an overt so-called people's militia of about 1,200 men. The other commands, although varying in size, are probably all considerably smaller. However, they are not miniscule; indeed, about 100 persons have already been arrested in the past six months from the northern Oman command in connection with the discovery of a plot to overthrow the Sultan. Sizable arms caches were also confiscated in several of Oman's major towns, including the capital. Judging from those arrested, PFLOAG also appeals to the better educated elements of society, particularly school teachers and even some Omani army officers. These arrests have certainly dis-

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rupted the PFLOAG organization in northern Oman.

12. In the UAE, PFLOAG apparently began organizing in earnest early in 1972, largely through the efforts of a long-time Soviet-trained revolutionary of Bahraini origins. Most of the PFLOAG activities are directed against the sheikhdoms of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, although some activity is carried on in the other principalities as well. Because its small security forces and the erratic political orientation of its ruler, Ras al-Khaimah is apparently used as a staging area and support base by PFLOAG for operations elsewhere in the UAE. A total of about 80 PFLOAG activists were arrested in a series of roundups between December 1972 and February 1973 throughout the UAE; 37 of these were Omani members of the UAE Defense Force. This was undoubtedly a setback of some significance to PFLOAG, but the command leader, reputed to be a superb organizer, escaped.

13. The PFLOAG organization in Bahrain apparently emerged at about the same time as that in the UAE; the UAE organizer is believed also to have provided his services to the Bahrain group. Bahrain has a history of revolutionary activity, and PFLOAG probably found fertile ground for its organizing efforts, though the extent of its membership is unknown. It is believed to work closely with, and may be attempting to incorporate into its own organization, the National Liberation Front of Bahrain, which is now carrying on propaganda against Bahrain's newly elected Constituent Assembly. Approximately 30 PFLOAG activists were arrested in Bahrain early in 1973, but many more are still believed to be at large. PFLOAG has also reportedly infiltrated Bahraini student unions abroad, particularly in Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, and Kuwait.

14. Little is known of PFLOAG activity in Qatar and Kuwait. PFLOAG is supported primarily by South Yemen on both the Omani and Gulf fronts, and it receives assistance from Iraq in its Gulf activities. Its arms are mostly Soviet, with some Chinese models. Dhows are used to bring arms to the Omani and Gulf coasts. The Soviets provide most of the arms through South Yemen and Iraq; the Chinese funnel their supplies through South Yemen. Chinese instructors are believed to provide guerrilla training for PFLOAG rebels at bases in the eastern border area of South Yemen.

15. Ties between PFLOAG and the Palestinian fedayeen appear to be close. Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) have reportedly provided arms to PFLOAG organizations in the Gulf states, particularly the UAE, and some PFLOAG members have been trained in Syria by Fatah.

C. National Liberation Front of Bahrain

16. The strongest and most sophisticated subversive organization now active in Bahrain is the National Liberation Front (NLF). In the late 1960s, the NLF was believed to have about 500 members, half of them active, but it was subsequently suppressed and its principal leaders exiled. For several years until late 1972, when one of the leaders returned, the organization was dormant. In December 1972, the NLF increased its propaganda activity, directing this chiefly against the Bahrain Constituent Assembly which was elected at that time, and it probably also renewed its organizational efforts. It is believed to be working closely with the PFLOAG apparatus, and there are some indications that the NLF will become part of PFLOAG. NLF members could provide an experienced cadre to fill the holes left in PFLOAG by recent arrests.

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D. The Baath Party

17. The Baath Party (Arab Socialist Renaissance Party) pursues the goals of Arab socialism and pan-Arab unity. The party's Syrian and Iraqi branches are bitterly hostile. The Iraqi party is now much more active than its Syrian counterpart in the Gulf. Besides efforts to extend their own organizations in the Gulf, the Iraqis support PFLOAG clandestine activity in the Gulf states and give a few dissidents training in Iraq. The Baath Party has perhaps 100-200 members in Bahrain drawn especially from the better educated population, including those in government service. There is little information on Baath activity elsewhere in the Gulf, although they are known to be active in the UAE and Qatar.

E. The Fedayeen

18. The Palestinian population throughout the Gulf is sizable, and Palestinians are employed in the civil service of virtually every state. The large majority of them is not actively associated with the fedayeen. The fedayeen, however, are active and have considerable freedom of movement in most of the Gulf states. The Palestine Liberation Organization and Fatah have representatives in almost every state, and their officials are in fairly regular contact with local government officials.

