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By ht NARA Date 5/9/05

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION MEMORANDUM

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S/S

October 13, 1973

To: The Secretary  
From: EUR - Walter J. <sup>3</sup>Stoessel, Jr.

Possible Pressure Points on Soviets

In response to your request, a list of possible actions which might be used to bring pressure on the USSR follows. We have not considered possible military movements in the Mediterranean and Middle East area.

Political/Diplomatic

There are three general areas in which we could pressure the Soviets without violating any existing agreements. Our signals should be designed to indicate to the Soviets our readiness to slow down or stop multilateral activities that are fundamentally in their interest. They should also be designed to attempt to develop greater understanding on the part of other governments of the irresponsible role the Soviets are playing in this conflict. And they should signal the Soviets that we are serious enough about these developments to consider a turn around in our political relations with them.

-- CSCE. Signal the Soviets that we are hardening our positions in CSCE in a way which could endanger -- or substantially delay -- a successful outcome and/or that we will oppose a culminating meeting at the summit level.

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For the Soviets this would threaten a significant and highly symbolic culmination of detente in Europe to which the Soviet leadership is committed and which they see as underpinning their position in Eastern Europe. Even substantial delay in CSCE agreement would take some momentum out of the appearance of progress of their own detente efforts. They would not see a commensurate setback for us, though they might well restore jamming of VOA and tighten up on other aspects of "freer movement."

Any problems with our allies should be manageable, unless they concluded that we had unilaterally decided completely to sabotage agreement. They are mostly inclined to move slowly and to test the Soviets on "basket three" measures and would not be too unhappy with a tougher U.S. position.

-- China. We are unaware of the agenda of your scheduled discussions with the Chinese leadership -- but the Soviets would, of course, be particularly sensitive to any advance announcement or signal which suggested some element of closer movement toward the Chinese at a time when our relationship with the Soviets appeared to be under re-examination. Although implied U.S. actions with the Chinese would probably bother the Soviets, the Chinese, who also support the Arabs, might well reject any move which required response from them.

-- Diplomatic/Public. We could mount a considered diplomatic and public effort to underline the failure of the Soviets to act responsibly in the present crisis:

-- With Foreign Governments. Send a circular cable to all Diplomatic posts urging Ambassadors to inform Foreign Ministers of the situation and role Soviets

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are playing in current crisis and the extent to which they are in violation of principles three and six of the Basic Principles that were agreed to in Moscow in 1972.

-- Directly with the Soviets.

The President could invoke with Brezhnev the Moscow declaration of Basic Principles with the Soviets, particularly article three (on avoiding international tensions) and article six (on limiting armaments). He could stress that this is the first real test of this agreement and that we expect that they will abide by it or our relations will suffer the consequences. Perhaps this has already been done.

-- Diplomatically with the Soviets Worldwide.

Diplomatic officials in Washington and abroad are instructed to maintain restrained relations with their Soviet colleagues and to the extent that they have relations express their grave concern over the Soviet role in the Middle East and the effect that this role may eventually have on our bilateral relations. Such a step would support demarches to foreign governments and emphasize other actions taken but would not of itself exert much pressure.

-- Public Stance. The President or Secretary of State could issue a public statement concerning the Soviet role, the degree to which it violates our Basic Principles and impact it could have on U.S.-Soviet relations.

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This would be a serious step that probably should follow diplomatic and direct efforts. Some variation of this approach such as publicized consultations with Congress on the implications of Soviet moves in the Middle East could provide a step short of a direct public statement.

-- SALT. We could signal the Soviets our intentions to suspend the talks in Geneva or actually suspend them. There would be little immediate pressure derived from merely slowing down the talks since there is little movement now. A decision to suspend them, however, would be taken seriously by the Soviets. It is doubtful however that it would be to our advantage at this time to break off the talks, unless it was seen as necessary in the context of an across the board suspension of bilateral programs.

#### Military

We have not considered military actions in the area of conflict. In other areas we could take steps such as stepping up intelligence gathering operations on the periphery of the Soviet Union, placing our troops in Europe on alert or airlifting additional troops to the European theater.

Stepping up intelligence gathering might be an adjunct to other military signals we might give in the Middle East area but apparent military escalation of a general nature would seem inappropriate to the problem. Steps serious enough to give the Soviets pause would alarm our allies, disturb our own people and go beyond signalling that it is significant aspects of our relations with the Soviet Union that their actions are jeopardizing.

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Economic

The evolving economic relationship with the U.S., which the USSR has so assiduously cultivated in recent months and which undoubtedly is an important factor in its economic planning for the years to come, is a "pressure point" of considerable potential impact. The Soviets are well aware of the fact that we condition our readiness to improve economic relations on an improved political relationship. Specific steps directed at projects which have high priority in Soviet eyes could impress upon the Soviet leadership that their hopes for developing a wide-ranging economic relationship are being threatened.

