The Soviet Union's Control of the Warsaw Pact Forces

An Intelligence Assessment
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This paper was prepared by the Office of Soviet Analysis.

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Key Judgments

The Warsaw Pact, despite organization and procedures suggestive of a military alliance of equal members, is in fact the instrument of Soviet control over the armed forces of Eastern Europe. It is currently organized under authority of the Peacetime Statute ratified in 1969. Its organization for war is detailed in the 1980 Wartime Statute, signed by all the Warsaw Pact nations except Romania. The Soviet-imposed provisions of that statute, when implemented, legally subordinate the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact to a unilateral Soviet Supreme High Command, essentially abrogating the sovereign rights of the East European states.

The Soviet Supreme High Command assumes absolute control of the Combined Armed Forces well in advance of hostilities, according to the Wartime Statute's provisions. This early subordination of their armed forces to direct and complete Soviet control could deny the East Europeans a full voice in the later stages of a crisis.

The command structure established by the Wartime Statute reflects the Soviet General Staff's concept that all command and control must be centralized in a single, Soviet Supreme High Command without East European representation. The statute establishes two subordinate High Commands with absolute authority for operations in the Western and Southwestern Theaters of Military Operations. East European forces, including fleets and air defense units, will operate under the direct control of these commands.

The command and control structure of the Wartime Statute is designed for actual war fighting and is not intended to expand the Soviets' control of the Pact during peacetime. The organization established by the statute appears to be the result of the Soviets' general rationalization of all theater-level assets and commands, including their own. The statute was prepared at the same time that the Soviet General Staff, despite internal service resistance, shifted its own theater-oriented naval and air forces to the theater High Commands.

Romania is the exception to the Pact members' acceptance of the Wartime Statute; it has not accepted Soviet command of its forces and insists on developing its own defense concepts.
# Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Judgments</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peacetime Structure of the Warsaw Pact</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Political Consultative Committee</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Committee of Defense Ministers</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Military Council</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff of the Combined Armed Forces</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 1980 Wartime Statute and Its Provisions</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Workings of the Pact During Peacetime</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAF Staff Responsibility</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Allocations</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Plans</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Secretariat</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Wartime Combined Armed Forces</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The History of the Wartime Statute</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposals</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concepts</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparations</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Romanian Position</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Timetable</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reactions to the Draft Statute</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kulikov's Role</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approval</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implications</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Centralization of Command</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition to War</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacetime Controls</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Military cooperation among the Warsaw Pact nations is founded on the same principles as relations between these countries in all other areas. They include first and foremost proletarian, socialist internationalism; complete equality and sovereignty of the various parties; unity in determining the main questions of defense of the Warsaw Pact member nations; and collective responsibility for ensuring their security and defense of the achievements of socialism.

So wrote Marshal of the Soviet Union Viktor G. Kulikov, Commander in Chief of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact, in his 1982 booklet The Collective Defense of Socialism. A little more than a year later, in a conversation with the US Ambassador on the degree of Hungarian independence, János Kadar, Hungarian Communist Party First Secretary, opined that there were no real national command authorities that could intervene themselves in times of crisis between the Soviet General Staff and the individual national staffs. "The Warsaw Alliance," he said, "is a single army."

Differing vastly in tone and content, these two statements represent the issue of form versus substance. Separating the appearance from the reality is a major purpose of this paper.
The Soviet Union's Control of the Warsaw Pact Forces

Peacetime Structure of the Warsaw Pact

The Warsaw Pact's public posture is that of a military alliance of sovereign nations, joined together for common defense. It is a formal structure and, as such, has formally constituted bodies to ensure that its purposes are accomplished (Figure 2). One body—the Political Consultative Committee (PCC)—was formed the same year, 1955, that the Pact was created. A 1969 document, known as the Peacetime Statute, created the Committee of Defense Ministers (CDM) and an organization of forces called the Combined Armed Forces (CAF) of the Warsaw Pact. While the CDM and the Combined Command of the CAF exist only in peacetime, the PCC is to exist during both peace and war.

The Political Consultative Committee

The PCC is the most important body of the Warsaw Pact. In The Collective Defense of Socialism, Marshal Viktor G. Kulikov describes the PCC as the "highest political agency of the Warsaw Pact Organization" (Figure 3). With the participation of the First Secretaries, the PCC makes decisions of the broadest nature concerning the common interest and collective defense of the Pact's member countries. Throughout, the "principle of sovereign equality is the basic principle governing the activities of the PCC. Representatives of all allied nations enjoy equal rights in placing questions on the agenda, in discussing them, and in reaching decisions on them." Marshal Kulikov also asserts: "Participation in the work of the PCC meetings by the leaders of the ruling parties and heads of government gives the adopted decisions considerable weight and greatly raises the international prestige of this body."

The Committee of Defense Ministers

Next in the formal hierarchy is the Committee of Defense Ministers (Figure 4). It is made up of the Ministers of Defense of the member states and the Commander in Chief and Chief of Staff of the CAF of the Warsaw Pact. This body, rather than the PCC, deals more specifically with military questions than the CDM and, according to Marshal Kulikov, is concerned with "strengthening the defense capability of the allied nations, organizational development and improvement of the Combined Armed Forces, and increasing their combat readiness." Each defense minister presides at the annual meeting when it is held in turn in his country. Marshal Kulikov stresses that the "operating procedure for the Ministers of Defense Committee proceeds from the principles of equality and sovereignty on which mutual relations among the Warsaw Pact member nations are based."

The Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact

Citing the Warsaw Treaty provision concerning the requirement to provide mutual assistance, the 1969 Peacetime Statute created the Combined Command of the Combined Armed Forces. As indicated by Marshal Kulikov, the CAF consists of forces allocated to it by the member states in accordance with their own economic capabilities, PCC directives, and recommendations from the Commander in Chief of the Combined Armed Forces (CinC/CAF). The size of this allocation is laid out in bilateral protocols between individual states and the Combined Command. The statute specifies that allocated forces remain directly subordinate to their own Ministries of Defense.
Figure 2
Peacetime Organization of the Warsaw Pact

- Soviet General Secretary
- Polish First Secretary
- German First Secretary
- Czechoslovak First Secretary
- Hungarian First Secretary
- Bulgarian First Secretary
- Romanian First Secretary
- Soviet Minister of Defense
- Polish Minister of National Defense
- German Minister of National Defense
- Czechoslovak Minister of National Defense
- Hungarian Minister of Defense
- Bulgarian Minister of National Defense
- Romanian Minister of National Defense
- Committee of Defense Ministers (CDM)
- Combined Command of the Combined Armed Forces (CCAF)
- Military Council
The leadership of the Combined Command, according to Marshal Kulikov, includes himself as CinC/CAF; the Chief of Staff of the CAF, General Gribkov (figure 5); and deputy CinCs for air defense, air forces, naval forces, and weapons and equipment, as well as deputy CinCs from each Pact country. Kulikov points out that both the Commander in Chief and the Chief of Staff are selected by the Pact’s member governments “from the military commanders of any Warsaw Pact member nation . . .” From the beginning, however, these positions have been held only by Soviet officers. The national deputy CinCs are to “conduct extensive activities pertaining to training national troop contingents . . . and maintaining them in a continuous high state of combat readiness.” These deputies, who are normally national deputy ministers of defense or Chiefs of General Staff, do not reside in Moscow but remain in their national headquarters. As a consequence, they have little involvement in the activities of the Combined Armed Forces and its staff.

