MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT: USSR GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LECTURES: The Preparation and Conduct of Front and Army Offensive Operations

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report concludes a series based on a collection of seven lectures, classified SECRET, prepared by the General Staff Academy for publication by the First Directorate (Operations) of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR in October 1969. This lecture is a comprehensive study of the preparation and conduct of front and army offensive operations with heavy emphasis on the employment of nuclear weapons in preemptive strikes. Among the specific items discussed are the planning of the employment of nuclear weapons in these operations, combat readiness of troops and materiel, support measures, the establishment of attack groupings, and the most important aspects of the control of front and army troops in an operation. The Russian-language version was disseminated as FIRDB-312/00203-76.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.
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GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LECTURES: The Preparation and Conduct of Front and Army Offensive Operations

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of a lecture, classified SECRET, prepared by Colonel General I. S. Glebov. It is based on the assumption that nuclear weapons will be employed in any future war on a limited or an unlimited basis. Consequently, in his presentation the author frequently alludes to the importance of the element of surprise and to the need for preemptive nuclear strikes in Soviet planning. He first sets forth the objectives, characteristics, and possible methods of conducting modern-day offensive operations, and follows this with a comprehensive and in-depth discussion of the preparation and conduct of offensive operations at the front and army level. Much attention is devoted to planning the use of nuclear weapons in these operations. The final section deals with the most important aspects of the control of front and army troops in an operation. Some of the author's conclusions are based on a study of military exercises and war games conducted in the Western Theater of Military Operations.

Comment:

A table of contents listing the seven lectures in this series is included with this report. The Russian-language version of this lecture was disseminated as FIRDB-312/00203-76.
ORDERS OF LENIN AND SUVOROV MILITARY ACADEMY OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE USSR

APPROVED
Chief of the Academy,
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4 March 1969

SECRET
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Professor, Colonel General I. S. GLEBOV

THE PREPARATION AND CONDUCT OF FRONT AND ARMY OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Moscow -- 1969
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INTRODUCTION

The development of our operational art is determined by the nature of a future war and the views on its conduct, by the status of our armed forces, the status of the probable enemy's armed forces, and also the experience of past wars.

As a result of the extensive scientific research work and synthesis of material from numerous major exercises, we now have a relatively well-constructed, scientifically-based theory of operational art, which includes theory on the preparation and conduct of front and army offensive operations.

As is known, a future war will be primarily a missile/nuclear war. It may be initiated with either limited or unlimited employment of nuclear weapons. At the same time, the political and military-strategic situation might develop in such a way that military actions will be initiated and conducted for a certain period of time without the employment of nuclear weapons.

Consequently, front and army offensive operations may be initiated and conducted by employing nuclear weapons or they may be initiated and carried out with conventional means of destruction, with the possibility of a subsequent transition to the employment of nuclear weapons.

In discussing missile/nuclear war, we must emphasize that in connection with the further development of nuclear weapons, the increase of their yields, and the increase of stocks of nuclear warheads, a future war will in all likelihood be fast-moving.

Under present-day conditions the importance of surprise has increased and, in this connection, the most important task is to ensure the constant combat readiness of troops and their ability to deliver powerful surprise strikes against an enemy, to repel enemy strikes, and go over to a decisive offensive under the various conditions in which military actions might break out.

In this lecture it is proposed to set forth the most important problems of preparing and conducting present-day front (army) offensive operations with the employment of nuclear weapons. In it are set forth: the objectives, tasks, and scope of offensive operations; the methods of conducting an operation.
and routing large enemy groupings; the characteristic features of present-day operations; certain problems in the preparation and conduct of offensive operations and also of troop control in a front (army) operation.

All questions are examined as they apply to the Western Theater of Military Operations. It is completely obvious that in other theaters, including mountainous areas, the preparation and conduct of front (army) offensive operations will have their own distinctive characteristics.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

The Objectives, Tasks, and Scope of Offensive Operations

The objectives, tasks, and scope of a front (army) offensive operation depend on their role in a strategic (front) operation; on the tasks fulfilled in it by strategic nuclear forces and operational formations (large units) of other branches of the armed forces; on the operational status and combat capabilities of front (army) troops; on the grouping of the enemy's forces and means and the possible nature of his actions; and also on the specific physical-geographic features of the theater of military operations.

In examining the objectives, tasks, and scope of present-day front (army) offensive operations, it should be emphasized that they will differ significantly from operations of past wars, since at present nuclear means and the increased capabilities of conventional means of destruction have a decisive effect on the fulfilment of tasks.

The combat capabilities of a front are characterized by the following:

- First, fronts have been provided with powerful means of employing nuclear weapons which can ensure the delivery of strikes against an enemy to a depth of 400 or more kilometers and those of an army can strike to a depth of 200 or more kilometers. A front (army) is capable of inflicting decisive destruction on all of the most important targets and the opposing enemy troop grouping which are not destroyed by strategic nuclear forces;
- Second, front troops are equipped with great numbers of tanks, combat vehicles, and armored personnel carriers. A front may have from two to three thousand up to six to eight thousand tanks, 400 to 1,000 or more combat aircraft, and from 1.5 to two thousand up to six to eight thousand combat vehicles and armored personnel carriers, and an army may have 1,000 to 1,600 tanks and approximately the same number of combat vehicles and armored personnel carriers. This makes it possible to establish powerful attack groupings of front troops and aviation for conducting an offensive at high speeds and to a great depth;

- Third, front (army) troops are capable of inflicting severe damage on the enemy with conventional means and chemical weapons;

- Fourth, front (army) troops are equipped with powerful means of combating enemy aircraft in the air (with antiaircraft artillery, surface-to-air missile systems, and fighter-interceptors), making it possible to destroy hundreds of air targets simultaneously when repelling attacks by enemy aviation.

Finally, the front has considerably improved its capabilities for supporting the combat actions of troops in an operation: for reconnaissance of the enemy, radioelectronic warfare, and engineer and materiel-technical support. We have considerably increased the capabilities of a front (army) for achieving continuity and stability of troop control because control organs have been equipped with new communications means, and we have also increased its capabilities for employing means of automation and mechanization in some control processes.

On the basis of all factors affecting the objectives and tasks of offensive operations, it is customary at present to assume that the overall objective of a front offensive operation is to rout the enemy's principal missile, aviation, and ground forces groupings, to disrupt his mobilization measures, and to seize the most important installations and areas by whose capture the goal of a strategic operation is achieved or conditions favoring the conduct of subsequent operations for these purposes on a given strategic axis of a theater of military operations are established.

The scope of front and army offensive operations may be quite varied, depending on the scale on which strategic nuclear
forces are employed, as well as on the combat strength of the front and army, on the forces, means, and nature of enemy actions, and, finally, on the nature of the theater of military operations.

The scope of a front offensive operation might be: in depth -- from 500 to 1,000 or more kilometers; in average rates of advance -- from 60 to 80 kilometers and in a mountainous theater -- from 40 to 50 kilometers; and in duration -- from ten to 15 days. The width of a front offensive zone might range from 200 to 500 kilometers.

The scope of an offensive operation of a combined-arms army might be, respectively: in depth -- from 200 to 500 kilometers; in average rates of advance -- from 60 to 80 kilometers, and in a mountainous theater -- from 40 to 50 kilometers; and in duration -- from four or five up to seven or eight days. The width of an army's offensive zone might lie within the confines of 80 to 150 kilometers, and in a mountainous theater of military actions -- up to 200 kilometers or more.

As is known, a tank army normally conducts a single operation throughout the depth of a front offensive operation; therefore, the scope of its operation might be from 500 to 1,000 kilometers or more in depth, and its average rates of advance might be as high as 100 kilometers or more, due to the unique features of the organization of a tank army and the fact that it is employed on the main axis where the principal front means of destruction and airborne landing forces are employed.

To achieve the objective of an operation, a front (army) usually has defined for it the tasks of the initial nuclear strike and also immediate and subsequent tasks.

The substance of the tasks of an initial nuclear strike by front means might be to destroy enemy operational-tactical nuclear attack means in order to disrupt their employment against troops and rear installations, to inflict decisive damage on the enemy's principal troop groupings, aviation, and air defense means, and also to destroy his most important control and guidance posts and rear installations in order to create conditions ensuring the rapid and final defeat of enemy groupings during an offensive operation.
Armies of the first operational echelon participate in the initial nuclear strike of a front in accordance with the overall plan and fulfil the tasks of destroying enemy nuclear attack means and destroying his main, and especially tank, groupings, control posts, and some of the most important rear installations in the offensive zone of the armies. The army missile brigade and, when possible, the missile battalions of the army's first-echelon large units are allocated to fulfil these tasks.

The substance of the immediate task of a front, following the initial strikes of strategic means, is to begin the offensive not only on the ground, but in the air, so as to complete the destruction of opposing groupings and their nuclear means, or else rout them and seize areas and installations by whose capture the enemy's operational stability is disrupted and favorable conditions are created for further development of the offensive at high speeds into the depth of the theater of military operations. The depth of the immediate task of a front might range from 200 to 500 kilometers.

The substance of the subsequent task of a front might be to destroy newly detected enemy nuclear attack means, to complete the rout of, or to rout, his strategic reserves, and to seize installations and areas by whose capture the objective of the operation is achieved. The depth of the subsequent task, depending on the overall depth of the operation, may be as much as 300 to 500 kilometers or more.

The objective of the offensive operation of a combined-arms army of the first echelon of a front will most often be the final destruction of the opposing grouping and its nuclear means throughout the depth of its operational disposition, as well as the seizure of the most important areas and installations within the army's zone at the depth at which the immediate task of a front is fulfilled and favorable conditions are created for the conduct of a subsequent army operation.

The subsequent operation of a combined-arms army often will be carried out for the purpose of destroying newly detected nuclear attack means, of routing or completing the rout of deep enemy reserves, and of seizing areas and installations by whose capture the fulfilment of the subsequent task of a front is achieved.
For a combined-arms army of the first echelon the substance of its immediate task might be to destroy the enemy's tactical, and a portion of his operational-tactical, means of nuclear attack, to complete the rout of, or to rout, the opposing groupings of his troops, and to seize the most important installations (areas) by whose capture the operational stability of the enemy's first echelon is disrupted and conditions are created for successfully developing the offensive. The depth of an army's immediate task may range from 100 to 300 kilometers.

