8 September 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: John N. McMahon
   Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Report

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Summary:

This report is a translation of a Polish document entitled "Report on Visit of Polish Armed Forces General Staff Delegation to the USSR Armed Forces General Staff and to the Combined Command of the Combined Armed Forces" and classified SECRET OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE. The subjects discussed during the visit include: operational employment and development of the PPR Armed Forces during the next 5-year period; problems pertaining to PPR defense, operational training, expansion of special communications lines, delivery of armaments and military equipment; procedural tactics of the Vienna talks; and matters pertaining to preparation and conduct of Exercise WIOSNA-80 [SPRING-80].

Of particular note is the information obtained by the Polish delegation concerning changes in organization and subordination made or envisioned in the Soviet Air Force, National Air Defense, Civil Defense, premilitary and military training, and military district commands.

End of Summary
REPORT ON VISIT OF POLISH ARMED FORCES GENERAL STAFF
DELEGATION TO USSR ARMED FORCES GENERAL STAFF AND THE
COMBINED COMMAND OF THE COMBINED ARMED FORCES

During 25 to 27 March 1980, the Chief of the General Staff (GS), Polish Armed Forces (PAF), with his deputies for operational and organizational-mobilization matters, the Chief of Signal Troops, and a group of officers of the GS, PAF, paid a working visit to the GS of the USSR Armed Forces and the Combined Armed Forces (CAF) Combined Command. In the working consultations participated concerned deputy chiefs of the GS of the USSR Armed Forces and chiefs of directorates of that Staff.

The subjects of the talks were matters pertaining to operational employment and development of the PPR Armed Forces during the next 5-year period, and certain general problems pertaining to the defensive capacity of PPR, operational training, expansion of special communications lines, delivery of armaments and military equipment to PAF, procedural tactics at the Vienna talks, and matters related to preparation and conduct of exercise WIOSNA-80 [SPRING-80].

The Chief of the General Staff, PAF, met with the Chief of the GS of the USSR Armed Forces Marshal OGARKOV and the Chief of Staff, CAF, General of the Army GRIBKOV. He also held talks with the Commander in Chief (CINC) of the Combined Armed Forces, Marshal KULIKOV. At the conclusion of the visit he was received by the Minister of National Defense, USSR Marshal USTINOV. In addition, taking advantage of his stay in Moscow, the Chief of the GS, PAF, also paid a visit to the Commandant of the General Staff Academy of the USSR Armed Forces, General of the Army KOZLOV, and met a group of PAF students attending the military academy.
The talks held at the Headquarters of the GS of the USSR Armed Forces and CAF Combined Command provided much data necessary for properly preparing the plan for development of the armed forces as a whole and rationally resolving many detailed questions, especially in the fields of operational planning, organizational-structural planning, and authority planning. Problems were also defined pertaining to positive finalization of the delivery of armaments to the PAF, as well as implementation of provisions of the recently approved CAF wartime statute.

1. On the matter of operational planning, the Soviet comrades informed us that revision of the plan will take place in mid-1981. This is caused by the necessity of taking into consideration provisions of the CAF wartime statute concerning participation in this planning of the CINC of CAF of the theater of military operations (TMO), and also by the consequences resulting from present changes being made in the Soviet Armed Forces in the structural arrangement of the air forces, national air defense, and AA defense, within the framework of operational large units. At the same time, they stressed that in operational planning, the presently established interrelationship will remain as basic, namely, the GS of the USSR Armed Forces--the GS, PAF, (including also in regard to employment of the Combined Baltic Fleet and participation in it of the PPR Navy). Detailed discussions of agreements on problems of operational planning is included in a separate document held at the Directorate for Operations of the GS, PAF. [See Attachment 4.]

With reference to implementation of the wartime CAF statute, Marshal KULIKOV mentioned, among other things, the necessity of issuing mobilization assignments to officers envisaged for filling positions in CAF command organs in the theater of military operations. He also mentioned the instituting of national groups at the Supreme High Command. He again brought up the inadequacy of strength of the Polish Front against the tasks facing it (particularly of the strength of elements envisaged as second echelon of the Front) and the necessity of having a greater number of reserve divisions.
It was agreed that study of the successive version of the protocol on assignment of PPR Forces to the composition of the CAF and their development during 1981-85 will begin in June 1980 in MOSCOW on the level of Chiefs of GS of PAF and CAF (this type of meeting with the other armed forces will take place earlier).

The Soviet comrades did not bring up the matter of prognosticating and planning the prospective development of the armed forces—even in the methodological aspect. However, they shared their experiences in the field of planning of training. The essence of it is issuance every 2 years of concise (about 20-25 pages) training orders of the USSR Minister of Defense and organization guidelines of the Chief of the GS of Soviet Armed Forces for operational training. During the years in which an order is not issued, directive guidelines of the Defense Minister are prepared which precisely define training tasks of the armed forces. Deputies of the Defense Minister issue each year organizational guidelines for specialist training. They argued convincingly that planning of training activities for time intervals longer than 2 years does not pass the test. With reference to self-education of the cadre, they informed us that in the Soviet Army it constitutes an integral part of the whole system of operational training. Its forms, methods, and types are presented in Attachment 1. The basic training undertakings conducted in the main commands and institutions of the USSR Armed Forces for each training year are presented in Attachment 2. Supervised self-education in central institutions of the Ministry of Defense is organized twice a month, 2-3 hours each, in the afternoons, during duty hours.
We were informed that combat and service manuals of staffs of the USSR Armed Forces cannot be made available to us because work on them has not yet been completed. Completion of this work and issue of manuals is envisaged no sooner than 1981, and for this reason it was suggested that it is necessary for the Poles to continue their own studies in this field.