The primary responsibility of the CinC/CAF, as laid out in the statute, is the preparation of the CAF for the outbreak of hostilities. He directs training and exercises, proposes improvements in weapons systems and equipment, and directs logistic preparations and stockpiles in the theater. More significant is his ability to issue “orders or recommendations” for changing the combat readiness status of the CAF to implement “decisions of the governments” or the PCC. The “orders or recommendations” phrase is significant because it was formulated, according to as the result of sensitivity among the East European General Staffs about any peacetime authority that could order changes in the readiness status of their forces. This remains a particularly important issue for the Romanians who recognize no command authority other than their own for their forces, no matter the circumstances.

Marshal Kulikov writes that the strength, composition, organization, equipment, and related details of the Combined Armed Forces have been determined by each member after considering the recommendations of the PCC and CinC/CAF, “as well as the economic and military capabilities of each country.” He goes on to say that these forces are stationed on their own territory and “remain under the national ministries of defense.” These ministries “have full responsibility for the state, equipment, combat readiness, and military and political indoctrination of the personnel of these troops and naval forces.”
Figure 4. Committee of Defense Ministers, December 1981.

Czinge (Hungary); Dzhurov (Bulgaria); Uninor (USSR); Hoffman (East Germany); Siwecki (Poland); Olteanu (Romania); Dzur (Czechoslovakia); Kutikov, Commander in Chief/CAF (see Figure 1); and Grubkov, Chief of Staff/CAF (see Figure 5).
According to the statute, the Military Council is collegial, and its recommendations are the result of mutual agreement by members. A special opinion by a single member, though duly recorded, does not prevent the otherwise agreed on decision being implemented in the other countries. The Chief of Staff/CAF is responsible for the preparation and coordination of the MC's biannual sessions.

Staff of the Combined Armed Forces. The 1969 Peacetime Statute created the multinational CAF as the CInC's executive agent of control. It is responsible for preparing assessments, proposals, and implementing decisions in those areas under the purview of the Combined Command. Marshal Kulikov describes the CAF Staff as "a working body of the Committee of Defense Ministers" that works closely with the General Staffs of the national armies to plan "current and long-range joint measures, including those pertaining to operational and combat training." One of its most important tools is the preparation for and holding of joint exercises and other conferences and meetings. In particular, it "plays a major role in preparing for and holding meetings of the Ministers of Defense Committee and the Military Council, in practical execution of their decisions in the combat activities of troops and staffs, and in broadening the fighting friendship of the allied armies."
No provision is made for the participation of the staff in operational planning because, reportedly, the wartime planning process is carried out by the individual Ministries of Defense and General Staffs in accordance with the recommendations of the CinC/CAF and the proposals of the Soviet General Staff. Plans created for all the allocated forces are signed by the respective Ministers of Defense and the CinC/CAF and are approved by the respective governments.

Marshal Kulikov describes the Pact as a military alliance of equal and sovereign states, which operates through staffs and deliberative bodies that represent each of their interests in pursuit of common goals. By implication, Kulikov's description covers the operations of the CAF in both peace and war.


In March 1980, a document entitled "Statute on the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Member States and Their Command Organs for Wartime" was signed and ratified by all the members of the Warsaw Pact except Romania. One month later, in accordance with that statute, a protocol was signed by the same countries appointing Marshal of the Soviet Union Leonid Ilich Brezhnev as the Supreme Commander in Chief of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact. The statute's provisions and the process of its ratification provide a case study of Soviet control over Warsaw Pact decisionmaking, command relationships, and preparations for war.

In detail, as well as with some reportedly intentional ambiguity, the Wartime Statute describes how the Warsaw Pact sees itself organizing for the conduct of war in Europe. Far from the coalitional tone of the Pact's peacetime provisions and Marshal Kulikov's public assertions, the statute illustrates Soviet determination to control all aspects of a war in Europe.

The Wartime Statute significantly differs from Marshal Kulikov's portrayal of the CAF. The statute indicates that the Pact nations recognize that not only military, but economic, political, and other aspects of society would have to be mobilized "in the defense of Socialism." Instead of the existing Combined Command with its multinational staff, the Wartime Statute grants full control of Pact operations to a single, Soviet Supreme High Command (SHC) with the Soviet General Staff as its executive agent. The subsequent appointment of Brezhnev as the Supreme High Commander establishes the Supreme High Command of the Warsaw Pact as being one and the same as the Soviet Supreme High Command.

Absolute authority for the control of operations in the two European Theaters is vested in two High Commands directly subordinate to the Supreme High Command. The statute authorizes each commander to make direct contact with the national leaderships of the member nations in his theater.

A wartime staff for each Theater of Military Operations (TMO) is also provided for by the statute and, unlike the peacetime CAF Staff, given the responsibility to prepare and carry out operational planning for each TMO's assigned forces. Its full responsibilities are those traditionally assigned to an operational, wartime command.

Under the Wartime Statute, control of the composition of the CAF forces differs from the peacetime control that Marshal Kulikov describes. Virtually all theater forces—armies, divisions, tactical air forces, and naval units—are preallocated to the control of the

The East German armed forces do not maintain a General Staff but do have a Main Staff. For simplicity this paper will refer to all such staffs as General Staffs.

General Secretary and Chairman of the USSR Defense Council Andropov was named publicly at Supreme Commander in Chief of the Soviet Armed Forces on 9 May 1983, and we believe he has succeeded Brezhnev as SHC/CAF, by virtue of his assumption of this position.

The Theater High Command also have deputy commanders from each of the Pact members with forces in the theater. Their responsibility is to participate in planning and ensure effective liaison with the national leadership.
Supreme High Command. As a concession to East European sensibilities, the statute specifies that nonallocated forces (for example, the Polish Internal Front), remain subordinate to their national commands, but may be employed, if necessary, by “agreement of national leaderships” and the Supreme High Command. The statute goes on, however, to further specify that the size of the forces allocated to the CAF, in peacetime a responsibility of the national leaderships, in wartime falls under the authority of the Supreme High Command with only coordination of the national leaderships required. Nonallocated forces, therefore, while remaining a national responsibility, may become allocated forces by decision of the Supreme High Command.

