

HR70-14

TOP SECRET

THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED

WP 26/5

1588
3067CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

9 January 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Report of the Chief of Staff of the Combined
Armed Forces on the VAL-74 Command-Staff
Exercise for Allied Fleets in the Baltic Sea

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is a translation from Russian of a SECRET report by the Chief of Staff of the Combined Armed Forces on the VAL-74 combined naval command-staff exercise held in September 1974. East German, Polish and Soviet skeleton forces participated in the exercise, which had the objectives of gaining supremacy in the Baltic Sea and assisting a coastal front. The report identifies the specific targets of these forces and examines the organization of cooperation among the participating fleets, then describes the situations and the decisions of the commanders involved at the three stages of the exercise, and provides a brief outline of resulting combat actions. Despite certain shortcomings in staff work, all assigned tasks were accomplished and control and communications were generally effective. The conclusion of the report stresses the need to master control under radioelectronic warfare conditions and particularly to automate the entire control process.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.

William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

TS #208617
Copy # 6

Page 1 of 24 Pages

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

Distribution:

The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
Director of Weapons Intelligence

Page 2 of 24 Pages

~~TOP SECRET~~

TS #208617
Copy # 6

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED~~

24 pp



Intelligence Information Special Report

Page 3 of 24 Pages

COUNTRY USSR/WARSAW PACT

DATE OF
INFO. September 1974

DATE 9 January 1976

SUBJECT

Report of the Chief of Staff of the Combined Armed Forces
on the VAL-74 Command-Staff Exercise for Allied Fleets
in the Baltic Sea

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of a SECRET report by the Chief of Staff of the Combined Armed Forces, General of the Army Sergey Matveyevich Shtemenko, on the VAL-74 combined naval command-staff exercise held in September 1974. East German, Polish and Soviet skeleton forces participated in the exercise, which had the objectives of gaining supremacy in the Baltic Sea and assisting a coastal front. The report identifies the specific targets of these forces and examines the organization of cooperation among the participating fleets, then describes the situations and the decisions of the commanders involved at the three stages of the exercise, and provides a brief outline of resulting combat actions. Despite certain shortcomings in staff work, all assigned tasks were accomplished and control and communications were generally effective. The conclusion of the report stresses the need to master control under radioelectronic warfare conditions and particularly to automate the entire control process. End of Summary

COMMENT:

Although not specifically identified, the colors representing NATO countries in this report probably equate as follows: "Gray" - Denmark, "Brown" - West Germany, "Turquoise" - Norway, "Dark Blue" - Great Britain, "Green" - United States, "Light Blue" - France. The diagrams to which the report refers are not available.

TS #208617
Copy # 6

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 4 of 24 Pages

SECRET

Copy No. _____

REPORT

Of the Chief of Staff of the Combined Armed Forces, General of the Army Comrade S. M. Shtemenko at the Critique of VAL-74, a One-Sided, Two-Level Command-Staff Exercise for Allied Fleets in the Baltic Sea with Skeleton Forces

(September 1974)

Comrade Commander-in-Chief!

Comrades!

VAL-74, a one-sided, two-level command-staff exercise, was conducted in accordance with the Plan of Combined Undertakings of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Member States for 1974.

The following were allocated for the exercise:

From the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic -- an operations group from the headquarters of the People's Navy, headed by Rear Admiral Comrade Hesse -- in the role of the headquarters of the 3rd Fleet, the headquarters of the main large units and the directorate of the rear of the fleet; an operations group from the headquarters of the 3rd Air Defense Division -- in the role of the headquarters of the 33rd Air Defense Division, the headquarters of the Greifswald naval onloading-offloading area, a road traffic control battalion, a road battalion, and servicing companies; and the directorates of the military commandants of railroad stations and ports.

From the Polish Armed Forces -- an operations group from the headquarters of the Navy, headed by Rear Admiral Comrade Petrashkevich -- in the role of the headquarters of the 2nd Fleet, the headquarters of the main large units and the directorate of the rear of the fleet; the headquarters of the amphibious landing division -- in the role of the headquarters of the 7th Army Corps; operations groups from the headquarters

TS #208617
Copy # 6

~~TOP SECRET~~

of the Air Force and the headquarters of the 2nd Air Defense Corps -- in the roles of the headquarters of the Air Force and the headquarters of the 22nd Air Defense Corps, respectively.

From the Armed Forces of the USSR -- an operations group from the headquarters of the Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet of the USSR, headed by Vice Admiral Comrade Kosov -- in the role of the headquarters of the 1st Fleet, the headquarters of the main large units, the headquarters of aviation, and the directorate of the rear of the fleet.

During the exercise the following were allocated from the national armed forces to represent actions by naval forces: 154 warships; 92 auxiliary ships; 75 aircraft and helicopters; a motorized rifle battalion from the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic; an amphibious landing regiment from the Polish Armed Forces; and a marine battalion from the USSR Baltic Fleet. A total of 1,586 pieces of equipment and 24,530 persons took part.