The concept of the WIOsNA-80 [SPRING-80] exercise was analyzed by the CAF staff and met with general approval and acceptance. Only certain comments on specifics were made, and these will be taken into consideration in future works. General of the Army GRIBKOV was very much interested in the exercise, suggesting that all Polish officers under the Combined Command be included in the directing organs of the exercise. Also, a group of appropriately authorized officers from CAF Combined Commands would be sent as observers of the exercise. At the same time, Marshal OGARKOV on his part expressed particular interest in the mobilization exercise played within the framework of the WIOsNA-80 exercise, requesting that familiarization with the conduct of the exercise be made possible to a group of officers from the GS of the USSR Armed Forces headed by General Polkovnik ABOLINS, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces for Organization-Mobilization Matters. It was agreed that their presence at the exercise could be combined with consultations on establishing a sector for handling technology and technical support matters in the PAF for which the Soviets clamor.

General of the Army GRIBKOV, Chief of Staff of the CAF, expressed praise for the work of the Polish officers assigned to the Combined Command, pointing out that both sides can be blamed for not keeping these officers fully occupied because of--among other things--insufficient information available to them on given aspects of life and activities of the PAF. In addition, he suggested that greater attention be paid to health conditions of officers assigned to work at the Combined Command (to date, there were three incidents of death and several officers, because of their health status, qualify for retirement).
2. Much essential and specific data was obtained in the field of organizational development of the armed forces, preparation of youth for military service, and representation of defense matters in nonmilitary elements. In particular, the Soviet comrades informed us on undertaking the following works on structural-authority changes in the armed forces.

The problem is being examined of structurally combining the air forces and air defense forces and subordinating them to the combined arms commanders, at least on the operational level. At present there exists, in the opinion of the Soviet comrades, occurrences of duplication of many means appearing independently in both branches of the armed forces, but serving the same purpose.

In three combined arms armies an organic army aviation is being experimentally formed, headed by a commander and staff fully subordinate to the army commander. The composition of this aviation includes helicopters, but as may be expected the need is envisioned for incorporating also assault aviation, including vertical takeoff aircraft. In a solution under discussion, aviation-technical supplies are provided through the air force channel, however, general supplies and POL—which is considered particularly important—through the combined arms channel. It is expected that such organizational solutions will permit elimination of basic weaknesses in utilization of aviation on the operational level, and primarily, on the one hand, the incompetent cooperation of support aviation with ground forces, and, on the other hand, the limited interest in aviation on the part of the combined arms army. Even now positive results are noted from the subordination of the commander of the air army to the commander of the military district. Marshal OGARKOV described it this way, "the combined arms commanders have grown up by a head, as far as familiarity with aviation matters is concerned." In the practical arrangement of command organs only insignificant changes took place. The staffs retained their structures and remained in their places, only the technical and financial administrative sections were combined. The essence of these changes consists of total subordination of the air army commander to the military district commander—as his deputy for aviation matters. In the wartime structure the current command of the air army will command the front aviation. The principles of deploying command points have not changed.
Similarly, the National Air Defense (NAD) forces disposed in the area of a given military district were subordinated to the military district commander, whereupon in military districts adjacent to state borders, the NAD forces were combined with AA defense troops, creating at the same time a new post of air defense commander.

They reported the introduction of new divisional TO&E into first echelon military districts. Among others, the number of infantrymen in tank divisions was considerably increased, which permitted increasing the combat strength of a division by 20-30 percent.

In the Soviet Army research is being conducted on improving technical support and on the role of the deputy commander for technical matters, a position which has been presently introduced on the military district level. The ordnance and motor vehicle-tank services have been directly subordinated to this deputy for whom a staff has also been created. However, the total scope of his authority has not been defined with regard to technical activities of other services (arms of troops). The Soviet comrades, knowing that we are conducting studies on solutions to these problems, would like to arrange close consultation (Marshal OGARKOV made this proposal). In turn, they are ready to advise us on matters of pilot training, however, they request that we send to the GS of the USSR Armed Forces a list of problems of interest to us, before the group of Soviet specialists arrives in Poland. Marshal OGARKOV also agreed to hold consultations with representatives of the GS, PAF on training of military administrative cadre at the SARATOV Training Center.
The Soviets reported on the research in progress on combining military commissariats of appropriate levels with civilian defense (CD) staffs. By doing so it is endeavored to coordinate efforts and concentrate under one authority decisionmaking on matters such as: organization of communications (to date, communications of the military commissariats and CD staffs have been independent), evacuation of the population, and utilization of human reserves, vehicles, and the like. This problem is considered difficult to resolve because of various principles for maintaining and financing military commissariats and CD staffs (the commissariats are supported by the budget of the Ministry of Defense; CD staffs, being nonmilitary elements, are supported by the budgets of executive committees of the Delegate Councils). However, they have no intention of forming--on the basis of military commissariats or the above-mentioned combined staffs--specific area commands with subordinate units and with command authority over a given area; these tendencies sometimes appear in the opinions of certain leadership organs of PAF.