Pact naval forces in the Baltic and Black Seas and CAF Air Defense Forces are directly subordinated to Soviet commanders, who are, in turn, subordinated to the High Commands. The Wartime Statute establishes two Combined Fleets—one in the Baltic Sea and one in the Black Sea. Each fleet comprises the non-Soviet and Soviet fleets in its area and places them under its Combined Fleet Commander. The Commander of the Soviet Baltic Sea Fleet is the Commander of the Combined Baltic Fleet; the Soviet Black Fleet Commander is Commander of the Combined Black Sea Fleet. The Staff and control organs of the Soviet Baltic and Black Sea Fleets are also the executive agents of both Combined Fleets. The national fleet commanders are designated Deputy Combined Fleet Commanders. Both Combined Fleets are directly subordinate to the High Commands of their theaters.

The Wartime Statute stipulates that the peacetime Unified Air Defense System, continuing under Soviet control, is to be retained in war. Breaking with the Peacetime Statute, it specifies that, in addition to protecting their own territories, the national air defense forces may also be required to assist neighboring states. To this end, they may be relocated outside their own countries and even resubordinated by the Theater CinC, in coordination with the national leaderships and the Commander of Warsaw Pact Air Defense Forces. The theater commander controls air defense forces in the theater through his deputy for

Air Defense. Coordination between theaters is a responsibility of the Supreme High Command, through the Commander of Warsaw Pact Air Defenses.

Even in peacetime, the statute requires that the control posts of the two High Commands, their Combined Fleets, and each of the national commands be included in a unified communications system to ensure control by the Supreme High Command during conversion from peacetime to wartime status. The Wartime Statute also provides for additional communications systems to be deployed upon order of the Supreme High Command, in accordance with coordinated peacetime plans.

The Wartime Statute also defines rear services and armaments support structures, which are based on the directives of the Supreme High Command. The statute provides for the transfer of jurisdiction over materiel stockpiles from national depots to the High Commands, access to the national defense industrial base, and authority for the High Commands to coordinate logistic and industrial support for the CAF with the national leaderships.

Under the Wartime Statute, party political work in the CAF would be carried out on orders from the Supreme High Command rather than the national authority. Each of the Pact armies maintains a hierarchy of political officers, whose peacetime responsibilities include political indoctrination of the troops and maintenance of national party control. Political directorates, established simultaneously with the formation of the High Commands, would take over full control of political work during wartime. Representatives from the member states would be responsible for assessing and reporting on their own troops and participating in the planning and implementation of political work for their theaters. Implementation of political work in each of the forces would remain the responsibility of national political officers.
In a separate section of the statute, the High Commands are directed to function on the basis of "decisions of the member states" and orders of the Supreme High Command. The High Commands are also vested with binding authority in their respective theaters. National authorities are to ensure execution of the decisions of the Supreme High Command. In wartime, the national authorities retain responsibility for maintaining combat readiness and other support functions, in effect, reducing their role to that of a mobilization and support base.

The Wartime Statute gives operational control of the CAF to the Supreme High Command and the Theater High Commands. It stipulates that CAF tasking is to come from those commands and from the Combined Fleet Commands. The High Commands, in turn, are charged with the responsibility of informing the respective national leaderships about the plans, status, and progress of their forces. Indeed, the statute also stipulates that for both the preparation and conduct of war, the national leaderships are to be guided by "decisions of the member states" and of the Supreme High Command.

Under the Wartime Statute, the CAF would be shifted to a wartime footing on order of the Supreme High Command, by "decision of the member states." If such a change were required before the activation of the Supreme High Command, the order could be given by the CinC/CAF. The statute, however, reportedly presumes that the activation of the Supreme High Command would occur well in advance of actual hostilities. For example, the staffs of the High Commands, whose activation follows that of the Supreme High Command, are specifically charged with overseeing the conversion of the CAF.

Despite the obvious centralization of authority in a Soviet-manned and Soviet-led command structure, literally interpreted, the Wartime Statute still provides an appearance of shared decisionmaking, albeit unspecified. The ambiguous "by decision of the member states" appears to be the only reference in the statute to any authority even close to that of the Supreme High Command. To adequately understand this phrase, as well as the full potential of the statute's provisions, we must examine how the ostensibly multilateral peacetime provisions of the Pact were used in the coordination and ratification of the Wartime Statute.

The Workings of the Pact During Peacetime

CAF Staff Responsibility
The work of the CAF Staff is closely controlled by Soviets—from the top where Marshal Kulikov is both Commander in Chief of the CAF and Soviet First Deputy Defense Minister to the bottom where all major staff sections are headed by Soviets. (For the organization of the Combined Command of the CAF, see figure 7.) East European officers are assigned only to working-level positions in the individual divisions dealing with their theater. (A typical breakdown is shown in figure 8.) For non-Soviets, assignment to the CAF Staff is a low-pressure job usually given officers nearing retirement. Posting to the staff located in Moscow affords them opportunities to place their children in Soviet schools and to earn bonuses. The General Staff of one Warsaw Pact country is reported to have started placing younger officers on the CAF Staff, however, because several older officers died while on assignment there.

Soviet domination of the CAF Staff is reinforced by strict limitations on responsibilities of non-Soviet officers. A Czechoslovak officer assigned to West Division of the Communications Directorate, for example, actually functions as a representative of his own General Staff and has access to and authority for work dealing only with Czechoslovakia. He is not allowed access to related information on Polish, East German, or Soviet forces. That information is released only to the other appropriate national desks. The various pieces come together only on a Soviet desk.

These procedures raise the question of how a staff operating under such constraints could initiate multinational and multforce planning—and the answer, according to Soviet interpretation, is that it does not. The Soviet General Staff generally initiates and prepares documents and plans that are forwarded to the CAF Staff. There, the plans are broken down and issued to national staff officers to pass information, requirements, and reactions to their own general staffs.
Figure 7
Simplified Organization of the Combined Command

Military Council
(Deputy CinC)

Command
Chief of the
Combined
Armed Forces
(Chio/CAP)

Deputy CinC for
Air Defense

Commander of
Air Defense Forces
of the Warsaw Pact

First Deputy
Chief of Staff

Deputy Chief
of Staff
for Bulgaria

Deputy Chief
of Staff
for Czechoslovakia

Deputy Chief
of Staff
for Hungary

Deputy Chief
of Staff
for Germany

Combined
Armed Forces
Staff

Operations
Directorate

Intelligence and
Information
Directorate

Operational and
Combat Training
Directorate

Organization and
Mobilization
Directorate
**Figure 8**
Nominal CAF Staff Structure

![Diagram of CAF Staff Structure]

