MEMORANDUM FOR: Crisis Management
National Security Council Staff

SUBJECT: Stages of Soviet Military Readiness

1. The attached paper is in response to your questions regarding Soviet military preparedness.

2. Rather than delay your receipt of the requested information, we are responding at this time with the following caveats. The paper was prepared by CIA analysts. It has been coordinated within this Agency at the analyst level, but it has not yet been subjected to the formal coordination process within the Directorate of Intelligence. Therefore, it cannot be considered in all respects to represent final CIA judgments.

3. The paper relies heavily on previously published reports. There are several judgments, however, which differ from those appearing in past CIA publications and National Intelligence Estimates. These changes arise from new information and new analysis. Key changes are as follows:

   --Based on intelligence estimates of the readiness of Soviet theater forces in the forward area, the recent WMCCS command and control communications net assessment study concluded that these forces are maintained at higher readiness than comparable US forces.
-- With respect to ICBM forces, we have revised our assessment of the effect of long gyroscope operation time (an individual missile constraint) on the force readiness. We now believe that there is no technical constraint on the maintenance of a high percentage of the ICBM force in a state of full combat readiness for long periods--i.e., months.

-- Based on inference from known Soviet practices in operating general purpose submarines, we believe that some ballistic missile submarines in port are kept in readiness for immediate combat.

-- Recently acquired knowledge of the planned dispersal of Long Range Aviation (LRA) regiments to alternate airfields has caused us to change our judgment on the survivability of LRA aircraft.

-- Better knowledge of the peacetime alert status of Air Defense Aviation regiments has caused a reduction in our estimates of the reaction time of alert interceptors.

-- Similarly, better knowledge of non-alert SAM battalions has caused an upward revision in our estimate of the time required for full SAM readiness.

-- Higher estimates of day-to-day VTA aircraft operational availability have led to a decrease in the time estimated for airborne troops to reach full combat readiness and be launched on their mission.

These changes in our estimates have not in all cases been exposed to other components of the intelligence community, and they may not meet full community concurrence.
4. The attached paper includes a summary of key findings.

Attachments:
A. "Stages of Soviet Military Readiness,"
B. Background Reports as Listed.
THE STAGES OF SOVIET MILITARY READINESS
THE STAGES OF SOVIET MILITARY READINESS

Summary

The Soviets have an established alerting procedure that is somewhat similar to that of the US Defense Conditions (DEFCONs). The Soviets have three stages of readiness -- constant, increased, and full -- as opposed to the five US DEFCONs. It should be noted, however, that the Soviets have a different perception of readiness than does the US. They appear to rely heavily upon strategic warning (or what they call the "Threatening Period") which they believe will precede any major use of military forces. This may be one reason why their strategic forces are normally maintained at lower levels of readiness than their US counterparts.

The Soviet command and control system is capable of supporting a variety of alert options, and there are no known weaknesses in it that would result in a loss of control if the system is not attacked. In fact, during those few crises in which we have been able to detect an increase in Soviet military readiness, no significant control problems were noted. The Soviets have also demonstrated the ability to change readiness posture on a basis. We have seen no evidence to
suggest that the Soviets make automatic responses to changes in US readiness. They do, however, have an excellent capability to detect changes.

The time required to achieve full combat readiness varies considerably among the forces. Some forces can achieve this posture within minutes, others hours, and others days. Nonetheless, the Soviets could generate a large portion of their forces, both strategic and theater, to full combat readiness within about 24 hours, although it could take several more days or even weeks to bring their theater forces to bear in a given area. It also appears that a large portion of the force could be held at full combat readiness indefinitely, although the reaction times of some weapon systems would have to be extended to maintain this posture.

Thus, the Soviet ability quickly to generate forces in an emergency to full combat readiness, retain strict control over those forces, and maintain that posture for an extended period and their ability to monitor closely changes in US force posture gives them a great deal of flexibility in responding to crisis situations. In the
past, however, the Soviets have shown restraint in moving to higher levels of readiness -- primarily engaging in increased reconnaissance and in the activation of additional command and control systems.
THE STAGES OF SOVIET MILITARY READINESS

Soviet military writings place a great deal of importance on military readiness. Nevertheless, we believe Soviet strategic forces are routinely maintained at readiness levels below those of US strategic forces. Soviet theater forces in the forward area, however, are maintained at higher readiness than US forces. There is a mix of readiness levels within Soviet strategic force components, with probably no more than a small percentage of the force normally maintained at full readiness. Technological disparities could explain this difference between US and Soviet forces readiness, but we believe that current Soviet technology would allow a higher overall posture than currently is exhibited. Thus, the actual posture probably is the result of purposeful decision that reflects a number of considerations. Chief among these is that the Soviets apparently believe that a period of increased

Comments and queries regarding this paper are welcomed. They may be directed to ________________

Copy No. ___
tension will precede conflict. Other factors probably include confidence on the part of the Soviets in their early warning capabilities, the survivability of some of their offensive systems, the rapidity with which some strategic forces can achieve full readiness, and an appreciation of the risks and costs that high combat readiness entails. Those changes necessary to place the military on a war footing occur in the period the Soviets have defined as the "Threatening Period" (discussed in more detail below).

1. Military Readiness Stages

The three formal readiness stages of Soviet forces and US DEFCON stages are summarized below:

**Soviet**

**Constant Combat Readiness**

- Normal (constant) readiness condition
- Can be sustained indefinitely
- Strategic forces at a lower stage of readiness relative to US strategic forces
Increased Combat Readiness

- Increased intelligence/threat assessment
- Command Staffs and Operations Groups alerted
- C² communications/Command Posts readied
- Operations plans reviewed/modified
- Security measures increased
- Selected unit deployment may be made
- Personnel leaves cancelled, troops recalled to barracks

Full Combat Readiness

- War is imminent
- Highest state of force readiness
- C² communications/command posts fully manned
- Forces deployed, ready to execute war plans
- Nuclear warheads released from storage to user units

NOTE: There are only three stages of readiness for the Soviet armed forces. There are, however, varying numbers of readiness conditions for weapons systems. For example, missile soft sites have four readiness conditions and SCUD units have six. These measures of weapons systems reaction capabilities should not be confused with the three stages of readiness.
2. The "Special" and "Threatening Periods"

During a tense international situation that could lead to war, the Soviets would declare a "Special Period" which, in effect, would legalize the dramatic steps necessary to prepare for war.

a. "Special Period"

Our first knowledge of the Special Period was obtained from the Soviet Statute on Civil Defense, adopted on 13 July 1961, and classified Top Secret by the USSR. This document, without precisely defining the Special Period, makes it clear that it is a condition which is decreed in preparation for or expectation of general war. As stated in the statute:

The civil defense of the Union of SSRs is a system of national defensive measures undertaken in advance in peacetime with the aim of protecting the population and the national economy from missile-nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons, and also for carrying out rescue and urgent emergency-reconstruction work at centers of devastation during the "Special Period."