Discussions were also held on the position and authority of organs for defense matters in civil ministries of the USSR. Elements such as our military departments with real tasks (coordination of military production, performance of services on behalf of mobilization, the armed forces, and preparation of the defensive capability of the national territory, as well as civil defense and security) do not exist in the USSR. In the Soviet Union one of the deputy ministers of a civil ministry, together with a special branch subordinate to him, is responsible for the ministry fulfillment of tasks on behalf of the armed forces both in peacetime and wartime. These are civilian elements which willingly employ reserve officers. The Deputy Minister of National Defense for Equipment and Armament Matters has the right to inspect these elements.
Civil defense matters, however, are handled by civil defense staffs present on the ministerial level and are supervised by one of the deputy ministers, frequently the same one who is responsible for the above-mentioned defense matters. In larger enterprises special functionaries are designated for military records, where particularly strict discipline is applied in maintaining registration rosters of conscript age youth (during registration, data on the conscripts come in from the organ of local administration and, in addition, from the place of work or school--independently of each other). Military representations at places of work, charged with supervision of special production and its receipt, are developed to a greater extent than in our own industry. Two-thirds of the strength of these elements are officers, even though they are established outside of the military norm and are maintained by funds designated for defense production. Distribution of these funds is adjusted annually, and the TO&E of the representations are appropriately changed by the GS on request of the Deputy Minister of Defense for Armament Matters. These representations have the right to inspect preparations for conversion of appropriate industrial plants.

On the subject of division of authority between the General Staff and the Deputy Minister for Technical Matters, the Soviet comrades fully support the views of the GS, PAF, which favor giving the GS the leading role in preparation of the five-year plan for developing the armed forces in its full dimension—with regard to the plan’s basic components (organizational structure, disposition, basic armament) and the balancing role of the technical sector—with regard to preparing lists of requirements for armament and equipment, representing the Ministry of Defense in talks with the planning commission and industry in regard to placing orders, and overseeing production and fulfillment of deliveries. The Soviet comrades admitted that under their conditions incidents also occur of the technical sector trying to overstep the limits of authority assigned to it.
At command organs of the central and district level, essential changes were made in arranging elements directing military education and training outside of the armed forces. The most important change was instituting at military district commands the positions of deputy military district commander for training matters outside of the armed forces and a staff section (unit) subordinate to him. The task of this organ is supervision of military training of students within the framework of military studies at colleges, military training of youth conducted at high schools, training activities of the Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation, and Navy (DOSAAF), as well as responsibility for improving the cadre of military departments of colleges and high schools. Also on the central level, the Directorate for Training outside the military was detached from the current Military Training Directorate and subordinated to the Deputy Minister of Defense—the commander of the ground forces. The Military Training Directorate retained the responsibility for coordinating training at colleges and officer schools (in military districts, a section with the combat training unit is responsible for this).

The changes in establishing authority in the field of control, described above, resulted in a considerable increase in the role of military district commanders. In this light the position of military district commanders stands out particularly strongly in relation to so-called central disposition units. All units disposed in the area of the military district, except units of the academy and scientific-research institute type, are subordinate to the district commander. Only specific activity of designated units, requiring central instructions, is supervised by appropriate central institutions of the Defense Ministry, and even in such an event, cadre matters are conducted by military district commanders. The chief of a central institution of the Ministry of Defense has only the right to appoint the commander of a given unit (e.g., the commandant of a special training center).
Important definitions of authority and accordingly structural-organizational definitions are being made at the informatics organs. On the central level, the Directorate for Automation and Control Points is located at the Main Directorate for Operations. Its task is development of a concept (idea) of control with application of automation means. The function of central supply organ (CSO) for technical development and supply of automation means as well as links and circuits essential for their operation, is performed by the Signal Troops Headquarters. However, there are definite differentiations. Automation of control of the combat means remains a function of commands of branches of the armed forces and headquarters of arm of troops, whereas the Signal Troops Headquarters performs, in this case, the function of coordinating CSO. With reference to general purpose automation means, including PASUV, the Signal Troops Headquarters performs the function of indirect CSO. Within the staffs of military districts and branches of the armed forces there are automation and control point units. They are components of operational directorates or constitute separate sections subordinate to one of the deputies of the chief of staff. Subordinate to these units are the electronic computer centers.

Many conclusions can be drawn from the knowledge gained on matters of military training of youth--including pre-military training for performing specific technical tasks in the military. Of particular importance is the fact that the majority of junior specialists is being trained directly in the units and at the expense of personnel strengths of the units. This is in contrast to the Polish Armed Forces, in which almost all NCO's and junior specialists are trained in TO&E slots (as a result of which approximately one-third of the NCO and junior specialist strength is continuously in schools); whereas in the Soviet Army, even in the most complex specialties only 80 percent of the required personnel are trained, in the air forces--approximately 60 percent, in communications--40 percent. The average fluctuates within the limits of 40-50 percent, which is 50 percent less than in the Polish Armed Forces. With regard to specialists trained outside of TO&E strengths, the mandatory principle in the Soviet Army is to call up conscripts--with appropriate civilian skill and DOSAAF training--directly to the units where, upon transfer.