The subsequent task of an army may consist in destroying newly detected nuclear attack means of the enemy, completing the rout of, or routing, his operational reserves, and seizing installations (areas) by whose capture the objective of the operation is achieved. The depth of an army's subsequent task may range from 100 to 300 kilometers or more.

Should a tank army, and also a combined-arms army, conduct an operation throughout the depth of a front operation, their immediate and subsequent tasks might coincide in depth with the corresponding tasks of the front.

When operating on a coastal axis, the substance of the immediate and subsequent tasks of a front (army) might be to rout the coastal grouping of the enemy, to seize straits zones, islands, naval bases, ports, and other important shore installations, and also to implement the antilanding defense of the captured shore which is organized as troops advance deep into enemy territory.

In an offensive in mountainous areas, the important points of the substance of the immediate and subsequent tasks of a front (army) might be to rout enemy groupings on axes leading toward the main road junctions, mountain passes, defiles, and other enemy installations whose capture will provide our forces with an exit from the mountains into valleys or wide plains.

Thus, the objectives, tasks, and scope of front offensive operations, as well as the substance and depth of immediate and subsequent tasks, are established in each case on the basis of the specific conditions of the situation in the theater of military operations, including also its specific physical and geographical characteristics.
The Possible Methods of Conducting Offensive Operations and Routing Major Enemy Groupings

By the method of conducting an operation we mean the procedure for employing the forces and means of a front (army) to rout the main forces of an enemy throughout the depth of an operation, in order to achieve its tasks and ultimate objective. The method of conducting offensive operations is defined in the concept of the operation (decision) and carried out by employing various methods to rout the enemy.

By methods of routing major (individual) enemy groupings we have customarily meant the procedure for employing forces and means to rout only specific enemy groupings, that is, a part of his main forces on any given axis of the offensive while fulfilling the immediate or subsequent task of a front (army). Also, a major enemy grouping is supposed to mean that grouping of his forces and means (ranging from several divisions to several corps), including its nuclear means, whose actions might gravely and decisively affect the course of an offensive operation. The totality of the methods of routing major enemy groupings in an operation will express, in the final analysis, the method of conducting the operation.

The basis of any method of conducting an operation and a method of routing the enemy is the employment of nuclear weapons coordinated with the rapid offensive actions of tank and motorized rifle troops.

Under present-day conditions there are various possible methods of conducting operations. The principal one is the inflicting of destruction on the enemy by the sudden, massed employment of nuclear weapons and a rapid offensive by motorized rifle and tank troops in conjunction with the dropping of airborne landing forces on several of the shortest axes following the nuclear strikes (of course, bypassing or negotiating the contaminated zones) for the purpose of splitting the main grouping, or other groupings of the enemy, and destroying them in detail. This method makes it possible in a short time to inflict grave damage on opposing enemy groupings with nuclear weapons and to complete their destruction during the rapid development of the offensive by the troops into the depth and on the routes to those areas by whose seizure the objective of the operation is...
achieved.

We can also employ such methods of conducting offensive operations as the delivery of nuclear strikes and a troop offensive on divergent axes in order to encircle and destroy the main forces of the enemy in cooperation with adjacent armies and fronts, or independently, with the simultaneous development of an offensive into the depth on another axis (or other axes) to split a particular enemy grouping and destroy it in detail.

On a coastal axis we can employ such methods of conducting an offensive operation as cutting off the main grouping of the enemy from other groupings in the theater of military operations and from naval bases; and then, by the delivery of attacks on several axes, the enemy is destroyed in detail.

It is also possible to employ other methods of conducting operations, and these can be combined in various ways. The method chosen for the conduct of operations is set forth in detail in the decision of the front (army) commander, i.e., in the operation plan.

When choosing the method of conducting an offensive operation it is necessary to consider the possible results of nuclear strikes by strategic forces, to determine the enemy's strong and weak points, and, based on the actual combat capabilities of the front (army), to outline the method which will best ensure effective employment of nuclear weapons and a rapid offensive by troops to accomplish the tasks and achieve the objective of the operation within a short period of time.

The methods of routing major enemy groupings during an offensive operation depend on the results of nuclear strikes by strategic means, front (army) capabilities for employing nuclear weapons, and the readiness of the troops to rapidly exploit the results of nuclear strikes, and also on the nature of enemy actions and the specific characteristics of the theater of military operations.

Under present-day conditions we can employ various methods to rout major enemy groupings. Depending on the situation, during an offensive operation these groupings may be destroyed simultaneously or in succession, and on a single axis or on
several axes. However, at present the basic method of routing major enemy groupings during a front offensive operation is by delivering massed nuclear strikes in conjunction with rapid troop actions which complete the destruction of these groupings.

At the same time, under present-day conditions major enemy groupings can also be routed by employing nuclear weapons alone. This method of routing an enemy will be more and more applicable as nuclear attack means are improved. Its advantage consists in the following: the rout of major enemy groupings is achieved in the shortest possible time, simultaneously ensuring that they are defeated most reliably and fully and not requiring actions by the main forces of the troops to complete the destruction of the enemy.

In those cases when the forces and means of a front are not ready to deliver a massed nuclear strike, the rout of major enemy groupings may be accomplished by successively delivering grouped nuclear strikes, and their destruction may be completed by the actions of attacking troops.

Massed and grouped nuclear strikes for the purpose of routing major enemy groupings are delivered, as a rule, by operational-tactical means.

As a rule, under any method of routing major enemy groupings during an offensive operation, chemical weapons and conventional means of destruction, which supplement nuclear strikes, are employed.

In a number of cases, enemy groupings may be destroyed by chemical weapons alone and combined with the employment of conventional means of destruction and with coordinated troop actions. Under certain conditions, especially during the final stages of a strategic operation, the rout of enemy groupings may be accomplished only by troop actions and by employing conventional means of destruction. Under these circumstances it is necessary to quickly establish a decisive superiority over the enemy in forces and means (particularly in tanks and artillery) on the main axes of troop actions so as to be able to accomplish these tasks in a short period of time.
Motorized rifle and tank large units of a front (army) will complete the destruction of the enemy either immediately following nuclear strikes or as they approach the areas where his groupings are located by enveloping, outflanking, or encircling them, based on actions along the axes. In some cases, for example when the enemy has been damaged to a high degree by nuclear weapons, limited forces (large units, individual units, and even detachments), or a part of our forces, may be allocated, while the main forces of the front and army will be developing the attack into the depth. In other cases, when the enemy has been damaged to a lesser degree by nuclear weapons, actions by the main forces will be needed to complete the destruction of a major enemy grouping, and limited forces will be allocated to develop the attack into the depth.

When completing the destruction of these groupings it will be possible to employ tactical nuclear means quite extensively. At the same time, during this period single and grouped nuclear strikes may also be delivered against enemy groupings by operational-tactical means.

The methods of routing major groupings are specified in great detail for the first one or two days of an operation, and tentatively for the following days of its immediate task.

Thus, the art of conducting present-day offensive operations requires, first of all, correctly choosing the method of conducting operations, as well as methods of routing major enemy groupings, which in the final analysis will ensure the achievement of the objectives and tasks of an operation in the shortest period of time.

The Nature of Present-day Offensive Operations

The new qualities of ground forces, as well as the changes in the conditions of conducting combat actions and the nature of armed combat as a whole, have imparted completely new characteristic features to front (army) offensive operations.

Present-day offensive operations of a front (army) are characterized first of all by the fact that the nuclear weapons employed in them are the principal and decisive means of destruction. The capability for massed employment of nuclear
weapons and other means of destruction creates realistic conditions for conducting offensive operations with even more decisive objectives than was the case in the past. The decisiveness of objectives in an operation is based on the rapid defeat of the enemy by employing nuclear weapons and other means of destruction, on the full utilization of the increasing mobility and maneuverability of all branches of the armed forces and branch arms, on the art of troop control, and on the high morale and combat qualities of personnel.

Present-day front (army) offensive operations will also be characterized by the growing importance of surprise in actions and the struggle for the initiative, which will be evident in all types of troop combat actions.

Surprise and preemptive strikes of crushing power create conditions favoring the achievement of the best results in an operation. Therefore, each decision for an operation and troop combat actions must include concomitant measures ensuring actions are carried out with surprise.

Surprise in actions is attained in various ways: by keeping secret the concept of the operation and our intentions, as well as by knowing the enemy's intentions and the nature of his possible actions; by maneuvering rapidly and covertly; by delivering strikes, especially with nuclear weapons, where the enemy does not expect them; by skillfully carrying out operational camouflage; by extensively exploiting nighttime and adverse meteorological conditions for combat actions; by adhering strictly to communications discipline, to the rules of secure troop control, and to established procedures for using radiotechnical means; by employing new means and methods of conducting combat actions which are unknown to the enemy; by preempting the enemy in the employment of forces and means, primarily nuclear weapons; by having troops go over to the offensive immediately; and also by having a reliable air defense.

The delivery of deep and rapid attacks, based on the employment of nuclear weapons and the carrying out of daring and highly mobile troop actions, is one of the conditions for rapidly achieving decisive objectives and a large spatial scope for the operation.
Exploiting conditions created by nuclear strikes delivered by strategic and operational-tactical means, attack groupings of front (army) troops should develop rapid actions throughout the depth of the operation and ensure the achievement of the operation's objective in the shortest period of time.

When an opposing enemy grouping is reliably neutralized by nuclear strikes and other means of destruction throughout its depth, attack groupings of front (army) troops are afforded great opportunities for conducting highly mobile combat actions, penetrating rapidly to a great depth, and reaching the objective of the operation. Because of this, the scope of front (army) offensive operations is sharply increased, while the duration of these operations is considerably reduced.

Attack groupings of a front (army) will develop highly mobile combat actions simultaneously over areas that are extensive in frontage and depth, and these actions will be characterized by multiple centers of combat. At the same time, actions characterized by multiple centers of combat will be combined with rapid troop movements into the depth and will also be characterized by great intensity and, as a rule, by actions under conditions of intensive radioactive contamination, destruction, and flooded terrain.