Theme of the exercise: "Destroying Combined Enemy Naval Forces in Order to Gain Supremacy in the Baltic Sea, and Assisting Troops of the Coastal Front".

The goals of the exercise were: to improve the skills of exercise participants in preparing combined combat actions by allied fleets to destroy enemy naval forces and gain supremacy in the theater, seize the islands in the straits zone and assist Coastal Front troops advancing along the coast of the Baltic and North Seas.

Another goal was to give participants practice in organizing and exercising control over allied naval forces, and practice in coordinating the efforts of these forces and maintaining efficient cooperation while conducting combined combat actions. A third goal was to improve the skills of the participants in organizing and carrying out movements of troops and military cargos, including their transfer in naval transshipment-offloading areas, and to improve the level of sea training of the ships and the training of the units, large units and staffs.

The exercise was carried out in three stages.

During the first stage planning and preparation of combined actions by allied fleets were worked on. The second stage dealt with the conduct of combined combat actions by allied fleets when conventional means of destruction and active radioelectronic warfare are employed.

TS #208617
Copy # 6

During the third stage commanders and staffs improved their skills in planning and preparing combined actions by allied naval forces in the North Sea under conditions of employment of conventional and nuclear weapons.

This was the first time an exercise of this nature and scale had been conducted in the Baltic Sea under the direction of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces. This was the reason for the great significance of the exercise and for the great feeling of responsibility on the part of all participants in the exercise for the high-quality fulfilment of the tasks assigned them.

We must also mention that the situation in the exercise area was complicated due to the intensified activity of NATO reconnaissance. This made it necessary to work out and implement a number of additional measures to ensure safe navigation for ships, and also to take measures to camouflage the actions of allied naval forces participating in the exercise.

The Concept of the Actions of the Sides

(Diagram No. _____)

The two sides in the exercise were called the "West" and the "East".

The "West" planned to begin military actions against the "East" at daybreak on 6 September with the delivery of surprise massed strikes by aviation employing conventional weapons. It planned to defeat the "East" with a decisive offensive, seize the territory of the German Democratic Republic, and then to develop the offensive on the Berlin, Poznan and Warsaw axes and along the coast to Gdynia and Kaliningrad.

The "West" intended to use troops from the Northern Army Group on the Berlin axis and, on the coastal axis, a combined army corps in cooperation with combined naval forces from the Baltic Straits zone.

The combined naval forces of the "West" had to destroy the "East's" groupings of fleets in order to gain supremacy in the straits zone and to prevent amphibious landings on the islands and the movement of the "East's" naval forces into the North Sea.

Subsequently, the task was to destroy allied naval forces located to the east of Bornholm Island and to assist the ground forces by landing amphibious landing forces.

TS #208617
Copy # 6



In order to accomplish the tasks indicated, the following groupings of forces were created from the combined naval forces of the "West": 16 submarines for actions in the Baltic Sea; more than 65 strike and antisubmarine ships for actions in the western portion of the Baltic Sea and in the straits zone on the central and Sund axes; up to 55 ships on the Kiel-Belt axis; and in the Skagerrak and Kattegat Straits, a permanent large unit of combined NATO naval forces consisting of seven destroyers and escort vessels.

In the North Sea, the "West" deployed groupings consisting of up to 120 warships of various types to combat submarines and protect its own sea lines of communication.

Provision was made to support actions by forces of warships on all axes with carrier-based ground-attack and shore-based ground-attack aviation.

✓ It was assumed military actions would begin and be conducted with conventional means of destruction. When a threat existed that the intended goals in continental and naval theaters would not be achieved, a switch to the employment of nuclear weapons was planned. ✓

The "East" -- if the "West" developed its military actions -- had made provisions to repel the offensive, defeat enemy land groupings and naval forces by decisive aggressive actions and seize the Baltic Straits zone.

When the "West" switched to the employment of nuclear weapons, the "East" also planned to switch to actions employing nuclear means. ✓

The Coastal Front, according to the concept, was supposed to operate on the Saxony-Netherlands and Jutland operational axes. Its task was to prepare and carry out an offensive operation to defeat the main forces of the Northern Army Group and, together with allied fleets, to seize the Baltic Straits zone.

The front had to deliver the main strike, using two combined-arms armies and one tank army, on the general axis toward Hannover and Brussels; the second strike by one combined-arms army had to be delivered on the Lübeck and Olberg axis. ✓

✓ The immediate task of the front was to defeat the opposing groupings of the "West" and, in conjunction with the 2nd Fleet, to carry out a [landing operation] in the Baltic Straits zone in order to seize the islands

TS #208617
Copy # 6

in the straits zone (Sjaelland, Møn, Falster, Lolland) and create conditions favorable to the movement of warship forces of the allied fleets into the North Sea. On the sixth or seventh day of the operation the Horsens-Ølgod line, the Norden-Osnabrück line and Fyn Island were to be seized.

