MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Report HR70-14

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John N. McMahon

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Page 1 of 15 Pages
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Director of the National Foreign Assessment Center
Intelligence Information Special Report

COUNTRY: Poland
DATE OF INFO: December 1979

SUBJECT: Draft Statute of Warsaw Pact Combined Armed Forces and Their Control Organs in Wartime

SOURCE: Documentary

Summary:

This report is a translation of a Polish document containing the speech of the Polish Minister of National Defense on Point 2 of the agenda of the XII Session of the Committee of Defense Ministers, the draft Statute of the Combined Armed Forces and Their Control Organs in Wartime. The minister fully approves the requirement for centralized authority and unity of command. He cites the Polish contribution to the statute, makes laudatory remarks on the role of the Soviet Armed Forces in fighting NATO imperialism, and praises Soviet-Polish friendship and cooperation. In discussing the principle of coalitional command of the Warsaw Pact forces, he is very critical of the negative attitude of the Romanians on provisions of the draft statute.

End of Summary

TS #808046
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Speech of the Minister of National Defense
of the Polish Peoples Republic on the Second
Point of the Agenda of the XII Session of the
Committee of Defense Ministers on "The Draft
Statute of the Combined Armed Forces and Their
Control Organs in Wartime."

Esteemed Comrades:

Examination and approval at the present session of the
draft Statute of the Combined Armed Forces and their control
organs in wartime deals with one of the most significant
problems which has been discussed and resolved by the
Committee of Defense Ministers during its activities up to
the present.

Our present session was preceded by an active,
constructive and sufficiently long (almost one year)
preparatory work ensuing from the appropriate resolution of
the Political Consultative Committee of 23 November 1978.

Conduct of this work in the PPR was of direct interest
to, and the results approved by, party and state leaderships
and Comrade Edward GIEREK personally.

The Polish side completely approved the basic
assumptions of the draft statute from the very beginning.
At the same time we were afforded unlimited possibilities to
present and justify specific comments and proposals. Our
several meetings had great bearing on clarification of all
problems. Exchange of views, particularly with the
Commander in Chief and also with the Combined Armed Forces
Chief of Staff and his closest collaborators, were fully
open, honest, and friendly.
Thus, we state with satisfaction that our proposals were met with understanding and many of them were accepted.

The present version of the draft statute was coordinated with us. It is a well developed document and deserves full support. For this reason any changes aimed at weakening, softening, or diluting the principles and mechanisms of the coalitional command would undermine its essence and meaning. We learned with sorrow that comments of the Romanian comrades are aimed in this undesirable direction.

Basic justification of the draft statute was presented today by the Commander in Chief of the Combined Armed Forces, Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade Viktor Georgiyevich KULIKOV. We agree with him completely. We also agree with the comrade Ministers of Defense who have spoken so far.

I think that in the course of work on the statute we have all tried to get at the theory of the problem, its historical sources and contemporary aspects, and finally at solutions arrived at by the enemy--NATO.

All this confirms conclusively the necessity for a wartime statute as irrefutable and urgent. We can openly admit that in this matter we are inexcusably late.

An involuntary thought occurs to us that this very delay of ours serves also to prove and demonstrate how deceitful and incongruous are accusations of the West regarding the scope of our military preparations and the so-called threat from the East, from our socialist side.
It is not we but the West itself who has a fully developed system for coalitional response. It is NATO itself which has matters pertaining to wartime command sewed up to the proverbial "last stitch." It is the enemy himself who had settled this matter long ago, almost from the beginning of the bloc's existence.

And what is our situation? The Warsaw Pact has been in existence for almost 25 years. In 1969, i.e., not until 15 years later, the peacetime statute was introduced. In chapter I of the statute there is a reference, among other things, to the "method of controlling the Combined Armed Forces, operation of the Combined Command, and relation between the Combined Command and national commands in wartime which are to be defined by a separate statute."

And we had to wait as long as 10 years before this intent was implemented, until the emergence of the draft statute which is presently under study.

This matter must no longer be postponed for subsequent discussion and deliberation. Further delay is not simply a later publication of the document, but principally a loss of time and continuation--to who knows when--of an undesirable state of affairs for us in regard to the coalitional command.

What does this mean? We start with the situation that there is in Europe a widely accepted military balance. This means that in case of war there will be a clash between basically comparable forces and means--ours and the enemy's. In such a situation the main consideration and decisive factor will be the way these forces are used, or, in other words, how they are commanded. The matter of command is therefore the indispensable and chief element in the defense potential. It conditions the speed and effectiveness of operations. As is known, every aggressor has always counted on relaxation of vigilance and, above all, on belated
reaction of the attacked party. For this reason, the best possible organization, preparedness and reliability of the coalitional command system objectively inhibits military designs of the enemy, is a condition for countereacting surprise, and a basis for repelling aggression.

