MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Guidelines of the Chief of the Soviet General Staff for the Journal Military Thought

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought." This article is a speech by the former Chief of the Soviet General Staff to a gathering of Military Thought editors, authors and readers. The late Marshal Zakharov emphasizes the ideological foundation of Soviet military doctrine and expresses some generalities about the future work of the journal. He sees the unclassified version as a forum for study and understanding of military philosophy and experience, and the classified version as an exchange of views by Soviet command personnel on the principal military problems. This article appeared in Issue No. 2 (90) for 1970.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.

William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations
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MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Tasks of Military Science at Its Present Stage and the Main Directions of Work of the Journal "Military Thought"

Summary

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 2 (90) for 1970 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The author of this article is Marshal of the Soviet Union M. V. Zakharov, Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Army and Navy. This article is a speech by the former Chief of the Soviet General Staff to a gathering of Military Thought editors, authors and readers. The late Marshal Zakharov emphasizes the ideological foundation of Soviet military doctrine and expresses some generalities about the future work of the journal. He sees the unclassified version as a forum for study and understanding of military philosophy and experience, and the classified version as an exchange of views by Soviet command personnel on the principal military problems.

End of Summary

Comment:

Marshal of the Soviet Union M. V. Zakharov retired as Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Army and Navy in September 1971 and died in January 1972. Military Thought has been published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions in the past--TOP SECRET, SECRET, and RESTRICTED. There is no information as to whether or not the TOP SECRET version continues to be published. The SECRET version is published three times annually and is distributed down to the level of division commander.
The Tasks of Military Science at Its Present Stage
and the Main Directions of Work of the Journal
"Military Thought"

On 28 January 1970, the editorial board and the editors of Military Thought held their regular meeting with authors and readers from the Moscow Garrison. The Chief of the General Staff, Marshal of the Soviet Union M. V. Zakharov, spoke at this meeting, presenting a detailed exposition of the tasks of military science and the main directions of work of the Journal at the present time. The full text of Marshal Zakharov's speech is published below.

Comrades!

We are meeting in this year of Lenin's Anniversary, and this meeting may be regarded first of all as one manifestation of the activity which is taking place in all sectors of the military-theoretical front. This activity is directed toward self-critical analysis of the extent to which we have progressed in our studies for developing Lenin's military legacy, as well as toward a definition of some of our problems in this field.

The study of Lenin's legacy, the philosophical interpretation of the processes and events which occur in society, and particularly the thorough and comprehensive exposition of the complex phenomenon of war—all comprise an essential condition for the successful resolution of the problems facing us.

Our military theory and practice are founded on the Marxist-Leninist view of the world, on dialectical and historical materialism, and on Marxist-Leninist methodology, and they have been developed on the basis of the Leninist policies of the Communist Party. Lenin's teachings on the socialist homeland form the basis of the military policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. With only Leninist methodology as a guide, we can discover the essence, content, nature, and characteristics of modern war in greater detail and can correctly determine: the essential aspects of building armed forces, ways of perfecting the material-technical basis of the army and navy, and the growing significance of the direction taken by personnel training and education and by troop preparation in the fields of morale, politics, and ideology. From the tenets of Marxism-Leninism, and in the spirit of Communist Party principles, we draw the capability for mounting further
offensives to combat hostile military ideologies and aggressive imperialist policies and to maintain the purity of Marxist-Leninist military theory.

It is the task of military personnel to make a profound study of Marxist-Leninist philosophy as a basis for military theory and practice.

The extension of the Marxist dialectical method to the field of military events is the most important achievement of our military-theoretical thought. We must continually maintain and develop this achievement, because it is the key to true scientific resolution of the problems facing us.

The revolutionary materialistic dialectics with which we are armed enable us to understand the objective patterns of military affairs and to use these patterns to perfect the organization of troops and combat operations and to perfect the systems and methods of troop control. The Marxist-Leninist dialectic, which calls for specific analysis of specific situations, provides for a strictly scientific approach to actual situations; increases the spirit of creativeness among military personnel; and stimulates our relentlessness against outmoded concepts, against setting a pattern in our actions, and against methods which have already lost their value in our changing conditions. The core of dialectics, as you know, is above all the creation of a synthesis in a conflict of opposites. This is perhaps nowhere operative in such clearly expressed forms as in war, which is extraordinarily full of contradictions in its essence and content. Figuratively speaking, combat is a complex dialectic, and our enormous advantages lie in the fact that we stand on a foundation of proven points and on the capability for spontaneous application of the dialectical method. But we must put this method into actual practice. Otherwise military leaders and commanders will not be able to use it to make estimates in a complex and unexpected future war. Dwelling on the known data is of no help because, unfortunately, we still run up against facts attesting to shortcomings in the role and significance of philosophical-social ideological training of personnel. But all personnel units have now taken measures for indoctrination and for systematic study of the laws and categories of materialistic dialectics, and this will enable us to resolve our problems in the best possible way.

