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SUMMARY

In January 1980, the Warsaw Pact member states ratified a series of statutes and protocols which established the Unified Wartime Command System for the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact. The draft protocol establishing the table of organization of the wartime command organs was presented to the member states in October 1981. It was planned that this protocol be ratified and the assignment of officers and NCOs to the command organs be completed by January 1982. The process leading to the development of the wartime command system began in 1977 and spanned almost five years. This process was typical of the methods used by the Soviets to obtain non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) member state acceptance of conditions inimical to NSWP interests. The NSWP members were gradually accustomed to the general concepts of the wartime command system through military exercises and day to day contact well in advance of any suggestion.
that the development of a formal system was in the offing. The Soviets obtained NSWP agreement to general concepts and vague resolutions, and then followed this up with specific draft protocols which went much further than the NSWP members ever anticipated. The overall issue was never addressed in one single comprehensive format. Rather, the Soviets put the system together piecemeal, often using unexpected means and methods of accomplishing their aims. This approach may be described as "taking hold of a finger and then swallowing the entire arm."

TEXT: 1. Beginning with the exercise ZAPAD-77 (held in the spring of 1977), the Soviets changed the troop control system throughout the Western Theater of Military Operations (TMO). For the first time in the history of the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet General Staff ran a Pact exercise without the facade of the Combined Headquarters (HQ) of the Combined Armed Forces (CAF). Marshal of the Soviet Union V.G. ((Kulikov)) played the role of Commander in Chief of the High Command of the Strategic Grouping of Forces in the Western TMO with elements of the CAF HQ and Staff playing as the Staff of the High Command in the Western TMO. This command was directly subordinate to the General Staff of the Soviet Forces, which acted as the control organ of the Supreme High Command (SHC) of the Combined Armed Forces. Although the East European General Staff officers understood that the Soviet General Staff was the primary control organ of the Soviet SHC, these two entities had never played the supreme command role in Warsaw Pact exercises before. Rather, in the past the CAF HQ had always acted as exercise control organ, and its subordination was not addressed as part of the exercises. This new change was a surprise to the NSWP General Staffs.

2. The new feature of the troop control system in the Western TMO which most dismayed the NSWP military leaders and officers who participated in ZAPAD-77 was the complete minimization of the roles of the NSWP political and military leadership organs throughout the exercise play, both in the scenario and in reality. Throughout the exercise, the NSWP party first secretaries, national ministers of defense, and national general staffs were treated as subordinates of the Commander-in-Chief (Cinc) of the High Command in the Western TMO. During the exercise, General ((Shcheglov)), the Representative of the CAF HQ to the Polish Armed Forces, played the role of umpire to the Polish General Staff. He supervised all phases of their work, and was present whenever 5 4 3 2 1
the Polish General Staff presented its problem solutions to General Wojciech (Jaruzelski), the Polish Minister of National Defense. Kulikov treated both Jaruzelski and General Florian (Siwicki) (Chief of the Polish General Staff) as if they were students. During the exercise, a briefing was scheduled at the Polish city of Bydgoszcz which Party First Secretary Edward (Gierek) was to attend. The military phase of the briefing was held before Gierek's arrival. As the time approached for Gierek's plane to arrive at the airport, Kulikov unnecessarily continued the discussion of exercise details. When Jaruzelski and Siwicki, on separate occasions attempted to close the discussions so that the party could go to the airport to meet Gierek, Kulikov summarily brushed them aside and continued to ask relatively unimportant questions. When Jaruzelski told Kulikov that they would have to stop in order to get to the airport to meet Gierek, Kulikov waved Jaruzelski away with his hand and said within the hearing of all the assembled Polish General Staff officers to "let Gierek wait." The briefing continued another 40 minutes while Gierek waited at the airport for the military party to arrive.

