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
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


WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

7 May 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT:  Report

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

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Intelligence Information Special Report

COUNTRY Poland, Warsaw Pact

DATE OF INFO. Late 1977

DATE 7 May 1979

SUBJECT

Polish Comments on Marshal KULIKOV's Critique
of Exercise "ZACHOD [WEST]-77"

SOURCE --Documentary

Summary:

This report is a translation of a Polish document entitled "Memorandum on Marshal KULIKOV's Report Regarding Exercise "ZACHOD [WEST]-77" and classified SECRET. The memo was prepared by the Polish General Staff for the Minister of National Defense and includes the following subjects:

- States of combat readiness, including a proposed "intermediate state."
- Reequipping of the armed forces.
- Airfield construction.
- Assignment of operational coordination groups to front and army level.
- A new operational command point system.
- Linking the military communications network with the national network.
- Introduction into allied armies of a uniform automated command system.
- Coordination of rear services support at theater level.
- Theater air operations.
- Organization of supporting fires.

End of Summary

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Page 4 of 22 Pages

The Ministry of National Defense
General Staff
Warsaw

SECRET

The Minister of National Defense,
Citizen General of the Army
Wojciech JARUZELSKI

MEMORANDUM
on Marshal KULIKOV'S report regarding
Exercise "ZACHOD [WEST]-77"

In response to the problems discussed by the Commander in Chief of the Combined Armed Forces (letter No. I/00900, dated 30 August 1977) the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces submits the following evaluation and recommendations:*

- * Tasks and proposals generated by Exercises "ZACHOD [WEST]-77", "FALA [WAVE]-77", and "TRANZYT [TRANSIT]-77" are presented in Attachment No. 1. [Not available.]

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1. Establishment of an additional "intermediate state" between increased and full combat readiness for the purpose--as defined--of more efficient response to possible enemy actions during the period immediately preceding outbreak of hostilities. The problem is broader; the readiness system now in force requires far-reaching changes and improvements. Past provisions regarding this matter omit the political aspect of the problem (the role of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact countries, and of the national organs of authority, in making political decisions), and do not take into consideration appropriate relations with other elements of member country defense systems. Also, the procedure for initiating higher states of combat readiness requires more precise definition. The "Directive of the Commander in Chief of the Combined Armed Forces on Combat Readiness of Forces and Fleets assigned to the Combined Armed Forces, No. 001", put into effect as of 1 January 1972, regulates only the questions of readiness of operational and tactical large units and units. However, it does not define, on the Warsaw Pact level, strategic-operational criteria appropriate for the particular state of readiness which could constitute the basis for expanding, on a selective basis, specific functional elements of the national armed forces according to the degree of the threat, level of their authorized strength, and their role and place in the allied or national defense system. The General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces filled this gap by preparing a plan for projects carried out in the armed forces, in the event of increased threat to national security, and a plan for gradual attainment of combat readiness by the Polish Armed Forces. The provisions of these documents, in conjunction with Directive No. 001/operational, of the Minister of National Defense, on combat readiness of the Polish Armed Forces, form the basis for a more flexible system of combat readiness of our armed forces, because it establishes the capability for selective and multistage reaction to enemy activities.

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

The recommendation to initiate an additional "intermediate state" between increased and full combat readiness, presumably aimed at creation within the framework of the Pact of a more flexible system, warrants careful examination, primarily however in the aspect of defining uniform general provisions for specific states of readiness within a four-stage system. However, taking into consideration our own specific conditions, we envisage no real need for introducing in the Polish Armed Forces an additional state of readiness for operational and tactical large units and units.

Deployed units at 80 percent strength, augment 20 percent of their wartime TO&E strength within 8 hours. Also, within the same period, the operational level staffs are brought up to wartime TO&E strength and move out to alternate alert areas (the forward command posts to primary alert areas), and are ready to carry out wartime functions. Attainment of full combat readiness is limited to drawing of war supply reserves and moving out of the area of permanent disposition. Considering the limited scope of augmentation and short time for attaining full combat readiness of these units and staffs, introduction of an intermediate state of readiness is not advisable.