The "Special Period" in the country is proclaimed by decision of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. In the event of a sudden attack by the enemy, the civil defense plans are brought into effect immediately by decision of the Chiefs of Civil Defense of the Union Republics.

Preparatory measures for the fulfillment of the plans of civil defense for the "Special Period" may be put into effect by preliminary orders of the chief of civil defense of the USSR.

*Declared by the Council of Ministers.*
The document calls for a wide range of civil defense and related military and civil measures which are to be carried out to protect the populace and insure the survival of the Soviet state in a nuclear conflict. Among these are the evacuation of children and non-working people from the cities. A few of the many actions to be carried out by various Soviet ministries during the Special Period are:

-- The Ministry of Defense carries out mobilization and accomplishes the disposition of staffs and engineer-antichemical units of civil defense.

-- The Ministry of Communications provides communications for civil defense, organizing centralized use of all State and departmental means of communication.

-- The Ministry of Transportation develops plans for and carries out transportation for civil defense, including a civil defense medical service for railway transport.

Over the years there have been a number of other references to the Special Period which indicate that there has been no significant change in the USSR's plans to declare such a condition in preparation for war. There have been reports which suggest that the Special Period applies not only to civil defense measures but also to other preparatory measures.
b. "Threatening Period"

Closely related to the Special Period and seemingly involving a very similar series of preparedness measures is the "Threatening Period" (also translated "Period of Threat") or "Threatening Situation" -- the terms are evidently used synonymously.* They are defined in the Soviet Ministry of Defense publication, Dictionary of Basic Military Terms (which does not include a definition of the "Special Period"), as follows:

Threatening Situation (Threatening Period) -- A period of direct preparations of a country and of the armed forces of war, established by a decision of a government in the moment of an especially tense international situation. The bases (conditions) for the introduction of a Threatening Situation can be: a change in political relations between states or their sharp aggravation, the outbreak of a local military conflict, the carrying out in the countries of the imperialist bloc of civil defense measures and by raising of combat readiness of the armed forces, etc. (Emphasis added.)

In classified Soviet military writings there are a number of references to the Threatening Situation as a period of both preparedness for Soviet forces and of enemy preparations. It is clear from these writings that the Soviet military regard this period prior to

*It is not clear whether or not this period is formally declared (either publicly or secretly) or is simply a perception of the situation.
hostilities as of great importance and that the Soviets have had many of the same uncertainties as we have concerning the duration of the "Threatening Period" or, in our language, "warning time." They argue, as have we, that while a period of threat might or probably would precede hostilities, the enemy might also be capable of unexpected or surprise attack which would reduce the Period of Threat (warning) to no more than a few hours. There are differences of opinion on this issue.

In response to the threat of enemy attack (all Soviet writings of course maintain that the imperialists will be aggressors), Soviet forces would undertake a series of preparatory measures to include:

- Bringing forces, particularly those of the first operational echelon, to full combat readiness;

- Initiating full mobilization and bringing units to full strength;

- Deployment of units to areas of concentration and deployment (one writer argued that to accomplish this as secretly as possible it should be done gradually, employing not more than 30 to 35 percent of the traffic capacity of the railroads);

- Economic mobilization measures;

- Deployment of units from permanent to alternate locations to avoid enemy nuclear strikes, while at the same time bringing them to increased readiness.

- Dispersal of stocks of material.
Changes in military readiness stages, therefore, occur within the context of the "Threatening Period." Such changes are but part of the overall Soviet efforts to prepare the nation for war.

c. Concealment

Concealed or secret mobilization during a "threatening period" is apparently an accepted doctrinal tenet. The Soviets have elaborated an extensive doctrine on concealment and deception (C&D) known as maskirovka. The Soviets contend that C&D measures are designed to enable the USSR to attain the element of surprise or to carry out a sudden attack.

We see C&D practiced in every force element of the Soviet Armed Forces, strategic or tactical. Although a good deal of the C&D we see is crude and ineffective, some techniques are highly sophisticated. However, even crude examples such as a poorly designed dummy SSBN has mistakenly been identified as a real submarine.

We must assume that the Soviets would employ C&D to cover measures taken to increase the readiness of their forces during a Threatening Period. How effective they would be cannot be determined, in part because there is evidence that the Soviets have, by design, employed
poor camouflage in the field to mislead the US on Soviet C&D capabilities.*

3. Normal Readiness Posture (see chart for summary)

This section addresses force readiness stages -- the alert status of the force as a whole. This should not be confused with assessments of the readiness conditions or reaction time capabilities of individual weapons systems.