I will cite two variants in connection with this.

The first involves the realm of theory. The weak philosophical preparation of many of our specialists in military affairs, and
(no offense intended to the philosophers present here today) the insufficient military training of specialists in the social sciences, have led to an abnormal situation in which we have been unable up to the present time to definitively reach conclusions on essential questions of methodological problems of studying the laws of war, the structure of military science, and military theory in general.

The second example comes from the realm of actual practice. Judging from a cross-section of various training plans, our commanding officers allot considerable time for the study of dialectical and historical materialism, the laws and categories of dialectics, etc. Officers can also actively enlarge their knowledge of philosophy through independent study. But, it must be said, they are giving only superficial attention to mastering the essence of the categories of dialectics. They know, for example, that there are such categories as potential and reality, and they recall that the former must be transformed into the latter; but in actual practice this "transformation" is sometimes such that we can only throw up our hands in helplessness.

Why does it turn out this way? Because the mechanism by which the categories interact has not been mastered, potential is either underestimated or overestimated, and plans for exploiting potential are not sufficiently well grounded. As a result we sometimes "fight with an open fist", dissipate our efforts, and make more difficult the attainment of our set objectives.

It is appropriate here to underline the importance of being able to adhere to the principle of the fundamental link. As we know, Lenin taught us to resolve complex problems by finding the main, fundamental link which, if we grasp it, will enable us to draw forth the entire chain, the whole complex of interrelated problems. This is a great art, and we must master it to perfection. Every part of our work has its own fundamental links, and we must master them before it is too late.

Only one conclusion follows from the foregoing: through high-quality work, we must see to it that the Leninist dialectic becomes a living guide to the actions of us all. In order to accomplish this, we must raise the level of military-philosophical and sociological training of officers, generals, and admirals. The journal Military Thought and its most active personnel are called upon to take the lead in resolving this problem.
From the very first days of the Soviet State, Comrade
Vladimir Ilich Lenin devoted exceptional attention to developing
science and technology, emphasizing their enormous importance in
building socialist society. He was the first in the world to
regard science as an important part of the activities of the
state. Let us apply these views to the army. V. I. Lenin
indicated that an army must be created not with phrases and
exhortations but with organizational work based on the achieve-
ments of science.

The enormous importance of science is reflected in the Program
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which states that under
the conditions of a socialist society, science becomes a direct
productive force. This very transformation of science into a
direct productive force has a direct connection with the bur-
goneing scientific-technical progress that began as we entered
the second half of the twentieth century. Influencing economics,
politics, everyday life, and other spheres of social existence,
the scientific-technical revolution became an object of state
policy and a basic factor in the main phenomena of the day.

The Theses of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union issued for the one-hundredth anniversary of
the birth of Vladimir Ilich Lenin state: "Science and technology
in the world of today have been turned into a most important spring-
board in the competition between two opposing social-economic
systems. This promises to be a long and stubborn conflict. The
penetration of science into various areas of social existence and
the ever more thorough exploitation of the potential of scientific-
technical progress constitute the most important economic and
political task".

The rapid development of the economy, brought about by
scientific-technical progress, formed the material base for the
military-technical revolution, i.e. for those fundamental changes
which took place in the fields of armament, military equipment,
forms and methods of conducting war, and organization of troops.

The military-technical revolution has a clearly-defined
political trend and is taking place under conditions of a bitter
conflict between two opposing world systems, socialist and
capitalist, in which the drive to preserve superiority in the
newest means of armed conflict has acquired particular urgency.
It was these circumstances which predetermined the unprecedented
scale, depth, and velocity of the revolution.
The military-technical revolution is responsible for the introduction of nuclear weapons into our armament, the creation of new means of delivering them, and the development of electronics, leading to the resolution of the problem of comprehensive automation in controlling weapons and troops. Further development of conventional military equipment and weapons is taking place simultaneously with the introduction of nuclear missile means of destruction.

Ground troops are receiving newer forms of combat equipment. The fire power, mobility, and maneuverability of tanks have increased with the increase of the range over which they can operate between refuelings. Infantry combat vehicles are being issued to the troops—a qualitatively new combat means combining powerful armament, armor protection, high speed, versatility, and maneuverability. Great changes have also taken place in the equipping of troops with air defense means. Engineer equipment has been thoroughly modernized.

The air forces have undergone substantial changes. Modern jet aircraft can achieve very considerable ranges, a wide choice of altitudes, and very great flight speeds almost three times the speed of sound. Aircraft are distinguished by high mobility, precision in mounting strikes, potential for rapid retargeting, and the capability to seek out and destroy stationary or moving targets of small dimensions. In conducting non-nuclear military actions, aviation is the only force capable of acting in the entire depth of the enemy's operational formation. Military transport aviation has become extremely important, making possible long-distant transfers not only of troops but of heavy combat equipment as well.