Introduction of an intermediate state for reduced strength, cadre and newly formed units requires detailed study. Reduced strength units at 35 percent to 80 percent strength, during increased combat readiness, call up mobilization alert echelons which constitute up to 10 percent of personnel, and up to 50 percent of vehicle strength. Cadre units at up to 35 percent strength call up to 20 percent of personnel, and up to 50 percent of vehicles. Newly formed units call up to 20 percent of personnel, and up to 25 percent of vehicles. Introduction of an intermediate state for the purpose of increasing the degree of augmentation only cannot be fully justified because it has no influence anyway on the end result, that is--it does not ensure combat capability of those units. Extension of time in the mobilization process is primarily of economic and social importance, but is not of major defense importance. In principle, the same effect can be obtained by attaining combat readiness gradually, secretly, without calling an alert, during which time, successively ordered undertakings can be carried out during an extended period.

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2. Equipping the allied forces and fleets with new models of weapons and technical equipment. In accordance with recommendations of the Combined Armed Forces Command, refitting and equipping of assigned units of the Polish Armed Forces with new types of military equipment is being carried out within the framework of financial limits approved by the National Defense Committee and to the extent deliveries are fulfilled.

The scope of this reequipping during the current 5-year period has been specified in the "Protocol on Assignment of Polish Forces to the Composition of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Countries, and their Development for the years 1976-1980." The quality and degree of modernization of weapons and equipment introduced into service depends on deliveries, including primarily those from the USSR--which is the producer of the majority of Polish Armed Forces armament. In accordance with provisions of the "protocol" and of the 5-year plan for developing the Polish Armed Forces during 1976-1980 the following was programmed:

- continuation of reequipping mechanized and armored divisions with the new T-55A tanks, and modification of T-54 and T-55 tanks. By the end of 1980, there will still be in service 722 T-34 tanks; their total replacement is envisaged for 1987-1988. Plans are being made for the next 5-year period to introduce into line service T-72 tanks which will be produced in Poland;

- complete reequipping of the operational-tactical missile brigade with R-17 launchers, replacing R-11 launchers, and completion of equipping the tactical missile battalion with the LUNA-M launcher (these undertakings already have been accomplished). The older type LUNA launchers (15 launchers), which are still in service with some tactical missile battalions, will be replaced by the new type during 1981-1985;

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
- modernization of the field artillery park by introducing BM-21 artillery launchers into expanded tactical large units and army artillery brigades, and by beginning to equip other tactical large units with the 122-mm GVOZDIKA self-propelled howitzer (at present, only the 1st Mechanized Division has four of these howitzers, and the 4th Mechanized Division has six). The process of equipping the forces with self-propelled howitzers and guns will continue until 1980; on a larger scale than in the current 5-year period;

- introduction into tactical large units additional numbers of MALYUTKA-P antitank guided missile launchers with semi-automatic guidance (old type SHMEL launchers will be completely replaced), and beginning to equip tactical large units with manportable FAGOT antitank guided missile launchers. Further modernization of the armed forces antitank defense means during the next 5-year period is planned;

- ~~large scale conversion to missiles of the operational~~ forces AA defense, by forming four additional KUB antiaircraft missile regiments (two regiments have been formed during the past 5-year period), a KRUG antiaircraft missile brigade, and introduction into expanded tactical large units of STRELA type antiaircraft missile systems. In the National Air Defense Forces, the process of forming mixed groupings continues in an attempt to introduce additional NEVA-M antiaircraft missile systems. Plans are made for the 1980's to increase the number of antiaircraft missiles in the operational forces, and to replace gradually the older type DVINA antiaircraft missile system in the National Air Defense forces;

- introduction into armed forces aviation of the MIG-21 bis fighter aircraft and the SU-20 aircraft of the fighter-bomber and reconnaissance version (purchase of the SU-20 aircraft has been completed) and of helicopters for various purposes, among others: MI-2 version, armed with the MALYUTKA antitank guided missile; W-14, for combatting submarines, and MI-8PP, for conducting radioelectronic warfare. The older type MIG-15A and MIG-17 aircraft will remain for the time being in the aviation armament, but during the 1980's will be replaced gradually by newer type aircraft, including the SU-25 fighter-assault aircraft, production of which is envisaged in Poland;

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- initial introduction in the navy of new type surface ships, including missile-artillery cutters, ships for submarine warfare, and inshore minesweepers. Introduction of additional numbers of these ships, and replacement of obsolete submarines is envisaged for the post-1980 period.

Simultaneously with the introduction in the armed forces of new types of weapons, appropriate supply reserves of missiles, ammunition, and material means are being stockpiled for the assigned forces. It is assumed that the quantity of these supply reserves will be stockpiled by 1980 in accordance with Attachment 4 of the "Protocol."