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of equipment to them by older troops being released to the reserve, they are trained within 2-3 months in a temporary, extemporaneously organized training subunit.* This practice is facilitated by a contingency existing in the Soviet legislation for extending military service of a soldier, which is broadly applied to specialists in order to overlap the troops of the older class with conscripts who are replacing them and to whom the equipment is transferred (for example, for a conscript called up in October, the 2-year service begins in January of the following year, and for those called up in May--1 July).

DOSAAF offers youth training in as many as 18 types of specialties. City youth are trained under a system which is capable of organizing groups for up to 19 days, and rural youth, also under a boarding system for periods up to 3 months. Other distinct problems are the training of youth for service in military aviation under the 2-year DOSAAF training program and the training, also within the framework of DOSAAF, of reserve pilots, including on MIG-17 jet aircraft. In view of the special consultations planned on matters of aviation training and the expected arrival in Poland of a Soviet specialist group, the above-mentioned problems were not discussed in detail.

* For example, drivers of APC's, multiton trucks, or drivers-electricians are trained for 3 months. The primary subject of their training is familiarization with the characteristics of equipment, knowledge on how to service the equipment of the vehicle, and knowledge on how to drive in a column. This is concluded with a practical long distance march.
Great importance is attached to patriotic indoctrination attained within the framework of military training of youth in high schools. In these schools there is a position of deputy principal--director for military training, who as a rule is a male with the rank of reserve officer, frequently trained in a special field. Testifying to the importance attached to military training of youth are also the organizational-authority undertakings previously mentioned, carried out by the leadership organs at the central and district levels of the Soviet Army.

The consultative talks cleared up for the PAF the controversial matter of arrangement and sizes of mobilization groups or nucleus groups for newly mobilized rear units (QM). In the Soviet army mobilization groups similar to our own (most frequently a rear base administrative large unit) are designated only if the unit forming them is low level and limited in personnel strength and capability, whereas the unit being expanded is superior in rank, size, and the like (e.g., a small depot forming a rear base headquarters). In other instances the commander, together with the best cadre of the mobilizing unit existing during peacetime, is designated commander of the unit being formed (e.g., the commander of a hospital is designated commander of a hospital base), thus strengthening, to the extent necessary, specific sections with functionaries for maintaining mobilization documentation, conservation of supplies, and the like.

In the structure of the operational rear, the Soviets introduced the concept of a material support brigade which is equivalent to our own mobile base of the front (army), eliminating the intermediate control elements (e.g., the transportation regiment command, which was a component of the base, was disestablished, leaving only separate battalions directly subordinate to the brigade command).
We gained full insight into the TO&E of units of interest to us, particularly those units envisaged for formation in the PAF equipped with VEGA and OSA systems, and MIG-23 aircraft. The structures of all units are characterized by considerably more economic organizational construction in comparison with Polish solutions. In the peacetime TO&E, as a rule, a limited degree of reduction in strength is applied—including units equipped with VEGA-type equipment (e.g., a VEGA regiment in peacetime has 548 men and in wartime 862). Soviet units are also numerically less expanded in comparison with similar PAF units (e.g., a Soviet VOLKHOV battalion in peacetime has 109 men and in wartime 142, a Polish battalion has 177 and 134 men respectively; in a Soviet radiotechnical company the P-14 radar station has a crew of 8 to 10 men, in a Polish company—15). The Soviets also have a smaller number of engineers with college education (e.g., an aviation regiment equipped with MIG-21bis aircraft has 11 engineers, while we have 34).

The method of staffing Soviet units designated for performing alert duty indicates that the Soviets have an appropriate rotation system in contrast to the full four shifts appearing in our own National Air Defense forces, a system excessively expanded, even for wartime conditions.

During talks on organizational matters, the Soviet comrades pointed to the need for a penetrating and highly absorbing analysis of requirements submitted by interested arms of troops and services, particularly when new structures are formed and new equipment introduced. For this reason, in order to avoid answering questions on TO&E, investments, and other matters at bilateral specialist consultation, it was agreed, with full approval of Marshal OGARKOV, that all consultations on organizational matters may be conducted only with participation of representatives of the general staffs of both parties.
3. On the subject of deliveries, most attention during the talks was devoted to equipment of the Polish Navy. The Soviet comrades are waiting for an answer to comrade KOSYGIN's letter sent to comrade BABIUCH in March 1980, with reference to deliveries and construction of ships for the needs of the navy. They underscored that this matter requires decisions on the State level, and that the Soviet side intends to designate a delegation for the talks headed by comrades GRISHIN and FILONOVICh. At the same time, they mentioned that plans are underway to send to Poland in April a Soviet delegation for signing an import agreement for delivery of ships and vessels from Poland to the USSR. They also emphasized that the Soviets had requested that consideration be given to the possibility of Poland undertaking construction of landing ships of greater displacement, all of which they are prepared to purchase. The Soviet comrades are also prepared to consider a prospective plan for 10-15 years, proposing construction of naval ships with the cooperation of three countries: Poland, USSR, and the German Democratic Republic. The Chief of the Polish General Staff expressed the view that this matter could be discussed with comrades GRISHIN and FILONOVICh during the visit of the Soviet delegation.