Ratification of the statute and especially meticulous implementation in accordance with its provisions would be a matter of great defensive significance.

I do not wish to repeat everything which has already been said on this subject, and so permit me to limit myself to only a few problems.

As ministers of defense we implement tasks placed upon us by our parties and governments in the field of improving the armed forces and strengthening the defenses of each of our countries. At the same time we have a duty to work out, in the framework of our Committee, the best possible proposals and implement decisions supporting common security of the socialist commonwealth states.

These two tasks are closely connected and are organically interdependent. The basis of this interdependence is Marxist-Leninist ideology, internationalist unity, and community of our class and national interests, particularly clearly perceptible against the imperialist threat and the anticomunist policy of imperialism.

As inhabitants of Europe we know well that it is an area of greatest military concentration divided by a line of basic political differences and contradictions.
Aggression started in Europe or brought into Europe from other continents would inevitably transform itself into general war, the sharpest form of confrontation between two systems--socialist and imperialist.

Such a war would present a most trying test and would demand from our nations, governments and armed forces the greatest effort. Everybody and everything would have to be committed to repulse aggression and attain victory over the enemy.

Such a war would not allow any of our countries or any of our households to stand idly by. Contemporary means of waging war, their range, scope and effects of strikes exclude the possibility of tranquility and security for any territory. This applies also to such countries as Poland and Romania which do not have direct common borders with the potential enemy.

According to Article 4 of the Warsaw Pact in case of attack on one or several Pact member states the other states will extend the necessary aid, including use of armed forces. We take this to mean that we will enter the armed struggle as a single body, both in our own territory and in the territory on which operations will be launched against the aggressor. From the military-political viewpoint this is completely logical and self-evident. Thus we understand our duty as an ally.

At the same time this presents an occasion for reflection. We always remember with deep gratitude the historical contribution of the Soviet Army which liberated us and other countries from the fascist yoke. We recall also that the Polish armed forces and other allied formations participated at the side of the Soviet Army in this mission of liberation. We operated then also beyond the borders of our countries. This was a situation which cannot be avoided in case of future imperialist aggression.
This requires us, even today in peacetime, to conduct necessary joint undertakings on territories of the allied countries, particularly within the framework of an appropriate theater of military operations. Among such undertakings we may list operational reconnaissance, mutual utilization of training areas by units of allied armed forces, and all kinds of exercises, including troop exercises. We are glad that this will take place once more in the great joint exercise BROTHERHOOD OF ARMS-80 [BRATERSTWO BRONI-80].

Now that we have the commonwealth of socialist states, the Warsaw Pact and the Combined Armed Forces, we have the necessary conditions for building and expanding coalitional mechanisms on a durable and solid basis.

At the same time, we as military men know well that the inexorable laws of war, principles of military art, violence and force of modern military operations, particularly the use of missile and nuclear weaponry, demand great clarity and precision, and purposefulness and operativeness of the command system. This can be attained only through the necessary degree of centralization, harmonious structure, unity of command principle, doctrinal unity of views, decisions, and actions.

It is only in this manner that the draft statute, which is presently under study, views and implements the above requirements.

First of all the draft defines the structure and makes precise the principle of coalitional command in the systems of the:
- Supreme High Command with its working organ, the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces;
- High Commands of the Combined Armed Forces in the Western and Southwestern Theaters of Military Operations;
- Combined Fleet Commands—Baltic and Black Seas.

Simultaneously it establishes clearly the wartime relations of the coalitional and national organs, the principles of their cooperation or subordination.

In our view this is the best possible arrangement and solution. Above all, it assures high military effectiveness. This means that:

- it will assure high operativeness and elasticity of command;
- it will permit better and faster expansion, regrouping, and a smooth takeover of command of the Combined Armed Forces in case of war;
- it will create conditions for optimal association of macrostrategic aims and tasks of the whole coalition with the strategic and operational situations in individual theaters of military operations;
- it will permit, through a broadly conceived maneuver at strategic level, concentration of efforts on the main axes, offsetting shortages and replacing losses, influencing—through use of reconnaissance systems and most powerful combat means—execution of partial as well as complete tasks in a given theater of military operations.
The feasibility of all possibilities and benefits indicated above derives principally from the position, role and contribution made to our defense coalition by the Soviet Union and its armed forces. They have been the guardian for almost 35 postwar years of the security and borders of the whole socialist commonwealth, that is, each of our countries, without exception. They constantly bear the main burden of confrontation, facing up to the military potential of imperialism. Only the Soviet Union which has at its disposal a complete arsenal of strategic and operational-tactical means can resolve problems on the broadest scale. This justifies completely the thesis that the Soviet Army General Staff should play the role of the working organ of the Supreme High Command. Such a solution will only reflect the present reality in which this Staff is a most authoritative, powerful, and experienced organ with the highest degree of preparedness, and is capable without reorganization of executing the most complicated tasks. It already coordinates certain interallied problems and always provides aid and support.