3. ZAPAD-77 was the pattern for a new type of command/staff exercise for the Combined Armed Forces' annual training cycle. In the late winter/early spring of 1978, 1979 and 1980 similar special command/staff drills were held for the CAF. These exercises did not replace the ZAPAD-type exercise, but were in addition to them. These command/staff exercises lacked the dynamics of the ZAPAD-type exercises (e.g., no troop deployments), but the scenarios were the same. Their purpose was to train the NSWP General Staffs and command organs in the new troop control, readiness and alerting procedures, and to accustom them to the new command organization introduced in ZAPAD-77. These exercises (after 1977) had no cryptonym designations, and the documentation associated with them was held in the strictest security. The Soviets established a system of controlled destruction for all documentation, although the Poles secretly kept notes and copies of many of the documents. The players in these exercises were the NSWP General Staffs and other appropriate staffs, national-level communications units and command post elements. The Soviet General Staff directed all of these exercises through the Cinc of the High Command in the Western TMO.

Comment: Source did not know for sure if similar exercises...
were carried out in the Southwestern TMO but he surmised that they were, since Hungarian and Bulgarian General Staff officers appeared knowledgeable of the new procedure and structures.) The background material for these exercises (and for all ZAPAD-type exercises) was prepared by the Main Operations Directorate of the Soviet General Staff, which transmitted all documentation directly to the operations directorates of national general staffs. The national ministers of defense played the roles of deputy exercise directors for national matters in each of these exercises, a position subordinate to MSU Kulikov, and indicating the positions intended by the Soviets for them in the organization of the High Command of the TMOs.

4. Although unknown to the NSWP leaders in 1977, in retrospect it is clear that these exercises were intended to indoctrinate the national command organs in the new lines of authority between the national general staffs and the high commands of the TMOs when the Unified Wartime Command System was implemented. During these exercises, the Soviet General Staff began to send alerts directly to the national general staffs raising the readiness levels of the NSWP armed forces. When the TMO High Command was established in the exercise play, it sent orders directly to the national FRONT and army commands, with only information copies sent to the national general staffs. Also, operational directives affecting the national home fronts were sent directly from the TMO High Command to the national general staffs. Furthermore, national civil defense troops and national territorial forces were deployed and maneuvered according to plans of the TMO high command beginning with ZAPAD-77. (Source Comment: In the special command/staff exercises only the command organs of these forces were involved, as no troops were actually deployed.)

5. In 1979 the Polish General Staff and the other NSWP military leaders were shocked at the following statement in the background documentation for the Special Command/Staff Drill for 1979: "The assumption of command by the High Command in the Western Theater of Military Operations will take place before full combat readiness is reached, and directives for attaining the highest levels of readiness will
come from Moscow."

Comment: The above statement is said by Source to be the exact sentence as remembered by him from a reading of the appropriate document. This meant, according to Source, that the Soviet Supreme High Command was taking control of the NSWP armed forces without even a declaration of war having been issued.) This situation has become common practice in large scale Warsaw Pact exercises since that time. Although there was no legal basis for the procedures practiced in these special drills in 1978 and especially 1979, the Polish and other NSWP military leaders simply accepted the exercise procedures rather than make a "fuss" over legalisms. (Source Comment: In retrospect it is clear that this is exactly what the Soviets intended, as the exercises set a precedent for the Soviets to insist on the least desirable provisions of the Unified Wartime Command System when it was finally unfolded.)

6. In November 1978, the Political Consultative Committee (PCC) of the Warsaw Pact took a resolution asserting the need for a unified command and control system for the CAF in wartime, including the modernizing of CAF alerting and readiness procedures. There was general acceptance among the PCC members (except for the Romanians) on the need for these developments, and the resolution was sufficiently vague as to leave the impression that the details could be worked out jointly over time. Both Gierek and Jaruzelski signed the resolution for Poland. Only the Romanians refused to endorse the resolution.

7. The general rule for meetings of the PCC and the Committee of Defense Ministers (CDM) was for an agenda to be provided 30 days in advance of the meeting, along with copies of all speeches, resolutions and draft press releases. The agenda for the November 1978 PCC meeting included an item on wartime command, but no speeches or resolutions were included. Also, no mention of this issue in a legal context had occurred in relation to the prior exercises. Gierek's speech at the PCC meeting did not contain reference to the issue because no one thought it important enough to address. The issues of concern to the Poles and others were budgetary matters and the question of standardization of weapons and equipment in the CAF. The resolution was a surprise to all but the Soviets. In addition, the Soviets addressed the matter in a speech (a copy of which had not been sent...
beforehand), and proposed that the Soviet General Staff be named the control organ for any CAF wartime command system. It was thought that this issue was left unresolved at the PCC meeting.