It will be difficult to increase deliveries of aviation fuel for the needs of the Polish air force. The GS of the USSR Armed Forces suggested that in this matter we once again ask the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade. The problem of aviation lubricants, in view of the small volume, can be favorably resolved.

Meeting Polish requirements for ambulances on UAZ chassis also will be unrealistic. The Soviet army also receives them in small numbers (200 units annually--that is just as many as the Polish side would like to receive annually), in view of which the Soviets use mobilization allocations of vehicles at the disposal of the civilian health service; however, for evacuation of wounded from the battlefield, they are preparing special "vehicle-stretchers."
Marshal KULIKOV mentioned that the problem of construction of armament works in Libya jointly with Poland is being studied again. No obstacles are expected in the way of joint undertaking of construction of assembly works for certain types of armament.

The Soviet comrades confirmed the need to organize on Polish territory tropospheric communications for the needs of the GS, PAF, and the GS of the USSR Armed Forces, and in time of war also for the needs of the high command organs of the CAF, the front, and the armies. The equipment of the proposed tropospheric communications, which at this time is undergoing state testing, will not interfere with the television wavelengths, which until now constituted a basic obstacle in installing these communications on Polish territory. The communications network under discussion on our own territory will require installation of six stations deployed in hardened positions. The estimated cost of the investment will be approximately 18 million rubles (approximately 1 billion zlotys). Half of the capacity of the stations (approximately 30 channels) could be used during peacetime for internal national needs.

With reference to space communications the Chief of the Signal Troops of the Soviet Army will organize for signal troop headquarters of armies of Warsaw Pact countries a demonstration in June 1980 on the operation of these means of communications, and will discuss the principle of their use. At present, these means of communications ensure telecommunications with Vietnam, Cuba, and Afghanistan.

4. Soviet views on the subject of VIENNA talks on MBFR in Central Europe were presented by General Leytenant N.F. CHERCOV, chief of the newly instituted Legal-Negotiations Directorate of the GS of the USSR Armed Forces. He stated that the drawn out impasse and lack of results in the talks is not the result of official differences regarding data on numbers of troops in the zone of reduction. The real reason is the aspiration of NATO countries to attain military superiority in Central Europe. During the last 2 years alone, these countries increased their armed forces by 26,000 troops, and since 1 January 1976, by a total of 45,000 troops.
The draft agreement on the subject of first stage of reduction presented by the delegation of NATO countries on 20 December 1979, proposes reduction of USSR forces by 30,000 men and USA forces by 12,000 men, at the same time setting up a broad packet of confidence building measures. These proposals--considered by the West as compromises--do not constitute a step forward because NATO countries:

- oppose inclusion into the proposed reduction ceiling for the USSR of the 20,000 troops and 1,000 tanks currently being withdrawn from the GDR on the basis of a unilateral decision of the Soviet Union;

- practically withdrew from talks on the subject of armaments reductions, limiting themselves only to negotiations of personnel strengths of the armed forces;

- demand that within the framework of reduction measures the USSR withdraw three full divisions from the zone, while the US only individual soldiers, companies, and at most, battalions;

- do not agree to establish limitations on development of armed forces of the FRG and Great Britain, which comprise 75 percent of NATO forces, at the same time striving to impose limitations on approximately 50 percent of the Warsaw Pact (WP) forces (the FRG in particular does not approve reduction of its army by even a single soldier or by a single tank);

- oppose freezing of troop strengths during the talks. The socialist countries are repeatedly submitting this proposal, considering it an important factor in halting the uncontrollable development of NATO armed forces;

- by introducing inspections, they desire to legalize intelligence operations against the WP states.
In sum, acceptance of the Western proposals would mean agreement to a fourfold reduction of WP troops (50,000 against 13,000), which would constitute an indirect confirmation of NATO arguments on decreasing by WP states the numerical data on their troops. It would also mean giving NATO states, with the exception of the USA, freedom to continue further expansion of their forces in Central Europe.

The WP states cannot accept these conditions. An agreement can be signed anytime, but only when the NATO states agree to:

- freeze current troop strengths and their armaments during the negotiations;
- take into account, within the reductions proposed for the USSR, the 20,000 troops and 1,000 tanks being currently withdrawn from the GDR;
- reduce personnel strengths in the composition of specific divisions, brigades;
- reduce troops of the remainder states, particularly the Bundeswehr, during the second stage.

The February proposal of PPR Ambassador STRULAK, pertaining to updating the numerical data on armed forces strength as of 1 January 1980, took the Western states by surprise and thus far they have not given an answer on this matter. It is assumed that this problem, after consultations within NATO, will come up during the 21st round of talks starting on 12 May 1980. The Soviet side believes that the Western negotiators will present a detailed breakdown of their forces, including indicators of the divisional structure, demanding reciprocation on this subject. The WP states should be prepared for this.
The correction of the numerical data should show an increase in NATO forces, giving basis for a demand for equal reduction ceilings. Breaking the impasse will be possible only if both sides agree to compromise. In the present stage of worsening international relations, to which suspension of all talks between the USSR and USA is related, VIENNA remains the only negotiating plane on the East-West line. Therefore it is necessary to seek opportunities to continue the talks.