a. Strategic Forces

1) Missile Force Readiness

Readiness at Soft Sites

Analysis of satellite photography indicates that the 134 soft pads at deployed ICBM complexes have consistently been in a low state of day-to-day readiness since the first of them became operational 15 years ago. A tabulation of over 6000 sightings of these pads from 1962 through 1970 reveals that missiles were erected on the pads no more than two percent of the time, including the period during which these missiles constituted the entire Soviet ICBM force.
**Naval Force Readiness Status**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>COMPONENT</th>
<th>NORMAL STATUS</th>
<th>TIME TO CONINDEX FULL READINESS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SRF</td>
<td>Hard Sites (silos)</td>
<td>Unknown, but a small part of force may be kept at full combat readiness.</td>
<td>From current combat readiness, it takes 10-25 minutes to place available force on full combat readiness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Soil Sites</td>
<td>Majority of missiles are normally maintained at low readiness conditions.</td>
<td>Takes about 5 hours to bring to full combat readiness from lowest missile readiness conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVY</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile Subs</td>
<td>80% of force normally in port.</td>
<td>The time required to place entire force on full combat readiness is unknown. A large portion of the force could put to sea within 24 to 72 hours.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attack Subs</td>
<td>About 50% are deployable within 48 hours.</td>
<td>About 80% are deployable within 10 days.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Major Surf Face Ships</td>
<td>Some 10% routinely deployed in forward operating areas, 40% in home waters, rest minor to major repair or workup.</td>
<td>50% of force can be at full combat readiness within 24 to 48 hours. 50-80% would be within 60 days. Remainder would take many months.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORCE COMPONENT</td>
<td>COMBAT READINESS</td>
<td>TIME TO REACH FULL READINESS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRA</td>
<td>Normally kept at low readiness, entire force could be placed at full combat readiness in several hours.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMD</td>
<td>Small percentage (1/3) kept on strip alert. Force could be brought to full combat readiness within 3-8 hours if dispersal was required.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAMs/Radars</td>
<td>About 25% kept at full combat readiness. Rest of force could be brought to full combat readiness in two hours.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAMS</td>
<td>Normally 50-60% of AAM launchers loaded. Rest of launchers can fire on order if radars operational.</td>
<td>The radars would take several hours to load; rest of launchers as missiles not located at launch site. Radars take 1-5 minutes to reach operational status.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORCE COMPONENT</td>
<td>NORMAL STATUS</td>
<td>TIME TO REACH FULL READINESS</td>
<td>MOVEMENT/PREPARATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground Forces</td>
<td>Forces maintained at high readiness. East European divisions vary in category.</td>
<td>Category I divisions could move to their concentration areas within about 24 hours.</td>
<td>Movement to forward area would take 4-20 days.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27 Soviet divisions are category 1.</td>
<td>Category II divisions would require somewhat longer. East European divisions at full combat readiness within 3 days.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Soviet forces in the Western Hubs are maintained at lower levels of readiness than those in the forward area.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Military Districts</td>
<td>Understrength units could be fully manned and ready to begin movement within 1-3 days.</td>
<td>Movement time dependent upon flight time to objective.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Frontal Aviation</td>
<td>85% of force available on day-to-day basis.</td>
<td>Could bring 85% of force to full combat readiness in about 4 hours.</td>
<td>It would take about 72 hours to move Western Hubs to forward area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airborne Troops</td>
<td>All airborne divisions considered to achieve full combat readiness within a few hours.</td>
<td>Airborne units can probably be moved to airfields and be able to depart in about 2-3 hours.</td>
<td>Once at full combat readiness, selected units can move to aircraft and be able to depart in about 2-3 hours.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Readiness at Hard Sites

Although the readiness condition of soft ICBM sites in the USSR is of historical significance as a reflection of Soviet readiness doctrine, it is the readiness condition of the silo force that is of critical importance and that more accurately reflects present Soviet readiness doctrine. Soft launchers now comprise less than ten percent of the total ICBM force. We do not know, however, the normal readiness status of the silo-based force. We know that missile forces are commonly ordered to readiness stages higher than normal during exercises.

The reaction time of ballistic missiles in silos is ultimately dependent on the status of the gyroscopic elements of their guidance systems. It takes some 20 to 25 minutes to spin up, stabilize, and calibrate the type of gyroscopes used in ballistic missiles. To maintain an ICBM at full readiness its gyros must be kept running. Whether the gyros on Soviet ICBMs in silos are
run constantly and whether gyro lifetime is a constraint on readiness are not known. From a technological standpoint, the silo-based force could be maintained in a state of full combat readiness for long periods—i.e., months, although individual weapons systems would require periodic maintenance. Other factors, such as cost, perception of how war would begin, and faith in strategic warning, however, are believed to be reasons these missiles are not maintained at full combat readiness.

It is possible that the Soviets keep a portion of their silo-based missiles at full combat readiness specifically because their soft-site missiles, bombers, and most of their missile submarines are not. Soviet nuclear strategy may require that at least one element of the Soviet strategic attack arsenal always be at full readiness. Silo-based missiles are the best candidates for this role because they probably could be held in full readiness more cheaply than the other strategic attack systems, and the safeguards against their accidental or unauthorized use probably could be more stringent and reliable.
2) **Ballistic Missile Submarine Readiness**

There is very limited information on what specific actions a Soviet missile submarine would take at each of the three principal levels of combat readiness.
A submarine's readiness condition at constant and full readiness can be reasonably assumed, however.

Submarines at constant, that is minimum, readiness would be those in port. (The Soviets probably do not consider submarines in a condition of major overhaul to have a readiness status.) Submarines in port are at various levels of readiness to put to sea, depending on the degree to which they have been replenished and on the nature and extent of the repair and maintenance work outstanding. We do not know whether any Soviet ballistic missile submarines in home port are ready to weigh anchor the moment an alert is sounded. At least one unit per general purpose submarine brigade apparently is maintained on alert status, fully manned, armed, and ready for immediate combat. We can infer that ballistic missile submarine units have a similar procedure. In any case, it is unlikely that any submarine could be out of port within the warning time which Soviet radars could give in the event of a surprise missile attack from the US.

A submarine at full (maximum) combat readiness presumably would be deployed at sea and within missile range of its targets. All combat posts on the submarine would be manned, a navigation update would have been accomplished,
and gyroscopes in the missile guidance systems would be running. The submarine would be traveling at launch depth and speed and in communication with a launch authority. It is unknown how long a submarine could remain at this condition of readiness.

Between these minimum and maximum levels of submarine readiness, there is a spectrum of possible stages of increased combat readiness. At what point in the sequence of readiness measures a Soviet missile submarine passes from constant to increased, or from increased to full combat readiness, is not known. The Soviets may consider most of the submarines in port to be at constant combat readiness and those in transit to or from station to be in some form of increased readiness.