Irrespective of the above, in compliance with the provisions of the resolution of the Political Consultative Committee, adopted at the Bucharest conference, additional undertakings concerning refitting the armed forces with modern military equipment will be accomplished during the current 5-year period. Weapons which will be introduced into the armed forces beyond the provisions of the "Protocol" include:

- MIG-23 fighter-interceptor aircraft; ✓
- MI-24D support helicopters; ✓
- T-72 medium tanks;
- OSA anti-aircraft missile system.

It is assumed that, along with the above mentioned weapons, appropriate quantities of missiles and ammunition will be purchased for supporting training and establishing supply reserves.

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


3. The need for further development and strengthening of technical equipment of the airfield network, construction of road segment airfields, and stockpiling of material means, particularly of fuel and ammunition for new types of weapons. On the territory of Poland, the coefficient of density of the airfield network per 1,000 square kilometers is 0.313 (in the Federal Republic of Germany--0.563, Netherlands--0.416, Belgium--0.622). We do not know the situation in the German Democratic Republic. We have constructed 18 class III road segment airfields, most of them located in the northwestern and western part of Poland. The Air Force operates 10 of them; the National Air Defense Forces, 7; and the Navy, 1. By the end of the current 5-year period we intend to construct three more road segment airfields and modernize two existing airfields to a class II standard (the Rossoszyca and Debница Kaszubska road segment airfields). The airfield network situation on Polish territory is satisfactory, but in the area of operations (on the planned operational axis) it might be a cause for concern.

By 1976 we constructed a total of 84 hardened aircraft shelters at 7 airfields. For 1977-1980, plans are made for the construction of an additional 186 shelters, so that there will be a total of 270 shelters at 13 airfields. In comparison with the potential enemy, the situation is in our favor. Based on intelligence information, it appears that in the Federal German Republic there are 6 airfields which have a total of 109 shelters, and in the Netherlands there are 8 airfields with a total of 122 shelters. On the territory of Denmark and Belgium, there are no airfields with shelters.

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
All permanent base airfields on Polish territory are equipped with air traffic control means according to the study entitled "Norms and Standards of Communications Means for Radiotechnical Traffic Control of Military Aviation of the Warsaw Pact Countries", sent to us in 1974 by the Staff of the Warsaw Pact Combined Armed Forces. Over 50 percent of the air traffic control installations in operation by the air forces has been purchased in 1970-1975, and they are consequently the latest models offered by the USSR. If they are not up to the latest standards, the conclusion can be drawn that Polish participation in developing the program of these means is necessary, beginning already at the drafting stage, thus preventing needless purchases of obsolete equipment.


Currently, all permanent and alternate airfields planned for displacement have airfield dumps with reserve supplies of fuel for 25-27 sorties (including 18.5 sorties from current reserve supplies, and 6.5 to 8.5 sorties from the emergency reserve supplies), and an appropriate quantity of full distribution equipment, both fixed and mobile.

Plans for modernization of airfield POL depots by 1990 encompass 56 airfields (93 percent of the current number of airfields) where we envisage construction of new storage tanks of a total capacity of 87,000 cubic meters, compared with current capacity of 72,000 cubic meters. By 1980 we envisage repair or modernization of POL facilities on 26 airfields, with a total capacity of 57,000 cubic meters. Attainment of full capacity according to the new solutions should take place by 1985, and until then, the normative reserve supplies will be temporarily stored in mobile tanks.

It is estimated that initial modernization and repair projects included in the plan for 1976-1980, and perspective by 1985, will support aviation needs in the field of reconstituting combat readiness of aircraft and newly introduced military equipment.

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Reconstitution of combat readiness of aircraft temporarily based at the road segment airfields is accomplished under field conditions by using forces and means of ground support aviation troops and facilities of the closest permanent POL depots.

4. Creation in peacetime of a nucleus for the staff of the Commander in Chief of the Western Theater of Military Operations, and formation of a complement of signal units supporting and servicing this organ, ensuring--in the event of a sudden increase of threat--conditions for its rapid expansion to wartime strength.