The Navy, too, is different. Nuclear-powered submarines, missile-carrying and antisubmarine naval aircraft equipped with the latest navigational and search devices, modern, fast surface ships of various classes, including helicopter carriers, landing craft of special design, missile armament: all of these (and the list is far from complete) show how sharply the navy's combat might is increasing.

The Air Defense Troops of the Country are equipped with highly effective antiaircraft missile systems and with air intercept means, making it possible to insure the destruction of aircraft and of some enemy pilotless attack weapons.

Under the leadership of the Soviet Government and of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the
army and navy have been reequipped and the armed forces reorganized on this basis. Strategic rocket troops have become the main strike force of our armed forces, the determinant means of conducting nuclear war. As a result of the military-technical revolution, the Soviet Armed Forces have changed qualitatively, rising to a new level. Their combat strength and readiness satisfy current requirements. They are able to conduct military operations successfully with nuclear weapons or conventional means. All of these changes in the organizational structure of the army and navy and in the capabilities of the armed forces have confronted Soviet military science with complicated problems.

It was necessary within the shortest possible time to investigate the nature of nuclear war, the combat features of military equipment and of new and traditional types of armament, the changing problems which this brought in the Armed Forces branches and arms of service, and the methods of training our forces to carry on war with nuclear weapons or conventional means of destruction. The military-technical revolution demanded that we re-evaluate the role and significance of economic and morale factors in modern war.

The permanent concern of the Party and its Central Committee with the development of science, and the decisive struggle against dogmatism and subjectivism in theory, have created favorable conditions for creative work by military personnel and have laid the groundwork for a new phase in the development of Soviet military science. Over a period of only three years (from 1966 through 1968), the theory of military art in the armed forces was the subject of 180 different theoretical works and several hundred classified articles in collections of works of military academies and in military journals; twenty-two doctoral and over 300 candidate theses were defended; and seventy-eight military-scientific conferences took place. Military academies conducted thirty-nine military-research games and about eighty front and army troop exercises, command-staff exercises, and games. A considerable part of this research was devoted to the most pressing questions of strategy and the operational art.

In the field of strategy, attention was focused mainly on investigating the problems of using armed forces under various different conditions in which modern war may begin and be carried on. Many theoretical concepts of strategy applicable to the new conditions were perfected and made more specific, and conceptual theoretical conclusions were made, including conclusions concerning methods of developing modern warfare, their division into periods, and the forms which strategic actions may take.
An important result of the research conducted in recent years has been the recognition that a future war between the imperialist coalition and the Warsaw Pact member states does not absolutely have to begin with the unrestricted use of nuclear weapons. An armed confrontation may begin with the use of only conventional means of destruction. This concept has had a substantial influence on the development of methods for armed forces evolution and operations.

Military science has also reviewed and studied the problems of perfecting control of strategic rocket troops, and there has been further exposition of problems concerning the theory of air defense (including employment of the Air Defense Troops of the Country), the theory of strategic operations in a theater of military operations, and the theories concerning the use of airborne troops, the Navy, and the air forces.

Collating the experience of local wars in the post-war period and making a critical analysis of the views of bourgeois specialists concerning theory, we have been able to formulate a basic theory of local wars.

Extensive research has been conducted directed toward finding ways to further increase the combat readiness of formations and large units of all branches of the armed forces and to provide for actions by them to disrupt a possible enemy attack and conduct initial operations whether nuclear weapons are used or only conventional means of destruction.

There has also been further working out of the problems of operational defense, of advancing formations over large distances and committing them to combat direct from the march, of increasing the effectiveness of reconnaissance, of defending rear troops and objectives against weapons of mass destruction, and of conducting combat with radioelectronic means. Important conclusions have been reached in the field of assuring a high level of reliability and efficiency in troop control.

These achievements in various branches of military science have created a military-theoretical base on which to formulate the current military doctrine of the Soviet State, including a comprehensive estimate of the nature of war in the future and of what will be required to prepare the armed forces and the country as a whole to decisively repulse an aggressor. These concepts of Soviet military doctrine, in turn, have served as a foundation for the continued development of the theory of the military art.
These are some of the general conclusions of military-theoretical thinking at the present stage of development.

Essential contributions in the development of military art have come from the main staffs of the armed forces branches, military academies, chief and central directorates, staffs of military districts, groups of forces, air defense districts, fleets, and many generals, admirals, and officers who have prepared scientific works and articles on individual problems of military theory. The service periodical publications have also played a major role in the development of military theory.