The massed employment of forces and means on the crucial axes still retains its importance in present-day operations. However, the conditions and procedure for massing forces and means differs significantly today from similar actions in past operations. Under new conditions, decisive importance is attached to the massed employment of nuclear weapons and other means of destruction against the enemy's principal groupings and most important installations on the crucial axes. However, we must provide for dispersing the operational dispositions of troops and establishing the necessary densities only on specific axes and for the time required to accomplish combat tasks.

Dense dispositions, as well as the massing of troops, have now become dangerous. Of course, front (army) forces and means must be dispersed only insofar as operational considerations permit, and primarily so as to ensure their rapid employment on the crucial axes and against the principal targets.
Also a characteristic feature of present-day operations is the sudden increase in the requirements for materiel, particularly for tank, motor transport, and aircraft fuel and missile propellant. The conduct of highly mobile combat actions by front (army) troops employing modern means of destruction requires huge expenditures of materiel and will entail considerable losses in both personnel and equipment. Uninterrupted materiel-technical support will directly affect the fulfillment of combat tasks.

Sudden, rapid, and frequent changes in the situation will occur in present-day offensive operations, usually accompanied by radical changes in the balance of forces, which will require the flexible employment of front forces and means, as well as of various types of combat actions.

The successful conduct of present-day operations is impossible without well-organized, continuous, and steady troop control. The outcome of combat to seize the initiative and achieve victory will depend on how quickly decisions are made and tasks are assigned to the troops. In this connection, command over troop combat activity will require from commands and staffs at all levels extremely high working efficiency, quick reactions to sudden changes in the situation, and timely monitoring of troop activities. In this matter, an important role will belong to organizing stable communications, which, as is known, are the principal means of providing troop control in an operation. Only when communications are operating without interruption can a commander and his staff know at any moment what the situation is and exercise continuous command over troop activities.

When discussing the nature of present-day offensive operations we must particularly emphasize the decisive role of man and his fighting efficiency and morale in achieving the objectives of an operation. Moreover, the high morale and political consciousness of troops are very important factors defining their combat effectiveness, since in the final analysis the tasks in an operation are fulfilled by men who have full mastery over their weapons and equipment. The high morale and political consciousness of the troops, their stability, steadfastness, deep faith in the righteousness of their struggle to build communism, and also their high level of combat (field) training always have been and always will be the fundamental
principle of success in achieving victory over an enemy. These qualities in the troops (which cannot be calculated by machines) acquire special importance under nuclear war conditions. Political work among the troops is of great importance, both during training and during an operation. In political work our primary attention should be directed at ensuring a high level of troop combat readiness, creating an unshakeable confidence in our victory, fulfilling the tasks of the initial nuclear strike in a timely manner, repelling enemy attacks, and at having front troops rapidly and decisively go over to the offensive. Work of this nature is the most important activity not only of political workers, but of all command personnel and staffs as well.

These are the most important characteristic features of present-day offensive operations which are used as the basis for structuring and conducting them. Undoubtedly every operation will have other characteristic features dictated by the specific conditions of the situation, tasks, objectives and, in general, by the concept of the operation.

Thus, the objectives, tasks, and methods of conducting front (army) offensive operations, as well as their nature, may be extremely varied depending on the actual conditions of the situation, which should be taken into account when preparing and conducting an operation.

PREPARING OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

The comprehensive, thoroughly thought out, careful, and timely carrying out of preparations for an operation will to a large extent predetermine whether it is conducted successfully.

In connection with the employment of diversified means of warfare and the varied conditions under which war may break out and be waged, there has been a considerable increase in the volume and a change in the content of preparatory measures for an operation. There has been a drastic expansion in the role the organizational activities of a front (army) commander and his staff and also of the chiefs of branch arms and services play in preparing an offensive operation. There has arisen a need to employ new and more sophisticated methods of organizing the work of the command and staffs at all levels.
The Substance and Tasks of the Preparation of Offensive Operations

The preparation of front (army) offensive operations includes an extensive system of diversified measures carried out by the command, staffs, political organs, and troops to organize, plan, and comprehensively support an operation.

The principal measures in preparing operations are: making a decision and planning the operation; establishing the required troop groupings and assigning tasks to them; organizing cooperation; preparing forces and means and maintaining them in a high state of constant combat readiness to deliver powerful, sudden strikes against the enemy, to repel his strikes, and to go over to a decisive offensive under the varied conditions in which a war is initiated and conducted. Measures for comprehensive support of troop combat actions have an important place in the preparation for an operation.

Before combat actions are initiated, the main task of preparing an operation is to foresee and implement all measures which would guarantee that front (army) troops fulfil their tasks successfully under any conditions in which a war is unleashed and, first and foremost, that would ensure the delivery of a sudden strike against the enemy and the disruption of his attack. All measures for preparing operations are not only inseparably linked to each other, but are definitely interrelated with the measures carried out by other operational formations of the armed forces participating in a strategic operation. Measures for preparing an operation must be carried out secretly and within prescribed time limits.

Making a Decision

The front commander's making of a decision is the basis for carrying out all measures for the preparation and conduct of an operation. Therefore, a front commander must show all of his skill so that his decision for the operation ensures the rapid and efficient achievement of the objective of the operation and that the decision is comprehensively based and fully appropriate to the developing situation. In this connection we must examine the possible methods of making a decision and, first and foremost, the scientific method.
The scientific method of making a decision must ensure, above all, that it is completely objective, sound, and that it anticipates possible developments in the situation during the operation. A decision can be worthwhile only when it is based on reliable data about the enemy grouping, on an objective assessment of the actual capabilities of the opposing forces, and on operational calculations that are as accurate as possible. To make a sound decision it is very important to identify the concept of the enemy's probable actions. We must emphasize that the clarity and purposefulness of the work of the collective of the field headquarters, as well as the rapidity with which troops prepare for an offensive, will depend on the accuracy of the concept and the specificity of the tasks in the concept. This clarity and purposefulness must be ensured primarily by the staff and the chiefs of the branch arms and services.

As we have already indicated, the methods of making a decision may vary, depending on the conditions under which the operation is prepared. The commander of a front will often make the decision for the initial operation under peacetime conditions. Having adequate time available, he can clarify all aspects of the decision in a consistent and detailed manner, make all necessary calculations, and substantiate the decision he has made. In so doing, he can assign tasks to the chief of staff, chief of rocket troops and artillery, commander of the air army, and other personnel of the front field headquarters when preparing the data and calculations he requires in making the decision, and he can consult with them on matters he is interested in.

However, conditions might arise when the situation changes rapidly in anticipation of the outbreak of war, as a result of which new tasks will be assigned to a border military district (front) requiring other decisions and the carrying out of other measures in a very limited period of time. When making a decision under these conditions, the front commander may limit himself to an exchange of views with the chief of staff alone, and clarify those questions of interest to him with appropriate senior personnel, expending on this a minimum amount of time.

Finally, military actions might develop suddenly or they might be preceded by a very brief period of threat, which may also require rapidly carrying out important modifications in the
previously adopted decision or even making a new decision conforming to the situation that has developed. Under these conditions the front commander must personally assess all elements of the situation and make a decision immediately (counted as minutes or tens of minutes). Only if time is available will he be able to refine specific questions of the chief of staff and chiefs of branch arms.

It is well known that the commander makes the decision and bears personal responsibility for the consequences of this decision. The principal command personnel of a front field headquarters, primarily the chief of staff and chiefs of the branch arms, provide the commander with all necessary data to make a sound decision. Therefore, proper organization of the activities of a commander and the main personnel of the field headquarters is one of the most important items determining whether the decision adopted is worthwhile. The organization of these activities will vary depending on the time available to a commander, the level of his knowledge, and his assessment of the situation.

However, under present conditions timeliness is important not only in making a decision, but also in transmitting combat tasks to the executors. A decision must be made in a timely manner and must conform to the conditions of the situation, and the methods of transmitting tasks to the troops (staffs are responsible for this) must always provide executors with enough time to organize combat actions. One should persevere in learning how to make decisions for operations within short periods of time, because in a future war the importance of the time factor will increase drastically.

In the practice of operational training the parallel method of work of the command and staffs at all levels is being used more widely when a decision for an operation is made in a short period of time. The essence of this method can be expressed briefly as follows. Upon receiving the operational directive, the front (army) commander, along with the chief of staff, the chiefs of the operations and intelligence directorates, the chief of the rocket troops and artillery, the chief of the air defense troops, and the commander (chief of the operations group) of the air army, clarifies the assigned task, assesses the situation, indicates the concept of the operation, and defines the tasks for...
the troops in general terms; the tasks are then immediately transmitted to the executors as preliminary instructions. After this, the commander, continuing to work on the decision, makes a more thorough analysis of certain aspects of the assessment of the situation, refines the tasks of the troops, and defines the bases of their cooperation and the most important measures for support of the operation and for control. When necessary, he consults with the chief of staff and the chiefs of the branch arms and services or has them brief him on matters that are of interest to him.

At the same time, the chief of staff organizes the purposeful work of the entire front (army) field headquarters based on the concept of the operation, and subordinate commanders (in an army, large unit commanders), upon receiving the preliminary instructions, make decisions in parallel with the higher commander. In a front, the process of making a decision by this work method is often completed within 4.5 to five hours after the operational directive is received from the Supreme High Command. Rapid transmission of tasks to subordinates by means of preliminary instructions ensures that work will be initiated almost simultaneously in the staffs of the various command levels (front, army, division, regiment).

A front (army) commander and field headquarters can employ other methods of work when making a decision. The making of a decision for an operation in peacetime is, as a rule, linked to the working out of an operation plan. Therefore, the work procedure of a front field headquarters is determined under these conditions by the orders of the General Staff.

Those are present-day views on methods of making a decision. As regards the content of a decision, at present the following usually are considered the fundamental items of a decision for an offensive operation: the concept of the operation; the tasks for the employment of nuclear weapons, and primarily for the conduct of the initial massed nuclear strike; the tasks of first- and second-echelon armies, airborne troops, rocket troops, the air army, air defense troops, and the front reserve; and also the orders on organizing the cooperation, support, and control of the troops.
The basic requirement of the content of a decision is that it fully conform to the objectives of the operation and the tasks assigned to the front, and that in all cases it ensure that the enemy is defeated quickly and that his territory is seized in a short period of time. These requirements must be reflected throughout the decision, and first of all in the concept of the operation -- the most important and determining portion of the decision. In this connection, it is necessary to devote exceptionally great attention to determining the concept of the operation.