Subsequently, the front had to develop the offensive on the Brussels axis, destroy the approaching reserves of the 'West', and make an assault crossing of the Rhine. The front also had to approach the northeastern borders of the 'Light Blue' on the eleventh to thirteenth day of the operation, seize the Jutland Peninsula and, together with allied fleets, set up an antilanding defense.

The 1st Fleet -- carrying out, together with forces of the other Soviet fleets and Long Range Aviation, the task of destroying strike carriers, submarines, groupings of warships, and convoys in the North and Norwegian Seas -- also had to prepare and carry out an operation in cooperation with the 2nd and 3rd Fleets to defeat the 'West's' naval forces in the straits zone and the Baltic Sea and to gain supremacy in the theater.

One hundred sixteen nuclear warheads were allocated to the fleet for carrying out tasks in the Baltic and North Sea areas.

The 2nd Fleet, in cooperation with forces of the 1st and 3rd Fleets, had to destroy enemy naval forces in the western portion of the Baltic Sea and in the straits zone.

Using attached forces from the 1st and 3rd Fleets, on the morning of the fourth day of the operation the 2nd Fleet had to land an amphibious landing force consisting of the 7th Army Corps and 125th Marine Regiment on the Falster and Sjaelland islands, and to assist front troops from the sea in seizing these islands.

The task of providing operational cover from the northern axis for the amphibious landing force during sea transit and during the amphibious assault was assigned to the 1st Fleet. The 3rd Fleet was to provide cover from the Kiel-Belt axis.

To ensure a successful amphibious landing, the 26th Airborne Division from the Polish Armed Forces was landed on the Falster and Sjaelland islands.

TS #208617
Copy # 6

The 3rd Fleet, in cooperation with forces of the 1st and 2nd Fleets, had to destroy the grouping of the "West's" naval forces located on the Kiel-Belt axis west of the Rügen Island-Møn Island line. It had to blockade the Great Belt Strait, cover front troops advancing on the Jutland axis against attacks from the sea, and protect the sea shipments for them.

After seizing the islands in the straits zone and the Jutland Peninsula, the allied fleets had to move their main forces into the North Sea in order to destroy the enemy's groupings of warships, landing forces and convoys, to cover Coastal Front troops against attacks from the sea in cooperation with the air forces and air defense forces, and to protect sea-shipment for Coastal Front troops.

In the Baltic Sea and the straits zone the concept of the exercise provided that the balance of forces of the two sides was to be established at 1:1.8, in favor of the "East's" fleets. This corresponded to the actual situation and, when the forces were used correctly, ensured the accomplishment of assigned combat tasks by the "East's" fleets.

The Supreme High Command organized the cooperation of the three allied fleets during the operation.

The organization of cooperation among naval forces when carrying out individual tasks was assigned to: in the North Sea, in the open portion of the Baltic Sea and on the Sund axis of the straits zone -- the commander of the 1st Fleet; during the preparation and conduct of the amphibious landing operation -- the commander of the 2nd Fleet; and on the Kiel-Belt axis -- the commander of the 3rd Fleet.

The commander of the amphibious landing force had to organize cooperation between the troops of the amphibious and airborne landing forces when seizing the islands in the straits zone.

The air defense of allied naval forces at bases, in dispersal areas, and during actions at sea within the range of air defense fighter aviation was assigned to the 22nd and 127th Corps and the 33rd Division from the unified system of air defense forces of the Warsaw Pact countries in their zones of responsibility; and during combined actions by naval forces and front troops, the air defense was assigned to allocated forces and means of the front air defense and the air defense forces of the Warsaw Pact countries.

TS #208617
Copy # 6

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 10 of 24 Pages

The readiness of the forces of the allied fleets to carry out their assigned tasks was set for 5 September at the end of the day.

The Initial Situation of 1600 Hours on 3 September
and the Decisions of the "East"
(Diagram Nos. _____)

In accordance with this concept, an initial situation was set up which was characterized by the following.

During the second half of August, the "West" undertook a number of military-political actions aimed at the sharp aggravation of the international situation in Europe. It intentionally created difficulties for commercial shipping in the straits zone, prohibited the passage of ships through the Kiel Canal, and began to curtail its shipping in the Baltic Sea. At the same time it began direct preparation for the unleashing of war.

Under the guise of an exercise, the "West" deployed groupings of ground forces, aviation and naval forces. Large units and units were brought up to full strength and new contingents were activated.

The "West's" air defense forces and air forces increased their readiness. Aviation carried out air reconnaissance more actively along the state border and also in the North and Baltic seas.

