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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

1 December 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Ensuring the
Concealment of Troop Deployment When
Preparing an Offensive Operation


1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article dwells on camouflage and deception measures to ensure concealed deployment of ground troops and aircraft. The authors discuss radiotechnical deception techniques and various camouflaged deployment and support procedures to elude enemy land-based and satellite reconnaissance. This article appeared in Issue No. 1 (83) for 1968.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned

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
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Intelligence Information Special Report

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COUNTRY USSR

DATE OF INFO. Early 1968

[Redacted]

DATE

1 December 1976

SUBJECT

MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Ensuring the Concealment of Troop Deployment When Preparing an Offensive Operation

SOURCE Documentary
Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 1 (83) for 1968 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The authors of this article, General-Leytenant I. Katyshkin and Colonel N. Pavlikov, discuss several methods of ensuring concealed troop deployment, which include operational camouflage and deception measures against enemy land-based and satellite reconnaissance. The article emphasizes the need for advance planning and preparation, and dwells on radiotechnical deception and silence routines. Some of the other methods are to reduce traffic control during troop movements, improve rocket troop deployment, technical and logistical support, and organize secure troop control. Aircraft should be moved in small groups, and permanent airfields utilized in combat.

End of Summary

[Redacted] Comment:

[Redacted]

[Redacted] General-Leytenant I. Katyshkin was Chief of Staff of the Transcaucasus Military District from 1965 to 1967.

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Ensuring the Concealment of Troop Deployment
When Preparing an Offensive Operation

by
General-Leytenant I. Katyshkin
and
Colonel N. Pavlikov

Preparing for an offensive operation always involves regroupings and deployment of troops. Concealed deployment of troops is the most important condition for achieving strategic or operational surprise. Surprise in turn creates preconditions favorable to achieving victory, even over superior enemy forces.

In the Great Patriotic War the Soviet command, when preparing strategic and front operations, often was able to conceal the axis of the main attack, the time of its delivery, regroupings of troops, and their deployment on new axes. At the same time, we know of examples in which preparations for operations were not concealed. As a whole the experience acquired is indicative of the complexity of solving this problem. Naturally, the greater the capabilities of enemy reconnaissance, the more difficult it is to achieve concealment.

The probable enemy currently has available a large number of heterogeneous reconnaissance forces and means, which in integrated use and in the absence of proper camouflage on our part permit detecting the grouping of front troops to the entire depth of their operational disposition, in any weather and at any time of day. On photographs taken by the equipment of the Samos artificial Earth satellite in cloudless weather from altitudes of 200 to 300 kilometers, aircraft in parking areas, missiles on launchers and other equipment are detected, and their coordinates are determined with high accuracy.

Therefore, military theory and practice, utilizing the experience of the Great Patriotic War and taking into account radical troop changes and the nature of the conduct of modern operations, must find new methods of achieving the maximum concealment of troop deployment when preparing a front offensive operation.

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To achieve concealment of troop deployment first requires advance preparation of the conditions for the rapid formation of an offensive grouping of front troops. It is desirable to have a permanent garrisoning of units and large units in peacetime which would permit them to move out to their axes of operations and siting areas in the shortest possible time. This is particularly important to remember during construction in connection with the accommodation of large units and units. The areas of this construction must be chosen taking into consideration the probable employment of the troops in the initial front operation. At the same time measures must be implemented so as not to disclose the axis of the main attack. But in practice this is not always done.

The most important measure ensuring concealed troop deployment and sudden initiation of an operation is operational camouflage. It must be implemented continuously to conceal the true location of troops, staffs and installations, and the nature of their activities, as well as to deceive the reconnaissance of probable enemies with simulation measures even in peacetime.

Operational camouflage and deception become especially important while preparing and during large-scale command-staff and tactical troop exercises, when it is difficult to conceal the movements of staffs and troops and the operation of their radioelectronic means, and the reconnaissance of probable enemies displays heightened interest in them.

Operational camouflage and deception measures have to be planned and implemented when preparing, and especially while conducting, each large-scale command-staff and tactical exercise. The staff of the directing body has to define the goals, and the methods and means of accomplishing them, in the exercise plan. Their assigned goal usually is to conceal the area, initiation and duration of the exercise, the number of participating staffs and troops, and the training problems they are working on. The methods are determined according to the scale of the exercise and the availability of forces and means. For example, in a front command-staff exercise a system of simulated control posts may be set up (two or three army control posts, and five or six division posts with a minimum number of officers and communications means at each), or a radio exercise conducted by staffs not participating in the particular command-staff exercise. The

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simulated posts may begin operating before the real ones and continue for some time after the command-staff exercise is completed. It is useful to activate intergarrison radio nets at the same time.

A second way to camouflage an exercise is to display it for enemy reconnaissance on a smaller scale by limiting the operation of radio means accordingly.

