MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Report

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John N. McMahon

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Director of the National Foreign Assessment Center
Intelligence Information Special Report

COUNTRY: Poland/Warsaw Pact

DATE OF INFO.: 1980

SUBJECT: GIEREK Discussions with Marshal KULIKOV

SOURCE: Documentary

Summary:

This report is a translation of a SECRET Polish document, entitled "Notes on Conversations of Comrade Edward GIEREK, First Secretary of the Central Committee, Polish United Workers Party, with the Commander in Chief, Combined Armed Forces." Among the subjects for discussion were the matter of a CAF wartime statute, Poland's proposal to hold a CSCE conference in WARSAW, the five-year plan for development of the Polish Armed Forces 1981-85, a bilateral protocol for Polish forces assigned to the CAF, and production of new types of weapons and equipment. The USSR is considering granting Poland a low-interest, long-term loan of over 1 billion rubles for weapons purchases from the USSR. Poland is interested in entering the Libyan arms market together with the USSR.

End of Summary

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MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

NOTES
on Conversations of Comrade Edward GIEREK, First Secretary of the Central Committee, Polish United Workers Party, with the Commander in Chief, Combined Armed Forces

1. Subject matter of the statute concerning the Combined Armed Forces (CAF) of the Warsaw Pact (WP) member states and the organs for maintaining command over them (in wartime)

   - We will consistently implement agreements from the recently sanctioned statute concerning the CAF of the WP member-states and the organs for maintaining control over them (in wartime).

   - The Polish Peoples Republic (PPR) and the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP) fully support and accept the proposals for turning over the functions of the CAF Supreme Commander in Chief in wartime to Comrade Leonid Ilich BREZHnev, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Chairman of the Presidium, USSR Supreme Soviet, and Marshal of the Soviet Union.

2. Crucial problems relative to the European disarmament conference and Polish proposals to be presented at such a conference in WARSAW
Because of its concern for strengthening political detente in Europe and for reenforcing it with a military detente, the PUWP Eighth Congress has offered to sponsor a European conference in WARSAW (with participation of the USA and Canada) concerning military detente and disarmament, soon after a proposal for holding such a conference was mentioned by the WP countries.

Diplomatic representatives of the PPR have transmitted the resolution of the Eighth Congress to governments participating in the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe and have also clarified its significance and political context. This resolution has also been transmitted to the UN and the Disarmament Conference in GENEVA. The Polish proposition received much publicity, was interpreted in many political circles and in the mass media as an acknowledgement of the sincerity of our activities and commitment toward detente. For this, Poland has particularly convincing historical and political justification. The realism of the Polish proposition stood out in relief. A number of governments expressed interest in this initiative and probable acceptance of a decision for its implementation at a meeting of participants of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe in MADRID in November of this year.

On the question of an all-European conference, France and Finland have also announced their own proposals. Some similarity exists between the proposals of the WP countries and the French proposals (pertaining to reciprocal notification of large movements of troops, restricting the number of troops taking part in military exercises, both air and in part maritime). In addition, some of the French proposals appear acceptable and some are even expandable, such as exchange visits of warships, lectures, artistic groups, films, etc. However, other questions are highly controversial. Among other things, this applies to banning or limiting use of nuclear arms or territorial range of weapons proposed by France (beyond the Urals). In spite of this, we consider it necessary to search for any additional similar viewpoints.
- Arduous preparatory work is still necessary to win governments of Western countries over to the idea of a conference. Acceptance of WARSAW as the location for holding the conference would constitute a great political success, not only for Poland but for the entire socialist community. This would justify the Polish Government assuming the role of coordinator, which task, among others, would include conducting discussions for elaboration, possibly in coordination with the governments of France, Finland, and others, particularly with neutral governments, of political platforms which would win approval.

- For a number of years the VIENNA negotiations have found themselves at an impasse. The cause for this state of affairs is the position taken by the NATO allies, who are aiming to alter the balance of military forces in central Europe to their advantage, and by a wide expansion of the means of control by inspection of military activities of the WP countries, especially the USSR. At the present moment the greatest disagreement concerns data on the number of troops in the zone, mainly ground forces of the USSR and the PPR. The latest initiative of the WP countries (22 February 1980) is to resolve this question by attempting to bring this matter up to date and correct the data concerning forces of both sides, according to the situation on 1 January 1980. We feel that the discussions anticipated in the near future of the chiefs of general staffs of the USSR and PPR armed forces will result in finding formulas and solutions acceptable to the WP countries.

3. Observance of the 35th anniversary of victory over HITLER's Fascism and also the 25th WP anniversary

- A special role and great political programming importance must be attached to both these anniversaries, whose observances in Poland are mutually related.
- Against a historical background of victory and of the decisive role of the Soviet Army, and also the notable contribution of the Polish Peoples Army, we are emphasizing the significance of the WP in preserving the fruits of this victory. We are exhibiting the essence of the coalitional defensive doctrine. We are active in further tightening of universal cooperation and brotherhood of arms with the Soviet Army and other armies of the socialist alliance.