The Soviets now routinely maintain nine modern SSBNs on station or in transit to patrol areas and possibly as many as 11 were concurrently deployed in late 1976. Y class SSBNs do not always patrol within missile range of the US, and Y and D class units probably do not maintain continuous communications with a command center while at sea. In conducting a missile launch under operational conditions, a submarine must receive the command to launch, and the navigation, fire control, and launch eject subsystems must be brought to a condition of launch readiness. The passage of a launch command to a Soviet
SSBN could be instantaneous or could take hours, depending on whether the SSBN is trailing its buoy antenna (which it probably would be during a crisis) or whether it had to come to periscope depth to receive a scheduled communication (which would be the case under peacetime conditions).

Soviet SSBN navigation systems are believed to be inferior to those on US submarines, so they may have to be updated in some situations. If so, this would further delay missile launch by about 30 minutes if navigation satellites or radio navigation aids were used. If the submarines had to go to presurveyed ocean areas to do the updating, it could take several hours. In crisis situation, however, Soviet SSBNs might be required to update their navigation systems often enough to avoid having to update after receiving a launch command. This might result in some sacrifice of survivability, but it would reduce the time required for missile launch to that necessary to prepare missile and submarine subsystems.

There is some evidence that the launch eject system on Soviet SSBNs can be readied in 15 minutes, during which time any new targeting data could be inserted into the missile guidance system, and the guidance platform could be stabilized, leveled, and aligned. The
missile would then be ready for launch. We do not know how long the Soviets can maintain their SLBM systems at peak readiness -- i.e., within a few minutes of launch.

In sum, we believe the readiness of Soviet SLBM systems is much more scenario dependent than that of US systems. Under normal peacetime readiness conditions, the interval between the transmission of a launch command and the actual launch might be considerably longer -- perhaps hours -- than specified for US SLBM systems. We believe that the new MIRV-capable SS-NX-18 SLBM, which is nearing IOC, employs a stellar-inertial system that can sense and correct in flight the effects of several navigation system errors. If so, this missile system may require less frequent updating, and thus have a shorter reaction time, than presently deployed Soviet SLBM systems. However, we need to obtain and analyze operational data on this system before we can make judgments about the readiness of the SS-NX-18 and future Soviet SLBM systems.

3) **Strategic Bomber Readiness**

Analysis of overhead photography of Long Range Aviation bases indicates that the Soviets do not normally maintain any strategic bombers at either increased or full combat readiness. The 190 long-range bombers and tankers
in the LRA are normally stationed at only five bases and the 625 intermediate-range bombers have 19 home bases. Each of these 24 airfields only has a single hard-surface runway, and they do not have high speed taxiways. This concentration of aircraft alone would prevent the total force of strategic bombers from taking off quickly. In addition, no bombers are lined up at one end of the runway at each airbase for quick takeoff. Instead, the Soviet aircraft are routinely parked on hardstands along a taxiway which usually runs parallel to the runway.

Another indication of the LRA's low readiness is that those bombers which are equipped to carry air-to-surface missiles (ASMs) -- some 45 percent of the force -- normally are not armed. The ASMs are stored in a special depot adjacent to the base, and their nuclear warheads are kept in a separate, secure facility normally located several miles away. The process of mating a combat-ready ASM with an aircraft would probably take over an hour. Although we have no direct evidence, aircraft configured to carry bombs probably follow similar procedures. Thus, the launch of the Soviet strategic bomber force from its peacetime posture would require at least several hours.
There is no reason to believe, however, that bomb-carrying aircraft would be maintained in a higher state of readiness than ASM carriers.

Khrushchev, in a public address to the Supreme Soviet in May 1960 (when LRA constituted the bulk of the Soviet strategic forces), asserted that Soviet strategic bombers were not kept on alert. "True," he declared, "we have no bombers on duty." Several days later, according to TASS, he made a similar statement at a reception in the Czechoslovak Embassy in Moscow: "Listen, gentlemen, we also have bombers, but they are not on watch."

Precisely what measures the LRA would take to bring its units to increased or full readiness is not known, but they can be inferred from what is known about the readiness procedures of the Ground Forces and the SRF. Measures taken at increased readiness serve principally to reduce the time needed to achieve full readiness, and in the case of the LRA it would take many hours, perhaps even days, to place all of the bombers in a fully combat-ready condition. Indeed, calculations (principally based on US Air Force experience) show that as much as four hours would be needed to arm, fuel, and check out the first two aircraft to take off from each Soviet bomber.
base from a condition of constant readiness.

At increased readiness, most LRA regiments probably would disperse to alternate airfields, aircraft would be checked and fueled, nuclear warheads would be mated to ASMs, and missiles and bombs would be moved to the airstrip. Training flights probably would be curtailed and might be halted. Whether any weapons would be loaded aboard the bombers at increased readiness, or whether that critical step would be taken only at full readiness, is not known.

At full combat readiness, bombers would be fueled, armed, manned, and lined up waiting for the command to take off, and all other flight activity of LRA bombers probably would cease. At the highest state of readiness, air force pilots would be in cockpits awaiting orders to take off. He probably was referring to tactical fighter pilots, but his statement probably would apply to LRA pilots as well. An article in an unclassified Soviet English-language publication states that at "readiness number one, fighter-interceptor pilots lost no time in getting to their plans and were ready to take off at a moment's notice." Just how long it would take the LRA force to take off while at full combat readiness is unknown.
The Soviets probably would place the LRA in increased or full readiness only during periods of heightened international tension, but there is no conclusive evidence that they have ever done so during past crises. Some LRA units were reported to have been on alert during the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968.

b. Defensive Forces

In peacetime, four aircraft from each Air Defense Aviation regiment are kept on alert with aircraft fully serviced and armed, and the pilots standing by. In
this posture the alert aircraft could react in about six to 12 minutes. If the pilots were in the cockpit, take-off could occur within three to eight minutes, depending on the type of aircraft. It would take about one to four hours for other aircraft to reach full readiness. Once readied, they could respond in two to five minutes. If movement to dispersal bases were ordered, the time to reach full readiness at the dispersal base would increase to 8 to 24 hours.