8. The NSWP members assumed that the process of developing a unified wartime command system would be a joint and leisurely one. Thus, the documentation and scenario details of the 1979 Special Command/Staff Drill jolted them. The exercise documentation was entitled "Principles for the Training of the General Staffs of the Allied Armies." Because of this, at least in part, the Polish General Staff began drafting proposals concerning the presumed future work on the wartime command system. In late May or early June 1979 (exact date unrecalled) the Soviets surprised everyone by presenting the NSWP members with a draft of the Wartime Command Statute. This was the first time the NSWP members had an idea of exactly how far along the Soviets were in the development process.

9. Upon receipt of the draft Statute, the Polish General Staff officers who were cognizant of the document gathered to discuss the matter. Some officers took the position that the Poles should support the draft in order to facilitate Soviet good will, and not dwell on those aspects which were undesirable from a Polish perspective. Others argued that the document was a disaster from the perspective of Polish national sovereignty. A report was prepared for Jaruzelski, in which a quote from a speech by V.I. Lenin in 1914 was incorporated. The quote was "Poland should be free, but not tied to Russia by a military alliance -- the stronger party will always dominate." Jaruzelski was angered by this inclusion and the negative tone of the report. Jaruzelski ordered that nothing in writing should go beyond his desk dealing with the Statute unless he personally read and approved it, as "nothing stains like ink." Furthermore, he instructed that the entire issue of the Statute should be held as the highest state secret. Henceforth, only a limited number of officers at the highest levels of the General Staff were given full access to the Statute. The political leaders and other military leaders (including the Vice-Ministers of National Defense) were given very general briefings on those aspects of the Statute which were important for them to be aware of. This has remained the manner in which
the Statute has been handled since that time.

10. There were three meetings between Kulikov and Jaruzelski to resolve Polish objections to details of the draft Statue. The first was held early in July 1979 at the Soviet airbase in Chojna, Poland. Only vague generalities were discussed at this meeting, and the Poles succeeded in putting off the Soviets with the complaint that they had not had time to review the draft Statue carefully. A second meeting was held at Helenowo, Poland, in the late Summer 1979 (exact date unrecalled) at which the Poles presented a full list of questions and objections. This meeting lasted 12 hours. The Soviets promised to review the Polish position and scheduled a third meeting between Kulikov and Jaruzelski for October 1979. The Soviets also informed the Poles at the Helenowa meeting that they were preparing proposals on the establishment of a Supreme High Command (SHC), the naming of a Supreme Commander in Chief, and the designation of a control organ for the SHC. It was explained to the Poles that the Soviets intended to propose that these organs and persons be identical for the CAF and the Soviet Armed Forces.

11. The third Kulikov-Jaruzelski meeting on the Wartime Statute was held at Omulewo, Poland, in October 1979. The meeting opened with Kulikov complaining bitterly about Romanian and Hungarian intransigence. Jaruzelski joined the criticism of the Romanians, and also adopted a positive attitude about the need for the Unified Wartime Command System. After the opening discussion, Jaruzelski invited Kulikov on a hunting trip, to which the latter agreed. At this point General Anatoliy ((Gribkov)) interjected that the work on the Statute must be finished by the next day, as the delegation would be leaving for Moscow. Gribkov insisted that they must return to Moscow with an agreed position on the Statute. Kulikov and Jaruzelski promptly delegated several Soviet and Polish officers to stay behind and finish a coordinated position on the Statute, which the principals would review that night after the hunting trip. (Source Comment: The entire day and much of the night was filled with the most detailed haggling between the Soviet officers and the Polish General Staff officers assigned to the case.)