- Among the many undertakings initiated in this observance of the 35th anniversary of the great, liberating January offensive, the conference of the Political Consultative Committee to be held in the capital of our country occupies a special place.

- It is a great honor for Poland that during the WP anniversary, this conference will take place in WARSAW, where 25 years ago the cradle of the defensive socialist coalition, an effective, affirmative practice for a quarter of a century, has guaranteed the security of our countries.

- Convinced of the great importance of this undertaking, we are preparing for it actively and thoroughly.


- In working up a plan for development of the armed forces, we follow the decision of the WP countries approved at the MOSCOW conference of the Political Consultative Committee on 23 November 1978.

* In coordination with the CAF statutes for peacetime and wartime, the protocol is reanalyzed every 5 years. It is signed by the MND and the CAF High Command, and is ratified by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers.
Poland has constant and vivid evidence of its defensive needs, particularly in light of the current international situation. Among other things, we expressed this at the Eighth Conference of our Party. Taking into consideration these needs and still prevalent deficiencies in weapons and level of modernization of the armed forces, we proposed a 40 percent increase in general expenditures for defense, concerning which the chairman of the Council of Ministers informed Comrade A. Kosygin, Chairman Council of Ministers, in writing in July 1979. Being aware that these expenditures do not guarantee that the great needs in this field will be satisfied, we approached the USSR Government for purchases on credit of weapons and equipment in order to approach in part the recommendations of the CAF Command concerning the development, in the next 5 years of forces assigned by the PPR to the CAF structure.

We have been working on this for nearly two years. In addition to the Ministry of National Defense (MND), the Planning Commission of the Council of Ministers and the economic ministries have also been engaged in fulfilling these tasks for the MND, and in preparation of the entire territory of the country as part of the theater of war operations.

At the beginning of the current year a special government team was established which will prepare a program on development of the defense industry for 1981-85, and long-range to 1990, and also plans for deliveries of weapons and military equipment for the CAF of the WP countries.

* Marshal Kulikov informed the Chief of the PAF General Staff that the Soviets are ready to review the possibility of a long-term loan to the PPR (for a 10-year period), low-interest credit (2-3 percent) in an amount above 1 billion rubles for supplementary purchases from the USSR, in 1981-85, of recommended systems of weapons and military equipment.
- Representatives of the Planning Commission of the Council of Ministers and of the MND participated in a two-stage agreement among the WP countries concerning mutual deliveries of weapons and military equipment (April 1979 for stage I in the Hungarian Peoples Republic, and November 1979 for stage II in the German Democratic Republic). Nevertheless not all matters were agreed upon, and we anticipate the need of further study in this area.

- Recently, (in mid-March in WARSAW) representatives of the PAF General Staff and the CAF Staff completed preliminary protocol agreements concerning assignment of PPR forces to the CAF structure and its development in 1981-85*. However there still exist significant divergences between defense needs and recommendations, and our capabilities. These apply to:

a) The number of troops assigned from the PPR to the CAF

In relation to the actual agreements for wartime, we intend to increase the number of troops by 10-20,000. The CAF Command, however, demands that the increase amount to 60,000 as a necessary step to establish a composition of troops at the front for two or three additional reserve divisions. In spite of the soundness of this demand, we do not have the capability to carry it out because of lack of cadre, objective shortage of weapons and equipment, and a storage base.

b) Introduction of a new, unified organizational structure recommended by the CAF for armored and mechanized divisions

* In accordance with the accepted plan, the next revision of this document will take place in MOSCOW at the level of the Chiefs of the PAF General Staff and the CAF Staff, following which in September 1980, its final determination and endorsement are anticipated by the MND and the CAF Commander in Chief, and also ratification by the Chairman of the PPR Council of Ministers.
Although this is a valid and proper proposal (in the WP, only PAF has a different, in sum a weaker, structure of armored and mechanized divisions); full implementation under our conditions would be very difficult or simply impossible. Moreover, such an undertaking would require a considerable increase in the number of tanks (about 370), support artillery (about 532 guns and artillery launchers), AT defense means (about 44 ATGM launchers) and AA defense means (about 386 STRELA-2M missiles). Under these circumstances we intend to change to a new structure gradually.

c) Armed forces aviation

In our plans we anticipate maintaining each aviation regiment with 36 aircraft. The Combined Arms Command is demanding an increase of this number to 40. Implementation of the above proposal would require an additional purchase of 44 fighter aircraft and at least 20 fighter-bomber aircraft, with total value of about 15.6 billion zlotys. From the point of view of limited expenditures and shortage of pilots, we see no possibility of a solution vis-a-vis these proposals. Against this background, it is likewise necessary to emphasize the very intensified fuel difficulties, in which matter, further assistance from the USSR would be strongly advisable.