In all cases it is very important that the nature of the operational camouflage measures carried out in peacetime make it possible to expand them gradually to ensure later concealment of the preparation and conduct of a front offensive operation.


The correct assessment of enemy reconnaissance capabilities in any one period of time deserves special attention when organizing operational camouflage.

When preparing an operation the main type of enemy reconnaissance in the zone of the impending front offensive may be radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance, therefore radio camouflage and radio deception obviously must occupy a special place among the operational camouflage measures. Since the main attention of these types of reconnaissance will be attracted most rapidly to the permanent garrison areas and the major roadways, of course the operation of powerful shortwave radio sets must be prohibited and the operation of other column control radio means strictly limited while the troops and staffs are moving.

Other types of enemy reconnaissance also will exhibit a heightened interest in the movements of front troops. Agent reconnaissance will be activated, and reconnaissance aviation flights in violation of the national border are possible. Therefore, the front command must take all steps to detect and eliminate agents, to destroy reconnaissance aircraft, and also to camouflage its own troops. It is desirable to move troops at night, and use anti-radar means, smoke screens and artificial fog on individual sectors of routes.

The following methods may prove useful for deceiving the enemy regarding the real axis on which the main front efforts are concentrated: moving large units and units by the largest possible number of routes, moving into waiting areas or onto

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deployment lines from different directions, using routes which are improbable from the enemy point of view, and changing the direction of movement from one route to another.

Camouflaging troops in waiting areas and on deployment lines is no less important. This primarily requires using naturally camouflaging terrain features as well as artificial means to conceal the most important installations (missile launchers, tanks, radio stations and others). When time is available it is desirable to set up simulated waiting areas, command posts and deployment lines using various kinds of dummy equipment.

A well organized provost and traffic control service can play a major role in achieving concealment of troop movement and deployment.

In addition to fulfilling its assigned task, the provost and traffic control service must combat enemy sabotage-reconnaissance groups and agents on the movement routes, in the disposition areas and on deployment lines. So as not to reveal the direction of troop movement and deployment lines prematurely, it is desirable to deploy the provost and traffic control service to the appropriate routes or areas immediately before the troop movement. For these purposes the troop movement should be regulated only in bottlenecks. In other instances it is advisable to manage without traffic controllers. Troops should move along the real routes with officer guides who have learned these routes in advance.

Let us examine the methods by which individual elements of the operational disposition of the front troops achieve concealed deployment.

Of greatest interest, in our view, is ensuring the concealment of deployment of the motorized rifle divisions which are in the combined-arms armies of the front first echelon and located in immediate proximity to the national border or a few tens of kilometers away. Any movement of these divisions will be recorded by enemy reconnaissance. Therefore, the first-echelon divisions, like all front troops, must be brought to full combat readiness secretly by an efficient procedure without putting combat alert signals into effect. Moving troops to their areas of combat assignment after they have been alerted by signal,




which is an essential element of the present system of deployment, is not conducive to concealment and therefore may be used as a forced variant when the situation requires bringing the troops to combat readiness in the shortest possible time.

In systematic preparation of an offensive operation it is desirable that the first-echelon divisions, brought to increased combat readiness, be moved from permanent garrison points to departure or waiting areas gradually, by individual units and subunits, at night or under conditions of limited visibility. The missile battalions and artillery may be brought to siting areas by the same procedure, if their participation in the initial nuclear strike or in providing fire support to the troops crossing the national border, is projected. But in those instances in which enemy border guard subunits can be destroyed by motorized rifle regiments equipped with organic tanks and artillery, advance deployment of divisional artillery to conduct preparatory fire may not be required.

One of the effective methods of achieving concealed deployment of first-echelon divisions may be to have them go over to the offensive directly from permanent garrison points. In so doing the troops are brought to combat readiness and organize the offensive while located in permanent garrison points and observing everyday routine. This method may prove to be the most acceptable when the first-echelon divisions of the border military district are located from 10-15 to 30-40 kilometers from the national border.

For purposes of concealed deployment of first-echelon motorized rifle divisions, all materiel necessary for initiating combat actions must be at the permanent garrison points, and increased mobile reserves of fuel and ammunition must be loaded onto motor transport.

Concealment of the preparation of the rocket troops to fulfil combat tasks can be achieved primarily by selecting the most desirable methods of deploying large units and units at siting areas and of organizing missile technical support. It seems to us that under conditions in which the garrison points of the missile and missile technical units are best concealed from enemy reconnaissance in peacetime (in comparison with the other branch arms) it is desirable to develop their combat activity at



these points or nearby (five to ten kilometers away). The appropriate routine should be maintained at the siting areas to prevent their penetration by enemy agents, and camouflage measures should be implemented. The movement to the siting areas must be planned so that the missile units are not in them for a long time before combat actions begin.