**Force Allocations**

The process by which forces are allocated to the CAF is one in which the East Europeans react to Soviet initiatives. According to the Peacetime Statute, force allocations to the Combined Armed Forces are made through bilateral agreements between the national staffs, the CAF Staff, and the Soviet General Staff. According to reliable reporting, the Soviets opened negotiations by presenting Kulikov's (CinC/CAF) request for a total 200-percent increase in Polish expenditures for the 1981-85 period to meet five-year goals set for the CAF and national forces that would be allocated to the CAF in war. The Polish General Staff referred Kulikov's request to the Chairman of the Planning Commission at the Polish Council of Ministers, who delegated the responsibility for preparing an alternative negotiating position to the Chief of the Polish General Staff. The Poles then managed to whittle the request down to about 34 percent.\(^1\)

CinC/CAF Marshal Kulikov involved himself in negotiations. Faced with particularly thorny problems, the Soviet CAF staffs declared that the issue had

\[^1\] In the past, the East Europeans have not met the spending commitments agreed to with the Soviets. We doubt, therefore, that the Poles will meet the 34-percent increase.
been cleared by the Soviet General Staff and that any appeal would have to be made to it. When the allocation was finally agreed on and approved by Poland's Prime Minister, the document automatically became part of the Polish Five-Year Plan and was considered an international agreement. Thus, the Soviet-Polish negotiations gave the appearance of equal nations allocating forces to a joint command, but in reality they showed that each Pact nation had to negotiate its best deal through a combined staff that actually represents the interests of the Soviet General Staff.

War Plans
Unlike force allocations, which are processed through the CAF Staff, operational war plans are prepared by the Soviet General Staff and the individual national staffs. According to reliable reporting, the number of individuals with access to war plans is small—in the Polish military, for example, only about 16 officers. Even these national staffs, however, have no knowledge of war plans not pertaining directly to their own forces. Once drafted, war plans are approved by the party First Secretary and signed by the Prime Minister. Regardless of that requirement, Polish Prime Ministers Edward Babiuch and Jozef Pinkowski were not shown the plans by order of the Defense Minister, General of Arms Wojciech Jaruzelski, because of their uncertain tenure.

The CAF Staff essentially represents a means by which the Soviets coordinate the activities of their military alliance; they ensure that their interests are protected by maintaining direct control over its work. Although Marshal Kulikov is reported to have justified changes in the CAF structure as necessary to ensure rapid transition to a wartime status, the East Europeans' lack of access to overall Soviet operational planning makes it unlikely that the current CAF staff could be transformed into the staffs of the High Commands.

The Wartime Statute makes no mention of a Combined Staff at all, except to say that there would be multinational representation on the staffs of the High Commands. East European officers going to the High Commands in wartime are likely only to supplement Soviet General Staff officers detailed to those commands. Their roles would probably be confined to staff actions involving their own forces; they would thereby act as liaison officers rather than as functioning members of the Combined Staff. Each East European General Staff loses nearly all of its Operations Directorate and a significant portion of the other directorates to the High Command Staff.

The Secretariat
Administrative preparations for all three of the major procedural bodies of the Warsaw Pact—PCC, CDM, and MC—are controlled by a Soviet Secretariat directly subordinate to Marshal Kulikov. The Chief of Staff/CAF is responsible for the preparation and coordination of the meetings of all three bodies, and a single secretariat has been established within the Combined Command, under Marshal Kulikov and General Gribkov. Heading this Secretariat is the Chief of the Operations Directorate of the CAF Staff, Soviet Lieutenant General Mikhail G. Titov. He is supported by a small organization consisting of stenographers, secretaries, and a Secret Registry. In preparation for each meeting, Titov selects a number of Soviet officers and generals from the CAF Staff, six or more, and assigns them to support the meeting. General Titov's Secretariat performs this function not only for the CDM and the Military Council, but, when military decisions are involved, for the PCC as well.

Preparation by the Secretariat allows the Soviet General Staff to act as gatekeepers for the controlling bodies of the Warsaw Pact. The Secretariat provides individual countries a detailed agenda, summaries of the major presentations, draft resolutions on issues, and a draft communique. Proposed presentations by national ministers must be submitted at least six months in advance to the Secretariat in Moscow. At
best, therefore, a Soviet Staff appears to exercise subtle pressure through control of agendas and other procedural matters.

In reality, the Soviets use the Secretariat to ensure the proper treatment of issues that concern them, to the extent of disallowing contesting agenda items and orchestrating the members' responses. Drafts of all proposed presentations are collected to determine which, if any, threaten Soviet positions. Some items are simply struck from the agenda. Romanian proposals for the agenda, for example, have often been cut out on various pretexts. The Soviets, often Marshal Kulikov personally, also attempt to modify positions. Failing that, as is most often the case with the Romanians, the Soviets orchestrate the other members' arguments in support of their position. All this takes place well in advance of the meetings, which are usually pro forma. Final committee resolutions are always written by the Secretariat.

The Wartime Combined Armed Forces

At its highest level, the Soviet Supreme High Command, operating through the Soviet General Staff, controls military decisionmaking for the Warsaw Pact. Absolute authority to conduct operations in two European theaters is vested in two High Commands that replace the single peacetime Combined Command. According to knowledgeable sources, the planned disestablishment of the Combined Command and Staff during the transition to war caused the East European General Staffs to conclude that Marshal Kulikov would assume the High Command for the Western TMO and General Gribkov, the Southwestern TMO. They, in turn, would control the combined forces in the theater through the Soviet Deputy CinCs, who would accompany them from the peacetime Combined Command. National theater Deputy CinCs would probably have perfunctory roles in the planning and conduct of combat operations and serve mainly as liaison officers between the High Commands and their respective national ministries and what remained of the national general staffs. According to knowledgeable sources, no provision has been made in any planning associated with this structure to provide for representatives or even communications links between the national defense ministries and staffs and the Supreme High Command. The High Commands, however, would have direct access and command authority over national units at the operational level (see figure 9).

The History of the Wartime Statute

The process by which the Soviets organized the proposal, preparation, and ratification of the Wartime Statute is a major factor in our assessment of the subordinate role played by the East Europeans in the Warsaw Pact.

Proposals

Despite provision in the 1969 Peacetime Statute for a subsequent "special" statute to cover wartime relationships, preparations of such a document did not begin until the November 1976 meeting of the PCC. At that meeting, a CinC/CAF report cited a requirement to improve control systems organizationally, as well as qualitatively, through the introduction of automated systems. In general, it stated there was a need to bring the entire structure closer to meeting its wartime requirements—specifically to give the CAF greater direct control of troops. The report expressed the CinC/CAF's concern to keep pace with NATO through general improvements in the CAF: strengthening the Air Defense System, improving rear services and increasing material reserves, and greatly increasing the depth and breadth of the CAF structure. The PCC—made up of all the First and General Secretaries of the Warsaw Pact parties—approved the measures presented in the report and charged the CDM with their elaboration.