With reference to the initiatives of Comrade E. GIEREK and G. MARCHAIS pertaining to the European Conference of Communist Parties on the problems of armaments and disarmament, it was confirmed that the conference would be of great propaganda importance and that more attention than thus far should be devoted to it. The WP states should take advantage of weak points in the position of the West. It is necessary to point out invalid arguments of NATO states about the threat of tanks, stating that no war, particularly modern war, can be conducted by one branch of the armed forces. In propaganda activities, a comprehensive balance should be underscored and not parity of forces between NATO and WP. Even data presented in works of Western strategic studies institutes, e.g., of Great Britain and others, speak in favor of the existence of such a balance.

In conclusion the Soviets presented for coordination the proposals of the GS of the USSR Armed Forces pertaining to numerical data on USSR and PPR armed force strengths as of 1 January 1980, which will be submitted during the next round of the VIENNA negotiations. This data is included in Attachment 3. During a critique of this problem in Marshal OGARKOV's office, the Soviet comrades proposed that during the VIENNA talks Poland declare a new category in the nomenclature of the branches of the armed forces, which thus far has been excluded from the context of the talks. It would be desirable if the numbers of PPR troops in this service amounted to 13,000 men. This could be, for example, the constant and variable strength of aviation schools which fall into the category of territorial defense units and which thus far are not included in the negotiations. At the same time it was underscored that this sort of declaration of a new category cannot under any circumstances mean or even imply that numbers, thus far concealed, are being disclosed and what
follows—that Western charges for decreasing the numerical strength of the WP armed forces are justified. This would be—as Marshal OGARKOV noted—even more illogical in the situation where the withdrawal of 20,000 troops from the GDR is in progress and, at the same time, the number of troops exceeding this number were revealed on our side. The updating of data can be understood as an enumeration of a new category of troops which until now has remained outside of talks but of which both negotiating sides were aware. It was agreed that this matter requires further analysis and consultation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including our delegation participating in the talks, and only upon comprehensive consideration, appropriate proposals will be presented for decision of the leadership bodies of parties and governments.

5. In the final stage of the visit, the Chief of the GS, PAF, and his deputies were received by Marshal USTINOV who was accompanied by the Chief of the GS of the USSR Armed Forces and deputies for operations and organization-mobilization matters, as well as the Chief of Staff of the CAF.

The Chief of Staff, PAF, reported on the national situation subsequent to the Eight Party Congress and during the elections, and also broadly explained the state of readiness of the PAF, emphasizing the problem of mutual collaboration and Soviet assistance required for resolving successfully matters on the equipping our armed forces, in particular the navy, training of pilots, and making available a larger number of acceptances by the K. VOROSHILOV Academy of the GS of the USSR Armed Forces.

Marshal USTINOV stated that in the present situation where outright adventurous behavior characterizes our adversaries—it is necessary to be more restrained in contacts with the capitalist countries and maintain alertness, particularly against intensified efforts to destroy the unity of the states of our community.
Marshal USTINOV stated that he is satisfied with the progress of work in Poland on starting production of the T-72 tank and that development of the defense industry is for various reasons beneficial and profitable. Limited deliveries within national scope are not to be feared—the products of defense industry, including e.g., SU-25 aircraft, will find a market in the Soviet Union, in the Socialist countries, and elsewhere. Assistance in developing coproduction should be wise—it is not advisable to prepare for production of only simple components, counting on the cooperating partners to deliver the more complex components. It is necessary to undertake production not only of the fuselage of an aircraft but also more complex equipment, e.g., internal gear, sights, hydropneumatic installations, and naval guns. Polish industry is sufficiently strong to handle these tasks. Therefore, excessive caution is unnecessary; when the need arises—the Soviet side will be ready with assistance, particularly in the beginning. Also, production should be undertaken by gradual projection of complexity—do not start immediately with the more complex products. For example, only after overcoming difficulties and developing production of the STRELA-1 can production in Poland of the STRELA-10 be presently considered. Similarly, the earliest possible start of production of the T-72 tank will condition the capability of introducing successive modifications. At the same time, it is necessary to undertake planning on a broader front of new solutions—indeed, and jointly with the Soviet Union—involving to a greater degree civilian higher schools and institutes, and using the great potential of the Military Technical Academy.

In view of the expression of satisfaction of the Chief of the GS, PAF, with the successful implementation of the resolutions of the Political Consultative Committee concerning the high command organs of the CAF, Marshal USTINOV remarked that the Supreme CINC, Comrade L.I. BREZHNEV—being a realistic and precise man, no doubt will ask all of us about the status of fulfillment of the defense tasks assigned to us.
While requesting to convey his respects to comrades GIEREK, BABIUCH, JARUZELSKI, and KANIA, he underscored the indispensability of serious talks with Comrade BABIUCH on the matter of defense needs. One of the urgent and no doubt expensive needs, according to Marshal USTINOV, is expansion of the airfield network on Polish territory (the Combined Command recommends five airfields, of which the construction of at least three should be started in the current 5-year period). In addition, he commented that he is an advocate of airborne--to some extent assault--divisions, which can be used immediately as was the case in Afghanistan.

With reference to increasing the number of Polish students at the K. VOROSHILOV Academy of the GS of the USSR Armed Forces, Marshal USTINOV promised to increase the number by four; better chances will exist after 1983, when a new building will be turned over to the academy.