This problem, in the form of a specific suggestion, has been submitted to the interallied forum by the Soviets for the first time. Earlier proposals related to this problem were resolved within the framework of the plan under the cryptonym "ALBATROS [ALBATROSS]." ✓

Adapting the wartime command structure of the Combined Armed Forces to a contemporary concept for conducting strategic operations in the theater of military operations appears to be a foregone conclusion, requiring no justification. However, this problem need not necessarily be related to creation in peacetime of an additional staff, because in principle the staff of the Combined Armed Forces can fulfill these functions. The problem should be thoroughly studied in its organizational, structural, jurisdictional, and economic aspects. It is likely that the staff of the Combined Armed Forces or the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces will present for consideration even more specific proposals. The General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces will prepare its own stipulations so they can be taken into consideration already during the initial drafting stage.

5. Presence within the front and army regrouping zones on territories of allied countries of joint operational groups with sufficient cadre strength, equipped with communications and command means, directed by responsible representatives of the general staffs, exercising broad powers.

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


This requirement needs to be defined more precisely. In our evaluation, the troop movement control system, deployed on the basis of mutual agreements, performs the functions for which it was created. Broadening of tasks and jurisdictions of troop movement control central groups, as well as granting them broad powers, cannot be justified because our representatives are organs of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces. However, it would be desirable to ensure equal jurisdiction and subordination principles to Soviet Army representatives in central groups troop movement control (up to now they have been representing the military district level).

6. Incorporation of operations coordination groups equipped with communications and command means into the front and army staff TO&E's, as well as their preparation in accordance with standardized training methodology. We have already resolved this problem with the National Peoples Army of the German Democratic Republic. On the basis of provisions of the protocol dated 3 June 1976, assignment of permanent operations coordination groups is envisaged. However, we had no basis for a similar solution of the problem in relation to the Soviet Army. According to instructions implemented by order of the Commander in Chief of the Combined Armed Forces, No. 04 dated 24 May 1973, operations coordination groups were extemporaneously assigned by appropriate commanders in specific situations. Their composition and equipment conformed to specific tasks assigned. Upon careful analysis of the matter and consultations with pertinent Central Institutions of the Ministry of National Defense and commands of the branches of the armed forces and of military districts, the General Staff will present appropriate recommendations as a separate matter.

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


7. New command points system of operational components.
The recommendation to replace the present command post (CP), quartermaster CP, and forward CP with CP, alternate CP, and quartermaster CP having a capability for rapid establishment of a forward CP, is correct. However, this problem is linked with available communications and command forces and means. During the current 5-year period, the problem can be resolved only by way of temporary internal changes, while a final solution is not expected before the 1980's. The current level of personnel and communications means permits establishment of communications centers in two CP and QMCP positions at front and army, in two front forward CP positions, and one army forward CP position. The proposed concept for establishing a CP and an alternate CP requires utilization of forces and means from the second CP position for establishing a communications center at the alternate CP. In order to ensure continuity of command, it is necessary to have additional forces and communications means (equal to those of a CP) essential for establishing communications centers at the second CP and alternate CP positions. During the discussion of the problem, the representatives of the Soviet Army expressed the opinion that this problem could be resolved by creating an additional communications center. In effect, at operational levels, there would be three communications centers (one for establishing the CP communications center, one at the alternate CP, and one for displacement), and forces and means for rapid establishment of a forward CP. At the same time, it would be necessary to add to staff equipment appropriate command means and to reorganize and strengthen line signal units in order to establish a long-range communications system from the CP and alternate CP's.

Because the problem is so important, it is recommended that the Training Inspectorate, in coordination with the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, prepare as soon as possible the concept of a temporary solution as well as comprehensive solution of the problem for the next 5-year period, and submit them to the Policy Board of the Ministry of National Defense for consideration.

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
8. Linking the basic military communications network in the theater of military operations with the national network; utilization of ground and tropospheric communications. The command and communications system of the Combined Armed Forces and of the Polish Armed Forces on Polish territory is based on the national telecommunications network, backed up on principal links by military radio. In addition, the principal operational axes of the theater of operations are backed up by Soviet radiorelay and tropospheric communications.

For many years the Staff of the Combined Armed Forces has requested that the national telecommunications net in Poland be backed up by tropospheric communications, taking into consideration, first of all, the needs of the Combined Armed Forces. Backup of the national telecommunications network with tropospheric communications network constructed on Polish territory would be most advisable, providing that it would also include the needs of national control (National Defense Committee) and of the Polish Armed Forces (General Staff, National Air Defense Forces, and Navy).