Regarding the journal Military Thought in particular, it should be emphasized that it is, on the whole, adequately fulfilling its role in the working out of problems of military theory and military art, in the popularization of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on war and the army, and in the interpretation of the policies of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government. Over the past year, the quality of all issues of Military Thought has unquestionably improved, the ideological-theoretical level of the articles has risen, and the subject matter in the journal and the collection has become more relevant to present conditions. The editors and the editorial board have expanded their connections with the troops, and they call upon authors in military districts and fleets. In a word, our Military Thought has begun to take a more lively part in resolving the problems facing the armed forces.

Comrades! The military-technical revolution is still under way. It is moving forward so rapidly that the prognoses and concepts of yesterday are already becoming the reality of today. In this setting the necessity arises for military theory to take stock of the advances and to refine, and if necessary correct, the concepts and recommendations worked out previously. This work acquires particular significance at present in connection with the fact that the Minister of Defense has ordered that manuals and regulations be made more precise--and these are the basic documents by which troops are guided in preparing for combat and operations. These concepts and recommendations will be tested in training exercises of various types; in military games; by conducting special research projects tailored to a specific purpose; and also in military-scientific conferences in military districts, groups of forces, fleets, main staffs of armed forces branches, and central directorates of the Ministry of Defense.

The task of the military-scientific personnel of our periodical press is to assist in the successful conduct of this extensive and
complex project with all the means at their disposal. Constructive experience in combat and operational preparation has been collated, and a unity of views has been worked out regarding the basic problems of military science and its important expository elements—we believe that military art should assist in defining both the concept and content of military science. This does not mean, be it understood, that we are thinking of any structuring of the new knowledge of military science. No, the structure was built a long time ago. At the same time, however, it cannot be denied that the military-technical revolution has gotten somewhat beyond the bounds of military science and that completely new scientific lines are justified.

It is obvious that in resolving the problems of military science a selective "purging" of our military language is indispensable. Terminology is, if you will, the heart of any science, including military science. In this field, however, we often overstep the bounds of what is necessary and reasonable. No matter how difficult and no matter how painful it may be to clean house in the field of military terms, Military Thought must concern itself with this problem, the resolution of which is particularly important as we prepare to revise our manuals and regulations.

Comrades! As is well known, one of the most important tasks of military science is to create a military-theoretical base on which to formulate the military doctrine of our state. From the many investigations of problems by military science, only two types of scientific recommendations are selected for inclusion in the content of our doctrine (taking into account the perspectives and basic directions of scientific-technical progress, including those of the enemy): those recommendations which correspond to our actual capabilities at the present stage of development and those which provide most successfully for resolution of the military problems facing our state. Doctrinal concepts, once worked out and accepted, cannot be subjected to frequent change; they have a certain stability and are closely tied in with the capabilities and actual condition of the armed forces. Military science can and must develop as a dynamic force which takes into account the prospects for creating means of armed combat, and it can and must anticipate the moment when it will be necessary to amend our doctrine.

At the present stage we must mobilize all of our scientific and military personnel for research on the nature of possible types of war (with special attention to the methods an aggressor may use in developing a war) and on the conditions of transition from one type of war to another. In studying a given problem, it
is necessary to produce correct conclusions from the experience of past wars but at the same time to keep in mind the applicability of this experience and to take into account the current technical base underlying our views on war and also the new organization of the armed forces.

Military-technical thinking must be gradually directed toward finding ways to assure high combat readiness in our armed forces so that they can repel an enemy strike regardless of what type of war an aggressor may conduct or the methods he may use to develop it. Priority attention should of course be given to pursuing nuclear war, since it is most dangerous.

Scientific-technical progress opens broad perspectives for perfecting the organizational structure of the armed forces. Military science must find and formulate the optimal variant for correlating the armed forces branches and arms of service and must do research on the perspectives for their development. The pursuit of correlated development and of methods to achieve maximum exploitation of the capabilities of each armed forces branch in a future war—is one of the enormous and very complex problems of military science. Its complexity lies above all in the fact that we must prepare ourselves to conduct military operations using nuclear weapons as well as conventional means of destruction.

A major problem of military science is the strategic deployment of armed forces in threatening periods and at the onset of military operations. As the most important tasks in working out this problem we may designate: first, pursuing the most expedient methods for deploying troops without enemy discovering and forming them rapidly into strategic groupings along the decisive axes and second, seeking out ways for effectively covering deployment in the light of present-day high troop mobility and the growing capabilities of modern technological reconnaissance means.

One of the most important tasks of military science consists of studying questions of the preparation and conduct of an in-depth strategic offensive operation in a theater of military operations in a nuclear war. Particular attention here must be allotted to research into the most effective methods of destroying the enemy's nuclear means, routing his main troop grouping, providing for rapid advance over the full depth of the operation, and seeking out ways for close cooperation among the operations formations of the armed forces branches participating in it.