The Soviets normally maintain one or two battalions of a PVO Strany SAM regiment or brigade at a readiness level that would require a maximum of 10 minutes to achieve full readiness. Personnel are at or reporting to battle stations, voice and data links are operational, tracking radars are operational or warming up, and fire control radars are activated. The remaining battalions have their radars and data systems turned off, but a skeleton crew remains on standby. It would require as much as two hours for these units to achieve full readiness, depending on such factors as how far the full launch crew must travel to get to their battle stations, whether or not all launchers are loaded with missiles, and how much equipment is undergoing maintenance.
on the average, eight to 16 launchers are empty. Ready missiles at each ABM site could be loaded in about 20 minutes. There are, however, no ready missile storage facilities at the sites, and it would take up to several hours to transport missiles from the ABM support facility to Borovsk. ABM radars require one to five minutes to reach operational status. The missiles on launchers could fire immediately.

The Soviet orbital antisatellite system is operational; but like other Soviet strategic systems, it is not kept in a high state of readiness. We believe that four to ten booster and spacecraft combinations are stored at the Tyuratam launch facility, and that two of these could be erected on the two available launchers within about a day and launched 15 to 60 minutes thereafter. Preparation of launch pads for subsequent operations could take a few hours.

Antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces are addressed in the section on general purpose naval forces. It is difficult to specify those forces that would be used for ASW because most general purpose naval forces have some ASW capability.
c. General Purpose Forces

This discussion addresses Soviet and East European Ground and Air Force elements since all forces in Central Europe are arrayed against NATO. Indeed, the Soviets have placed increased reliance on East European forces in recent years.

1) Ground Forces

The Warsaw Pact ground forces in Central Europe are maintained in a status that would enable them to react defensively in emergencies with little prior preparation. We believe that the Soviet divisions, while not fully manned in peacetime, are capable of vacating their garrisons within about two hours and would be prepared soon thereafter to conduct either defensive or limited offensive operations. The majority of the East European divisions are sufficiently manned to conduct limited military operations, and detailed alerting procedures are maintained and rehearsed frequently.

Before launching a coordinated, large-scale offensive, however, Pact ground forces would require major preparations including the bringing of forces to full combat readiness and general mobilization in all the East European countries, concentration of combat forces in assembly areas for attack or in reserve areas, and establishment of field depots and other support bases. Other measures
would include establishment of communications networks, activation of command posts and exchange of staff and liaison personnel, reconnaissance, preparation of field fortifications and weapons emplacements, and the preparation and issuance of orders. The Pact would attempt initially to conceal or disguise their preparations but, on the whole, the scale of activities would be so great as to preclude effective concealment (see chart).

Analysis of the mobilization system and of exercises leaves little reason to doubt that the Warsaw Pact could mobilize the majority of its forces under this system, within a few days, and Pact writings generally reflect satisfaction with its capabilities. Full Pact mobilization has never been tested, however, and it is unlikely that it ever will be -- except during a war emergency -- because of the resulting internal economic disruption and the international military and political implications of such an action. There is virtually no empirical basis, therefore, from which to assess the capabilities of the Warsaw Pact ground forces to meet their evident three-day mobilization goal.

Although the Pact goal is to complete mobilization of all of its active units within three days, East European ground forces and Soviet forces stationed in Eastern
Combat Readiness Levels of Warsaw Pact Ground Forces

Constant Combat Readiness
Minimum manpower and equipment levels (usually 70-90 percent of the authorized peacetime strength) are maintained in the unit at all times.
Weapon, trucks, and other equipment are maintained in a condition to be used on short notice. Every piece of equipment that has been used during the day is to be checked for efficiency and, like the rest of the unit equipment, must be ready for immediate operation.
Reserve supplies (ammunition, POL, spare parts, etc.) are maintained in usable condition and loaded on the unit's motor transport so that the unit can quickly leave the garrison.
Units must be capable at all times of vacating their peacetime garrisons within 30 minutes to an hour after receiving an alert (except in those cadre units where manpower limitations make this an impossibility), because of the danger of nuclear attack, or even conventional air attack.
Troops and staff conduct normal peacetime combat training.

Increased Combat Readiness
All units and active duty personnel who are away on leave, detail, school, or exercises are recalled to their garrisons.
Some reservists and motor vehicles are called up from the economy to facilitate full mobilization if it is ordered.
Active duty personnel and equipment (referred to as mobilization nuclei) are detached and sent to low-strength cadre units and units to be activated only in time of war (MDU units).
Equipment and armaments are removed from permanent storage.
Any reserve supplies not yet on transport vehicles are loaded.
Ammunition is loaded into combat vehicles.
Repairs on equipment are accelerated and completed.
Service units and workshops that are not included in the wartime tables of organization are disbanded or transferred. Work contracts with civilian workers are terminated.
Organization groups or command teams are dispatched to unit alert or assembly areas to establish a field communications system and to organize the operation of command posts.
A troop movement control system is established.
Unit commanders are issued the required documentation for the command of troops in wartime.
Some units may leave their garrisons and go to assembly, staging, or concentration areas.
A limited tactical and political training schedule may continue, but only in the vicinity of the garrisons, or in the alert and assembly areas.

Full Combat Readiness
Units move as rapidly as possible from their garrisons to the alert or assembly areas, together with the available equipment and reserve supplies.
Full mobilization is ordered and the units receive reservists, transport means, equipment, and appropriate supplies from the national economy and national reserves.
The wartime system of command and supply is established.
Envelopes containing combat orders are issued to the units.
Troops are issued ammunition.
All routine unit tactical training ceases.
Europe would require four days or more for all of these forces to be ready and in position to enter combat.* Units in the USSR are to be mobilized within the same time period, but the assembly of these forces into armies and fronts probably would be completed until subordinate elements move to forward staging or concentration areas. The timing of their introduction into combat would depend on the distances to be traveled, the means of transportation used, operational needs, and the possible effects of enemy interdiction.

The Pact countries would prefer a longer time for war preparations and have plans to use the "Threatening Period" -- if it occurs -- to enhance their readiness to mobilize. These preparatory measures would be carried out without activating the Pact alert and call-up system. Preparations would include testing the operating condition of combat equipment and trucks, checking the suitability of mobilization assembly areas, and generally reviewing specific mobilization assignments. During this period there is no plan to mobilize government reserves, now would there by any additional expenditures of national resources. These preparations would be carried out primarily by active duty military personnel and would be done in secrecy.