The concept of the operation must be based on the combat capabilities of the nuclear weapons and troops which will be available to the front in the operation, and it must express the idea of the front commander's decision for routing the enemy's main forces and means and seizing important areas of his territory. In it the front commander determines the following: which enemy grouping is to be routed where and by what means, in order to achieve the objectives of the operation; what nuclear strikes must be delivered for this; which and how many ground forces groupings are to be established and on what axes it is most desirable to employ them to exploit the nuclear strikes; and what should be the operational disposition of the troops.

The substance of the troop tasks and of the orders on organizing cooperation and comprehensive troop support and control should stem from the concept of the operation. That being the case, tasks must be assigned to the troops in a specific manner, reflecting all of the characteristic features of each army and large unit (unit) subordinate to the front.

On the whole, the decision must be comprehensively based.

The Substance and Tasks of the Planning of Operations

Adopting a decision and planning operations are unique creative processes which cannot be split up into activities of the front (army) commander and those of the field headquarters.

The essence of planning a present-day offensive operation consists in selecting, in accordance with the front (army) commander's concept and decision, a sound optimum variant of the employment of available forces and means to fulfil the assigned

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tasks in a timely manner and achieve the objective of the operation. In the plan of the operation the following are worked out in detail: the methods selected for conducting the operation, methods of routing the enemy, and the measures concerning cooperation, comprehensive support of combat actions, and troop control under whatever conditions a war is unleashed.

Since fronts are called upon to exploit, first of all, the results of strikes by strategic nuclear forces, the planning of front offensive operations must be based on the possible results of nuclear strikes by these forces. Furthermore, a front also takes into account tasks accomplished by adjacent fronts and by frontline formations (large units) of the Air Defense Forces of the Country, and during actions on a coastal axis—tasks accomplished by the navy. Only in the event of such a condition will a front be able to correctly plan the employment of its own forces and means to fulfill the assigned tasks.

A front offensive operation is planned in accordance with tasks, which are planned in a most detailed and exact manner, e.g., the employment of forces and means in the initial nuclear strike, the repulse of an enemy attack, the protection of troops from weapons of mass destruction, the applicable procedure for an advance and deployment, and the troop combat actions for the first day and, if possible, for the second and sometimes the third day of the offensive. The planning of subsequent tasks is accomplished in rough outline.

Under present-day conditions it is necessary, when planning an operation, to make a number of operational and technical calculations which will allow a troop commander to compare several variants of fulfilling each task, taking into account the possible nature of enemy actions, and to choose from these the optimum variant.

Special attention should be given to the establishment of a favorable quantitative and qualitative balance of forces between the belligerents in nuclear weapons, aircraft, tanks, and artillery when fulfilling the assigned tasks, as well as the detection of a possible change in the balance of forces during an operation. This will make it possible to choose the most effective methods of employing forces and means in an operation. When making calculations it is necessary, above all, to take into
consideration the possible results of the employment of nuclear weapons by the belligerents.

Everything that has been stated above concerning the planning of a front operation applies in equal measure to the planning of an army offensive operation. We should keep in mind, however, that the fulfilment of an immediate task of an army will often be planned for each day of the operation. Combat actions in the first 24-hour period of an offensive are planned in great detail.

These are the fundamental items in planning an operation which predetermine the trend of development of all the other measures: planning the employment of nuclear weapons (especially of the initial nuclear strike); establishing attack groupings; organizing cooperation; maintaining a high level of troop combat readiness; and also planning the support of troop combat actions.

Planning the Employment of Nuclear Weapons

The problems of employing nuclear weapons occupy the most important place in the activities of the front troop commander and staff when organizing an operation. The front troop commander personally resolves all problems of organizing the employment of nuclear weapons. Such problems are: determining tasks of employing nuclear weapons according to the concept of the operation; allocating nuclear warheads and determining the delivery means to fulfill these tasks; organizing rear area reconnaissance for rocket troops and organizing other types of support; organizing control of rocket troops and aviation which employ nuclear weapons; and also thoroughly preparing the initial nuclear strike.

The principal tasks for nuclear weapons in a front offensive operation might be to destroy and damage the enemy's nuclear attack means, his principal aviation and troop groupings, and the most important rear installations and control posts. In doing so, separate provisions are made for tasks ensuring achievement of the objective of the initial nuclear strike and fulfilment of the immediate and subsequent tasks of a front. We cannot establish any norms (percentages) for the allocation of nuclear warheads to fulfill these tasks. Everything will depend on the specific conditions of the situation.
The employment of nuclear weapons in the initial strike is planned in detail, indicating not only the tasks, but also the specific installations (targets), the yield of the nuclear warheads allocated for their destruction, the type of burst, and the delivery means and times (or sequence) for destroying the installations. In addition, when planning strikes against reliably known and stationary targets, their coordinates are specified. To strike targets whose exact location is unknown or whose location might be changed when military actions begin, the final reconnaissance means and procedure for their destruction are indicated. Together with this we stipulate targets which are to be struck by chemical weapons and conventional means of destruction. A reserve (on-alert rocket troop batteries and air army subunits) is assigned to strike newly detected nuclear attack means of the enemy and his other important installations.

To fulfill the immediate task of a front, the employment of nuclear weapons is planned in rough outline for each task and day. However, the tasks and expenditure of nuclear warheads for the first day of an operation must be specifically established.

To fulfill the subsequent task of a front, the overall requirements for nuclear warheads are determined, based on the probable tasks which must be accomplished by nuclear weapons.

To accomplish unforeseen tasks in an operation, provisions are made for a reserve of nuclear warheads which, according to the experience of exercises, will often comprise approximately five to ten percent of the total number of nuclear warheads allocated for the operation.

Planning an initial nuclear strike requires special attention, as it is an extremely laborious and responsible matter. First of all, to accomplish the tasks of an initial nuclear strike it is necessary to select from among the vast number of diverse enemy targets the most important ones, whose destruction will decisively influence the attainment of the objectives of the operation. To ensure the highest level of destruction, it is necessary to correctly determine the most vulnerable elements of enemy installations, by whose destruction these installations lose their combat effectiveness, to determine the yield of the nuclear warheads, as well as the means of delivering them, with due regard for the rational exploitation of
the advantages of each delivery vehicle. Furthermore, when planning the initial nuclear strike of a front, we must determine the sequence in which tasks are to be fulfilled and also ensure the safety of our own troops.

When planning the initial nuclear strike of a front it is necessary to proceed from the conditions and nature of the cooperation with the strategic rocket forces, the essence of which consists primarily in not expending front nuclear forces in the area of the strikes delivered by the strategic rocket forces. Therefore, a front must know the boundary (line) beyond which enemy installations are to be hit by strategic rocket forces, or the installations within range of front means which are to be hit by strategic forces.

When the initial launching of operational-tactical missiles and the sorties of front aviation are carried out at the same time as the initial strike of the strategic nuclear forces, it should be considered as a desirable variant of carrying out the initial nuclear strike of the front. In this case, the initial nuclear strike of the front achieves surprise and its delivery is ensured in a short period of time. Conditions are also created whereby front nuclear means cannot be subjected to an enemy nuclear strike before we begin their employment.

In present-day operations the problem of achieving surprise with the initial nuclear strike and of carrying it out within short time limits with the maximum amount of forces and means under any situational conditions can be solved in various ways.

Undoubtedly the most efficient way, in peacetime or during the period of threat, is by maintaining at full combat readiness the number of front rocket troops and aviation which would ensure the destruction of the enemy's operational-tactical means of nuclear attack in their launching sites and airfields prior to their employment, the disruption of his control system, and the delivery of strikes against his main troop groupings.

However, maintaining the necessary amount of forces and means at full combat readiness is an extremely difficult matter, since this requires great expenditures of materiel, and the personnel of front missile and aviation large units will experience a great deal of stress. Therefore this problem can be
solved another way -- namely, by maintaining a limited number of rocket troops and delivery aircraft (means on alert) at full combat readiness, which will ensure the delivery of a surprise strike against enemy operational-tactical means of nuclear attack and against his important control posts in order to disrupt his employment of these means and disorganize his troop control.

Finally, an important approach to the solution of this problem is to reduce to the utmost the time limits required to bring front rocket troops and aviation up to full combat readiness.

Apparently the first way may be acceptable only if a period of threat precedes the initiation of a war. The second way of solving the problem may be employed when the situation is somewhat strained. The third way is the most effective one, but it requires implementing an entire set of measures primarily of a technical nature (missile-technical support).

Determining the makeup and duration of the initial nuclear strike is very important. When planning, in all cases it is necessary to strive to deliver the strike against all the planned targets in the shortest possible time. Based on this requirement, it is considered most advisable to carry out the initial nuclear strike of a front by a single launching of missiles and with a single sortie of aircraft. Subsequent missile launchings and repeated aircraft sorties will be carried out during the front offensive operation.

The makeup and duration of an initial nuclear strike will depend greatly on the conditions under which a war is unleashed. It is known that the initial nuclear strike of a front may be delivered by surprise against an enemy in his permanent disposition areas or during the period of his movement forward and deployment, or simultaneously against an enemy grouping beginning to move forward and against permanent disposition areas. At the same time, it can be carried out simultaneously with the enemy's nuclear attack (a mutual exchange of nuclear strikes). Finally, an event unfavorable to us may occur if our initial nuclear strike is carried out under conditions of a surprise enemy attack and is in the form of a retaliatory strike. In all of the above-mentioned cases, the initial nuclear strike of a front may be delivered either in the daytime or at night.
It is perfectly clear that the procedure for delivering the initial nuclear strike, as well as the necessary forces and means, will be determined according to the above-mentioned conditions.

In order to disrupt a surprise attack by the enemy, it is advisable for a front to plan the delivery of the initial nuclear strike against the enemy at the first signs of his preparing for this attack. This task may be accomplished by delivering the initial nuclear strike against the permanent disposition areas of his forces or when his forces are advancing and deploying for the attack. Other conditions for delivering the initial nuclear strike must also be taken into consideration when planning this strike, special attention being required to be ready to deliver an initial nuclear strike under conditions where the enemy succeeds in achieving a certain degree of surprise, so as not to give him an opportunity to catch us unawares.