The next step in the process was at the December 1977 meeting of the CDM where Marshal Kulikov made a presentation concerning the improvements attributed to the PCC. He reportedly declared that NATO was stressing surprise attack and that the CAF should be prepared. Because there would be no time then to reorganize the CAF, its peacetime
structure should be modified to meet wartime requirements. Citing years of study (presumably by the Soviet General Staff), Kulikov informed the ministers of a general consensus among military thinkers that coalitional operations on strategic axes should be controlled during wartime by High Commands set up for that purpose. He then proposed a change in the CAF's peacetime structure, recommending the establishment of Deputy CinC/CAF for the Air Force and the Navy, each supported by a separate directorate. In peacetime, these officers and staffs would participate in development and planning for their respective forces, while in ...
them. He also proposed a number of other detailed changes in the Combined Command. In a final resolution, written by the Soviet Secretariat, the CDM decided to concur with Marshal Kulikov's proposals, citing as its authority the prior approval of the PCC in 1976. The CDM then went one step further, however, and charged the CAF Staff and the national General Staffs with producing a draft Wartime Statute in 1978 and with preparing it for approval at a meeting of the PCC.

Concepts
In March 1978, according to highly reliable sources, a Soviet memorandum dealing with naval organization argued that the most effective utilization of fleets for war would be through their reorganization as Combined Fleets. The memo acknowledged that during peacetime the Pact's national fleets should remain subordinate to national commands. In wartime, however, command and control of both proposed Combined Fleets, for the Baltic and Black Seas, would become the responsibility of the Soviet Fleet commanders and their staffs in those areas, reducing the national commanders to subordinate status. The memo also reportedly specified that fleet planning would respond to tasking from the High Commands in the theater. Also significant was the memo's stipulation that actual resubordination of the fleets would take place upon the Supreme High Command's decision well in advance of hostilities.

Another memorandum, originated in March 1978 as recommendations of the Soviet General Staff and the CAF Staff, proposed changes in the CAF's combat readiness structure. Specifically, it suggested that a new level of combat readiness be added to the existing three. A condition designated "Military Threat" was to be inserted between the middle level, "Increased" (the lowest level was "Constant"), and the highest level, "Full." It also recommended that the military obtain additional communications channels by taking over the state networks.

In June 1978, a special Naval Statute promulgated this Soviet outline for Combined Fleet structure, but apparently bowing to national sensitivities, reportedly stipulated that the Combined Fleet commander in a theater was "appointed by the governments of the member states" on the basis of recommendations by the CinC/CAF. His staff was to be the staff of the fleet from which he was "chosen." The wartime organization for the fleets would be covered in a special statute. This nod to the East Europeans was, nevertheless, followed by the naming of Soviet Fleet Commanders to these positions.

According to knowledgeable sources, neither this nor the subsequent Wartime Statute sat well with the Commander of the Polish Navy, Adm. Ludwik Janczyszyn, who on being subordinated to the Soviet Baltic Fleet Commander, Adm. Ivan M. Kapitanets, threatened resignation but finally accepted the situation (figure 10). From the moment the Soviet staff, located in Baltysk, was given wartime control over the Polish Navy, it reportedly began sending a series of requirements and directives to Polish Naval headquarters, entirely bypassing any connection with the Polish General Staff. The affront to the Poles was softened only after the Defense Minister, General of Arms Jaruzelski, personally intervened with Marshal Kulikov who directed that the Baltic Fleet Commander back off somewhat.

The East Europeans had some advance knowledge of how the Soviets envisaged the forthcoming statute; in fall 1978 they received a Soviet memorandum that indicated the need for all the states to mobilize their entire military, economic, and social forces and that declared that a war utilizing such forces could be controlled only by a single headquarters with complete party, state, and military authority. The memorandum argued that command in the theaters should be centralized and directly subordinate to that headquarters. The High Commands themselves were described as having complete control and authority within their theaters. It also added that the High Commands should be established in advance, to ensure that they would be able to assume control during the conversion from peacetime to wartime status. The main responsibility of the national commands in the theater would be ensuring the successful outcome of operational-strategic tasks levied on the
CAF. The theater commander, therefore, would have to be sure to inform the national commands about his plans, as well as about the current situation and requirements for support and replacements. The memorandum concluded that representatives and operations groups from the national commands should be present at the theater headquarters. Subordination of the national commands would be, therefore, to the Theater High Commands, one level below that of the Supreme High Command in Moscow.

At the October 1978 session of the Military Council, Marshal Kulikov reported that both party and government leaderships were concerned with the Council's actions. He stressed the importance of the organizational changes he had instituted and cited the requirement to set up High Commands to control ground and Combined Fleet preparations in the Western and Southwestern TMOs. At the same meeting, General Gribkov reported on improvements in the CAF's readiness posture, including those in its alerting mechanism, which would improve both combat and mobilization readiness. The introduction of automated systems reportedly allowed transmission of readiness signals to subunits in one to three minutes. In addition, the signals could be sent collectively to all units or selectively. Concurrently, changes that focused the activities of all the members into a single system reportedly were being introduced. To speed the conversion of troops from peace to war, General Gribkov informed the Council that the CAF Staff would soon produce a new directive on combat readiness.

Preparations
The non-Soviet members of the Pact reportedly concurred with the concept of centralized control in the theaters. Reliable information indicates that the East Europeans presumed that the highest strategic authority for the war would continue to be a coalitional body—probably the PCC. Their initial concern, the same as the Romanians' long-held position, was that the Soviets should remember to apply the principle of proportional representation to assignments in the structure. In general, they saw the entire process as one that would require some time to complete. Work on the Wartime Statute was taking place primarily at the working levels of the staffs.

At the November 1978 PCC meeting Marshal Kulikov reported that the military leaderships of the member nations shared the view that control of the CAF in wartime should be centralized and exercised by a single Supreme High Command with broad authority. Such a command was needed because questions were arising about the strategic leadership of the CAF in wartime. He then proposed that this view be reflected in a wartime statute. He is reported to have suggested that before such a statute's ratification, the CAF leadership should be a Supreme High Command (established by decision of the member states) and the Soviet General Staff. The PCC issued a resolution that approved this proposal, directing the...
preparation of a statute and specifically acknowledging the principle of a single wartime Supreme High Command, with Theater High Commands and Combined Fleets. Approval was given despite recognition in the various national staffs that Kulikov’s proposal would have the effect not only of subordinating their forces to High Commands in the theaters but also of removing a degree of political direction from their leadership.

The PCC resolution, probably prepared by the Secretariat, directed that the final statute be submitted to the member states for approval, bypassing the PCC mechanism for ratification and thereby avoiding a veto by the Romanians. Secretary General Nicolae Ceausescu had signaled Romania’s displeasure by refusing to sign the resolution. All actions undertaken by the PCC reportedly require unanimity to be binding.