12. The next day Kulikov announced that he was extending his visit because he was surprised at the number
of Polish objections remaining. He gave the impression that he felt the Soviets had taken the original Polish objections into consideration, and that the Poles had raised new problems. (Source Comment: This was an act -- the issues which Kulikov addressed on the second day of this meeting were the same ones which had always been contentious.) Throughout the day the Soviets compromised on the small points, but remained adamant on the important issues. For example, the original draft of the Statute made no mention of where its provisions applied. The Poles asserted that the Warsaw Pact was created to resist aggression in Europe, and that according to the terms of the draft Wartime Statute, attacks on a Pact member and of any condition anywhere in the world would trigger the Wartime Command System. The Soviets compromised by inserting in the preamble to the Statute a paraphrase from the original agreement which stated that the purpose of the CAF was to defend its members against aggression, and that the most likely location of that aggression would be Europe. This was accepted by the Poles, although it did not answer the original Polish General Staff objection that the Statute was vague as to where, geographically its provisions applied. (Source Comment: It was held among NSWP members that if the Soviets became involved in a conflict in Asia or elsewhere they would still use the Wartime Statute to drag the NSWP members into the conflict.) Another issue of contention was the lack of political representation on the Supreme High Command. The original draft had a reference to such representation, but the draft which the Soviets brought with them in October 1979 did not contain any reference to such representation. The Soviet position was that this was a matter to be settled by mutual agreement of the political authorities. They refused to compromise on this issue. The Poles argued that the national political-military leadership should always retain a veto over the use of national forces, regardless of whatever they had been committed to the CAF. The Soviets refused on the grounds that this would vitiate the Statute. They also took the position that the Statute provided for SHC control over national forces not allocated to the CAF only by mutual agreement. Ultimately all but two issues were resolved at this session. The first was the question of the subordination of the national air defense forces and means, and the second was the subordination of the party-political work and organs in the national forces allocated to the CAF (such as the Polish FRONT).
13. Kulikov instructed Jaruzelski to deliberate on the air defense question and that the political issue would be submitted to General Aleksey ((Yepishev)), Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Armed Forces. In two days the Poles were to send a delegation to Moscow to resolve these two remaining issues. When Jaruzelski raised the question of how he could justify to Gierek and the Polish leadership the subordination of the entire national air defense means to the CAF, Kulikov dismissed this as being of no concern to the Soviets.

14. Three days later, the Polish delegation, headed by General Longin ((Lozowicki)), Commander of Polish National Air Defense Forces, arrived in Moscow. It presented a scheme for a dual subordination of the air defense forces in wartime, with the Poles and the SHC sharing joint command. Throughout this meeting with Kulikov and various Soviet General Staff officers, Kulikov was abusive to the Polish delegation. He shouted and cursed at them, treating them like privates. Finally, in the presence of Lozowicki, Kulikov opened a direct line to Warsaw to speak to Jaruzelski. Kulikov then shouted and cursed at Jaruzelski, asserting that the Poles had sent incompetents to deal with these issues. He demanded a resolution of both the air defense and the political issue at once. After some brief discussion, Jaruzelski accepted the Soviet position on both issues and ordered the Polish delegation to return home at once.

15. The Soviets also initiated another step in their efforts to structure the statute in October 1979. They presented the NSWP members with a directive from the Commander in Chief of the CAF implementing new readiness and alerting procedures. This new system was called "MONUMENT System." Basically it provided for a Warsaw Pact alerting system controlled from Moscow, and a set of readiness procedures which would be uniform for the entire Pact armed forces. It included a new readiness level, "Threat of War Readiness." This level would precede "Full Combat Readiness," and encompass some of the steps formerly undertaken at the level of Full Combat Readiness. While the NSWP members had agreed at the 1978 PCC meeting that a unified readiness system and modernized alerting system were needed, they assumed that these would be jointly worked out. They were shocked to find that the Soviets had developed
the entire system, including the technical communications means, without any consultation whatever.

16. Under the new system the Soviet General Staff can initiate an increase in the combat readiness of the CAF by radio signal from Moscow to the national General Staffs. The new procedures require that the national General Staffs retransmit this signal to their forces within two minutes after receiving it from Moscow. As the signal is received and authenticated at each command level throughout the national armed forces, the appropriate steps are undertaken immediately at these levels. The alert messages can raise the levels of readiness on a step by step basis, from "Constant Combat Readiness" to "Full Combat Readiness." In addition, the alert message can leap over levels, so that a message could raise the readiness level from "Constant Combat Readiness" to "Full Combat Readiness", thereby collapsing the intermediate stages into the highest stage of readiness. Furthermore, an additional signal can be sent to "Implement War Plans," which automatically brings the armed forces to Full Combat Readiness and begins national mobilization. In each case, there is no provision for prior notification of or approval from the national military or political leaders before this signal is retransmitted by the national General Staffs.