In accordance with the concept, the combined naval forces of the "West" deployed submarines and groupings of warships for actions in the Baltic Sea. A permanent large unit from the combined NATO naval forces and a "Green" carrier strike large unit were maneuvering in the Kattegat Strait and the Norwegian Sea, respectively.

The main forces of the "Brown", "Gray" and "Turquoise" fleets were transferred to subordination to the Combined Command of the Baltic Straits zone.

In response to the "West's" preparations, the "East" brought its armed forces up to full combat readiness and fully mobilized and deployed them. In the border zone, troops from the Coastal Front covered the state border.

TS #208617
Copy # 6

~~TOP SECRET~~

Allied fleets took secret measures to increase their combat readiness, built up their combat duty forces, dispersed them, and set up all types of defense and protection for the bases and installations of the fleets.

In accordance with this situation and the tasks assigned, the commanders of the allied fleets made the following decisions.

The decision of the commander of the 2nd Fleet amounted to the following. During the period of threat, the main efforts of the forces of the fleet were concentrated on searching for and tracking enemy submarines in the operations zone of the fleet, on preventing the secret laying of mines in coastal channels and outer roadsteads, and on ensuring the concealed deployment of forces in the departure areas.

With the beginning of combat actions, the main efforts of the strike forces of the fleet, in cooperation with allied fleets, were concentrated on destroying groupings of enemy warships in the western portion of the Baltic Sea; the minesweeping and antisubmarine forces of two flotillas were directed toward maintaining operating conditions in the zone of responsibility of the fleet.

Provisions were made to organize convoys in order to protect sea shipments of military cargos via coastal channels.

After sea and artillery preparation it was planned to land the main amphibious landing forces in Fakse Bay (Sjaelland Island) in two echelons; part of the forces were to land on Falster Island. The first echelon was landed by the "shore to shore" method.

It was planned that the troops of the landing force would embark in the Baltiysk and Warnemünde areas and in the ports of Swinoujście, Rostock and Warnemünde.

It was decided to carry out the transit of the landing detachments of the first echelon during darkness under cover provided by the allocated forces and means from the 1st and 3rd Fleets.

To ensure a successful landing, provisions were made to sweep mines from channels leading to the landing points and, with allocated frogmen, to breach antilanding obstacles.

The commander of the 7th Army Corps, in his decision regarding the actions of troops of the landing force on the shore, concentrated their

TS #208617
Copy # 6

main efforts on Sjaelland Island. In order to do this, it was planned to land the 27th Amphibious Landing Division, the 125th Marine Regiment and the 37th Motorized Rifle Division (minus two motorized rifle regiments) in Fakse Bay. Together with the 26th Airborne Division, their task was to defeat units of the "Gray" Sjaelland Division and the "Dark Blue" infantry brigade, and to seize the island.

The first day's task consisted of seizing an area 30 to 40 kilometers deep. The second echelon (the 37th Motorized Rifle Division minus two motorized rifle regiments) was subsequently to be committed to battle; it was to complete the defeat of the enemy, sealing off the "Gray" capital with two regiments.

The battle formation was composed of two echelons: in the first echelon were the 27th Amphibious Landing Division, the 125th Marine Regiment, the 26th Airborne Division and two motorized rifle regiments from the 37th Motorized Rifle Division; the second echelon contained the 37th Motorized Rifle Division (minus the two motorized rifle regiments).

It was intended to land the two motorized rifle regiments from the 37th Motorized Rifle Division on Falster Island. Their task was to clear the island of the enemy, and then to move one regiment to the zone of the main forces of the division on Sjaelland Island, and to seize Lolland Island with the other regiment.

The decision of the commander of the 3rd Fleet stipulated that before the beginning of combat actions, combat duty forces were to be built up, the concealed deployment of strike forces was to be ensured in the area of impending combat actions on the Kiel-Belt axis, and stable operating conditions were to be maintained.

With the beginning of combat actions, the main efforts of the strike and antisubmarine forces of the fleet, in cooperation with the 1st and 2nd Fleets, were directed toward destroying enemy warship groupings and submarines west of the Rügen Island-Møn Island line on the axis toward the Kiel Canal and the Belt Straits.

To support the actions of the strike forces, it was planned to lay active minefields at the eastern end of the Fehmarnsund Strait and at the southern end of the Grønsund Strait.

The appropriate forces were allocated to cover the amphibious landing force, which was being landed by the 2nd Fleet, against attacks by enemy

TS #208617
Copy # 6

warship forces on the Kiel-Belt axis. Provisions were made for actions by forces to protect sea shipments in support of the Coastal Front.

After the Kiel Canal and the straits zone had been seized, it was planned to move part of the forces into the North Sea, to set up basing for them, and to develop aggressive combat actions to destroy groupings of enemy warships, disrupt his sea shipments, and assist the troops of the Coastal Front.