As a rule, the initial nuclear strike of a front against permanent disposition areas is carried out by surprise. Therefore, in the event of such a strike it is possible to catch the enemy unawares, deprive him of the opportunity of preparing himself to disrupt or repel the initial nuclear strike, and ensure the most accurate discharge (aiming) of nuclear weapons delivery means against the target, thus inflicting maximum losses on him and ensuring our seizing the initiative when combat actions begin. Consequently, by delivering the initial nuclear strike against permanent disposition areas it is possible, more successfully than under other conditions, to accomplish tasks involving the disruption of enemy employment of operational-tactical means of nuclear attack against front troops and installations and tasks involving the destruction of his forces. The duration of such a strike may be very short -- up to five minutes for rocket troops and 30 minutes for aircraft.

When planning the initial nuclear strike of a front it is necessary to determine with precision the yield and number of nuclear warheads and the types of delivery vehicles to employ against each enemy target. The yield and number of nuclear warheads, as well as the type of delivery vehicle, are selected in accordance with the required (assigned) level of destruction to be inflicted on enemy troop groupings and installations.
The required level of destruction of installations is determined on the basis of their importance, the characteristics of enemy troop groupings, and the importance of destroying them in order to fulfill the tasks and achieve the objective of the operation. At the same time, the level of destruction of the installations should ensure that the required superiority over the enemy is achieved, as a result of which favorable conditions can be created for the completion of the destruction of his forces by a rapid troop attack, primarily on the main axis, and also create conditions for the employment of front aviation and airborne landing forces.

The criterion of the level of destruction of such installations as command posts, communications centers, radiotechnical posts, and rear installations of the enemy is the disablement of personnel and equipment. If they are located in engineer shelters, the index of the level of destruction can be the demolition and destruction of these shelters with a temporary or full curtailment of the operation of the installations.

When planning an initial front nuclear strike, it is advisable to assign forces and means of the same branch arm to destroy major enemy installations. We must strive to have either rocket troops or aviation deliver the nuclear strike against each installation. It is most advantageous to have the forces and means of a single subunit or unit strike at each installation. If the forces of different branch arms (rocket troops and aviation) or various units of the same branch arm are designated to strike an enemy installation, it will be necessary to designate the personnel authorized to carry out the nuclear strike in a timely manner and reliably destroy the installation.

We must particularly explain how nuclear weapons are to be employed when conducting offensive operations under mountainous terrain conditions. It is true that the principles for employing them in mountainous areas are the same as under ordinary conditions. However, when employing nuclear weapons in mountains it is necessary to consider the effect of terrain relief, the casualty-producing elements of a nuclear burst, and the nature of mountain rocks and soil, in order to achieve maximum destruction of the enemy as a result of employing these weapons, and at the same time prevent the formation of barriers, landslides, forest fires, and zones of intensive radioactive contamination, which
are capable of hindering the actions of our own troops. Therefore, to strike an enemy who is, for example, defending passes, passages, or various defiles, and if there is a danger of destroying the latter objects as a result of nuclear bursts, then it is advisable to deliver single nuclear strikes with low-yield warheads in elevated bursts or to employ chemical warheads. At the same time, we must take into account the increased persistence of toxic agents in forested mountains, the possibility of prolonged stagnation of contaminated air in large forested tracts, depressions, hollows and gorges, and also the flow of this air down into ravines and valleys to the positions of our own troops.

Establishing Attack Groupings

One of the most important measures when preparing an operation is to establish attack groupings in the operational disposition of front (army) troops. By attack groupings we mean the main forces of a front (army) and, above all, its nuclear means concentrated on the axis of the main attack, as well as those forces and means allocated to other axes to fulfil the principal tasks of the offensive operation.

The front (army) attack groupings that are established must ensure reliable destruction of the projected targets in the initial nuclear strike, defeat of the main groupings in the border zone, rapid development of the offensive to great depth, and timely and efficient exploitation of the results of nuclear strikes by strategic nuclear forces.

When establishing attack groupings and also when fulfilling the main and intermediate tasks of the operation, it is first of all necessary to proceed from the balance of forces which may develop as a result of delivering the initial nuclear strike. These calculations, although they are to some degree approximate, nevertheless make it possible to forecast a possible change in the balance of forces. For the troops to conduct a rapid attack, the achievement of a decisive superiority in nuclear forces, tanks, artillery, and motorized infantry must be ensured on the selected axes of the offensive, both at the beginning of, and during, the operation.
Upon establishing attack groupings of troops, it is necessary to ensure a continuously high level of combat readiness and to also take into consideration the need to build up efforts during the operation. It is obvious that such a buildup of efforts can be carried out by setting up a deep operational disposition of front (army) troops.

When troops are operating in mountainous areas, several attack groupings are established along the axes, depending on the availability of through roads. In this case it must be borne in mind that a limited number of accessible sectors and a negligible capacity of axes create the danger of overcrowding them with troops and with combat and other equipment, especially when negotiating various defiles. In this connection, great importance is attached to the skilful concentration of forces and means in frontage and in depth, and also to covering them reliably against enemy air attacks. But again, as a result of the limited number of accessible terrain sectors and the negligible capacity of axes, the total density of forces and means will be less than under ordinary conditions.

When preparing an operation it is necessary to plan in detail the procedure for having motorized rifle and tank large units of the established troop groupings go over to the offensive under the various conditions of the beginning of military actions. Depending on the situation, front (army) troops can go over to the offensive directly from their permanent disposition areas, from their combat alert assembly areas, training areas, from waiting areas, or from direct contact with the enemy. The basic requirement under present-day conditions is that, under any of the aforementioned methods of going over to the offensive, the delivery of surprise strikes against the enemy be ensured.

In light of this requirement, the procedure for having troops go over to the offensive from their permanent disposition areas merits special attention, since this procedure is the one that ensures, to the highest degree, the achievement of surprise in the delivery of a strike. The essence of this going over to the offensive consists in having large units and units, after a combat alert is declared, move forward from their disposition areas in the shortest time limits on their previously designated routes of march, form up in march columns or immediately in approach march formation, and advance rapidly toward the state.
border. In this case, first-echelon divisions, bypassing their alert assembly areas or designated waiting (departure) areas, engage in combat from the march. The forming up of troops into columns or into approach march formations will be carried out, as a rule, during the advance and at a distance from the permanent disposition areas of the troops, which rules out their being hit by enemy strikes delivered against these areas with medium-yield nuclear warheads. This procedure of troops going over to the offensive has to be thoroughly prepared and worked out in the practice of combat and operational training.

Organizing Cooperation

The change in the character of present-day offensive operations and the participation of the forces and means of different branch arms in routing an enemy in a theater of military operations require not only organizing precise cooperation within a front (army), but also organizing the coordination of the actions of front (army) troops with operational formations of other branches of the armed forces and with adjacent fronts.

The fundamental problems of cooperation are specified in the commander's decision on the operation and are specifically included in the plan for the offensive operation of the front (army), in the combat employment plans of branch arms, and in the combat action plan of the air army. Precise coordination of efforts is achieved by specifying tasks correctly to the troops and by having formation commanders (commanders) of cooperating operational formations and large units know these tasks thoroughly. Orders on organizing cooperation are conveyed to cooperating operational formations and large units at the same time combat tasks are assigned to them. Subsequently these orders are refined as combat actions are organized.

The main problem in organizing cooperation in a present-day front offensive operation is to coordinate the strikes of forces and means employing nuclear weapons with respect to targets and time, and also to coordinate the actions of attacking troops exploiting the results of nuclear strikes to complete the rout of opposing enemy groupings.
When preparing an operation, a front commander organizes cooperation among troops and means that are employing nuclear weapons; among first-echelon armies attacking on various axes; among first- and second-echelon armies, rocket troops, aviation, and air defense means.

It is necessary to organize cooperation in such a manner, so as to inflict decisive damage on the enemy's main groupings and most important installations by the employment of nuclear weapons, and to complete the rout of those groupings by the actions of attacking troops. At the same time, it is important to safeguard our own troops against the radioactive contamination resulting from our nuclear strikes.

Furthermore, it is very important to coordinate the actions of a front (army) with operational formations (large units) of other branches of the armed forces and with other fronts (armies).

After strikes by the Strategic Rocket Forces in cooperation with Long Range Aviation, with the Air Defense Forces of the Country, with the naval forces, with strategic airborne landing forces, and also with adjacent fronts, the actions of front (army) troops are the basis for successfully conducting a front (army) offensive operation.

The interconnection of a front offensive with the strategic rocket forces is defined by the concept of the strategic operation and is mainly subordinated to the timely and fullest exploitation by front (army) troops of the results of their nuclear strikes to complete the rout of the enemy's main groupings.

Long Range Aviation can participate in the initial nuclear strike of strategic nuclear forces and at the same time, with a portion of its forces, it can operate in front operations. Long Range Aviation actions will exert particularly great influence on the conduct of a front operation when the front is allocated special resources. In turn, the successful operations of Long Range Aviation will be determined to a great extent by the actions of fronts (armies), including actions for carrying out measures to make its overflights secure.
It is very important to coordinate the actions of the air
defense forces and means of a front with the Air Defense Forces
of the Country to repel enemy air attacks at the beginning of
military actions and also during a strategic (front) operation.

Concerning the navy, it should be noted that it will
participate in the initial nuclear strike with its submarines
and, furthermore, it will conduct operations to destroy enemy
aircraft carrier groupings and submarine forces, and it will also
operate against enemy lines of transportation. By these means it
will exert direct influence on the course of the development of
the offensive of the fronts (armies). The offensive of a front
(army) on a coastal axis will be especially dependent on the
actions of the navy when joint tasks have to be accomplished to
seize straits zones, make amphibious landings, and disrupt and
repel enemy amphibious landings.

When strategic and operational airborne landings (airdrops)
are carried out in the front (army) zone, actions involving the
accomplishment of tasks for the rout of enemy groupings and the
seizure of the most important areas and installations deep in the
enemy rear area are to be coordinated between the airborne troops
and front (army) troops.

The cooperation of a front (army) with adjacent fronts
(armies) is of great significance when carrying out the tasks of
the initial nuclear strike, especially when repelling enemy air
attacks, and also when fulfilling tasks involving the destruction
of enemy nuclear attack means and the routing of enemy groupings
on adjacent flanks.