*This judgment is currently undergoing reanalysis.
The Pact gained considerable mobilization experience during the invasion of Czechoslovakia, when both Soviet and East European invasion forces were successfully called up, assembled, and moved. This invasion did not, however, provide a realistic test of the rapidity with which the entire force could be mobilized. The period of tension preceding the invasion lasted about four months, far longer than the time which Soviet doctrine allows for the assembly of forces in a time of crisis. Moreover, it provided the opportunity for the Soviets to assemble the invasion force using components from several armies to reduce disruption of the economy in any one area. The intervention did exercise the capabilities of individual units and formations to mobilize and assemble rapidly, however. The bulk of data indicates that East European divisions that participated mobilized successfully within one or two days. Support elements took longer, however.

The entire process of preparation has, of course, never been rehearsed on a scale approaching that required for war. Most of the elements are practiced on a partial scale from time to time, especially those involving the tactical preparations of the troop units. We have little evidential basis for estimating how long the Pact would take to make all of the preparations necessary for a
coordinated offensive. We can, however, estimate how long after the forces were alerted certain key actions would take.

-- The 22 Soviet division in East Germany and western Czechoslovakia probably could move from their garrisons to their pre-attack position in about 24 hours after being alerted. The five remaining Soviet divisions in Poland and eastern Czechoslovakia would also reach full combat readiness within 24 hours but would require somewhat longer to move to locations from which they could conduct operations against NATO. The six East German divisions probably could move from their garrisons to their concentration areas in about 24 hours.

-- The seven Czechoslovak division in western Czechoslovakia could be filled out and moved to their attack locations in about two days.

-- The nine Polish mechanized and tank divisions in the Pomeranian and Silesian Military Districts could be filled out and moved into northern East Germany in three to four days. The Polish airborne and sea landing divisions would be available within 24 hours but their movement would largely depend on the availability of Soviet transport.
The remaining seven Czechoslovak and Polish low-strength divisions could be filled out and moved into position for offensive operations within a week.

East European combat support units are mainly at low strength levels during peacetime and would require somewhat longer than maneuver units to mobilize and deploy to be able to support offensive operations.

The 31 Soviet divisions in the western USSR could also be filled out in from one to three days, depending on their peacetime manning levels, and made ready to begin movement westward.

Various estimates and calculations of Soviet capability to move these divisions and their associated headquarters and support units into their concentration areas in Central Europe have been made in the US and elsewhere. Depending upon the assumptions used as to road, rail, and air capacities, availability of trains, and organization and priority of units and supplies to be moved, these calculations yield figures ranging roughly between 8 and 20 days. Some Soviet exercises show that limited reinforcements may be intended to enter combat about a week after
mobilization. No interference by Western actions is assumed in any of these calculations.

(2) **Air Forces**

**Frontal Aviation.** Pact air forces generally are maintained at or near their wartime personnel and equipment levels and would require little preparation before combat. Some redeployment of tactical air units based in central Europe may occur prior to an attack. Many units in Central Europe, particularly those equipped with older, short-range aircraft, currently are located where they cannot reach critical NATO targets without staging to forward bases.

Additionally, the Soviets have approximately 900 tactical aircraft in the western USSR which appear intended for use in Central Europe. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Soviet planning for the use of these aircraft suggested the Soviets intended to have them redeploy forward into Central Europe before the start of combat. More recent evidence indicates this may no longer be a requirement. We estimate that once the Soviets decided to move this force forward it would take about
72 hours. This assumes they would have adequate air transport available to move the minimum amount of ground personnel and equipment to support these aircraft and that the movement would not be impeded by adverse weather or hostile action by NATO.

With the exception of some one to three aircraft (plus one spare) per frontal aviation regiment that are kept on strip alert, it would take the Pact some four hours to bring some 85 percent of its air forces to full combat readiness.

Within the state of full combat readiness, we can consider three possible readiness conditions. The highest would be to have the pilots in the cockpits, weapons loaded, engines running, and awaiting a launch order. The estimated length of time this condition could be maintained would be about 20-30 minutes per aircraft. After that time, the aircraft would have to shut down and refuel.

A second condition within a state of full combat readiness would be to have the pilots in the immediate vicinity of the aircraft, weapons loaded, aircraft serviced, targets assigned, and awaiting launch order. After receipt
of launch order, all aircraft could be ready for taxi in five minutes and be airborne in 10 to 15 minutes. The estimated length of time this condition could be maintained would be about 8 to 10 hours. After that time, the air and ground crews would require rest in order to maintain mental and physical stamina required by the situation.

A third condition within full combat readiness would be to have the pilots located on the base, ground crews on the base, aircraft serviced, weapons loaded, targets assigned, awaiting launch order. In this condition, all aircraft could be ready to taxi within 15 to 30 minutes and be airborne within a total of 25 to 45 minutes. This condition is estimated to be maintainable as long as the crisis requires.

during alerting exercises, all operational aircraft were expected to be ready for launch within 40 to 50 minutes. Prior notice was always given so that a unit would not fail to meet its alert requirements.
When considering all the events which would have to occur and the personnel and equipment required to prepare an entire Frontal Aviation regiment for launch on a combat mission, we do not consider it possible to go from a condition of normal day-to-day readiness to a condition permitting launch of the entire regiment in less than one hour. Our estimate, which we consider on the optimistic side, is that such an event would require some three to four hours of preparation.

VTA. About 80 percent of the VTA aircraft are estimated to be operationally ready on a day-to-day basis and, like Frontal Aviation units, would require little preparation prior to bringing these aircraft to full combat readiness. We are estimating about six to eight hours would be required to recover those aircraft which are flying routine training missions, service them, change crews as required, brief the new missions and reconfigure the aircraft for their designated missions, i.e., airlift of airborne units.

Within the state of full combat readiness, we estimate there may be two readiness condition. The highest condition would involve having crews and paratroops in the
immediate vicinity of the aircraft; those aircraft which are to transport cargo would be loaded, all aircraft fully serviced, missions briefed and paratroop personal gear on or next to the aircraft. We estimate that this force could be launched within about one hour and could maintain this readiness posture for about 8 to 10 hours. After that time, as in Frontal Aviation, the crews and paratroops would require rest prior to participating effectively in combat activity.