The Romanian Position
The Romanian objections actually were publicized in the government press. In Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe, Christopher D. Jones, referring to the 1978 PCC meeting, indicates that “for the first time in the history of the Pact, the other six, acting as six states rather than as a majority in the Warsaw Pact PCC, issued a separate statement at a PCC session.” From Ceausescu’s statements reported in the Romanian press, Dr. Jones correctly infers that:

The six other members . . . adopted a resolution, binding on the six only, to increase defense expenditures and to further tighten integration of the Warsaw Treaty Organization command structure. In justifying Romania’s refusal to accept these decisions as binding on the Romanian armed forces, Ceausescu repeatedly referred to the supremacy of Romanian constitutional procedures over Romanian military forces.

It was, indeed, rare for objections to such sensitive matters to be expressed publicly—especially because, even within the Pact military establishments, few were permitted knowledge of the statute.

Romania is unique among the East European Pact members because of its autonomous national defense policy. The Romanians are proud that their national defense concepts are designed and implemented by Romanians and are intended to defend the nation from any armed invader. Normal Pact formulations invariably include a specific identification of the potential aggressor—usually NATO, imperialists, counterrevolutionaries, and so on. The Romanians have been especially concerned about insulating their command structure from outside interference. In a January 1983 article published in Romania, Col. Gen. Vasile Milea, Romanian First Deputy Minister of National Defense, stressed “the inalienable right of the Romanian Communist Party to leadership of the national defense.” He quoted Ceausescu: “The sole leader of our armed forces is the Party, the government, the supreme national command. Only these can give orders to our army, and these orders can only be carried out within the Socialist Republic of Romania.”

A Timetable
Marshal Kulikov’s next move occurred in December 1978 when he sent a letter to the national defense ministers citing the authority of the PCC decision and formally directing them to prepare a wartime statute. His letter referred to the June 1978 meeting of the national Chiefs of General Staff and their general agreement about the statute’s outline and contents. In reality the session had been no more than a general briefing by General Gribkov, who had acquainted the Chiefs with the CAF Staff’s solutions. Kulikov outlined the statute’s general provisions, the role of the High Commands, Combined Fleets, rear services, and so on. In conclusion, he proposed an accelerated work schedule to allow approval of the draft by the 12th meeting of the CDM scheduled for December 1979 in Warsaw.

Concurrent with the work on the statute, staff work proceeded on a new directive on readiness, which at least one Pact member found difficult to accept. In a memorandum prepared for a meeting between the
Polish Chief of Staff, General of Armes Florian Siwicki (figure 11), and Gribkov, the Poles pointed out that they had sent the Combined Command their suggestions, but they had not been informed whether any had been taken into consideration. They further noted that, because the readiness directive dealt essentially with mobilization of the armed forces, they were facing a difficult problem. Under the Polish Constitution and various laws and resolutions, mobilization is explicitly the jurisdiction of Polish national bodies. The draft directive violated those laws and, if enacted, would require their change. The memorandum asked General Siwicki to inquire about the nature of related Soviet laws. The issue was never resolved to the Poles' satisfaction, and the following month the readiness directive was signed and distributed by Marshal Kulikov.

Reactions to the Draft Statute

The general reaction to the draft Wartime Statute among the non-Soviet General Staffs was negative but resigned because members generally believed that, specifics excluded, the document's main premise could not be avoided. Nevertheless, the Romanians produced a full, line-by-line revision that reflected most of the changes desired by the other staffs.

These changes provide a useful outline of East European concerns. Wherever the wording of the original draft was "Supreme High Command," the Romanians suggested substitution of "Combined Supreme High Command." They then defined that body as the Political Consultative Committee, acting through a Combined Staff. The Romanians noted that the wartime structure should assign the highest political-strategic direction of war to an explicitly defined, coalitional body, representing the interests of all member states. The subordinate Theater High Commands would still exist, but a greater role would be played by Deputy Commanders in Chief for national matters. The "Allied Fleets" would not be operationally removed from national control, but would coordinate their activities through an Allied Fleet Commander who would be appointed on a rotational basis. Political work under the statute would remain a national responsibility. Although accepting centralized control of Pactwide operations, the Romanians envisaged such control, nevertheless, as coalitional and as a direct extension of the peacetime mechanisms.

No other staff, although some privately held similar views, was apparently willing to go as far as the Romanians had in opposition. For example, in a memorandum prepared for Minister of Defense Jaruzelski, the Polish General Staff outlined Polish objections to the Wartime Statute. In coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other government agencies, the staff pointed out that vagueness about the activation of the Supreme High Command would lead to contention unless further defined. Statute provisions empowering the Supreme High Command to convert the forces to wartime status and authorizing the theater staffs to supervise the process were identified as contravening provisions of the Polish Constitution. The memorandum reportedly also highlighted the apparent subordination of the national military leadership to the Theater High Commands. Jaruzelski sympathized with the staff's concerns and sought to intervene on those issues.

Kulikov's Role

During fall 1979, numerous meetings concerning the statute took place with Marshal Kulikov. According to highly reliable sources, Kulikov's involvement was most effective in these bilateral negotiations. The Soviets conceded some points, but in general their
position remained firm. Kulikov argued that the structure provided by the statute was the only efficient way to control operations in Europe and to ensure the rapid transition of forces to a wartime status. Little by little, the East Europeans, except the Romanians, dropped their objections in the face of Soviet determination, which included angry fist pounding by Marshal Kulikov. In one case, Jaruzelski sent a delegation of Polish officers to Moscow. After determining that they were there to urge acceptance of the Polish position and not to concede, Kulikov called Warsaw in the officers’ presence and berated Jaruzelski for intransigence, whereupon Jaruzelski revised the Polish position over the phone.

Another striking example of Soviet negotiating tactics concerns the issue of national representatives at the Supreme High Command. The earliest versions of the draft statute included a reference to such representatives. The East Europeans sought to define the position and to empower each incumbent to participate in decisionmaking and hold a rank equivalent to a minister. The Soviets responded that the position had a liaison function only. When the other staffs persisted, the Soviets simply deleted the reference in subsequent drafts. Attempts to reintroduce the representative in the draft, even as a liaison officer, were cast aside with the argument that because it had only confused the members the position was not necessary.

Approval
Throughout spring and fall 1979, Marshal Kulikov made a series of visits to all the Ministers of Defense to obtain their comments. None of the ministers consulted with each other directly but only through Kulikov. During a visit to Poland, for example, the issue of the representatives to the Supreme High Command was raised. Kulikov informed Jaruzelski that the others agreed that the issue should be dropped, whereupon Jaruzelski also agreed. In reality, as the Polish General Staff later learned through its own connections, the other staffs were at least as concerned about the issue as they were.