It remains a very urgent problem to perfect the control of troops at all levels and to work out a unified methodology for
synthesizing military, economic, and political factors in making decisions and in establishing the objectives of research into questions of operational prognostication of how events will develop. In order to resolve these problems successfully, we must learn to direct in Lenin's way, in the Communist way, and that means that we must be guided by science. "Under present conditions," stated L. I. Brezhnev in a report at the December Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, "even experienced and gifted organizers are finding it impossible to manage in the old way, relying only on intuition and common sense. Management has become a science, and this science must be diligently studied and mastered as rapidly and as thoroughly as possible, even by those who occupy the lower command responsibilities in the field of management." This, be it said, applies wholly and fully to us in the military field.

Scientific management of armed combat presupposes knowledge of the laws of materialistic dialectics and mastery of Marxist-Leninist methodology, which provides the only true key to solving all military problems and carrying out all tasks. In order to implement scientific guidance of troops at all levels, it is necessary to have a deep knowledge of the laws of development in the military field and to use them intensively in actual practice, laws which determine the course and outcome of war and which make the most effective and most complete use of the morale-political, economic, and scientific capabilities of our country to strengthen the Soviet Armed Forces and keep them at a high level of combat readiness. In addition to a knowledge of the general fundamentals of this military art, all commanders must achieve perfect mastery of technology, must exploit its combat potential more fully, and must have a deep knowledge of physics, mathematics, chemistry, cybernetics, and radioelectronics. It is very important also to apply data-processing and other technology widely. Remember Lenin's advice: in order to manage, one must be competent, must have a complete and precise knowledge of all conditions of production, must know the technology of production and the maximum possible output, and must have actual scientific education.

The current demands for scientific leadership of troops make it necessary to determine a theory of troop control as a component part of military science. This theory is called upon to study the objective results of the development, functioning, and structure of the different systems of controlling troops, using as a basis the general laws of war and the principles of military art. Our task is to help command personnel to master scientific methods of control as rapidly as possible, to work persistently to perfect
the techniques of control, improve the system of communications, vigorously introduce data-processing techniques and other means of automation, and teach officers and generals to use these techniques skilfully--keeping in mind, however, that technology does not replace the commanding officer but merely helps him to carry out his tasks.

In examining the main problems of military science as applied to the various armed forces branches, I would like to draw your attention to the following.

In the Strategic Rocket Troops the main problem is still to find the most effective ways to maintain all weapons, equipment, and means of control in constant combat readiness to carry out the initial launch without delay and with the specified degree of accuracy.

The main line of scientific research in the Ground Forces comprises the study of problems of choosing the correct front and army operations to be conducted under the various conditions in which a war may begin or be carried on. It is also important to find ways to further increase the viability of groupings of ground forces in operations, as well as methods of organizing effective air defense using the various new means in this field.

A central problem of research in the Air Defense Forces of the Country is to find ways for the timely discovery of the beginning of an air space attack by an aggressor and for assuring that all air defense means have high combat readiness to repulse sudden attacks in cooperation with the other armed forces branches. Under modern conditions, in which the rapid development of technology can alter and perfect the enemy's means and methods of air space attack and also the means and methods of counteraction available to the systems of our Air Defense of the Country, it has become necessary to work out qualitatively-new forms and methods for using formations of Air Defense Troops of the Country, taking into account not only the level of today's combat means but also the prospects for further development and the trends in the ever-growing role of air defense in war, especially on the battlefield at times when combat is being conducted with conventional means only.

Basic research in the Air Forces must be directed toward finding methods for the rapid creation of air strike groupings on the main axes without enemy knowledge, taking into account the need for assuring their combat readiness to mount sudden massed strikes against the enemy with either nuclear or conventional means of
destruction. It is also necessary to conduct very thorough research into different variants of conducting air operations to rout the enemy's aviation and destroy his nuclear means at the very beginning of a war, and we must also perfect methods for overcoming strong enemy air defenses in the theater of military operations.

In the Navy the main scientific-research efforts should be concentrated on finding ways to raise the combat readiness of fleets and the effectiveness of their operations to destroy objectives on enemy territory and to rout enemy naval strike groupings in maritime theaters. Special attention must be given to studying methods for destroying nuclear submarines and air strike large units.

The most important problems of military science at its present stage also include the further working out of the problems of preparing and conducting military actions without the use of nuclear weapons. There must be comprehensive and penetrating research into such major questions as the following, for example: disruption of enemy attacks; deployment and grouping of ground, air, and naval forces; determination of the missions of formations (large units) in operations and the sequence in which they are to be carried out; selection of the axes of the main and other strikes; concentration of efforts along the decisive axes and for completing buildups during the course of combat actions; operational structuring and forms of maneuvers; cooperation of forces and means; comprehensive support of operations; etc. The urgency of resolving these problems is determined above all by the fundamental changes which take place in the armed forces when they are equipped with the newest combat means and combat technology; another determining factor is the fact that non-nuclear military actions will be conducted under the permanent threat that the enemy may mount nuclear strikes. Urgency may also be caused by changes in the international situation and in the views of our probable enemies regarding the nature of modern war.