The second condition would differ only in that the crews and paratroops and their personal gear would be on the base and not restricted to the immediate vicinity of the aircraft. We estimate that this condition could be maintained indefinitely and that the force could be launched from this condition within approximately two hours.
3) **Navy**

The Soviets normally keep some 10 percent of their ships and submarines out of area at any one time. Soviet naval forces on station in the Eastern Mediterranean would pose the most immediate threat to Western naval forces. Additional Soviet naval units could be deployed to most Western SSBN and aircraft carrier operating areas in about a week.

**Major Surface Ships.** Ships that the Soviets consider operationally available normally would be regarded as in "constant readiness." The other two general levels of readiness are alert conditions, and their use generally would be reserved for periods of heightened tension or crises preceding the outbreak of hostilities in which Soviet naval forces were expected to participate.

Under normal peacetime conditions about half the ships currently in the Soviet major surface force would qualify as operationally available or in "constant readiness"—those ready for combat or that could be ready within a day or two. Within this category, about 10 percent of the total force typically is deployed out of area, while about 40 percent of the force remains in
Soviet home waters. An additional 25 to 30 percent of the major surface force is in a state of reduced readiness, but most of these ships probably could be made combat ready within two months. Some might not reach full combat readiness within this time but would be able to participate in limited operations. The rest of the force—some 20 to 25 percent—typically is out of service for long-term overhaul or modification. Most of these major surface ships would be unavailable for combat operations even with several months' warning.

The newer Soviet ship classes, which present the greatest threat to Western naval forces, generally have a higher rate of availability than older, smaller classes. Some of the newer classes probably could approach 100 percent combat availability within a few weeks, whereas some older ship classes might not exceed 60 to 70 percent availability with much longer warning times. The actual number of available ships will vary from class to class and month to month depending on age, number of units in each class, and cycles for maintenance, overhaul, and modernization.

The 10 percent of Soviet major surface ships routinely deployed out of area are stationed for the most part in the Mediterranean Sea, but the Soviets also maintain a small, continuous presence in the...
Indian Ocean. In addition, Soviet major surface ships exercise periodically with Cuban naval forces in the Caribbean and regularly support the Soviet presence in Guinea.

Average levels for out-of-area deployment vary among the major surface ship classes. The more modern classes of missile-armed cruisers and destroyers, for example, have an average deployment rate of some 16 percent. Older gun-armed destroyers and all classes of ocean escorts, on the other hand, deploy less often than the average.

The average deployment levels of Soviet major surface ships vary from fleet to fleet as well. During the period from mid-1971 to mid-1973, for example, the Black Sea Fleet—with about 30 percent of the total force—accounted for over half the time spent out of area by major surface combatants. This pattern of operations reflects that fleet’s heavy commitment to support the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean Sea.

That portion (40 percent) of the major surface force in home waters and ready for combat within a day or two provides the Soviet Navy with a capability for contingency deployments in crisis situations as well as a reserve of ships that would be available within hours in the event of war. In the Black Sea Fleet, a "duty force" has been identified which apparently includes many of these ships.
Other fleets apparently designate "duty contingency" ships that are required to be able to put to sea within a few hours. In the Northern Fleet, such units have been observed leaving home waters on short notice in response to peacetime emergencies.

Some 25 to 30 percent of the major surface force (including warships) are in shipyards for minor repair and those undergoing trials, training, or workup after extended repair, overhaul, or modernization. The first group typically consists of several ships undergoing routine repair work that cannot be done by a ship's crew. Such maintenance, evidently scheduled every one to two years, normally lasts 30 to 60 days. All of these units probably could regain an acceptable level of combat readiness within a 14-day warning period, however.

The second group is made of ships emerging from an extended period in the shipyard. Each such ship undergoes a cycle of trials, training, and workup before it is again considered available for combat operations.
During this time, it is exercised and tested systematically and the crew is given at-sea training in local waters. A unit going through the workup cycle apparently must pass proficiency tests—administered by permanent inspection teams—during each phase before going on to the next phase.

Although ships normally take four to six months to complete the cycle, the time needed to bring a ship to a level of constant combat readiness probably could be substantially shortened in an emergency. Given the appropriate priority, most of these ships probably could be made operationally available within 60 days. Those ships not able to attain full combat readiness within that time—perhaps 5 to 10 percent of the total force—probably would be far enough along in their post-overhaul workup to be used for some limited tasks in waters near the USSR.
The Soviets attempt to give their ships periodic major overhauls which can last from about seven months to as long as two years, in order to maintain the combat efficiency of the units. Some evidence suggests that Soviet combatants are expected to undergo these overhauls every four years or so. In practice, however, the interval between them can vary from a few years to six or seven years.

**Attack Submarines**

The Soviets appear able to deploy about 60 percent of their submarine force with only about 40 hours advance notice. This is evidenced by their patterns of operation. The Pacific Fleet, for example, reacted to the mining of Haiphong harbor by deploying four of the five operational cruise-missile-armed nuclear submarines from the area of Vladivostok in about a day after President Nixon's message.* The remaining operational submarines, those undergoing short-term repairs, might be delayed as much as a week. Of the total force however, between 20 and 30 percent is typically undergoing major overhaul or modification.

*A total of 14 E-II submarines were in the Pacific Fleet at this time.
about three-fourths of the operational submarines by class are in port on a typical day, although the number varies. During the large annual fleet-wide exercises, somewhat fewer are in port. During some other periods more than 80 percent of the operational force has been observed in port. In addition, those submarines undergoing major overhaul or modification are at shipyards or other repair facilities in the Northern Fleet areas.

The Soviets severely limit the peacetime deployments and operations of their submarine force much the same as they constrain the activity of their air and ground forces. Although the full effect of limited operating time on readiness is not clear, additional time in port increases opportunities for repair and maintenance.

Satellite photography shows that while in port, most Soviet submarines are frequently moved from pier to pier. This movement probably is related to minor repair and maintenance activities, different phases of which take place at different piers or quays. The frequency and extent of the movements suggest a strong Soviet concern with keeping submarines ready for deployment.*

*There is a small but growing body of evidence that indicates that there are fewer submarines available for short notice deployment than previously believed.
The Soviets' practice of keeping most of their submarines in port and ready for deployment makes a large number of submarines available for action in areas close to the USSR -- including much of the Norwegian Sea -- in a short period of time. But unless there were time for transit to Atlantic Ocean areas -- 1500 to 3000 nautical miles distant -- at best the Soviets would have only a few submarines already on station in those important waters.