In order to fulfil the assigned tasks, the commander of the 1st Fleet decided to concentrate the main efforts of the fleet, in cooperation with forces of the 2nd and 3rd Fleets, on defeating the main groupings of enemy warships on the Sund-Kattegat axis and in the zone in the vicinity of the straits, employing both conventional means of destruction and nuclear weapons. With the switch to nuclear actions, it was planned to deliver a powerful first nuclear strike, expending 56 nuclear warheads. ✓

It was planned to blockade the Sund Strait and to set up a mine-missile-artillery line between Rügen and Bornholm Islands in order to break up the enemy groupings and destroy them in detail.

In the North Sea, combat duty forces and missile-carrying aircraft were designated to destroy aircraft carriers and strike and antisubmarine forces of the "West", to disrupt the enemy's sea shipments, and to thwart a buildup of forces in the Baltic Sea. It was assumed that combat duty forces would be built up during the period of threat.

By the actions of surface ships, submarines, missile-carrying aircraft and antisubmarine aircraft, it was planned to provide cover for the amphibious landing force of the 2nd Fleet in embarkation areas, during sea transit, and during the amphibious assault.

The efforts of warship and aviation antisubmarine forces were aimed at searching for and destroying enemy submarines in the Baltic Sea. It was proposed to concentrate minesweeping forces and obstacle-clearing means on carrying out antimine and engineer measures on the approaches to their own bases and the straits zone.

This is the essence of the decisions made by the commanders of the allied fleets in accordance with the initial situation.

TS #208617
Copy # 6

A Brief Outline of Combat Actions

The Situation at 0600 on 6 September and the Decisions of the Participants in the Exercise Concerning the Action of the Allied Naval Forces of the "East"

(Diagram Nos. _____)

At 0525 on 6 September, the "West" unleashed military actions with massed air strikes employing conventional means of destruction against troops, nuclear means of attack, airfields, naval bases and warships of the allied fleets, and basing points.

After air and artillery preparation, groupings of the "West's" ground forces went over to the offensive on the coastal and Berlin axes. At the same time, forces and means for the antilanding defense of the islands in the straits zone were built up.

Using carrier-based aviation, shore-based aviation, warships and submarines, the "West's" naval forces initiated combat actions against the allied naval forces of the "East" and attempted to destroy groupings of their warships in the zone in the vicinity of the straits and in the Baltic Sea. Part of the forces carried out actions designated to blockade the naval forces of the "East" located at basing points.

In the North Sea, submarines were searched for and destroyed, and troops and equipment were transported from the territory of the "Dark Blue" to the European continent.

On the Hannover axis, using troops of the Coastal Front allocated to cover the border, the "East" repelled the attack of the enemy, who had gone over to the offensive. The main forces were regrouped in order to go over to a decisive offensive.

On the Jutland axis, the front went over to the offensive with forces of the 5th Army and began to concentrate troops to carry out an amphibious landing operation.

Front aviation delivered strikes against enemy troops and air means and, in cooperation with the aviation of the 1st and 2nd Fleets, carried out tasks during the air operation in accordance with the plan of the Supreme High Command.

TS #208617
Ccopy # 6

In cooperation with the air defense forces and means of the fleets, the air defense forces of the countries repelled attacks by the "West's" aviation against troops, naval bases, ports, and dispersed basing points for warships, and covered the forces of the fleets in the areas of combat actions.

In accordance with the decisions of the commanders, allied fleets began combat actions to destroy the "West's" naval forces in the Baltic Sea and straits zone, and prepared to land an amphibious landing force on the islands. The strike forces of the fleets waged battles with groupings of enemy warships in the western portion of the Baltic Sea, in the zone in the vicinity of the straits and on the Kiel-Belt axis.

The antisubmarine forces of the "East's" fleets searched for and destroyed submarines of the "West" throughout the entire Baltic Sea.

Minesweeping forces were deployed to sweep mines from channels on the approaches to naval bases and ports.

In cooperation with Long Range Aviation, the 1st Fleet delivered strikes using naval missile-carrying aviation forces and submarines against enemy aviation strike large units, groupings of warships, and convoys in the North Sea.

As a result of the first strikes, allied fleets lost 12 warships and boats, and nine were damaged. The system of control was partially disrupted.

Thus, 35 minutes earlier the "West" had unleashed aggression. The ground forces and fleets of the "East" had put their operational plans into effect. The commanders of the fleets did not introduce any changes into the decisions which had been adopted earlier.

During the second stage of the command-staff exercise a whole series of combined tactical exercises of the forces of the allied fleets were conducted, including:

- protecting the departure of warships from bases;
- a combined strike by aviation, missile boats and torpedo boats against a detachment of warships, including the carrying out of combined missile launches and artillery firings;
- the forming of landing detachments, embarkation of troops, and sea transit of the landing force, including the working out of all types of defense and protection;

TS #208617
Copy # 6

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 16 of 24 Pages

- attacks by submarines against the ships of the enemy landing force;
- search for submarines and destruction of them;
- an amphibious assault, landing of an amphibious landing force, and antilanding defense of the coast;
- an assault crossing of a wide water obstacle by troops of the amphibious landing force;
- actions by troops and naval forces in a naval transshipment area.