* * *

The GS, PAF, is currently conducting a comprehensive analysis of the information obtained from the talks and consultations in order to profit from them in the process of planning the development of the armed forces during the next 5-year period and to improve the system of national defense capability.
### Basic Training Undertakings

Conducted in Military Districts, Groups of Armed Forces, and Fleets under the Direction of Commanders during Training Year 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Basic undertakings conducted during training year</th>
<th>Cycle</th>
<th>Number of undertaking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Front (army) command-staff exercises</td>
<td>Annually</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Army (corps) op-tac exercises with troops</td>
<td>Annually</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Army (corps) command-staff exercises in the field, when op-tac exercise not conducted</td>
<td>Annually with one army (corps)</td>
<td>2-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Command-staff exercises with wartime military districts (mobilization and civil defense exercises combined)</td>
<td>Once every 2 yrs.</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Command-staff op exercise with the air force or national air defense (NAF) (involving air force (air army) and AA defense in the role of trainees)</td>
<td>One exercise for air force or NAF annually</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Op courses for the leadership cadre</td>
<td>Annually</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Exercise in the field of rear area or specialist-technical support under the direction of the command</td>
<td>One exercise annually (successively)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Op field trips under the direction of the CO</td>
<td>Once every 2-5 yrs</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Joint staff training in the field under the direction of the CO</td>
<td>One exercise annually</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Experimental (research) exercise</td>
<td>Once every 2-3 yrs according to guidance from GS or branches of the armed forces</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Tac divisional exercises with troops and divisional command-staff exercises (with the remains under the direction of the army or corps CO)</td>
<td>Annually 1-2 tac div or command-staff exercises</td>
<td>Total of 3-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Tac large unit commanders methodical courses</td>
<td>Annually</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Courses in the field of mobilization, for leadership cadre</td>
<td>Annually</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Comprehensive inspection of forces</td>
<td>Semianually</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Scientific-military conferences</td>
<td>Once every 2 yrs</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Participation in exercise as umpires in other military districts</td>
<td>Average once every 2-3 yrs</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total undertakings in a year: 17-20

Comment: At the expense of decreasing the number of command-staff exercises with armies (corps, fleets), divisional exercises conducted directly by CO's of military districts, and with the conduct of 50% of two-sided exercises, the number of training undertakings in a district can be decreased by 4-8.
### Numerical Strength

of USSR and PPR Armed Forces for the Vienna Talks According to Strength as of 1 January 1980 (in thousands of men)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Previously Agreed Upon</th>
<th>Currently Agreed Upon</th>
<th>Ground Forces</th>
<th>Agreed Upon</th>
<th>Air Force and National Air Defense</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Including</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Including</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>406.3</td>
<td>445.3</td>
<td>420.2</td>
<td>454.4</td>
<td>344.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPR</td>
<td>215.9</td>
<td>228.9</td>
<td>246.6</td>
<td>261.6</td>
<td>115.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Numerical Strength of the West (in thousands of men): presented by NATO states according to strength as of 1 January 1976, total 981.8 including ground forces—791.1; according to our evaluation as of 1 January 1980, total—1,006.7 including ground forces—825.1.

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Secret

Attachment 3

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FRON: 312/2329-80
The subject of the consultations were problems pertaining to certain issues of operational planning, employment of aviation of the front, and the Polish Navy.

Consultations on subject problems established the following:

In the Field of Issues of Operational Planning

1. Existing forms, methods, and scope of planning will not undergo basic changes. We will continue to receive recommendations and hold consultations in this field with the GS of the USSR Armed Forces. However, broadening of the authority of the staff of the Warsaw Pact CAF (CINC of the Western Theater of Military Operations) in the field of operational planning is envisaged.

In the near future the CINC of the Western Theater of Military Operations (WTMO) will study (analyze) the substance of tasks of individual fronts on the WTMO, the operational-strategic groupings, the organization of displacement of forces to assembly areas, and other related matters.
In this connection, the Soviet side has not given us a valid reply to suggestions and proposals submitted with regard to reviewing the tasks of the Coastal Front (possible assignment of one axis), elimination of the Central Troop Movement Control Groups (CTMCG Nos. 1 and 2), and making new allocations of roads for regrouping forces and the like. The Soviets assured us that these suggestions and proposals will be taken into consideration in the course of planning work of the CINC of the WTMO.

The methodology of updating operational documentation will be defined at a later date.

2. The organization of delivery of nuclear warheads remains unchanged—in accordance with accepted provisions of the obligatory operational plan (from "WISLA" installations). In addition, the Soviet side confirmed the number and yield of the nuclear charges. Recommendations are also in the process of preparation which are supposed to clarify the following recurring problems: system of delivery of special ammunition to missile troops and Air Forces, mating of warheads, command and control, communications, camouflage, and the like.

3. The time of subordination of the forces of the Coastal Front to the CINC of the WTMO may differ. However, it should be assumed that forces of the front will be subordinated to the CINC WTMO upon attaining full combat readiness.* This is conditioned by the fact that the National Command is responsible for bringing the armed forces to full combat readiness.

*Tactical large units and units expanded to combat readiness, of incomplete strength, but staffed upon introduction of full combat readiness.
4. In the Soviet armed forces, on the operational level (front, army), the following command and control points are prepared: hardened and concealed on the territory of military districts from which command and control is exercised during the time the armed forces are attaining higher states of combat readiness; and field command points (alternate command posts, command posts, and rear command posts).