The new means of war and the fundamentally different conditions under which combat must be conducted are changing the methods of military operations. In the future, if war becomes inevitable, we will have to fight differently than in the past. And we must not forget this for a minute in resolving the problems of military art.

In its research into the problems of military theory and practice, Soviet military-scientific thought has always been guided by historical experience. In this connection, very important and responsible tasks face our military historians.
These tasks are specified in order No. 0010 of the Ministry of Defense concerning military-scientific work for 1969 to 1973 and are discussed in the directives on operational training of the Armed Forces. Finally, the main directions of military-historical research are examined thoroughly in the journal Military Thought, for example, No. 11 of 1969. I therefore consider it unnecessary to repeat all of these tasks. We need only note that at the present stage, the primary duty of military historians must be to concentrate their thorough and comprehensive research on the lessons of the past war and the leading role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in routing German fascism and Japanese militarism. We must apply maximum efforts so that the analysis and conclusions derived from this experience can be creatively used in military theory in accord with a definite plan to achieve scientific formulation and resolution of the problems of the military art today. In order to fulfill this task correctly and purposefully, military historians must work in full collaboration with military theoreticians and must constantly study and become well acquainted with the status and requirements of military theory and practice today and for the immediate future. From military theoreticians in turn is required a thorough study of historical experience.

We would also like to direct attention to the following question. In the last war, the organizing activity of commanders, commanding officers, and staffs was nowhere as evident as in the realm of troop control. It was in this field that their creative work was the most apparent, but it is this field which finds the least reflection in historical and theoretical research. We must fill this gap. In studying problems of troop control in the last war, we must above all make a thorough and comprehensive investigation of the work methods of commanders, commanding officers, and staffs, and more fully bring out their creative touch in organizing and implementing the leadership of formations, large units, and units, and the directing of forces and means in various different combat situations. It is this aspect of experience which is the most valuable in the training of executive command personnel of the armed forces, and especially of those who did not take part in the war. The direct perception of this aspect, and its implementation, will make it possible for military personnel to significantly widen their military horizon and to develop flexibility in operational and tactical thinking.

This is not an easy problem, and it too must be resolved with close cooperation between military historians and theoreticians. The former must skillfully collate our experience in troop control and produce a finished product along methodologically
correct lines, while the latter must teach our command personnel to apply experience creatively for resolving problems of troop control on the basis of new technology and armament in accord with the requirements of the modern military art.

We must also undertake thorough collation of our experience in building our Armed Forces and developing our military art in the postwar period. The experience which has accumulated over these twenty-five years is extraordinarily varied. It contains much that is positive, reflecting our achievements, but there are also negative aspects. We must continue to study, collate, and apply everything of value, not permitting the repetition of mistakes. The conclusions deriving from experience can have unexpected significance for the scientific resolution of all of the problems of theory and practice in the military field.

Military history, like the whole of military science, has become one of the most important sectors in the sharp ideological conflict with our enemies. The conflict of ideas with the imperialist theoreticians, on the military-historical and military-theoretical front, must be carried on effectively and aggressively, based on scientific Marxist-Leninist concepts:—Soviet military historians, theoreticians, sociologists, and philosophers, in their works and articles, must not only expose the distortion of the actual facts and events of the Second World War by bourgeois military historians, sociologists, and philosophers, but also show the political essence of these falsifying fabrications in order to make clear to our wide circles of readers the true political state of affairs regarding this unsavory work carried on by the enemies of socialism to justify the aggressive anti-Soviet intentions of the imperialists.

In the field of military theory, we must make a penetrating expose of reactionary military concepts, not only by the avowed enemies of communism but also by their accomplices: on the one hand the ideas of the rightist reactionaries, growing out of the primary meaning of the Marxist-Leninist teachings on war and the army, and on the other hand the "ultra-leftist" theory of those critics of the historical military experience of the Soviet Union who, under a false cover of "dedication" to Marxism-Leninism, are undermining the scientific bases for resolving military problems of today.

Among the most important tasks of our military science are studying the nature and characteristics of the military-strategic concepts of the main imperialist powers and analyzing the scale
and essence of their militaristic preparations. Here, it seems to us, the efforts of military-theoretical thought and, accordingly, of the military press must be concentrated along two basic inter-related lines.

First—a thorough pursuit and exposition of the content of imperialist military doctrines and theories and of the practical measures for their implementation above all in the United States and in the other NATO countries. Considering the rapid pace of scientific-technical progress, it is particularly important here to discover and study the prospects and trends in the development of the armed forces and of the changes in their organization, their equipping, and the methods of using them.