Comment: Source was asked if he understood this to mean that the Soviet General Staff could initiate a signal which would begin the implementation of Polish war plans throughout the Polish Armed Forces without prior consultation between the Soviet and Polish political leaders, and that the Polish General Staff duty office would retransmit this signal to all the Polish Armed Forces without first clearing it with the Polish military or political leadership. Source stated that not only did he understand this to be the case, but that it was in fact the case. This is the MONUMENT System, and it is regularly drilled throughout the CAF. He said that these procedures are rigidly adhered to in the Polish Armed Forces, and that this is the technical means of triggering the Unified Wartime Command System for the CAF. He repeated this assertion on several different days with absolute consistency. He pointed out repeatedly that these were the procedures practiced in the Polish Armed Forces since 1979 and that the entire Polish alerting and readiness system had been reorganized in accordance with these procedures. In addition, he repeatedly pointed out that these procedures
were consistent with the Wartime Command Statute, since the latter made no provision for any decisionmaking role for the national military or political leaders in the process triggering the UWCS. Source readily acknowledged that this system was a clear violation of the national sovereignty of the NSWP members. He was adamant on the issue as to whether the Poles had instituted some sort of secret procedures to intercept this signal process. He stated categorically that no such intercept measures existed, and that if someone attempted to do this they would eventually be found out by the Soviets in any case. He said such an action would lead to charges of disloyalty and treason by the Soviets. When pressed on what this would mean, he merely said that people are shot in East Europe for treason, and everyone knows this.

17. These new alerting and readiness procedures were intimately related to the provisions of the Wartime Command Statute, and this was pointed out to Polish military leaders by officers in the Polish General Staff, but to no avail. The Soviets were adamant on the procedures, and the Polish leadership accepted and implemented them.

18. The Wartime Command Statute and related protocols were introduced in final form at the December 1979 meeting of the Committee of Defense Ministers, which was held in Warsaw and chaired by Jaruzelski. Kulikov stated in his speech that they were intended to provide for the centralized command of the military, political, economic and scientific resources of the Warsaw Pact member states to resist aggression. He presented the proposals as fully coordinated by the member states. Jaruzelski devoted his speech to accepting the Statute and its associated protocols in detail, and to criticizing the Romanians for not accepting the documents. After the speech, Marshal Dmitriy ((Ustinov)) (the Soviet Defense Minister) embraced Jaruzelski and congratulated him on a job well done. At this point, the Poles expected that the Statute and protocols would be submitted to the next PCC meeting for formal ratification.

19. In January 1980 (exact date unrecalled) Marshal Kulikov arrived in Warsaw with only 30 minutes notice. He brought with him copies of all the documents which had been approved at the December 1979 CDM meeting. His instructions were that they were to be signed by the party first secretary
and the premier, and that this would constitute formal Pact ratification of these documents. In a brief ceremony, during which Jaruzelski recommended to Gierek that these agreements were in the best interests of Poland, Gierek and the premier signed. Kulikov also instructed the Poles that the documents should not be dated. Rather, all copies would be dated as of the signing by the Soviet leadership, and this would constitute the formal date of implementation. (Source Comment: The Polish government changed premiers between the signing in Warsaw and the signing in Moscow. Thus, there is some question as to the actual legality of the documents, though this has been dismissed by the Polish leadership.)

20. In addition to the Wartime Command Statute, the protocols which were ratified by the Warsaw Pact member states in January 1980 included the following:

- A protocol naming L. I. Brezhnev as Supreme Commander in Chief, and designating the Soviet General Staff as the control organ of the SCH;

- A protocol authorizing the High Commands of the CAF in the theaters of military operations to use national defense industrial means to refit and re-equip units of the CAF during wartime, regardless of the nationality of the units or the legal subordination of the industrial means, or their original intended missions;

- A protocol giving the Soviet General Staff the right to review and veto proposed military assistance sales agreements between NSWP member states and countries not affiliated with the Warsaw Pact by treaty.