In order to resolve the problem in a comprehensive manner, it is necessary to work out a plan for tropospheric communications on Polish territory and in the operational forces, and determine principles for financing and carrying out the plan. According to available information the USSR has worked out and started production of 24-channel tropospheric sets suitable for fulfilling the plan under discussion. Creation of a tropospheric communications system linked to the national telecommunications network will require formation of a tropospheric communications brigade for the national territory, and four tropospheric communications battalions (one each for the front and the armies). Considering the great expense and the substantial amount of necessary equipment (approximately 120 stations), fulfilment of the undertaking could be started during the next two or three 5-year periods. In order to lessen the burden of costs imposed on our economy, it is deemed advisable to activate domestic production, based on licensing, of tropospheric sets, and their export to allied countries.

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9. Introduction into all allied armies of a uniform automated command system based on the "MANEVR" system, developed by the Soviet Army.

Within the framework, of cooperation among the CMEA countries and the Warsaw Pact armies, work is being conducted on the PASUV automated command system, based on a standardized concept and tactical-technical requirements, worked out jointly under direction of the Combined Armed Forces Command. At this time, division of production specialization for the above-mentioned system has been determined for specific countries.*

* Participation of Poland in the production of PASUV equipment--according to USSR proposals--was supposed to be minimal, only two types of printers and two conduit means--approximately 1 percent of the overall production costs of PASUV (against 20 percent for the Bulgarian Peoples Republic, 8 percent for the Hungarian Peoples Republic and [illegible numeral] for the German Democratic Republic), which will not ensure attainment of appropriate balance in international payments of the PASUV costs, (estimated cost of equipment required for the Polish Armed Forces--approximately 11 billion zloty during 1980-1990). During the meeting of the CMEA Defense Industry Commission held on 25-27 May 1977, the Polish delegation contested this division, and submitted additional specialization capabilities in a number of devices, which would give a basis for substantial increase of our participation in deliveries for PASUV. By the end of September 1977, a specially appointed working group of the CMEA Defense Industry Commission will prepare a new specialization list.

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
This system will encompass five subsystems (combined arms, rocket troops and artillery, antiaircraft defense troops, air forces, and rear services) as well as all command components, from battalion level up to and including the front. It will ensure total uniformity of automated command systems within the framework of the Combined Armed Forces in the theater of military operations.

For the near future, the main attention of the Soviets will be concentrated on preparation of a subsystem for the tactical level. Work in this field is probably at an advanced stage; less so is work on a subsystem for the operational-tactical elements. From available information it is known that the Soviet Union has prepared for the tactical level a model system mounted on the MTLB armored personnel carrier and the BWP infantry combat vehicle, under the cryptonym MANEVR (MANEUVER). The system encompasses divisional and regimental levels, and the subsystems--the combined arms, rocket troops and artillery, antiaircraft defense, and aviation. With regard to informational and technological aspects, it is adapted to the requirements of PASUV, and technically it was built on the basis of informatics equipment currently in use. According to data obtained, the start of serial production of the tactical level PASUV subsystem can be expected in late 1979 or early 1980.

Currently, in the Polish Armed Forces, we are preparing and introducing programming of a field information processing system for the needs of operational level staffs, and the experimental-utilization divisional subsystem (CIECIWA [BOWSTRING]-D). These systems are based on specialized, common base data and, in comparison with programs used in the past, will produce considerable usable effects.

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Informatics support of command under field conditions is rendered at the present time on the basis of stationary computers connected with field command points, using data transmission equipment. At the same time, single units of mobile computer centers are being prepared, which will be experimentally introduced into field command posts during 1978-1979.

In working out these systems, we are guided by PASUV requirements, particularly in the programming field. These systems are, to a considerable degree, of an educational and experimental nature, having in addition utilization value, but their primary purpose is preparation for the switchover to the PASUV system. Also they do not ensure the necessary interallied cohesiveness.

Because up to the present time we have not had detailed data on the subject of the MANEVR system prepared by the Soviet Army, it would be advisable to arrange appropriate consultation with the Soviets in order to conduct comparative analysis and evaluation of the usefulness of this system for our needs, and possibly to give appropriate direction to the work conducted in this field by the Polish Armed Forces.

10. Assignment and deployment of the staff of the front on the basis of a military district.

This problem will be studied as a separate matter.