-- LNG. N. G. Osipov, Vice Minister of Foreign Trade of the USSR, is now visiting the U.S. with a large delegation of senior officials for technical discussions with the companies involved in the LNG deals. The USG could inform the firms concerned and the Osipov group that this is not an appropriate time to pursue these discussions and request the Soviet delegation to leave.

-- ExIm Financing. The majority of the credit arrangements entered into between the ExIm bank and the USSR are in the nature of preliminary commitments, including the large (\$180 million) and much publicized credit and guarantee for the Occidental Petroleum fertilizer complex. Chairman Kearns could inform the Soviets that, without prejudice to future review, no further consideration will be given to these preliminary commitments or to additional credit requests, without complete Soviet adherence to the Bank's informational requirements. (The USG has already informed the Soviets that additional export financing will be dependent on the USSR supplying the Bank with sufficient data to enable it to judge that its loans "offer reasonable assurance of repayment.")

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-- Air Traffic Control. Minister of Aviation Bugayev is due to visit the U.S. on October 24 to pursue discussions on an air traffic control system with major U.S. aircraft companies. He could be informed that the USG and the firms concerned regard the timing of his visit inappropriate.

-- Export Controls. U.S. export controls to the USSR have, in keeping with the improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations, been steadily liberalized. The Soviets could be informed that this trend may be reversed if they behave irresponsibly in their supply of military equipment to other countries.

-- Commercial Visits. The steps mentioned above could be reinforced by refusing to issue visas to Soviet commercial visitors. This could be damaging to the interests of numerous U.S. firms, however, and is probably inadvisable unless we desire to indicate a readiness to bring trade virtually to a standstill.

-- MFN and Congress. A change in the Administration's position in regarding MFN authority would be an extremely strong signal to the Soviets. It does not seem desirable, however, since it would make it virtually impossible to secure an unencumbered Trade Act if relations with the USSR should improve.

-- Cargo Ship Calls. Under the Maritime Agreement we are not obligated to approve Soviet ship calls at ports not included on the list of forty available to Soviet shipping on a four-day notice basis. The Soviets request several calls each month at ports not on the 40-port list and these have generally been approved if consistent with national security considerations. Refusing calls at these ports, and telling the Soviets that we will do so until further notice, would interfere to some extent with their growing maritime service to the U.S. It would have little impact as an isolated action, but would be consistent with other moves to demonstrate our determination to slow the development of economic ties. The ports and exporters would of course protest. We now have 11 such requests pending.

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Cooperative Agreements

Although individually none of the nine cooperative agreements with the USSR engage Soviet interests to a degree which would provide significant leverage, a signal that we are prepared to slow or halt their implementation if the political climate deteriorates could bring home to the Soviet leaders a realization that a worsening of our political relations will affect a wide range of secondary interests.

-- Joint Committee Meetings.

Three meetings of Joint Committees have been scheduled over the next two months: Agriculture (October 24-26); Environment (November 13-16) and Science and Technology (November 27-December 5). These could be postponed sine die. The Soviets have a substantial interest in these agreements -- particularly those on cooperation in agriculture and science and technology -- and delaying these meetings would indicate to them that we are not prepared to move forward toward a sharing of technology in an adverse political climate. Aside from some administrative inconvenience, the cost to us of postponement would be slight. The meetings could be rescheduled as there is improvement in our political relations.

-- Ongoing Working Groups.

In addition to the joint committee meetings, there are scheduled at least nine specific meetings under the framework of the various cooperative agreements between now and the end of October.

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These also could be postponed. Doing so would probably have little effect unless the postponement is across the board and coupled with postponement of the joint committee meetings. This is particularly true since most are in the health field, which is not a high priority area for the Soviets. Calling off these scheduled meetings would present greater problems than postponing the joint committee meetings since many private citizens are involved. It would, however, provide a more powerful signal than delaying the joint committee meetings alone, since it would indicate that we are willing not only to slow implementation of the cooperative agreements, but even to stop it altogether.

-- Exhibits. A Soviet exhibit has begun a six-city tour of the U.S. while we are mounting an exhibit in the USSR. We could ask the Soviets to terminate their exhibit here, in which case they would also require our exhibit to close.

Such a step would not seem effective or desirable since the exhibit exchange is much more in our interest than that of the Soviets. Furthermore this exchange has been maintained in previous years of high tension between us and terminating the Soviet exhibit would be in violation of a specific contractual relationship.

Summary Comment

If we are proceeding on the premise that at this stage we wish to find steps which are not irretrievable and which do minimum damage to our own interests, yet would be viewed by the Soviets as powerful signals, the following, in descending order of impact, seem to me most appropriate:

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- Cancel LNG talks
- Reconsider Preliminary Ex-Im Bank Commitments
- Cancel Bugayev visit on Air Traffic Control System
- Threaten Slowdown on CSCE, and
- Postpone Joint Committee Meetings

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