21. The terms of the Statute required that commanders and staffs be designated for the various wartime command organs as soon as possible, but this dragged out until the fall of 1981. In October 1980, the Soviets presented another protocol which established the table of organization of the High Commands of the TMOs and allocated the appropriate slots among the NSWP members. This protocol required that a 4-star general be named to the position of Deputy Commander in Chief of the High Command.
in the TMO for National Matters (one for each member in the TMO). The Poles raised this issue at the October 1981 Military Council meeting and suggested that the commander of the national FRONTS (General Eugeniusz (Molczyk)) in the Polish case be appointed concurrently to these positions. General Gribkov stated absolutely no. He said the position required a 4-star officer, it must be uniform for all the member states, and it must be someone superior to the national FRONT commanders, since the duties of this position required liaison with the national FRONT commanders among others. When asked if the Soviets envisaged the appointment of specific officials to these slots, Gribkov responded that it would be inappropriate to discuss personalities until the protocol had been formally approved. Gribkov did indicate that of course the Soviet Deputy CinC slots would be filled with an officer subordinate in status to Marshal Kulikov and himself. (Source Comment: The NSWP members had concluded that the Soviets intended to have the National Ministers of Defense (NMOD) fill these positions. The NMODs played these roles in command/staff exercises since 1977.)

22. The question of who would be appointed to the posts of CinCs of the High Commands in the TMOs also arose at this time. The Soviets flatly refused to address this issue until the protocol was approved. Nonetheless, it was widely rumored among the Soviets that Kulikov was to be appointed as CinC of the High Command in the Western TMO and Gribkov would get that position in the Southwestern TMO. This belief was shared by the NSWP General Staffs. These two often have played these respective positions in Warsaw Pact exercises since 1977. (Source Comment: Source drew attention to Gribkov's comment about the ranks of the Soviets who would be appointed as Deputy CinCs. Since the protocol stated that these positions also must be filled by 1982, Source was positive that the appointments were made by January 1982, probably as part of the approval of this protocol.)

23. The NSWP members were quite unhappy with the terms of this latest protocol. They feared that it would mean the appointment of the ministers of national defense to command positions subordinate to the CinCs of the High Commands in the TMOs. They also saw the prospective appointments of Kulikov and Gribkov as increasing the
authority these men exercised in the NSWP members' defense affairs in peacetime. (Source Comment: Since 1979 Kulikov had been issuing instructions and orders in the name of the Supreme Commander in Chief, rather than in the name of the CAF Command.) Finally, the NSWP members were extremely dissatisfied with the allocation of slots in the High Commands to the NSWP armed forces. For example, while the Polish contribution to the resources of the High Command in the Western TMO was about 22%, the Poles only received an allocation of less than 4% of the slots in the High Command. As a consequence of these concerns, the Polish General Staff officers charged with reviewing this protocol urged that it be modified. Siwicki and Jaruzelski rejected this advice, however, and had already decided to accept the protocol as presented. He understood that this was the case throughout the Warsaw Pact except in Romania. (Comment: Thus, Source believed positively that the protocol had been formally accepted and ratified by January 1982.)

24. The role of Polish and other NSWP political leaders in the development of the Wartime Command Statute and its associated protocols was minimal and primarily of a formal nature. After the 1978 PCC resolution, the Soviets dealt exclusively through the military on all matters relating to the UWCS. Up to and including the time when Gierek signed the Statute in January 1980, neither he nor any other Polish civilian leader had read a complete draft of any of these documents. They had relied on the Polish General Staff for general briefings. Even the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, who asked to comment on the legality of the document terms, was only given a briefing on the system. No one in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was ever given the opportunity to read the Statute or protocols. Except for General Siwicki, the Polish General Staff Chief, none of the other Vice-Ministers of National Defense in Poland were given complete access to all the material involved. They received only briefings relating to that which they had a necessity to understand because of their duties. This also applied to Gierek's successor, Stanislaw (Kania).