The Combat Readiness of Troops

An important problem in preparing an operation is to
maintain front troops at a continuously high level of combat
readiness. To have troops at a high level of combat readiness to
fulfil any tasks which may arise according to the situation --
this is the main requirement and fundamental condition which
ensures that the initial nuclear strike is delivered by surprise
and that front troops go over to the offensive in a timely manner
following that strike.
A system which is precise and has been worked out during peacetime for bringing troops up to increased or full combat readiness is one of the basic conditions ensuring the timely and successful fulfilment of the tasks in an operation.

Under peacetime conditions, depending on the situation, the level of combat readiness of troops can vary. They can be at a routine level of combat readiness, which is characteristic of normal peacetime conditions. Under conditions of a somewhat tense situation, troops are brought up to increased readiness, and when the unleashing of war is foreseen or when the international situation is sharply exacerbated, they are brought up to full combat readiness.

While discussing troop combat readiness, it should be emphasized that under present-day conditions it is not possible to count on there always being some kind of period of threat in the time sense. This could mean committing a fatal mistake. Obviously, the sudden outbreak of a war must serve as the foundation of all the measures for bringing troops up to full combat readiness. Basic measures which ensure a high level of combat readiness of the troops include the following: a well-developed system of notifying troops that they are to be brought up to a particular level of combat readiness; bringing units and large units up to a corresponding level of readiness and defining their concentration areas upon alert; bringing up to combat readiness units and large units that are going out to exercises, firing ranges, camps, etc.; regulations on maintaining and bringing armament, equipment, and reserves of materiel and equipment up to readiness; organization and mobilization measures, the deployment of control and communications organs, and the organization of the monitoring of troop combat readiness.

It is very important to prepare front rocket troops and aviation to participate in the initial nuclear strike, and also to prepare air defense forces and means to repel enemy air attacks. For this purpose, even during peacetime in border military districts (fronts), siting areas for rocket troops and air defense forces and means are selected and prepared, and a developed network of airfields for aircraft is established.

At the same time, we determine the procedure for advancing and deploying the forces and means participating in the initial
nuclear strike and for repelling an enemy attack. When there is a constant threat of a sudden outbreak of military actions, it is necessary that these forces and means be in a full, or at least an increased, state of combat readiness.

The readiness of control organs is one of the decisive factors in the constant combat readiness of troops. The readiness of control organs is ensured by preparing in a timely manner a system of control posts and communications for the control of all forces and means when fulfilling the tasks of a front offensive operation.

An important task pertaining to the constant readiness of control organs is the search for methods of speeding up their deployment into previously prepared areas and for more development of the organization of their work, which would ensure continuous troop control, particularly at the beginning of military actions.

Supporting Troop Combat Actions

Comprehensive support is the most important factor for the success of front (army) offensive operations, since it creates conditions favoring the fullest exploitation of troop combat capabilities when routing an enemy and achieving the objectives of an operation.

Combat support is very important (covering state borders from the ground, air, and sea) for the purposes of holding specific areas (lines) along state borders, repelling enemy attacks from the air and sea, and ensuring the organized advance and deployment of front (army) troops in going over to the offensive.

Combat support is organized and carried out on the basis of the possible conditions of the development of military actions, the nature of impending enemy actions, the disposition of front (army) troops, and the importance of installations in the border zone, retention of which are of major importance in going over to the offensive. Support is carried out, as a rule, by forces and means allocated from the complement of troops of the front (army) first echelon and front air defense forces and aviation.
Border forces are also included in the complement of troops designated for combat support (cover). Troops allocated to cover the ground portion of a state border usually fulfill their tasks by means of a defense.

It should be borne in mind that the extensive spatial scope of present-day operations, the high rates of advance, the short duration of battles and engagements, and the sudden and frequent changes in a situation are changing to a considerable degree the substance of the measures for the comprehensive support of troop combat actions and they are imposing greater requirements for speed and timeliness in accomplishing them. To successfully conduct troop combat actions in operations it is very important to carry out measures for comprehensive support in advance.

The appearance of new combat means and the changing nature of operations have drastically increased the importance of reconnaissance, material-technical support, and particularly of protecting troops and rear services facilities from weapons of mass destruction. A new type of support -- warfare against enemy radioelectronic means -- is acquiring major importance. This type of security can affect to a considerable degree the enemy's troop control and his employment of nuclear attack means.

As formerly, an important role is played by measures carried out for the purpose of achieving surprise, deceiving the enemy, and concealing our forces and means when preparing and conducting combat actions.

At the same time, several types of support, which were taken into consideration in the past, as, for example, air defense of troops and antitank defense, have already outgrown the framework of support and are now an integral and most important part of an operation and of all types of troop combat activities. Essentially, reconnaissance is also an integral part of combat actions and the conduct of operations. Reconnaissance actions precede and accompany the fulfilment of all tasks in an operation and they blend organically with these tasks.

The fundamental tasks of support consist primarily in achieving a continuous high level of troop combat readiness, creating the most favorable conditions for the sudden and effective employment of nuclear weapons and other types of
weapons of mass destruction, having front (army) troops carry out
decisive and highly mobile actions, preserving troop combat
readiness under conditions of enemy employment of these weapons,
as well as hindering the enemy in employing his forces and means
and in conducting combat actions.

Support for an offensive operation is organized on the basis
of the troop commander's decision and his instructions. Support
measures are developed under the direction of the chief of staff
by the appropriate directorates, departments, and staffs of
branch arms and services of the front (army) field headquarters,
in close cooperation with each other.

In conclusion, we must note that the successful conduct of
an offensive operation will be largely predetermined by carrying
out its preparation in a comprehensive, well thought-out,
 thorough, and timely manner.

CONDUCTING OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

The General Nature of Troop Combat Actions

The decisiveness of the objectives of both sides in a
nuclear war will confer on present-day offensive operations, from
their very inception, the characteristics of tension, violence,
and high mobility. Each side will strive to exploit rapidly and
most effectively the results of its nuclear strikes in order to
accomplish its tasks and achieve the objectives of the war in the
shortest period of time.

The first exchange of nuclear strikes will largely
predetermine the situation under which offensive operations are
carried out. Calculations and research on the experience of
operational games and exercises that have been conducted show
that should we deliver a timely initial nuclear strike a front
may sustain average losses of up to 12 to 20 percent; when a
front nuclear strike is delivered simultaneously with the enemy's
nuclear attack (a mutual exchange), front losses may amount to 25
to 35 percent; should the enemy preempt us in delivering the
initial nuclear strike, front troop losses might reach up to 60
percent, and possibly even more. But enemy troops may also incur
similar losses accordingly, depending on the conditions under
which the initial strike is carried out. Consequently, even if
our initial nuclear strike is timely and successful, the enemy may retain the capability of delivering nuclear strikes due to groupings of missiles and aircraft which have not been detected or destroyed for a variety of reasons, and due to the movement of forces and means from other axes and theaters, as well as from the sea. In the prospective offensive zones of a front or army, there may also remain groupings of enemy ground forces which are capable of not only offering resistance but also of conducting aggressive combat actions. Even were we to deliver a preemptive initial nuclear strike (as occurred in one of the research games in the Western Theater of Military Operations), the enemy may retain in the front offensive zone up to ten to 12 operational-tactical launchers, up to 600 to 650 aircraft (of which over 150 are delivery aircraft), up to 2,000 tanks, and 1,000 to 1,200 guns and mortars. Apparently, the troops of a front will also not succeed in avoiding losses from nuclear strikes, as a result of which some of its individual groupings may also be significantly weakened and forced to conduct combat actions with the complement of forces and means remaining.

As a result of nuclear strikes by both sides, the balance of forces may be suddenly changed, there may be a great deal of destruction, zones of radioactive contamination and flooding may be formed, and fires may spring up in large forested tracts and inhabited areas. This may require adopting urgent measures for the rapid elimination of the aftereffects of the employment of weapons of mass destruction and will adversely affect the nature of troop combat actions.

From the very beginning, combat actions will be characterized by rapid movements and by quick and sudden changes in the situation; and the endeavors of both sides to rapidly exploit the results of nuclear strikes will lead to deep mutual penetrations, the formation of separate centers of combat actions, and the establishment of large gaps and intervals in the operational disposition of the troops. This will require adopting the most diverse types and methods of combat actions -- actions which, in the absence of continuous fronts, will be conducted, as a rule, along axes, and which will be characterized by irregular forward movement and unequal intensity.

Thus, various types of troop combat actions may be carried out, depending on the following: the scale of nuclear weapons
employment, primarily by strategic means; the capabilities of
front and army troops to exploit the results of a nuclear strike
in a timely manner; the enemy's ability to offer resistance both
at the beginning of, and during, an offensive operation; and also
the characteristics of the theater of military operations.

To fulfill the tasks of routing, or of completing the rout of
the enemy and of seizing his territory, troops will often conduct
meeting engagements, overcome defenses, pursue and destroy the
enemy, disrupt his counterattacks, and destroy his counterattack
groupings. Front and army troops will have to negotiate various
obstacles and zones of contamination, make assault water
crossings, and seize major population centers and important
political, administrative, and economic areas. After strikes by
strategic nuclear forces it will be advisable to envelop and
occupy several of these areas with a portion of our forces. We
cannot exclude the possibility that during an offensive operation
a front will be forced to go over to the defense with a portion
of its forces on separate axes.

Front troops, operating jointly with the navy on a coastal
axis, may seize straits zones and islands, destroy enemy
groupings pinned down near the sea, carry out amphibious
landings, conduct an antilanding defense, and repel amphibious
and airborne landings.

The nature of troop actions in mountainous areas depends
greatly on specific terrain conditions. When attacking straight
across mountain ridges, front (army) troops, having routed the
enemy on the slopes of the mountain ridges, develop the offensive
with the main forces along roads and accessible axes; with a
portion of the forces they deliver blows on flanks and through
sectors of broken terrain; they split up hostile troops into
separate and isolated units, and seize commanding heights and
passes in cooperation with tactical airborne landing forces,
thereby creating favorable conditions for successfully developing
the offensive into the depth and routing the enemy in detail.
When attacking along the principal mountain ridges, front (army)
troops, exploiting the results of nuclear strikes, develop the
offensive with the main forces along valleys. Simultaneously
with this, they seize commanding heights on the flanks with a
portion of their forces, so as to secure the main forces against
flanking fire and counterthrusts (counterattacks). During an
attack under similar conditions it is necessary to avoid massing troops and equipment in defiles, passages, and ravines and to reliably secure the flanks of attacking troops against possible enemy strikes.