Second (a less important line)—an expose of the aggressive policy and reactionary essence of imperialist military ideology and a critical appraisal of the methodological bases of bourgeois military science. Along with this we must submit the adventurous, anti-Leninist military-political intentions of the Peking leadership to a searching critique and reveal anti-Soviet aspects of the military preparations of the Maoists.

Comrades! It is obviously no secret to anyone that the maintenance of an up-to-date army and navy will cost the state a great deal. And as the years pass, it will not grow any cheaper. But even for a state such as ours, budgetary allotments, material possibilities, and economic resources are not unlimited. Therefore the problem of rational use of the means supplied, and of economic resources, have acquired particularly crucial significance. To date, contributions toward solving these problems have been small; at first glance, the undertaking of measures to build a military establishment requires particularly careful economic grounding. Neither the unit commander nor the commanding officer of troops nor the designer working out new models of armament nor the leader of a research institute can get along without the precise indicators provided by the "economic approach". This is why the study of the problems of military economics constitutes an especially vital task in training command personnel. In the journal Military Thought it has been justly emphasized that no one has to be convinced of the importance of military economics or science and that we must learn to combine military-economic questions organically with strategy, with the operational art of tactics, and with the entire structure of the armed forces. Our officers, generals, and admirals must clearly evaluate the relevance of the elements of military economics, and must take the economic side of matters into consideration.
Particular attention under present-day conditions is also due to questions of the ideological-political and psychological preparation of troops for nuclear war. It is well known that it is people, personnel, who resolve all the questions of military theory and practice. Without a strong desire and urge to achieve the fixed goals, not even the first step will be taken. Without capable, strongly motivated military personnel, the best armament and the most perfect combat means will become merely inactive objects. We have modern armaments, and so does the enemy. The methods for using them, and their effectiveness on the field of combat, are approximately equal. Nevertheless we say, and truly so: our soldiers and our commanding officers are without equal in comparison with the army of any capitalist state. In what does our superiority lie? Inculcated with the ideas of the great Lenin, Soviet military personnel are superior to our probable enemy politically, psychologically, and in morale.

Morale-political and psychological preparation must be an integral part of life in our army and navy. It should be noted that we are not having to begin from the ground up in working toward this end; training and education of personnel in the past have always considered it important. Morale-political and psychological preparation depends on the effectiveness of armaments in general and of the new means of armed combat in particular. Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze noted, already in his day, that the effect of new armaments must be estimated by adding to their material influence that enormous psychological influence which is produced by the use of new and still unknown means. The full extent of the psychological influence is beyond calculation, and under certain conditions it can far exceed the material damage effected by these implements of destruction.

Psychological preparation is a special type of activity. The military press has recently begun to cover it more widely, but our discussions are still more on the general theoretical level, and we are far from putting everything into practice. The essence of our problem today is to work out, scientifically, practical recommendations and methods applicable to the armed forces branches, to the various services, and to the tasks which we must carry out regarding the psychological preparation of military personnel for the widespread introduction of these recommendations into practice among them.

Morale-political and psychological preparation means working with people. The science of handling people, never simple, has always relied on objective information and precise materials.
Such work is unthinkable without taking into account the psychology of the human being and the individual characteristics of the subordinate. In a word, it has always been difficult to command subordinates, although it is also an honor; to work with people today without having a knowledge of the bases of pedagogy and psychology and without considering the demands of these sciences is to condemn oneself in advance to failure. This touches especially on the problems of the professional molding of young officers--the largest and most long-term category of the officers' corps. Junior officers comprise two-thirds at the regimental level. Fifty percent of the young officers entering the armed forces in recent years have higher education.

Young officers are the future of the armed forces; from among them will arise the division commanders and commanders--military leaders of all levels and ranks. They will earn for themselves concentrated attention, support from all quarters, assistance in duty matters, fatherly encouragement, and wise counsel from senior comrades. The education and training of lieutenants represent a vital task for military theory, including actual troop practice.

To work out the problems of Soviet military pedagogy and psychology and the principles for training and educating military personnel--this means to improve and increase the mental, field, morale-political, and psychological qualities of army and navy personnel and to pave the way for perfecting the combat readiness and combat effectiveness of our Armed Forces.

It is obvious that the successful resolution of the above problems (and many other vital problems) of military science is attainable only through the combined efforts of commanding officers, political workers, staffs, scientific-research establishments, military-training academies, and troops. We would like to underline especially the major role played by the periodical press in the resolution of these problems. As is well known, the press makes it possible to present the urgent problems of military science as effectively as possible; to organize within its pages a professional and creative exchange on the subject by a wide circle of generals and officers; to place appropriate suggestions before readers without delay; and to collate favorable experience.