Under the existing missile technical support system the give-away sign is the supplying of completely ready missiles or warheads to the rocket troops. The negative effect of this sign may be reduced if the storage and preparation of delivery vehicles is organized in the missile brigades, and helicopters are used to supply warheads to the troops. The warheads must be loaded onto helicopters and unloaded in places which are concealed from observation and under appropriate security.

The most favorable conditions for concealing the deployment of the rocket troops could be provided by garrisoning the missile brigades and their supporting missile technical bases appropriately, and even more by setting up storage for the fueled missiles designated for the initial launch, and the prepared warheads for them, right in the missile brigades.

One of the hard-to-conceal elements of an operational disposition is front aviation. Its flying is easily recorded by enemy radiotechnical reconnaissance, and the permanent basing airfields are well known. Having aircraft take off from these airfields and land at alternate ones can be interpreted by the enemy as preparation for a front offensive operation, if such flights are not made frequently in peacetime. Therefore, in a number of instances it is desirable to prepare aviation to fulfil combat tasks at the permanent airfields and make the first combat sortie from them at the beginning of the operation. But, obviously, we will use this method only when the enemy has no means available for delivering sudden nuclear strikes against the permanent airfields before front aviation takes off from them.

But should it become necessary to rebase front aviation, the flights must be made by small groups of aircraft and at low altitudes to conceal the rebasing. Accordingly, the new homing and ground control radiotechnical means should not begin operating prior to the onset of combat actions but, on the contrary, their former operating routine should be maintained at



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the permanent airfields at which, in addition, flight operations must be simulated according to peacetime routine. The rebasing of aviation to alternate airfields has to be planned and carried out so that the air units remain there for the minimum time required to organize combat actions from these airfields.

To achieve concealment in preparing an operation, it is desirable that the front radiotechnical troops be deployed in advance, and committed to action right at the beginning of the operation. The radiotechnical means of large units of the Air Defense Forces of the Country, which are deployed and operating in peacetime, should be used for reconnaissance of air targets and control of the surface-to-air missile troops prior to the operation.

Success in deploying front troops will depend on how skilful and well organized control of them is. For secure control of troop deployment the control system must be especially carefully thought out and prepared to the required extent in advance along the axes of troop actions. Previously prepared front and army control posts should be occupied secretly, by moving to them primarily at night. The time from the moment the staffs arrive at the field control posts to the initiation of combat actions must be so minimal as to allow that only the actual tasks of organizing and checking control from them be carried out.

Troop control in the deployment period has to be based on existing communications lines and channels. Wire communications via high-frequency channels or with the use of secure communications equipment must form the basis of communications in this period. Intergarrison radio nets and links may be used in an emergency. In so doing it is very important to maintain their former operating routine.

In conclusion we will explain two points which, in our opinion, are very important.

First. Camouflage of troops and installations against reconnaissance from space must occupy a special place in the operational camouflage system. The system of camouflage measures during an overflight of artificial Earth reconnaissance satellites may include: limiting troop movements; restoring camouflage taken off combat equipment to carry out exercises,

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periodic servicing and other work; turning off the main illumination at positions, airfields and bases at night; turning off the radiotechnical means operating on emission; simulating combat activities at dummy rocket and radiotechnical troop positions, airfields, bases and other installations.

We think that camouflage against reconnaissance from space produces good results if all measures taken for this purpose form a harmonious system and are centrally planned throughout the territory of a border military district or group of forces. The special section of the plan for operational camouflage against artificial Earth reconnaissance satellites must define the following: the main installations to be camouflaged; measures to be implemented at these installations; simulated installations, the forces and means assigned to give the appearance of activity at them, and the nature of this activity; the procedure for reporting on the flight of reconnaissance satellites over the installations; and, the forces and means to monitor the implementation of camouflage measures at major installations.

On the basis of the system already set up for centralized reporting on the flights of hostile artificial Earth satellites, it is desirable that periodic training sessions (once or twice monthly) in implementing the camouflage measures outlined by the plan, be run at the major installations, and that the quality of their implementation be monitored.

Second. Of no little importance to ensuring deployment of troops in the shortest possible time and to achieving its concealment, is advance preparation of the territory of the military district or group of forces as part of a theater of military operations.

In support of the rocket troops this preparation must include reconnaissance of siting areas, conduct of topogeodetic operations, and reconnaissance, preparation and testing of trafficability of the routes for moving out to the siting areas and maneuvering between them.

In addition to the main airfields, front aviation requires establishing alternate and simulated airfields, reconnoitering sectors of paved roads and terrain suitable for the landing and take-off of aircraft and deciding the procedure for completely



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


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equipping these sectors as runways prior to the operation.

Conducting reconnaissance of the concentration areas of troops, rear services units and facilities to be used as departure areas up to the beginning of the operation, and of the deployment lines if they are stipulated by the plan, is required, as is preparing the routes of advance.

Providing control requires secretly preparing protected command posts, communications centers, and receiving and transmitting radio centers. It also is desirable to prepare simulated field control posts of operational staffs by having radio means operating at them.



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