The Situation at 2000 on 15 September and the Decisions
of the Participants in the Exercise

(Diagram Nos.)

Then, events developed in the following manner during the third stage of the exercise.

The "West", having suffered defeat in the border area engagement and been subjected to strikes by the "East", was forced to withdraw into the depth of its territory on the Hannover axis. After six days, by the morning of 15 September, the "West" was waging difficult defensive battles on the Emden-Lingen-Rheine-Münster line.

Having lost a large part of the Jutland Peninsula and the islands in the straits zone, resistance by the "West" was sharply reduced on the Jutland axis. At 1000 on 18 September the "Gray" announced their withdrawal from the war.

The "West's" naval forces, having suffered heavy losses in warships and aircraft, moved their remaining forces from the straits zone and continued blockading actions in the Skagerrak Strait in order to prevent the buildup of the "East's" naval forces in the North Sea. They transported troops and equipment by convoys and single transports from the territory of the "Dark Blue" and the "Green" to the European continent and to the ports of the "Turquoise", and supported actions by the ground forces. They prepared for the landing of an amphibious landing force in the Helgoland Bay area.

At 1510 on 15 September the "West", having failed to achieve the goals of the operation by employing conventional means of destruction, and threatened with the defeat of its troops and naval forces, switched to the employment of nuclear weapons.

The "East", having repelled the invasion of the "West" on the Berlin and coastal axes, switched to offensive actions on land and at sea.

TS #208617
Copy # 6

~~TOP SECRET~~

Having destroyed the main enemy forces, the Coastal Front seized the Emden-Lingen-Rheine-Münster line and moved to the North Sea coast east of Emden. It defeated the opposing grouping on the Jutland axis and, together with the forces of the fleets, seized the Jutland Peninsula and the islands in the straits zone by the end of 13 September.

The allied fleets totally defeated the groupings of warships from the enemy's Combined Naval Forces in the Baltic Sea and in the straits zone, and destroyed the submarines remaining in this area. Simultaneously, they continued to clear obstacles and sweep mines from the channels in the straits zone and moved forces out for actions in the North Sea.

The "East", in turn, switched to the employment of nuclear weapons.

During combat actions from 6 through 15 September and as a result of nuclear strikes, the "East's" fleets lost nine submarines, 105 warships of various types and up to 40 percent of their aviation. In addition, 43 warships were put out of action for varied amounts of time. In this same time period, the fleets of the "West" lost one strike carrier from the "Green" carrier-strike large unit, 17 submarines, and 152 warships.

Hydraulic engineering works, industrial and warehouse buildings, liquid fuel depots and electric power lines were totally destroyed or put out of operation at the main ports and naval bases of the allied fleets of the "East". Fires broke out and obstructions were formed.

The Bykhov, Ostrov, Peenemünde, Damgarten, Leborg, Kolobrzeg, and other airfields were put out of operation.

As a result of heavy damage, the communications means and systems at the main and alternate command posts of the 1st Fleet were not operating.

The radio centers and communications installations of the 2nd and 3rd Fleets were extensively damaged.

The protected command posts of the 1st and 2nd Fleets were also put out of operation.

Under these conditions, the "East's" fleets had to move their main combat-effective forces into the North Sea and carry out tasks, which amounted to the following:

-- the 1st Fleet, with attached forces from the 2nd and 3rd Fleets and in cooperation with Long Range Aviation, had to destroy the carrier of a

TS #208617
Copy # 6

carrier strike group, inflict destruction upon the groupings of warships in the North Sea, cover the ground forces against attacks from the sea, and disrupt the enemy's sea shipments:

-- the 2nd and 3rd Fleets, using submarines and missile boats and torpedo boats, in cooperation with forces from the 1st Fleet, had to destroy groupings of enemy warships, convoys and landing forces in the North Sea in their assigned zones of responsibility.

In addition, the 2nd Fleet had to finish clearing mines from the channels in the straits zone and ensure that operating conditions were maintained in the zone. The 3rd Fleet, with an attached ground-attack fighter aviation regiment from the 2nd Fleet, had to ensure that operating conditions were maintained and protect the basing of the allied fleets along the western coast of the Jutland Peninsula and along the southern shore of the North Sea.

In conformity with these tasks and the situation which had developed, the following decisions were adopted by the fleets.

The decision of the commander of the 3rd Fleet provided for the concentration of the main efforts of the fleet, in cooperation with the 1st Fleet, on the destruction of groupings of enemy warships, convoys, and landing forces in the North Sea. Part of the forces together with the attached 27th Ground-Attack Fighter Aviation Regiment were to ensure that operating conditions were maintained in this area. It was planned to protect the basing of the forces of the allied fleets along the western coast of the Jutland Peninsula and the southern portion of the North Sea.