In discussing specifically the publications of the main military-theoretical organ, the journal Military Thought, I consider it necessary to draw attention to the following.
The classified edition of the journal should deal with the greatest problems of our military doctrine and of Soviet military science. It must organize and promote a truly free exchange of opinions among the command personnel of our armed forces regarding the principal problems in the development of military theory and practice for the building of our armed forces, especially regarding problems which have been little studied so far and on whose solution depends the further development of the military field as a whole. One of the important tasks of the Collection of Articles consists above all in providing a comprehensive exposition of the theoretical problems connected with the preparation, conduct, and support of operations and combat actions by the various branches of our armed forces in both nuclear and non-nuclear war. It is particularly important to continue the broad exchange of opinions regarding the fundamental questions of the preparation and conduct of frontal offensive operations and army offensive and defensive operations and regarding also urgent problems in using the Air Defense Troops of the Country, the Air Forces, and the Navy. Serious attention must be allotted to finding ways to increase the stability of troop control during operations, to questions of moving operational formations into theaters of military operations, and to problems of defending troops against weapons of mass destruction.

The editors of the journal, the editorial board, and all of the active writers must bear in mind that, considering the level we have attained in the field of military theory, we must for the present devote more attention to working out specific problems which are directly related to increasing the combat power of our Armed Forces. In resolving the anticipated problems of military science, we must at the same time understand that war may break out at any moment and oblige us to fight with those means which we have. Therefore, our theory must above all provide our troops with practical recommendations for routing an aggressor with available forces and means.

The unclassified edition of Military Thought, as the most voluminous, occupies a special position. Within its pages we must continue the penetrating study of the military-theoretical analyses of V. I. Lenin and devote greater attention to gaining an understanding of the philosophy behind all of the processes taking place in the military field in connection with the continuing scientific-technical revolution, and to collating actual experience from operations and from troop combat training.

It is perfectly obvious that the successful resolution of these problems and of the many others facing the journal Military
Thought is impossible without drawing in authors from the troops. We must always remember that military thought comprises not only the research, collations, and conclusions of military theoreticians. It represents the force of the knowledge, skills, and ability of those who carry out the orders, who, in their daily labors in the troops, provide practical confirmation of the scientific validity and value of the theoretical propositions of military science and the military art. It is therefore necessary to set an example of stepping up participation by authors from the troops.

In conclusion I would like to call upon all participants of the present meeting to take an active part in working out the most urgent problems of military science. I consider it my duty to remind you in this regard that successful resolution of the problems facing us depends to a great extent on how self-critically we approach our work. The absence of proper self-criticism and the presence of elements of complacency are dangerous in general but particularly dangerous in the military field. This obliges us (workers on the military-theoretical front and military scholars), in preparing our works and articles on questions of building the armed forces, to penetrate more deeply into the essence of the phenomena being examined, to act more sensibly in pointing out the positive sides and exposing the negative, and to determine ways for eliminating defects. In its thematic surveys and reviews, the journal Military Thought must more clearly demonstrate the shortcomings in the development of the various scientific lines or (in reviews) must continue to publish surveys of the periodic military press and to analyze the contribution of each issue in the development of military theory.

Comrades! The international situation, a scientific analysis of which is contained in the speech by General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union L. I. Brezhnev at the December Plenum, and in the Theses of the Central Committee of the Party, continues to become more acute. As emphasized in the Theses, the most aggressive forces of imperialism, above all in the United States and West Germany, have not abandoned their hopes of "replaying" the historic battles of the Twentieth Century, of getting revenge, of casting socialism down from the heights of world influence, and of recreating colonialism in new forms.

In making a realistic appraisal of the military-strategic situation as it has developed, we must take into account not only the aggressive actions of the imperialists in Vietnam, the Near East, Europe, and other areas, but also the anti-Soviet militaristic course of the Peking adventurers. Under such conditions it
is particularly important that we not for one moment forget Lenin's demand for the highest possible military vigilance and discipline and for constant combat readiness. All of our efforts must be heightened toward the most important objective—readiness to deal the enemy a crushing repulse, from which he cannot manage to escape no matter what methods and means he may try to attack us with. Our military science is called upon to occupy the forward positions in carrying out this vital task.

"In the course of building Communism," it is noted in the Theses, "we face, in Lenin's words, a colossal amount of work, demanding much more labor than we have applied up to now. Life places before us new tasks and problems which require deep study and creative solutions. The guiding role of the Communist Party is our guarantee of successful progress. By following Lenin's way, under the leadership of the Party, the Soviet people achieved the victory of October and socialism. By following Lenin's way we are approaching—and will reach—Communism." The Soviet people and their armed defenders will accept these words from the Theses as a call to combat, a call full of optimism and of firm conviction that Lenin's cause, the cause of the Party, will triumph.

In conclusion, comrades, permit me to thank the editorial board and the entire collective of the journal Military Thought for organizing our meeting and to wish all of you new successes in creative activity.