All this does not violate the principle of sovereignty. But then one cannot be really sovereign without being really secure, without effective allied support, without guaranteed borders. We in Poland, our nation--and not only ours--has had in this regard tragic experiences. Development of a coalitional command system, described above, takes into consideration the constitutional--legal norms operative in our country. Also clearly defined is the superordinate political role of the Political Consultative Committee, the position and authority of the politico-military leadership, the principle for coordination of various substantive undertakings, including material-technical services on behalf of the Combined Armed Forces, retention of the indispensable tie, influence, and particularly in case of the party-political direction of troops assigned to the Combined Armed Forces, national subordination of unassigned troops, etc.
The draft statute also takes into consideration appropriate solutions in regard to organizational and personnel matters. Warsaw Pact member states determine through appropriate resolutions the appointment of the Supreme Commander in Chief, the composition of the Supreme High Command, and also personnel of High commands in the theaters of military operations. Next, it is anticipated, as is known, that there will be broad participation of responsible comrades from all allied armies in the composition of the High Command, the Staff and Political Directorate of the Combined Armed Forces in the theaters of military operations and also in the Military Council. Introduction of additional separate command channels is unjustifiable under these conditions. This would violate the cardinal principle of centralization and unity of command, and would lead in combat situations to loss of time, atomization of efforts, and confusion.

In sum, we consider that the draft correctly regulates the mutual relationship of national and coalitional authorities.

The rest depends on specific individuals, their party-mindedness and truly international views, mutual regard and confidence, and cultivation of mutual relations. This is an essential condition of unanimity. We have in the Polish Armed Forces in this field good experiences. They go back to the last war, when our two combined arms armies, the armored corps, the air corps and other tactical large units participated in decisive operations of Soviet fronts--1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian. These experiences and their military-political aspects became for us a valuable prototype of a coalitional command system, of socialist coalitism. At the same time these experiences remain up to this very day a rich source of internationalist education, in the spirit of Polish-Soviet friendship and Polish-Soviet brotherhood of arms.
The postwar period also provides several useful experiences. Even before organization of the Warsaw Pact all larger exercises contained an interallied element due to distinguished Soviet commanders who served in the Polish people's armed forces.

1955 initiated a new phase in the development of theory and practice of joint operations. Organized were many-sided forms of collaboration aimed at common strategic policy, particularly closely with the Soviet Army and with our immediate neighbors, the Czechoslovak Peoples Army and the National Peoples Army of the German Democratic Republic.

The last 2 years have evidenced attempts to find qualitatively higher coalitional command forms in individual theaters of military operations. The WEST-77 [ZACHOD-77] exercise, then the General (Main) Staff training exercises in 1978 and 1979 and, finally, our common work in drafting the statute present the most important new feature of the present phase.

Approval of the statute by participating Warsaw Pact countries will begin a new phase in this field.

Comrades:

Acceptance of the statute is, on one hand, the end, but is principally the beginning of a great effort. Although certain elements treated in the statute are in various degrees already functional and operative in practice, particularly in the field of exercises, the basic tasks are still ahead of us; in this sense the statute constitutes a formal codification of these exercises.
But it is not about these tasks that I would like to speak. I have in mind only a few specific problems, whose solution or improvement should accompany and support the complicated process of building the coalitional command system.

It should be evident that, taking into consideration the concrete conditions of each country, we are guided by the commonly accepted socialist defense doctrine based on the Leninist theory on war and the armed forces. A great role in creating a common denominator for military training of our cadres has been and is being played by Soviet educational institutions. We wish to continue to benefit from this aid; furthermore, we have requested an increase in the number of Polish officers in training, especially those in the General Staff Academy of the USSR Armed Forces.

We are glad that our initiative, and that of our German comrades, have permitted during the last 5 years regular exchange of auditors at military academies. This practice has expanded to include other allied academies. This a good, or rather farsighted, preparation for participation in the coalitional system of command.

It would appear that we should go still further. The new and broadened scope and level of coalitional requirements and needs put before us the problem of additional preparation of selected appropriate cadre. We are concerned that at specially organized courses, or at the General Staff Academy of the USSR Armed Forces, we should begin to implement the program specifically elaborated for this very purpose, which contains problems of a doctrinal-coalitional nature, work methods at the coalitional staff, improving knowledge of the Russian language, etc.
I also propose that we look into the possibility of expanding cooperation, and with the help of the Soviets elaborate a unified approach, a unified method for predicting development of the military-political situation in Europe and in the world, general policy for development of the armed forces, weaponry, and military art. Finally, a request that we improve coordination of our study and the current revision of our combat manuals and certain more important instruction manuals (e.g., "Handbook on Field Staff Service").

In my opinion positive examination of several of those proposals could bring our coalitional matters specific benefits.

In conclusion I express my full approval for the draft resolution on the second point of the conference.

Thank you for your attention.