19. The fedayeen are in the Gulf, as they are present in all Arab states, chiefly in search of support and financial backing. But the Gulf also provides tempting targets for fedayeen terrorism: American oil installations, Jordanian military and security advisers, and the conservative governments of the Gulf states themselves. The fedayeen are probably reluctant to bite the hand that feeds them, but they have apparently been quite ready to provide materiel and training for PFLOAG operations. PFLOAG and the PFLP were spawned from the same ANM, and their ties are close; the

PFLP is believed to have supplied PFLOAG with arms. Fatah has also become involved with PFLOAG, if on a limited basis, providing arms and training at bases in Syria.

20. The fedayeen's own capability and their assistance to PFLOAG make them a potentially serious threat in the Gulf. Black September terrorists are frequently reported to have their eyes on Gulf targets. Outside of Dhofar PFLOAG lacks the material assets necessary to carry out its operations, despite the aid provided by PDRY and others; hence the importance of fedayeen assistance, limited though it has been thus far. PFLOAG is an indigenous organization, and by virtue of its infiltration of many elements of the local security and armed services, it can provide the fedayeen with access to targets of interest to them, where they do not already have this access through local Palestinians.

II. SECURITY CONDITIONS IN INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES

A. Kuwait

21. The main internal security threat to the Kuwaiti regime comes from its large immigrant population. The Kuwaiti Government has devised means of dealing with this problem. For example, about a thousand "elders" chosen from among the Palestinians are made responsible for the actions of Palestinians in assigned areas. Should trouble occur, the elder and his family are quietly deported. Next, when a boy reaches the age of 18, he must leave Kuwait unless he has a job approved by the government, a mechanism that ensures that there will be no pool of unemployed youths likely to participate in street demonstrations. Lastly, the town is zoned to split up the Palestinian communities and thus discourage mass action. Since the Palestinians appreciate the opportunities they enjoy in Kuwait, they generally find it in their interest not to challenge the Kuwaiti system.

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22. The Kuwaiti military poses little threat to the regime. It is composed of loyal bedouin who are over-armed and under-trained. Various members of the ruling family hold commissions in the military at most levels and keep an eye on things. It will be sometime before the Kuwaiti Air Force receives anticipated equipment from the US.

23. The Kuwaiti civilian police apparatus can maintain internal security under normal conditions, although it could not simultaneously protect installations and control street disorders. The police force is thought to be efficient and to have high morale. Its officers are well trained and the force is loyal to the ruling family. The intelligence service is not as effective, despite recent efforts to upgrade it. The Directorate of Public Security, which reports to the Ministry of Interior, has a staff of some 40 men and a British advisor. Over one-third are bedouin, selected from tribes the government considers particularly loyal. There is also a Special Branch of 12 persons in the army, which makes security investigations inside the military. It is inefficiently organized and poorly managed. But all in all the level of police and security activity is commensurate with that of the subversive, and the Kuwaiti regime seems well able to cope with its security challenges.

B. Bahrain

24. While Bahrain gives the outward appearance of tranquility and stability, underneath there is bitterness. Though its population is the best educated in the Gulf, job opportunities are lacking and political development has been slow: it was not until December 1972 that Bahrain held its first free election. It cannot afford to buy off agitators. Despite reforms instituted by the Amir, the large royal family still enjoys a privileged position. A large number of lesser family members who are aloof and a burden on the people are

viewed with increasing public resentment. The population is divided between those of Iranian and Arab origin and even more between those of Sunni and Shia Islamic persuasion. The Shia probably outnumber the Sunnis, but the latter control the government. Many of the larger merchant families are Shia and of Persian origin and look to Iran for protection. Iran has responded with an active diplomatic mission which seeks to encourage them. The major subversive movements in Bahrain, however, are among the Arabs.

25. Bahrain's security lies largely in the hands of mercenaries who have thus far performed creditably. Its 1,300-man State Police force is composed of a number of foreigners—principally Yemenis, Baluchis, Pakistanis—in addition to a core of Bahrainis and some 20 British officers. A new Bahrain Defense Force was formed shortly before the British departure with the assistance of Jordanian advisers. It is composed almost entirely of Bahrainis with the Amir's son acting as its commander in chief. It is also believed to be an effective force. And it seems likely that these units could handle domestic unrest.