Depending on the developing situation, all these troop actions can be conducted simultaneously on the main axis and other axes, or they can be carried out in varied sequence. During the development of an offensive operation it is possible to employ these or other types of troop combat actions.

However, when fulfilling any tasks during an offensive operation it is important to preempt enemy employment of nuclear weapons, to carry out a swift attack following nuclear strikes, to boldly and decisively employ the tank armies and tank divisions of combined-arms armies, as well as airborne and helicopter landings, to continuously combat enemy nuclear attack means, to negotiate zones of radioactive contamination skilfully and in short time limits, and to continuously implement measures to protect troops against enemy weapons of mass destruction and incendiary means.

During an offensive operation front (army) troops may encounter enemy nuclear minefields, which will require the implementation of special measures to eliminate them and to prepare troops to negotiate such concentrations and sectors of obstacles.

**Employing Nuclear Weapons**

Troop combat actions and the fulfilment of the tasks of an offensive operation will be based primarily on the most effective employment of nuclear weapons, that is, on the timely infliction of decisive damage on the enemy with the minimum number of nuclear warheads required for it. Also, it is important to inflict decisive damage on the enemy in the initial nuclear strike, so that when front and army troops go over to the offensive they complete the rout of the enemy, advance swiftly into the depth the moment the operation is initiated, and do not get drawn into protracted battles and engagements. The success of the initial nuclear strike of a front is determined by the timeliness with which it is carried out and the most complete readiness of all forces and means participating in it. It is
necessary to be ready to fulfill the task of the initial nuclear strike in any situation, including under conditions of a surprise enemy attack. It is necessary to consider the most advantageous variant for carrying out the initial nuclear strike to be the one where it is accomplished by surprise with the maximum number of forces and means possible. We must strive for this.

The initial nuclear strike of a front is carried out according to a plan that has been previously developed and refined prior to the beginning of the operation.

When front troops go over to the offensive after the nuclear strike, subsequent missile launchings and aircraft sorties are to be carried out on the basis of data obtained from reconnaissance of the results of the initial nuclear strike, and nuclear weapons will be employed to strike and destroy nuclear, aviation, and ground force groupings remaining in the offensive zone, primarily those on the main axis throughout its depth in order to achieve a rapid troop advance. Nuclear weapons should be employed to destroy those important enemy targets which cannot be destroyed by conventional and chemical means or by troop actions.

When developing an offensive, nuclear weapons are employed to strike surviving (remaining) enemy groupings, primarily his nuclear attack means and his advancing operational and strategic reserves, and also to disrupt counterattacks or repel counteroffensives.

The fundamental requirement for employing nuclear weapons during an offensive operation must be to deliver surprise and powerful preemptive strikes. For this purpose it is necessary to reconnoiter the enemy continuously, and also to coordinate the procedure for the relocation of rocket troops and the rebasing of aircraft, to implement to the fullest extent operational camouflage measures for the concealment of the disposition areas of missile units and large units, of home airfields for delivery aircraft, and of their preparations for the delivery of nuclear strikes, to persistently carry out the requirements for the secure control of forces and means, and to supply nuclear warheads on time. Reliable air defense of the disposition areas of nuclear means and continuous combat against all types of enemy reconnaissance will assist in carrying out nuclear strikes by surprise.
To accomplish tasks which suddenly arise during an operation, missile and aviation large units and units should have in their complement forces and means on alert which are maintained at an appropriate level of readiness for the delivery of nuclear strikes. At the same time, it is important to stipulate that rocket troops and aviation be ready ahead of time to deliver massed and grouped nuclear strikes against enemy groupings in anticipation of the accomplishment of such tasks as assault crossings of major water obstacles, routing enemy counterattack groupings and reserves, negotiating enemy defenses prepared in advance, and others. Massed and grouped nuclear strikes are organized in compressed time limits. Since these time limits will be very short, during an offensive operation we must endeavor to determine the targets of nuclear strikes in a timely and reliable manner, and also carry out the necessary measures to ensure a high level of combat readiness in front rocket troops and aviation for the delivery of immediate nuclear strikes.

The front commander should determine the tasks, the targets to be destroyed, the number and yield of the nuclear warheads, the types of bursts, the employment of delivery means to strike at the targets, as well as the procedure for delivering massed and grouped nuclear strikes, and he should establish the most expedient time for their delivery.

When the front staff is organizing massed and grouped nuclear strikes during an offensive operation, it prepares all the data needed by the commander to make a decision on the delivery of these strikes, organizes all types of support, and monitors the execution of measures related to these strikes. In accordance with instructions of the front commander, the chief of rocket troops and artillery and the commander of the air army establish the level of readiness of rocket troops and aviation, participate in preparing the data for making the decision, ensure that tasks are conveyed to rocket troop and aviation large units (units), and also monitor the timing of missile launchings and aircraft sorties. Furthermore, the air army staff organizes and directs the conduct of aerial reconnaissance and reports the data obtained on the status of enemy targets to the front commander and staff and also to the chief of rocket troops and artillery.
Given the present-day capabilities for the employment of nuclear weapons, and also the conditions of the situation which might develop during an offensive operation, it can be assumed that during any one day of an operation (but not on a daily basis), a front will deliver, as a rule, not more than one massed nuclear strike. During the remaining time (between massed strikes), grouped and single strikes may be delivered against separate enemy targets.

When organizing nuclear strikes during an offensive operation it will be necessary to achieve a level of damage to the enemy which will ensure the establishment of a decisive superiority over the enemy in forces and means for the conduct of a rapid offensive.

The Methods of Routing an Enemy in a Border Zone

When front and army troops go over to the offensive, they are faced primarily with the task of routing or completing the rout of opposing enemy groupings in a border zone. In order to rout enemy groupings in a border zone, the methods of actions are employed which were discussed above and which were earlier defined in planning the operation. Decisive damage is inflicted on the enemy by the initial nuclear strike itself and it is completed by repeat nuclear and air strikes and by the actions of attacking troops. However, sudden changes in a situation as a result of nuclear strikes by both sides may make it necessary to examine or refine the methods of troop actions when routing enemy groupings which are still located in a border zone.

Depending on the level of damage to the enemy, the combat effectiveness of front (army) troops, and the developing balance of forces, different conditions for routing the enemy will arise. Under conditions where the damage inflicted on the enemy is such that he has separate and uncoordinated groupings in a border zone who have lost their combat effectiveness, the combat actions of front (army) troops will be characterized by a rapid advance of the main groupings in approach march formations and even in march formations to the depth and at high rates of advance. To complete the rout of the remaining enemy groupings, it will suffice to allocate a portion of the forces.
In a situation where both sides have suffered considerable losses on separate axes or throughout the zone of a front, it will be important to preempt the enemy by delivering nuclear strikes against his remaining groupings, by going over to the offensive with combat-effective troops, by eliminating the aftereffects of nuclear strikes, and by rapidly committing to combat those troops subjected to enemy nuclear strikes. It cannot be ruled out that separate groupings of a front will completely lose their combat effectiveness and that the enemy will go over to the offensive with his remaining forces. In this situation, a front will have to deliver repeat nuclear strikes against the most threatening enemy groupings, commit reserves of the front and adjacent armies, and sometimes even troops of the second-echelon army of the front. In some cases it may be expedient for armies to change their offensive zone.

Another possible situation is one where the enemy has sustained considerable losses on certain axes, but on others in the border zone he has retained groupings of forces and means capable of conducting combat actions. At the same time, front (army) forces have sustained considerable losses on individual axes. In this situation, front (army) troop actions will consist in delivering repeat nuclear strikes against the remaining enemy groupings in the border zone and in rapidly invading enemy territory with the main portion of the forces following the nuclear strikes.

When routing enemy aviation groupings, one of the most important tasks, in addition to delivering nuclear and chemical strikes against the enemy during combat in a border zone, will be the seizure and destruction of operating enemy airfields by tank groupings and airborne landing forces forging ahead into the depth.

**Developing an Offensive**

We understand developing an offensive by front (army) troops to mean building up (increasing) the rates of advance and routing surviving enemy groupings until they are completely destroyed. This is achieved by nuclear strikes and rapid troop actions which are coordinated and mutually linked as to objective, time, and place. To complete the rout of enemy groupings, tank armies (tank divisions) and airborne troops are primarily employed.
Tank armies and tank divisions of combined-arms armies will be the leading force of the attack groupings operating on the decisive axis of a front. They possess powerful striking force, high mobility, great resistance to the effects of the casualty-producing elements of nuclear bursts, and also an enhanced capability for negotiating zones of radioactive contamination, zones of destruction, and zones of obstacles. They are most capable of operating after nuclear strikes, of rapidly completing the rout of surviving enemy groupings, of destroying or seizing his airfield complexes, missile bases, air defense means, and major control posts, and also of disrupting his mobilization measures. While operating separately from the remaining forces of the front first echelon, tank armies can deliver attacks against the flanks and rear of remaining enemy groupings, intensify efforts on the decisive axes of an offensive, and fulfill the task of shifting efforts to other axes.

When developing an offensive, airborne landing forces will play an important role in accomplishing the task of completing the rout of the enemy. Airborne landing forces, which differ in their composition, their depth of landing, and the nature of the tasks assigned to them, and which are dropped with decisive objectives on single or adjacent axes following a nuclear strike, may make up, in total, the entire system of an offensive by air.

For tank and combined-arms armies to succeed in the offensive, tactical airborne landing forces will be widely employed even in the first days of the offensive for the following tasks: to destroy enemy nuclear attack means; to complete the rout of small surviving enemy groupings; to prevent the enemy from maneuvering his remaining forces and means; to assist first-echelon divisions in capturing road junctions; to seize crossings over water obstacles; and also to negotiate zones of radioactive contamination and zones of obstacles, primarily nuclear minefields. Tactical airborne landing forces, set down according to the orders of army commanders, require that the armies be reinforced by front helicopter units (one to two helicopter regiments per army).