5. With regard to the proposal that the Soviets allocate from their own or from the German Democratic Republic depots 8,000 tons of ammunition for the needs of the front, the Soviets assumed a positive attitude with the reservation that this problem should be coordinated with the Main Staff of the GDR Armed Forces.

In the Field of Employment of Front Aviation

1. In conjunction with organizational changes in aviation of the front (introduction of air forces of the front instead of an air army), the role and place of front aviation in offensive operations remain unchanged. Only the role increases of the present air army commander, who becomes deputy commander of the front for aviation matters—the commander of front aviation—to whom also the aviation of the ground forces is subordinated. The air forces of the front constitute an aviation operational large unit, similar to the air army, with its own command posts. Positioning of front air force CP's in relation to front CP's, and the forms of planning, instructing, and recording-reporting documentation remain the same as in the air army. Also, the responsibility of the front commander for preparation and combat employment of the front air force increases.
2. According to the new concepts, an air operation is conducted in order to destroy (weaken) missile-nuclear and aviation groupings of the enemy, and to gain air superiority. An air operation can be conducted under the following conditions: at the outbreak of hostilities (in the event preemptive operations are conducted by our side; upon repelling an enemy invasion; and in the course of conducting a strategic offensive operation in the theater of military operations. In principle, an air operation will be conducted under conditions of operations without use of nuclear weapons. However, conduct of air operations under conditions of use of nuclear weapons should not be ruled out.

An air operation is directed by the combined arms commander (CINC of theater of military operations). The following may participate in the operation: the air forces of several fronts, air armies subordinate to CINC TMQ, and forces and means of other branches of the armed forces and arms of troops.

It is proposed that during an air operation six to eight massed air strikes will be delivered in 5 days. The operation will encompass an area of 1,000-1,500 kilometers along the front and to a depth of 1,000 kilometers. To accomplish the operation, up to 3,000 aircraft may be employed which can fly 20,000-25,000 sorties.

3. With regard to an airfield network for the Polish air force on GDR territory, it was confirmed that eight airfields are assigned (excluding GUSTROW airfield), of which three airfields are for joint basing with the 16th Fighter Aviation Division. It is apparent from available data that only five airfields are suitable for use by modern aircraft. Efforts are made (pressure is applied) to have the Main Staff of the NPA, GDR, expand the airfield network in the northern part of the GDR.
4. In reference to the task assigned to the 16th Air Army (USSR), it was confirmed that operations of the Polish air force assigned to GDR airfields will be supported by ground support forces and means of the 16th Air Army during the first 2 days, with sorties intensified to two within a 24-hour period.

Our proposals to coordinate material-technical support problems directly with the headquarters of the 16th Air Army in view of difficulties anticipated in conjunction with reconstituting readiness of aircraft in the armament of the Polish air force for successive sorties, as well as the need for more precise planning of tasks and maneuver--were considered meaningless by the consultants who claimed that army level commands are not involved in operational planning. However, the tasks of material-technical support rendered to the PAF air force by the 16th Air Army (USSR) in the assembly area are contained in appropriate operational planning documents of the GS of the USSR Armed Forces.

At the same time the consultants considered it useful to conduct flights to airfields assigned to the Polish air force within the framework of flights conducted to airfields of coordinated action, complying with the principles of camouflage, as well as to conduct reconnaissance of these airfields.

In the Field of Employment of the PPR Navy

The Combined Baltic Fleet (CBF) organized for time of war is supposed to be, according to the concepts of the Soviet comrades, a strategic-operational large unit composed of: the USSR Baltic Fleet, the PPR Navy, and the GDR Peoples Navy--higher operational large units.
The PPR Navy, operating within the framework of the CBF, will carry out tasks independently on a designated axis as well as jointly with the USSR Baltic Fleet and the GDR Peoples Navy.

In the operational planning involving the PPR Navy, no basic changes are envisaged for peacetime. Wartime tasks of the navy will be determined through coordination between the GS of the USSR Armed Forces and the GS of the PAF.

In view of the fact that in wartime a new command and control element will be created in the WTMO, it is possible that a need will occur for introducing during the planning process certain changes in the field of organization of coordination between the forces of the Coastal Front and the forces of the fleets, particularly for sea landing operations.

In the opinion of the Soviet comrades, the problem of peacetime contacts among staffs of allied fleets—a problem brought up for discussion during the talks—appears as follows: in peacetime more frequent than thus far direct contacts between staffs of allied fleets will be necessary in order to work out detailed undertakings in the field of unified training of forces and to maintain operational procedures in the Baltic Sea. According to the statement of Admiral AMELKO, Deputy Chief of Staff of the USSR Armed Forces for Naval Matters, the suggestions put forward by the Chief of Staff of the USSR Baltic Fleet at the February meeting at SWINOUJSCIE on the subject of participation of the PPR Navy in maintenance of operational procedures in the Baltic, "should be understood as proposals which can be accepted by the Polish side in such a capacity as Poland deems appropriate. The Chief of Staff of the USSR Baltic Fleet in peacetime is not, after all, the Chief of the Combined Baltic Fleet."
Conclusion

The scope of the clarifications obtained during the talks conducted, and the inclusion of the CINC of the WTMO into the command and control system indicate the need for holding further consultations in the field of problems of interest to us and which arouse operational uncertainties.