Marshall Kulikov paid much attention to General Jaruzelski because Warsaw was to be the site of the CDM meeting and Jaruzelski was to chair the session. Kulikov wanted to prepare Jaruzelski by acquainting him with the various views that might be expressed.

According to knowledgeable sources, defense ministers usually prepare talking papers to take to CDM sessions. The Polish General Staff, therefore, prepared note cards for Jaruzelski’s use during the session. Several days before the meeting, however, General Titov and several other Soviet officers from the CAF Secretariat flew to Warsaw. On their arrival, they reviewed those cards, discarded them, and spent two days preparing new ones. These were extremely specific, included opening and closing remarks, and suggested alternative responses based on what might be said by the other ministers during the course of the meeting. On their arrival, the other defense ministers had prepared cards that also had been screened by the Soviet Secretariat. The session was, therefore, effectively orchestrated by the Soviets. Even the East Europeans were surprised at the Soviets’ direct interference, indicating their strong concern.

The meeting went as planned. Jaruzelski even made a speech that outlined the necessity and virtues of the statute. Although none of the standing Polish objections had been met, Jaruzelski told the group that the statute was the result of a full and open exchange of opinions, and he criticized the Romanians for their attempt to undermine its principles. Jaruzelski is also reported to have declared that the statute did not violate sovereignty and that a nation cannot be truly sovereign without security, guaranteed borders, and allied support. The other members “categorically” rejected the Romanian objections and approved the statute. It was to be forwarded, not to the PCC, but to the member states for approval. Once again, the Soviets avoided the possibility of a veto by the Romanians.

By April 1980, the statute was ratified by all member states but Romania. Marshal of the Soviet Union, Supreme Commander in Chief of the Soviet Armed Forces,
Forces Leonid II’ich Brezhnev was named as Supreme Commander in Chief of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states.

Implications

The Centralization of Command

Soviet interest in the specific authorities provided by the Wartime Statute was probably motivated by evolving Soviet concepts for the conduct of war in Europe. Since his assumption of the CAF command in 1977, Marshal Kulikov has seemed intent on making its peacetime organization more closely resemble its wartime organization. He has focused his attention on the command of his forces and has emphasized repeatedly that centralization command is the only effective answer to the problem of coalition war in Europe. Although the Soviets had expressed this general view for some time, it was Kulikov who has overseen its implementation.

The Wartime Statute should be considered in the context of changes that were occurring in the organization of Soviet forces in the European theater. These changes involved the nature and extent of command in the theater and were consistent with the authorities being drafted into the statute.

From the start, Marshal Kulikov began implementing peacetime changes that anticipated the command relationships of the Wartime Statute. At the 1977 CDM meeting, Kulikov not only received approval to go ahead with the statute but also had approved his plan to add two new Deputy Commanders in Chief (Air Force and Navy), who would have wartime control responsibilities, to the Combined Command.

Under the command structure imposed by the statute, the Black Sea and Baltic Sea Fleets, both now Combined Fleets, were removed from the operational control of Soviet naval headquarters and directly subordinated to the Soviet officer commanding the Theater High Command. Soviet officers from the CAF Staff were reported to have told the East Europeans that this was the result of a major defeat for the Soviet Navy Commander in Chief, Fleet Adm. Sergey G. Gorshkov (figure 12). Admiral Gorshkov had argued that naval forces operating along coastal areas should be controlled by autonomous naval commands operating in coordination with adjacent ground forces. He apparently resisted the reorganization but was overruled by the General Staff.

At the same time, changes were being implemented in the subordination of the Soviet Air Forces to unify command and control of Air Force elements with a role in the theater. They were made more responsive to the Theater High Commands and their subordinate ground units. Frontal air defense was similarly integrated by the creation of joint air and air defense command posts to replace separate command posts for those forces.
Adding the two Deputy Commanders in Chief to the Combined Command allowed Marshal Kulikov to more effectively control air and naval operations in the theater. Air defense was already provided for in the structure, but, given the nature of anticipated High Command control, its formal organization had to be changed somewhat to conform. Since 1969 there had been a Commander of Air Defense Forces of the Warsaw Pact, who was simultaneously a Deputy Commander in Chief of the CAF and Commander of Soviet National Air Defense Forces (PVO). Under the statute, however, activation of the High Command would, in theory, subordinate a Soviet commander of a national-level organization to the theater commander. This inconsistency was resolved in 1977 when Marshal Kulikov recommended that the Air Defense Department be made an independent department on the CAF Staff serving as a link between the staff and the Air Defense Commander. The Wartime Statute stipulated that the Air Defense Commander would assume responsibility for coordinating the air defense efforts of the two High Commands, which would each be controlled by a Deputy Commander in Chief for Air Defense. That, in effect, removed Soviet Marshal Koldunov, Commander of Soviet Air Defense Forces, from theoretical subordination to the theater commanders.

These changes were consistent with requirements generated by the creation of Theater High Commands where none existed previously. Where the CAF Combined Command already contained a certain function—for example, air defense—a slight change in defined responsibilities was probably considered sufficient. Where a function was essentially absent—such as separate deputies to control air force and navy operations—that function was added and Soviet officers named to the posts. All this occurred at the same time that work was to begin on the Wartime Statute, which would bring the East European forces, as represented by the CAF, into conformity with the Soviet General Staff's reorganization of Soviet forces.

Both the CAF and Soviet national forces underwent change and reorganization in the late 1970s, beginning with Marshal Kulikov's move from the Soviet General Staff to CAF Commander. It is unlikely that these changes were coincidental; they more probably reflect a fundamental decision by the Soviet General Staff about how to conduct a war in Europe. We believe that the Soviets' drive to centralize command and control in the European TMOs was the main cause of the Wartime Statute of the Warsaw Pact. East European sensitivities were a secondary consideration.

Transition to War

Pact command and control procedures influence how the Soviets and their East European allies might act during a period of crisis. In May 1979, a staff exercise involving the Commander in Chief/CAF and all Pact General Staffs and Fleets, except Romania's, tested the Supreme High Command and the High Commands as formulated by the November 1978 PCC decision. We believe this to be a significant event that helps to illustrate Soviet intentions for the statute and the nature of East European concerns. Although the Commander in Chief/CAF and his staff played both the Supreme High Command and the two High Commands, the exercise was run by the Soviet General Staff. Its avowed purpose was twofold: to gather information that could be of use in the subsequent development of the Wartime Statute and to test aspects of the recently promulgated readiness directive.