Particular importance is given to the employment of operational airborne landing forces composed of helicopter-borne brigades, which are landed following nuclear strikes to accomplish the principal tasks, both the tactical and most
important operational ones, in cooperation with attacking front troops.

The following can be tasks for operational airborne landing forces: to complete the rout of enemy groupings which have been subjected to nuclear strikes; to seize and destroy missile/nuclear bases, airfield complexes, and nuclear weapons depots and arsenals; to isolate enemy groupings, which are operating at the front, from the flow of reserves from the depth; to seize crossing areas and assist front troops in the negotiation of major water obstacles from the march; and to destroy the enemy's control posts, posts of radiotechnical means, and communications centers for the purpose of totally disrupting his troop control. Bold and aggressive actions by airborne landing forces will be the basis for success in accomplishing the tasks assigned to them. A front, to support the actions of airborne landing forces, can deliver single and grouped nuclear strikes against the most threatening enemy groupings and employ aviation to support the combat actions of the landing forces.

The enemy, by creating zones of radioactive contamination, will strive to hinder the offensive of front (army) troops in order to gain time to advance his reserves, withdraw troops into the depth, carry out the movement of his own forces, and also disrupt the combat effectiveness of front troops. In order to ensure the accomplishment of the tasks of the operation and preserve the combat effectiveness of the troops, an offensive must be developed swiftly, and troops have to be moved out of the zone of radioactive contamination in the shortest possible time limits.

The methods and procedure of negotiating zones of radioactive contamination have been set forth with adequate detail in our literature. The best method of action will be the one which does not require changing the tasks facing the troops, nor the axis of their offensive, and which affords the greatest possibility of preserving the combat effectiveness of the troops. However, when there are numerous zones of radioactive contamination, it will apparently be necessary to change the axes of the actions of the armies, carry out regrouping, and employ primarily tank troops to carry out tasks, as they have the best protection against radioactive radiation. In some cases, if the situation favors this, it will be necessary to wait for the
radiation levels to drop.

The swift and mobile actions of troops while the offensive is being developed and the delivery of increasingly powerful attacks will require reinforcing the first echelon of operating forces with front reserves. When routing or completing the rout of enemy counterattacking and advancing groupings, when shifting troop efforts to other axes, and also in cases when individual groupings on the offensive sustain heavy losses from enemy nuclear strikes, first-echelon armies will have to be reinforced with reserves and new groupings will have to be established. Furthermore, armies will have to be reinforced when the balance of forces on separate axes becomes unfavorable for the attack groupings of a front (army) which are on the offensive.

The second-echelon army of a front may be committed to battle when the immediate task is being completed or at the beginning of the fulfilment of the subsequent task of a front. This, of course, does not preclude employing it in the first days of an operation, depending on the evolving situation while the offensive is being developed.

As a rule, the second-echelon army of a front is designated to fulfil tasks on the main axis, but it is also possible to employ it to develop the offensive on new (different) axes to support the rapid achievement of the objectives of the operation. In all cases, committing this army to battle must be carried out on those axes which ensure its rapid advance to a considerable depth, its getting to the flanks and rear of the main enemy grouping to complete his rout, and also its seizure of important areas and installations in the theater of military operations.

Committing a second-echelon army to battle may be carried out in gaps between first-echelon armies of a front or in sectors which are weakly covered by enemy troops. In this way a second-echelon army can be committed to battle simultaneously or subsequently with all forces or with only a portion of the forces. Depending on the situation, massed or grouped nuclear strikes may precede the commitment to battle of a second-echelon army, so that from the very beginning it might be possible for it to rapidly develop the offensive into the depth.
Reserve large units and second echelons of a front and army must be constantly ready to fulfill any tasks which may arise in a given situation. This will require constant concern on the part of a front commander and the commanders of armies and their staffs for the timely advance and relocation of second echelons and reserves in the wake of the advancing troops, for ensuring their rapid commitment to battle, and also for preserving their combat effectiveness. For these purposes, reserves and second echelons should be positioned in the most sheltered areas and dispersal should be widely implemented to conceal their operational camouflage measures. When halted, troops must immediately set up shelters and at the same time be constantly ready to move out rapidly to new areas if they find themselves in zones of radioactive contamination. The relocation of reserves and second echelons must be carried out secretly, chiefly at night, on the maximum possible number of routes of march, and on a wide front. Under all conditions, if reserves or second echelons are subjected to enemy nuclear strikes, measures should be undertaken to ensure that the aftereffects of these strikes are eliminated.

Thus, success in conducting offensive operations is based on the timely and full exploitation of nuclear strikes by strategic forces, on the coordinated employment of nuclear weapons in conjunction with chemical and conventional means of destruction, and also on the rapid advance of attacking motorized rifle and tank troops.

CERTAIN PROBLEMS OF THE CONTROL OF FRONT (ARMY) TROOPS IN AN OPERATION

The fundamental principles in organizing front (army) troop control in an operation have been adequately dealt with in the theory and practice of the operational art. In this connection, it seems advisable to dwell only on those problems which are most important and require further investigation and new solutions. Counted among them must be the problems of ensuring the constant readiness of control organs, as well as certain problems of controlling troops from the onset of military actions and during an operation.

Constant readiness of control organs. The entire system of troop control, prepared in peacetime in the military districts,
must be reliable and capable of ensuring command over troops when they are fulfilling those tasks which are paramount to an operation at the beginning of a war, such as bringing all front (army) forces and means up to full combat readiness rapidly and under concealment, delivering a surprise and powerful initial nuclear strike against the enemy and repelling his surprise attacks, and organizing the forward movement and deployment of troops and their immediate going over to a decisive offensive following the initial nuclear strike.

The successful fulfilment of these tasks will be possible if, along with the high combat readiness of troops, an even higher level of constant readiness of all control organs and means is achieved. To do this, first of all front (army) control posts and a developed communications system must be available and have been prepared from the engineer standpoint. While maintaining the continuity of troop control, control organs must be able to occupy control posts in short time limits under any of the conditions whereby combat actions might be initiated. In those cases where a front (army) command post is set up a considerable distance away from the permanent disposition area of the staff, it will be advisable to have a temporary (intermediate) control post located near the latter (within ten to 12 kilometers) and made ready for a limited complement of the staff.

Engineer preparation of all control posts must ensure their survivability even under conditions of an enemy nuclear strike in the disposition area of the posts.

The communications system must include a developed network of links of all types of communications, primary and auxiliary communications centers, and it must ensure stable communications with the troops of a military district (army) from both the permanent disposition area and from the prepared control posts of the front and armies. The most reliable system of communications must ensure collective warning of the troops, communications with the forces and means participating in the initial nuclear strike and repelling enemy attacks, and also with troop groupings going over to the offensive.

In order to rapidly bring control organs up to full readiness it is necessary: to have in the staffs of military
districts (armies) a precise, reliable, and verifiable system of collectively warning officer personnel, units, and service subunits; to thoroughly organize assembling upon an alert; and to work out in detail the plan for the forward movement and deployment of control organs and communications means at the prepared control posts. For these very purposes, particularly in an aggravated international situation, it is advisable for the staffs of border military districts and armies to have a group of generals and officers on 24-hour alert, headed by a senior officer of the headquarters of a military district (army) who is capable of providing the commander with troop control during the period when the control organs are being brought up to full combat readiness and during the unfolding of their activities at the prepared control posts.

When a threat situation or an increased level of combat readiness is introduced, it will be expedient for a small group of generals and officers of the field headquarters to move forward to the prepared command post of the front (army) with the necessary communications means and documents. This group must provide the commander with troop control during the period when the troops are being brought up to full combat readiness and while delivering the initial nuclear strike and repelling an enemy attack. If the prepared control posts are located a considerable distance away from the permanent disposition areas of the staffs, then it will be advisable to contemplate shifting by helicopter the main complement of the command post with communications means.

Troop control from the onset of military actions must ensure the timely and most effective employment of all forces and means to deliver a surprise and powerful initial nuclear strike and to repel an enemy attack, and it must also ensure the immediate deployment of troops and their going over to the offensive.

The troop control procedures and work methods of a commander and his staff during this period of time will depend on the conditions under which military actions are unleashed and on the specific situation which develops in the front (army) zone. The first tasks of control organs, following troop notification by an alert, will be: transmitting signals about the beginning of the initial nuclear strike; advancing and deploying troops; conveying the refined tasks to the executors; organizing the reconnaissance.
and final reconnaissance of the enemy; and also monitoring the timely and secure execution of the commands and instructions that have been issued. The command and staffs must focus special attention on achieving secrecy in preparing forces and means to deliver the initial nuclear strike and repel an enemy attack.

The front (army) commander personally exercises control over forces and means during delivery of the initial nuclear strike and involves in this the chief of staff, the chief of rocket troops and artillery, and the commander of the air army. In order to rapidly convey refined or new tasks to the executors for the initial nuclear strike, it is very important for the chief of rocket troops and the commander of the air army to have direct communications with the appropriate launch batteries, air squadrons, or even with the crews of individual delivery aircraft.

Refined tasks are often conveyed to armies while they are moving forward and deploying to go over to the offensive. Tasks can also be confirmed by command signals or by brief oral combat orders followed up by written ones.

For the successful control of front (army) troops during an offensive operation it is very important to organize correctly the relocation of control posts. Conditions must also ensure that a front (army) commander is not cut off from troop control for even a minute.

The relocation of control posts, particularly a command post, to new areas must be carried out only after these areas have been prepared from the engineer standpoint and equipped with necessary communications.

A front (army) commander often changes his position to a new location jointly with the group of branch arms chiefs and officers. In order for the commander not to lose contact with the command post and to keep abreast of all changes in the situation, helicopters or armored personnel carriers (combat vehicles), equipped with the required radio systems which ensure uninterrupted maintenance of communications while in motion, are to be employed to change position.
The tasks and methods of troop control from the onset of military actions and during an operation will be determined by the conditions under which a war is unleashed and by the situation that develops while it is in progress.

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In this lecture I have set forth the most important problems of preparing and conducting front and army offensive operations, concerning which we have accumulated and collated experience that is well known to us from operational training and practical staff work. At the same time, we believe that the problems of organizing and conducting offensive operations require further research, particularly into the new aspects of missile/nuclear war.
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