Protecting sea shipments for the Coastal Front was planned.

Provisions were made to eliminate the aftereffects of the employment of weapons of mass destruction in a short time and to restore the combat readiness of the forces of the fleet.

It was planned to complete the movement of the main warship forces out into the North Sea by 17 September.

The decision of the commander of the 2nd Fleet stipulated that the main efforts of the minesweeping forces were to be concentrated on clearing mines and obstacles from the channels in the straits zone. Therefore, a system of radio navigation support for minesweeping operations was set up.

TS #208617
Copy # 6

TOP SECRET

Page 19 of 24 Pages

It was planned to allocate 60 percent of the antisubmarine forces to search for and destroy submarines in the Skagerrak Strait. The setting up of a barrier of radiosonobuoys for this purpose also was planned.

It was planned to use the remaining minesweeping and antisubmarine forces in the operations zone of the fleet in the Baltic Sea.

In addition, provisions were made to set up a system of basing for forces of the allied fleets on Sjaelland Island and on the eastern coast of the Jutland Peninsula.

For protection against weapons of mass destruction and to eliminate their aftereffects, warship forces were dispersed and the special battalion was redeployed.

The commander of the 1st Fleet decided to direct the main efforts of the fleet, in cooperation with the Northern Fleet, the 2nd and 3rd Fleets and Long Range Aviation, toward destroying the carrier of a carrier strike group, strike groupings of warships, landing detachments, and troop convoys of the enemy. He also decided to assist the troops of the Coastal Front in seizing the southern shore of the North Sea.

Employing part of the forces and the massed use of mine weapons, it was planned to blockade the English Channel and the ports and bases of the "East" (sic) in this area.

The actions of forces in the North Sea were to be organized into two zones, the southern and the northern zones.

It was planned to use 60 percent of the strike forces for actions in the southern zone (the main axis), and the remaining 40 percent in the northern zone.

The purpose in combating submarines was to provide antisubmarine defense for coastal lines of communication and for the routes for the deployment of the strike forces of the fleet.

It was planned to combat mines and clear the channels in the areas of the naval bases in the Baltic Sea with minesweeping forces making extensive use of detonating means.

The fleet commander planned to eliminate the aftereffects of the employment of weapons of mass destruction and restore combat readiness by

TS #208617
Copy # 6

TOP SECRET



using contingents for the protection of naval bases and the rear of the fleet in cooperation with civil defense contingents. The main efforts of the fleet were directed toward rescuing personnel and carrying out urgent emergency rehabilitation work and emergency combat repair of the strike forces of the fleet.

This is how the allied fleets planned to accomplish assigned tasks during the third stage of the exercise.

After decisions adopted in accordance with the situation at 2000 on 15 September were heard, the exercise was concluded.

I am able to report that there were no incidents or accidents, and no equipment was put out of operation during the exercise. Also, no ship left the exercise area without having accomplished its assigned tasks.

In conclusion, allow me to direct your attention to some matters of staff duty.

First of all, during the preparation and conduct of the command-staff exercise, the participants performed a great amount of work in planning combat actions, drawing up combat documents, and organizing control over forces while they were accomplishing their assigned tasks.

The majority of the documents drawn up in the staffs of the fleets and large units deserve a high rating. The standard of the staffs in executing documents has increased and the quality of the documents has improved.

As a rule, the materials which were drawn up when preparing decisions on the employment of forces were substantiated by convincing calculations. Electronic computer equipment was extensively used; this was of assistance in adopting optimal decisions. During the exercise, a total of (number omitted) operational-tactical problems were solved using the computer centers of the fleets.

However, there also were shortcomings.

Some documents were not drawn up clearly, were not formulated specifically; this made it difficult to understand, and consequently to implement, them. Occasionally, well-executed graphic documents contained unwieldy tables and explanatory legends.

TS #208617
Copy # 6

During the exercise, important in the work of the staffs were the matters of organizing cooperation among allied fleets and of controlling coalition groupings at both the operational and tactical levels. The staffs devoted a great deal of attention to these matters.

The practical working out of the matters of cooperation was aided to a significant extent by the fact that the exercise included actual actions at sea conducted by a large number of skeleton forces of various branch arms, which carried out a whole series of combat drills in addition to working out tactical methods for combined actions.

Combined operating documents on cooperation were subjected to good practical verification in the exercise. On the one hand, the viability of these documents and the need for them were confirmed. On the other hand, we can note that the staff officers of the allied fleets mastered these documents and skilfully employed them.

Formalized combat documents, codes and various brevity code tables, which had been worked out jointly, were used extensively in the control process. These documents were of considerable help in improving the quality of control, reduced the time needed for the passage of information, increased the stability and security of control, and for all practical purposes eliminated the difficulties connected with language differences.