Remarkably, the East Europeans were never told when the Supreme High Command was activated. The East Europeans had believed that the exercise would explicitly show them how they would participate in the decision to move from peace to war. It did not. The Poles agonized for weeks about how to word a memorandum to their own leaders describing the exercise. They did not feel that they could simply admit that their own political leadership had been excluded, so they drafted a memorandum presenting an assumed role for the PCC. The Poles presumed that, because of a deteriorating situation, the PCC authorized the activation of the Supreme High Command. According to the reported exercise scenario,
however, such authorization would have had to occur about 30 days before the outbreak of hostilities. No longer speculating, the Poles reportedly went on to report that the scenario specified that 26 days before the outbreak of hostilities the headquarters of the Theater High Commands were expanded to wartime strength by order of the Supreme High Command. Finally, 13 days before the outbreak, the Supreme High Command introduced the "Military Threat" readiness state, whereupon it assumed direct command of the national forces assigned to the CAF. In previous exercises, command had shifted to the CAF when "Full" readiness was declared. In at least one exercise after May 1979, the Supreme High Command assumed full control at "Increased" readiness only one level above normal, peacetime status. The Polish General Staff reportedly sought clarification of the activation process, but the Soviets were steadfast in their refusal to answer.

We believe the activation of the Supreme High Command so long before the initiation of hostilities has important implications for Soviet control and East European responsiveness during a crisis. The East Europeans seem to have little influence on Soviet military concepts—for controlling and conducting a conflict—which are imposed on them. In drafting the Wartime Statute, the Soviets successfully resisted East European attempts both to specify a role for the PCC and to identify a formally established, coalition, political body for wartime. We must conclude that sole authority in war does indeed rest with the Soviet Supreme High Command.

We believe the Wartime Statute would affect the role of East European leaders in a crisis leading to war. Each nation’s past reaction to the statute’s provisions makes it clear that each has concepts of sovereignty and national interest that go beyond “proletarian internationalism.” On matters concerning defense, however, those concepts are liable to be overridden by Soviet pressures. We assume that the Soviets to some degree accept the counsel of their allies. In any crisis that advice would be channeled through either the PCC or, more likely, made bilaterally. At some point during a worsening crisis, however, the Soviets would probably request the activation of the Supreme High Command, which would provide both the United States and the Soviets’ allies a clear indication of their serious intentions.

The statute does not specifically address how the political decision to go to war would be made. How or whether the Soviets would allow the East Europeans to participate in a decision to initiate hostilities subsequent to the establishment of the Supreme High Command is unclear.

Some analysts hold that by deciding to activate the Supreme High Command the Soviet leadership has determined that the crisis may lead to war. In such circumstances, these analysts believe that the decision to initiate hostilities would be made. How or whether the Soviets would allow the East Europeans to participate in a decision to initiate hostilities subsequent to the establishment of the Supreme High Command is unclear.

Other analysts believe that, in view of the role played by East European forces in wartime, the Soviet Union would somehow have to involve the East European political leaders in what would be a final political decision to launch a NATO-Warsaw Pact war without further consultation with East European political leaders.

Still other analysts believe that, even if the Warsaw Pact wartime command structure were already activated, many East European political leaders would be in a progressively better position to influence the course of a war and would be in a better position to influence the course of a war and would be in a better position to influence the course of a war.

We believe the Wartime Statute would affect the role of East European leaders in a crisis leading to war. Each nation’s past reaction to the statute’s provisions makes it clear that each has concepts of sovereignty and national interest that go beyond “proletarian internationalism.” On matters concerning defense, however, those concepts are liable to be overridden by Soviet pressures. We assume that the Soviets to some degree accept the counsel of their allies. In any crisis that advice would be channeled through either the PCC or, more likely, made bilaterally. At some point during a worsening crisis, however, the Soviets would probably request the activation of the Supreme High Command, which would provide both the United States and the Soviets’ allies a clear indication of their serious intentions.
Given the Soviets' refusal to define a role for the national leaderships, their perpetuation of ambiguous wording in discussions on the statute, and the scenarios of the exercises, many officers on the East European staffs reportedly concluded that the final decision in which their leaders might be allowed to participate collectively was the decision to activate the Supreme High Command. That action, according to the statute, was clearly to occur well in advance of hostilities.

Independent of any particular scenario, therefore, and regardless of any residual political influence they might have as individuals, the East European leaders, under the provisions of the Wartime Statute, would be losing not only operational control of their forces in advance of actual conflict, they could also be losing a significant voice in making a final judgment over their nations to war.

Peacetime Controls

The Wartime Statute has allowed the Soviets to increase their already high degree of control over the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact during peacetime. Almost immediately after the statute's ratification, the Soviets asserted a need to be involved in or informed of what had been strictly national defense matters. We expect a trend of increasing control to continue, while the East Europeans resist Soviet inroads with varying degrees of success.

Soviet control of the process used to create the statute underlined to the East Europeans their subordinate status. This reminder, however, is limited to a small circle. Details or even the existence of the Wartime Statute are not general knowledge in Eastern Europe. The implications of its wartime authorities are lost, therefore, on all but the handful of military and civilian officials charged with implementing them.

The statute's provisions seem to be based on the Soviets' belief that East European forces would indeed move when and as directed by the Supreme High Command. Its authorities could be used by the Soviets in the event of an internal East European crisis. Using the CAF's alerting system, the Soviet General Staff would be in a better position to manage a multinational armed force engaged in an intervention, such as in Czechoslovakia. Even elements of the armed forces of the recalcitrant member state could receive orders from the CAF headquarters that might weaken or neutralize potential resistance. Inasmuch as the statute neither strips national commanders of their control over their own combat forces nor replaces them with Soviets, it appears designed to work through these commanders as smoothly as possible.

The statute seems to be mainly a device for controlling wartime operations and not for furthering the Soviets' influence in peacetime. Their influence in peacetime is already so great that they could establish the Wartime Statute despite the East Europeans' serious objections. Whether through actual agreement or mere acquiescence, the East Europeans accepted the need for a single supreme command and, except for the Romanians, for a single supreme commander. They also certainly recognized that the supreme commander would be a Soviet. The East Europeans' major concerns focused on how they would participate in directing their own forces in the event of war and on their role in making a decision to activate the statute's authorities. The evidence indicates that the East Europeans were more concerned with the specific wartime authorities of the statute than with its implications for the Soviets' enhanced legalized peacetime involvement.

The peacetime Warsaw Pact continues to function according to the 1969 Peacetime Statute, with all its command, staff, and deliberative bodies in place. Had the Soviets intended primarily to increase their peacetime control, we believe that they would have strengthened the 1969 statute. In fact, they modified that statute and brought it into conformity with the anticipated wartime structure by creating Naval and Air Force Deputy Commanders in Chief. Furthermore, the full authority of the Wartime Statute can be wielded only by the Supreme High Command and the two Theater High Commands, when they are activated. Finally, the Soviets have not shown an inclination to activate the High Commands in peacetime.