26. There is also an 11-man Security and Intelligence Department headed by British and Jordanian officers which is in charge of ferreting out subversion and which has driven the revolutionaries deep underground. These groups now appear so well dug in, however, that in the event that the British leadership of the Intelligence Department were removed, they probably would present a considerable threat to the Bahraini regime. There are no Bahrainis in the intelligence organization, hence as yet no trained local personnel to take over these functions.

C. Qatar

27. The principal threat to the present ruler in Qatar comes from rivalries and in-

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fighting within the ruling family, which makes up about a quarter of the population of the state. The present ruler came to power in a coup in February 1972, ousting a corrupt and greedy predecessor and arousing the enthusiasm of much of the populace. Sheikh Khalifah enjoys growing popularity as he has cut royal expenses drastically and is letting oil revenues flow to the people in the form of development projects and higher government salaries. He has not ended all abuses, however, and faces the perennial efforts of the ex-ruler to foment a countercoup from his refuge in Dubai.

28. The present ruler is determined not to let himself be overthrown. He has increased the armament of his security forces; he has made his son commander of the army and his nephew commander of the police. Together these organizations have about 2,300 men, almost all mercenaries. The officers are mostly Jordanians. Khalifah has also surrounded himself with a large number of informally organized tribal elements which have traditional attachment to his clan.

29. Qatar's security force appears to be capable of meeting current threats. The large Palestinian and Iranian communities in Qatar are permitted to have organizations and hold rallies, but are held in check by threat of expulsion. The population is still quite unsophisticated. And with good jobs awaiting those who get some education, there is little incentive to join dissident movements.

D. The United Arab Emirates

30. The principal threat to the UAE comes from rivalries among its constituent states and the disparity in development between its larger and exceedingly wealthy components and the miserably poor small sheikhdoms. This both frustrates cooperation among the various internal security organizations and

breeds discontent among the less favored segment of the population. Until a few years ago, the states of the UAE were uniformly poor and outside of the main stream of movements in the Arab world. Their populations are still poorly educated and relatively unsophisticated. Hence, they are attractive to the revolutionary forces of the area and unprepared to meet their challenge. Sudden wealth has led to the importation of labor—mostly Indians, Pakistanis, Yemenis, and Palestinians. Thus the local populace in the richer states is in danger of being outnumbered by foreigners.

31. While the governments of most of the constituent states of the UAE are generally well aware of their need to hang together against outsiders, they are relatively oblivious of the dangers of internal subversion. The Abu Dhabi Intelligence Department, under its effective British chief, is an exception. The initiative and effectiveness of his department was entirely responsible for the roundup of PFLOAG activists in the past six months. The federal Special Branch appeared caught off guard by the PFLOAG movement. The information on PFLOAG operations developed from these arrests, however, may increase the vigilance and cooperation of these security forces in future. But there is little question that the effectiveness of these forces will long depend on the continuing service of the expatriates—primarily Britishers—who staff them.

32. Palestinian fedayeen organizations are also given a fairly free rein in the UAE. The UAE leaders do not now perceive them as a threat and do not realize the degree to which the fedayeen are cooperating with PFLOAG. Palestinians are required to fill many slots in the UAE government and this presents a continuing danger to the regime.

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33. The federal forces and especially the Abu Dhabi Defense Force are largely staffed with contract and seconded British officers and non-commissioned officers as well as other foreign mercenaries. The UAE Defense Force (formerly the Trucial Oman Scouts) is mostly staffed by British seconded officers, some of whom live with tribes and in UAE villages, while the Abu Dhabi Defense Force is staffed primarily with contract officers. Personnel for the Abu Dhabi Defense Force are drawn from bedouin tribes considered loyal to Sheikh Zayd. These forces, as well as a special 140-man guard force to protect oil installations, have demonstrated considerable capability to keep order against local opposition and to prevent the outbreak of tribal conflict.

E. Oman

34. The Sultan is faced with stubborn rebellion in Dhofar led by PFLOAG, while at the same time he is trying to unite the disparate elements of the country and bring it into the modern world, all on a limited budget. With only modest oil income, the Sultan depends on foreign assistance. But this is complicated by the difficulties of extracting all possible aid from the British and Iran without alienating his Arab neighbors, who promise assistance but move slowly. The Sultan is also somewhat isolated from the people. He lacks knowledge about his realm and has few competent local advisers and assistants. He still depends on local tribal leaders to govern outlying areas.