d) Navy

For the purpose of accelerating the successfully finalizing, during the current 5-year period, development processes of this type of armed forces, besides the necessary import from USSR, we intend to increase production of our own ship industry with cooperation of USSR industry, and possibly that of the German Democratic Republic. At the current stage, only various intergovernmental agreements exist. Development prospects of our Navy will depend on favorable resolution of problems of cooperation.
e) Ammunition reserves

The Combined Command recommends ammunition reserves to support 60 days of combat operations. This is operationally justifiable. Nonetheless, considering the actual production capability of the industry in some types of ammunition, deliveries have been planned which would allow for accumulation of reserves for 25 to 30 days of operations. During the latest discussions, CAF Staff representatives expressed the reservation that the status of these reserves is inadequate. The goal for accumulating reserves for 60 days of operations would necessitate additional purchases of about 380,000 122-mm shells for the model 38 howitzers, and 128,000 mortar shells, valued at about 4.1 billion zlotys. Taking into consideration the production capability of our industry, as well as the necessity of starting production of shells for T-72 tanks and GVOZDIKA self-propelled howitzers, this is an unrealistic undertaking.

f) Construction of new airfields on PPR territory

To create conditions for aviation maneuvering, the Combined Command is requiring construction by 1990 of five airfields with first-class parameters at the base of ground airfields. Preliminary estimated calculations indicate that the construction costs of these airfields would amount to about 6.3 billion zlotys. The primary problem, however, would be lack of materials and productive capacities. We, however, consider as realistically necessary, full implementation of the 1978 Resolution of the PPR Government on the subject of repair and modernization of already existing airfields as permanent aviation bases. In this situation, we temporarily do not see the possibility of complying with the above-mentioned demand of the Combined Command.
5. **Initiation of production of new types of weapons and military equipment**

- We attach great weight to the development of our own arms industry; we count in this sphere on assistance and cooperation of the USSR. We continue to consider the Soviet proposals, including those presented by Marshal Ustinov at the time of his December visit with the First Secretary of the PWP Central Committee concerning the arms industry. It would be very useful if Comrade Finojnov, Minister of the USSR Defense Industry, would visit Poland in the very near future.

- With interest we are considering Soviet suggestions regarding increase of domestic integration of our arms industry. We are examining and analyzing these suggestions, although this problem, under our conditions, is extremely complicated and difficult to implement. In this field the Planning Commission of the Council of Ministers has manifested much activity.

- We are taking concrete action concerning prompt implementation of investments connected with starting production of the T-72 tank and Strela-1M AA missiles, and of approaching the desired production capability for MTLB armored prime movers, as well as preparing for production of MTS tracked prime movers.

- We intend to start production of the Turkus-2 launcher on MTLB chassis, anticipating completion by 1981 of research and development work on its improvement and completing the test series by 1983.

- Considering Soviet interest in importing 1,500 Gvozdika 122-mm self-propelled howitzers in the next 5 years, our own needs, and also the interest of other Warsaw Pact countries, we are preparing to start production of this equipment in 1982-83.
We are working on early implementation of Soviet recommendations for perfecting the DUNAJEC and CYBER* automated control subsystems for the National Air Defense Forces.

We are counting on successful finalization of agreements with the Soviets in the sphere of ship construction. On this matter we are waiting for a reply to a letter sent by the Chairman of the PPR Council of Ministers of the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers in May 1979.**

We are likewise counting on a final agreement of cooperative coordination of production of the SU-25 aircraft, waiting for a reply to our proposals included in a letter sent by the Chairman of the PPR Council of Ministers to the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, dated July 1979, and also by the Minister of the PPR Machine Engineering Industry to the Minister of the USSR Aviation Industry, dated December 1979.

Soviet specialists have evaluated the DUNAJEC subsystem highly, emphasizing the modernity of its development and recommending at the same time conclusion of agreements for coordination with other equipment systems. They have also favorably supported the concept of realization of a CYBER subsystem, pointing to the need of its development for its reliability.

We anticipate that the Soviets might introduce a proposal for start by our industry of production under Soviet license for some models of weapons and shipping instrumentation. This problem would require detailed review and analysis.
- We are vitally interested in an increase of deliveries, from the USSR to the PPR, of spare parts and repair services in the field of weapons and military equipment. To date, the Soviets have approved deliveries of only 64.4 percent of spare parts and 30.9 percent of repair needs. This creates very complex problems. On our part we will also attempt to improve our deliveries of spare parts to the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries.

- We are also interested in developing a joint position of the PPR and the USSR concerning access to the Libyan market (construction of military equipment repair and assembly workshops). This would be politically beneficial for the development of PPR and USSR relationships with Libya. Our negotiations with Libya are conditioned on obtaining approval from the Soviet Union.

Ministry of National Defense