The exercise which we held showed that the organs of control of the fleets are prepared, can ensure reliable control over coalition groupings of the allied fleets, and can implement close cooperation among the fleets.

At the same time, some matters must be studied further and resolutely mastered.

This pertains primarily to control of forces under conditions of active radioelectronic warfare. The staffs are confronted with the difficult task of ensuring reliable control under these conditions.

It is well known that radioelectronic warfare involves basically the disruption of enemy radioelectronic means and systems of control of forces and weapons, and the ensuring of stable control of our own forces and weapons when the enemy is using means of neutralization.

We must mention that radioelectronic warfare attains particular importance under the conditions found in the Baltic. The reason for this is that in this theater the probable enemy has a deeply echeloned system

TS #208617
Copy # 6

for radiotechnical observation which enables him to monitor all actions by allied fleets throughout practically the entire area with great accuracy. We should also keep in mind that NATO has established here a far-flung communications system, including back-up communications, that makes it possible to reliably control forces at sea and troops on shore.

All of the above predetermines the need for putting enemy radioelectronic means out of operation or neutralizing them; this will be of great assistance in achieving the concealment of actions by naval forces.

During the exercise the staffs of the fleets devoted their attention to radioelectronic warfare. A specially worked out plan was implemented for electronic countermeasures against support forces. However, we should mention that allied fleets still do not have the necessary skills to accomplish this important matter and are not equipped with radioelectronic warfare means.

Thorough study and experimental research is required to improve the system of radioelectronic warfare, and we think that the attention of all organs of control of staffs must be centered on this matter. We are confronted with the task of finding a way to accomplish this matter, to attain a situation where the training of naval forces and organs of control and communications would always include the practical working out of the whole aggregate of radioelectronic warfare measures.

Comrades!

The following were put into operation to provide control over naval forces during the exercise: 72 communications centers of various types; five communications regiments and battalions; 170 equipment rooms of communications centers, and radio and radio-relay sets in motor vehicles; and seven stationary radio transmitting and receiving centers. In addition, 150 radio nets and radio links and 225 telephone and telegraph wire communications channels were set up, with extensive use of secure communications equipment.

Radio-relay communications channels were used for the exercise in the Świnoujście-Peenemünde and Rostock-Peenemünde sectors.

Government telephone communications were also widely employed. A total of 15 field communications centers and sets were set up in the territory of the three allied countries for this purpose, and eight centers

TS #208617
Copy # 6

in a stationary net were put into operation.

During the exercise the operation of communications was stable. There were no disruptions in communications and no delays in transmitting information. The average proper working order factor was 94 percent for radio communications channels, and 97 percent for telephone and telegraph wire communications channels.

During the period from 4 to 9 September, inclusive, 8,750 telegrams were transmitted and received through the communications centers of the staffs of the fleets and of the directing body. More than eight thousand conversations took place via secure telephone channels.

On the whole, the communications units of the allied fleets coped successfully with their assigned tasks during the exercise and displayed a good level of specialty training.

Under present-day conditions for the conduct of combat actions at sea, which will be distinguished by their fast-moving and highly fluid nature, the efficiency of the entire control-system, and primarily the efficiency of operation of the command posts, are assigned a special role. In other words, primary importance is attached to the problem of reducing the time used in the control cycle, i.e., the time spent on: obtaining and transmitting data on the enemy, analyzing data and adopting a decision, accurately and clearly formulating tasks, and rapidly transmitting them to subordinate forces.

Experience and research work show that the most effective, and perhaps the only, way to reduce the time used in the control cycle is to automate the entire control process. It is already impossible to limit ourselves to using computer equipment only for making the most labor-consuming operational-tactical calculations, even though this is, of course, also important. It is necessary to convert to the integrated automation of all control processes: i.e., the time has come to introduce automated control systems in the fleets.

The Staff of the Combined Armed Forces, together with the fleets, is finishing working out a standard concept for the setting up of an automated control system for a fleet and also the general tactical-technical requirements for it; lists are being drawn up of the information and computational tasks which must be worked out in this system.

TS #208517
Copy # 6

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 24 of 24 Pages

In our opinion, the matter of the further development of the system of command posts for fleets and their large units requires special attention. At the present time not all of the main large units have the necessary protected command posts; mobile land-based and ship-based command posts have not been set up everywhere; airborne control posts have not been established. Under present-day conditions we can hardly count on the stability of a control system without these.

The system of organization of the communications of allied fleets also needs improvement. The system we have is still too stationary and is not sufficiently resistant to jamming. Tropospheric communications means are not much employed in the fleets.

The search for ways to increase the effectiveness and reliability of control over naval forces must become a subject of constant concern for our staffs and for all levels of combat control.

Allow me to complete my report on this note.

Thank you for your attention.

TS #208617
Copy # 6

~~TOP SECRET~~