11. Appointment, within the staff of the commander in chief of the theater of military operations, of an organ for coordinating efforts and cooperation in the field of rear services support, with given powers to make decisions concerning maneuvering of reserve supplies of material means between allied armies; setting priorities for reconstruction of the transportation network in favor of mass military shipments; and resolving other tasks related to meeting the needs of the armed forces. The problem calls for detailed consideration and further consultations on the aspect of authority to make decisions. It

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


appears that the organ which possibly may be appointed should perform coordination functions within the field of services defined in a protocol, on behalf of the allied armed forces, and submit pertinent recommendations to the appropriate general staffs, which would ensure their implementation within the framework of current national capabilities. This results from the provisions of the national system for supplying material needs of the armed forces and from obligations agreed upon by the parties, to ensure operation of the transportation system, as well as allocation of specific quantities of material means and hospital beds on behalf of the allied forces. These tasks on behalf of either our own or allied forces will be carried out by appropriate departments of the national economy. For this reason, decisions pertaining to the matter under discussion should be made by national organs.

12. Adoption of a series of concepts pertaining to operational art. For us, of greatest importance are questions related to planning and conducting an air operation in the theater of military operations, and also to air command in such an operation. This problem has been the scenario of almost all more important exercises since 1975. We have had wide experience in this field; however, we believe that there is a need to become familiar with the rich experiences of the Soviets. Particularly beneficial in this respect would be participation of Polish General Staff officers and the Air Force command in joint planning and direction of an air operation with Soviet officers during an exercise organized by the Soviet command. For resolving problems pertaining to air operations, it is necessary to take steps establishing practical, uniform principles for joint air command and for organizing and implementing air coordination in the theater of military operations.

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The problem of radioelectronic warfare is contained in the basic documents ("Principles of organization and conduct of radioelectronic warfare by the Polish Armed Forces"), and in the training process of the forces, in accordance with current concepts of the USSR Armed Forces. However, solutions and practical fulfilment of tasks of radioelectronic warfare implemented by the Polish Armed Forces are limited by inadequate equipment in the hands of troops, caused by restricted deliveries of our planned imports from the USSR. This situation precludes assignment and accomplishment of radioelectronic warfare tasks as crucial as "elimination from combat" of enemy troop command systems and battle control centers recommended in the correspondence.

Organization of reconnaissance in the theater of military operations exceeds the capabilities of our armed forces. During allied exercises, the front conducts reconnaissance using limited organic reconnaissance forces and means, namely, radioelectronic, air, special operations and operational agent network intelligence. Also, it uses information from the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces collected by strategic intelligence, radioelectronic and sea reconnaissance.

Reconnaissance organs available on the operational and tactical levels, in principle, meet the requirements. Only improvement of reconnaissance equipment is necessary and, following that, of organizational structures and principles of operation.

The Polish Armed Forces lack experience and established principles in the field of organization, conduct, and coordination of reconnaissance of operational-strategic large units operating in the theater of military operations. For this reason, it is necessary to work them out within the framework of the general staffs of the Warsaw Pact countries.

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13. Improvement of operational training of commanders and staffs, particularly in the field of increasing effectiveness of destruction of enemy forces and means using artillery fire and air strikes; organization of first nuclear strike delivery, and improvement of coordination among branches of the armed forces. These problems encompass a number of training and organizational questions. In instruction of staffs and troops, for many years, much attention has been devoted to destruction of various enemy targets, particularly of nuclear weapons delivery systems, self-propelled artillery and antitank means, including helicopters armed with antitank missiles. These problems are fully reflected in the new firing programs of the combined arms and artillery subunits, and in tactical air training of pilots of operational aviation and ground forces aviation. In addition, the commands of the Air Forces and the Headquarters of Rocket Troops and Artillery have been conducting studies on defining methods for evaluation and selection of targets and establishing the priority and optimal methods for their destruction.

The specific model for preparing and delivering the first strike is being constantly improved during the exercises. However, it appears that some of the present principles should be reviewed and verified, primarily in the light of technical progress made, improved knowledge of nuclear weapons, and operational-tactical requirements.

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In the time frame of recent years, as a result of closer training coordination among military districts and branches of the armed forces, the forms of coordination among them were broadened and improved. The command of the National Air Defense has approved plans for coordination with military districts, air forces, and navy. Also, in the military districts there are forms and methods for joint operations and coordination with the air forces and navy (Pomeranian Military District, Warsaw Military District). Coordination principles are improved during all exercises organized on various command levels. Recent exercises point out that some consideration should be given to problems of coordination related to organization and conduct of assault landing operations, incorporation of forces and means of the grouping operational forces into the National Air Defense system, and coordination between tactical elements of ground forces and aviation.

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Polish Armed Forces

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