35. The war in Dhofar is not popular among Omanis at large. Dhofar has traditionally been considered a remote preserve of the ruling family and the Sultan has done little to convince the populace that it has a stake in winning the war. The military action is seen by many Omanis as an expensive mercenary endeavor which the country cannot afford.

36. The military insurgency is confined to the Qarra Mountains of Dhofar Province. The insurgents have some local offensive capability and have even been able to pin down an Omani battalion for a time. But they cannot mount a sustained attack, nor do they have the popular support required to expand their field of operations substantially. Yet the rebels are relatively secure in their mountain sanctuary, particularly as long as they have a supply base and safehaven in neighboring South Yemen.

37. The 7,800-man army is largely made up of foreign mercenaries. British officers provide the top leadership, although the Sultan, with prodding from his Arab neighbors, is seeking to reduce their role and visibility. At present 12 Omanis out of the 114 officers in his force have attended Sandhurst for 6 months to 2 years. There are 10 officer cadets now undergoing training in Oman and several others are preparing to go to specialist schools in England. Most Omani officers are still lieutenants with a few captains and one major. There are also a number of Baluchi officers of similar rank who have Omani nationality, having been born and raised in the large Baluchi colonies in Oman. A 200-man air wing, staffed principally by British contract and seconded personnel, has played a key role in combating the rebels.

38. In addition to his military forces, the Sultan has a recently reorganized intelligence apparatus. The evident dangers of PFLOAG operations against Oman led to the formation of an Intelligence Committee in February 1973 to coordinate all internal security matters. Headed by a seconded British officer, it maintains active liaison with the other intelligence services of the Gulf states and with both the US and UK. Its liaison officers in the Omani military establishment also provide information from Dhofari prisoners. Together the intelligence organization has a total of some

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150-200 personnel. Since its reorganization it has begun to streamline its procedures and now appears capable of reasonably effective operations.

F. Saudi Arabia

39. The monarchy in Saudi Arabia faces the possibility of challenge from cliques and factions within the large Saudi royal family, although no member of the family is inclined to oppose King Faisal as long as he is effectively in charge. There is also the problem of dissatisfaction among the growing number of those who have been educated and have seen life outside of Saudi Arabia. But this discontent lacks focus. The emigre opposition based in Iraq—principally the remnants of a group of air force plotters uncovered a few years ago—has not been very successful in gaining sympathizers inside Saudi Arabia. And what opposition exists is further fragmented by tribalism and regionalism.

40. The Saudi regime has used its enormous oil revenue effectively to buy loyalty. The student returning from education abroad finds that his talents are rewarded, if not utilized. The royal family is slowly relaxing its grip on top positions; commoners like Petroleum Minister Ahmad Zaki Yamani have achieved notable stature. And Yamani's success in negotiating with the Western oil companies have probably encouraged technicians and professionals in and out of Saudi Arabia. The army, which has been a springboard for coups elsewhere in the Arab world, is well paid, content, and is balanced by the tribal 33,000-man National Guard commanded by a prominent prince. The Saudi intelligence service is headed by one of the most able and loyal individuals in the Kingdom. It works effectively among the traditionalist population inside the country, though it has not been as successful in operations in neighboring countries.

G. Iran

41. There has been powerful opposition to the rule of the Shah in the past and to the monarchical system as well. But his skill in handling dissidents—appropriating much of their program, while putting their personnel in jail or exile—has blunted the appeal of this opposition which has no overt organization. Some discontent with the Shah's rule remains, however, and a few younger, well-educated elements are attempting to mount a terrorist movement against the regime. Nearly 200 have been arrested in this connection in the past several years. And the Shah is also concerned about Iraqi efforts to arouse dissidence among the large Baluchi minority in eastern Iran.

42. The Shah's ultimate base of power remains the military establishment. He carefully selects the upper ranks of the officer corps who are well paid and given other privileges. At the same time, the Shah is attempting to encourage greater professionalism among the military profession. He is expanding his forces and providing them with the most modern equipment in the area. Military dissidence has not been a major problem for the regime in the past. Though a few senior officers as individuals have broken with the Shah, they have not been successful in attracting adherents to move against him. Moreover, the Shah relies on the effective civilian security service, SAVAK. It not only checks on the loyalty of the military establishment, but supervises the political process and the normal workings of the government. In addition, the Shah has his own network of personal informants in all major institutions of Iranian society. He is very well informed about the workings of his country and is not likely to be caught by surprise by dissidents.

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