25. Whenever Kulikov and Gribkov would arrive in Warsaw to discuss some aspect of the UWCS between 1979 and 1981, Gierek would meet them at the airport (if the visit was announced officially), hold a brief general discussion with
them, and then leave them with Jaruzelski for substantive discussions. This pattern held even more strongly during Kania’s tenure. Comment: Source noted that he never heard of a political representative of the USSR discussing any aspect of the UWCS with the Polish political leadership, and Source was in a particularly unique position to be aware of such discussions if they had occurred on this particular matter.) It was Jaruzelski’s former policy to keep a tight lid on this issue and to control the flow of information to the political leadership on this and all other defense matters involving the Soviets. One received the distinct impression that the Soviets did not want political involvement in these discussions. Jaruzelski had refrained from presenting the Statute or its associated protocols to the National Defense Committee, because he felt that the National Defense Committee was too unstable in membership by 1980 to be trusted with such sensitive matters. It was Jaruzelski’s intention to wait until the membership of the National Defense Committee had stabilized and then present the documents. (Source
Comment: This situation had not occurred by late November 1981.) However, this state of affairs was not unique to the UWCS. Political leaders were never given detailed information regarding the five-year budget protocols relating to the Warsaw Pact. Rather they were only given summaries, and these did not include references to the more delicate aspects of negotiations with the Soviets. Polish political leaders never knew the details of the numbers proposed at the MBFR talks. They were told by Jaruzelski that the problems surrounding the numbers had to do with technical details and methods of counting, nothing more. By way of summary on this question, it was not a matter of whether the military was scheming against the political leadership. The fact was that the political leadership did not want to be involved in most of these issues. Such issues had nothing to do with the daily activity of running the Polish state, and this was the focus of the political leadership. He said that everyone understood that the party first secretary and premier had the legal right to access all defense information. Rather, they did not want it, and they knew the Soviets did not want them involved. Comment: Source was questioned as to whether this was a pattern unique to Poland. He responded that he did not have the same access to information in the case of the other NSWP members as he
did in Poland, but his experience and contacts had led him to believe that the pattern was the same everywhere. In the case of the UWCS, for example, he said that Kulikov had been the channel to all the NSWP members. Frequently Kulikov would make observations about his talks with Hungarian or East German leaders, and it was clear that he was taking the same approach as he did with the Poles. Source stated also that in this issue, and in such other issues as defense budgets, his contacts with other NSWP General Staff officers led him to conclude that their pattern was similar if not identical to the Polish case. He observed that the military in Eastern Europe holds a very special place. It is the only institution in most of these states which can tie itself to a nationalistic tradition and gain public support. The Communist Parties are held in place by military power and backed up the Soviets. Thus, the political leadership in the NSWP states needs the military in many cases more than the military needs the political leadership. Also, Source stated that the Soviets prefer this situation because it leaves the political leaders without an independent base of power, so long as they (the Soviets) control the NSWP military establishments. He cited Romania as the one case within the Pact where this situation did not exist, and he felt it was clear that the Soviets were not at all satisfied with Romania.)

26. Comment: Throughout his discussion of the background to the Unified Wartime Command System, Source sought to direct attention to the methodology used by the Soviets to obtain their ends. He insisted that this was not an isolated case, but rather a typical example of that methodology. They approached their goal from many directions at once. In each case they never revealed the totality of their goal. Rather they obtained a continuous stream of agreements from the NSWP members on apparently separate issues until these agreements built up into the final construct. They laid political traps when they felt that the NSWP members would be recalcitrant on an issue, and then exploited these traps. They did not hesitate to use Soviet sympathizers and opportunists within the leadership organs of the NSWP members. They would concentrate on gaining agreement in principle to form, and then come back with substantive proposals which effectively reshaped the formal aspects of previous agreements. Often they would imply or even promise joint consultation, and then return with the "whole cloth." When the issue became sticky,
the Soviets did not hesitate to use whatever abuse and force was necessary to achieve their ends, as for example in the case of Polish national air defense assets. Source described the Soviet process as one of "taking hold of a finger, and then swallowing the entire arm." When pressed on the issue of national sovereignty, Source responded that this was not a Soviet concern. He said that the Polish leadership, for example, was more concerned with the appearance of national sovereignty than with the reality of it. In fact, Source recalled the old Stalinist expression, "nationalist in form, socialist in content." He observed that one should exchange the word Soviet for socialist and this expression would aptly describe present relations between the Soviets and the NSWP members.)