A delay in deployment during a crisis would increase the likelihood that Soviet submarines would be crippled by attacks on them while at their bases and could also allow the Western powers to form antisubmarine barriers. Further, a mass movement of military forces might itself become the cause of war. The behavior of Soviet leaders in previous crises, such as the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, suggests that they have considered such a reaction.

Naval Aviation. The normal peacetime readiness condition of Soviet Naval Aviation and the measures taken to increase readiness probably are similar to those in LRA. Naval Aviation does not maintain a continual aerial reconnaissance of ocean areas considered vital to Soviet interests, nor does it maintain strike or ASW aircraft on regular patrol. Rather, intensive aerial
reconnaissance and the upgrading of the entire force to an alert condition occur only under special conditions, such as fleet exercises or in periods of heightened international tensions.

Normally a few aircraft at each naval aviation base are maintained in an alert or ready status. These aircraft probably are fueled and ready for takeoff with crews standing by in nearby barracks. Alert strike aircraft, however, apparently are not armed with ASMs. As in LRA, the process of mating a combat-ready ASM with an aircraft probably would take over an hour. Reconnaissance and ASW aircraft in an alert status probably are fully ready for takeoff and could get airborne in 30 to 40 minutes. Occasionally, alert ASW aircraft are noted responding to reported submarine contacts in areas close to their bases.

4. Authority to Change Readiness

The authority to bring the entire armed forces up to full combat readiness probably rests with the full Politburo in all but the most extreme circumstances such as the USSR being or about to come under attack. If full combat readiness were to be instituted prior to the outbreak of hostilities, it would occur in the "Threatening Period" (see Page __).
There are circumstances, however, when military commanders can unilaterally make changes in readiness status. The national military command authorities can probably take certain measures to improve readiness under prescribed conditions. Although we do not know just what these conditions are or what degree of change may be made in readiness, it is most unlikely that these authorities could order full combat readiness unless the USSR were under attack.

Field commanders also have some authority to order changes in readiness levels. This authority extends to at least the level of Military District, Group of Forces, and Fleet -- and possibly to Commanders at all echelons. In the Strategic Rocket Forces we have excellent evidence that it extends to the division and independent regiment commands. It is likely that this authority is shared by commanders at equivalent levels in PVO Strany and Long Range Aviation forces. Field commanders can order their entire command to full combat readiness if it is threatened. What latitude they have beyond this is not known. In any event, there is a requirement to immediately report and justify to the high command any significant change in force readiness posture.
Other Warsaw Pact member nations military alerting systems function on the national level independently from the General Staff alert/warning system. Pact-wide alerts, however, are coordinated by the General Staff systems. Alerting or readiness scales vary slightly from the Soviet system depending on national needs; however, all systems provide for equivalent states of readiness.
The military channels of communications, via the prescribed chain of command, would be used under direction of the General Staff to formally raise or lower force readiness levels. Actual readiness changes would undoubtedly be a subject of NCA concern. In the event of such changes, KGB-provided communications could, and likely would, be used by the NCA to communicate with key military and political leaders and to ensure compliance with political/military directives.
7. **Assessment of Soviet Capabilities to Alert Forces**

There is no reason to believe that the Soviets have any significant difficulty in controlling increases or decreases in readiness posture. The majority of the forces can generate considerable combat potential within about 24 hours after being alerted and hold that posture for an extended period of several days, weeks, or even months.

Soviet capabilities to alert forces and control them once alerted is considered to be quite good. The means and procedures for alerting forces is controlled by the General Staff and is part of the command and control system. This system is assessed as being capable of supporting a variety of alert options and there are no known weaknesses in it that would result in a loss of control of alerted forces.
During those crises in which there has been an increase in readiness, no significant control problems were detected. The Soviets appear to be able to move up and down the readiness ladder at will. This occurred during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, for example. During that crisis, the Soviets increased their readiness posture in early September and maintained that posture until 20 September. During the period of late September through early October, their readiness level apparently returned to near normal. It was raised again on 22 October and maintained through 21 November--the height of the crisis.

The Soviets have also demonstrated the ability to change readiness posture on a very selective basis. They have the capability to alert specific units, an entire force, a geographic region, or a mix of forces. This capability is particularly effective in tailoring forces for specific situations.
There is no reason to believe, therefore, that there is a point of no return at which forces on increased or full combat readiness cannot be controlled. Indeed, control is rigidly maintained at all stages.

8. Soviet Response to Changes in US DEFCON

There is no way to make generalized judgments regarding Soviet reactions to changes in US DEFCON status. We are, however, able to assess possible Soviet reactions to anticipated US actions--including changes in DEFCON--during a particular crisis. A necessary precondition for these judgments is that those making the assessment must have access to all information regarding Soviet readiness, Soviet political activities, Soviet military and intelligence activities, as well as US activities in these areas.
There is no evidence to suggest that the Soviets make automatic or knee-jerk responses to changes in US readiness. They do, however, have an excellent capability to monitor these changes. This allows the Soviet leadership to make informed decisions regarding possible responses. A review of past crises suggests that the Soviets have shown constraint in their military responses. Their activities appear to have concentrated primarily on intelligence collection and the activation of additional command and control systems. They do not normally deploy combat forces, with the exception of naval vessels, during a crisis. Such deployments are, by their very nature, provocative and would not likely occur unless the Soviet leadership had decided conflict was inevitable or at least a reasonable possibility.
-- Political attitudes of countries in area. We would have a high degree of confidence of detecting political attitudes of allied and neutral governments and could probably determine which countries would be willing to offer overt and/or covert assistance. We would also have some success in monitoring the political and military assistance activities of pro-Soviet countries.

-- Other side's ability to detect US "signals."
The community could advise policy-makers on how quickly and accurately the other side could detect US moves and provide estimates on the likely response. Knowing what "signals" the US is sending would be critical in analyzing the other side's political-military activities and distinguishing responses to our actions from actions which it initiated.
Courses of action available to the other side.
The community could make assessments of the other side's military capability to adopt various courses of action. For example, it could estimate the size of the forces which could be made available and the speed with which they could be employed.