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DDI - 06862/84  
ACIS - 789/84  
8 December 1984  
Copy 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM:

[Redacted]

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Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff

SUBJECT:

Briefing Book for NSPG Meeting

[Redacted]

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1. This memorandum transmits your briefing book for the National Security Planning Group (NSPG) meeting, now scheduled for Monday, 10 December, in the White House Situation Room. This book contains products by NIO/USSR, NIO/SP, NIO/EUR and ACIS. [Redacted]

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2. The Table of Contents is listed on the left. New items have asterisks. A set of proposed talking points is at Tab A. [Redacted]

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3. This meeting is the third in a series leading to the session on 7-8 January, 1985 between Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko. The purpose of this meeting is to continue discussion of US strategy for Geneva. Two papers are to be discussed: Follow-up to Geneva (Tab B) and Rationale for SDI (Tab C). There may be discussion of additional topics bearing on preparations for Geneva that have not yet been addressed in the basic policy work. I have included all of the existing policy papers. You saw the earlier ones. A few key intelligence products are here as well. [Redacted]

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4. With your concurrence, my plan is to send you update materials Sunday and meet with you on Monday before the NSPG. [Redacted]

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5. If there is more I can do to assist you, please call. [Redacted]

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NSPG Meeting, 10 December 1984

	<u>New</u>
Tab A - Proposed DCI Talking Points	*
<u>US Policy Papers:</u> (DDI/DDCI only)	
B - Follow-up to Geneva (prepared by State/PM) <i>[to be revised]</i>	*
C - Rationale for SDI (prepared by OSD) <i>[to be revised]</i>	*
D - Strategy for Geneva (prepared by PM, OSD, et al)	
<u>Intelligence Papers:</u>	
E - SOVA paper: Soviet Comments on January Arms Talks	*
F - Key Judgments of SACG paper: Soviet Approaches to Arms Control in the Mid-to-Late 1980s	
G - SOVA Paper: Soviet Strategic Force Planning and the Expiration of SALT II	
H - NIO/USSR Memorandums:	
o The Soviets Grab the Umbrella	
o Soviet Desire for Arms Talks to Influence US Defense Programs	
I - ASAT/SDI Memo of August <i>(and CIA/CS dissent)</i>	
J - US Arms Control Monitoring Capabilities for Strategic Forces at the End of the Decade (Draft)	
K - Overview of US Compliance Work (Revised)	
L - Current Press Articles	
o <u>Soviets Said to Consider Nuclear Test Site Checks, Boston Globe, 6 Dec 84</u>	*

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Proposed DCI Talking Points for the NSPG Meeting, 10 December 1984

US

- The key issues in this meeting are the topic "subject and objectives" for Geneva and SDI. We need to be very careful in framing the "subject and objectives" of the negotiations in such a way that the words don't box us in and the Soviets won't denounce them. At this stage, we must not confuse US internal objectives with the objectives needed to get the negotiations going.
- SDI is the major negotiating lever here, but we can only use it if we talk to the Soviets about it and explain the rationale behind the US interest in renewed negotiations and reductions in offensive arms.

USSR

- The evidence continues to accumulate that the Soviets are trying to put maximum pressure on the US prior to Geneva. (Cite Beecher interview with a "senior Soviet bloc diplomat" (Tab L).
- The Soviets continue to give the appearance of reasonableness: "if only the US would begin negotiations on space defenses and satellite weapon systems..." However, the Soviets probably will not be interested in the kind of deep cuts in land-based missiles and warheads that the Administration has proposed previously; reductions per se are acceptable, but will come with conditions.
- The Soviets are giving the impression of being ready to conclude a major arms control deal with the prospect of a summit, but they are not likely to be prepared, in Geneva, to go very far.
- They needed a fig leaf to get negotiations resumed and they got it. They are expecting "very long, very difficult negotiations", suggesting that an acceptable declaration of intent by the US, addressing subject and objectives, might be adequate to get negotiations moving.

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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

5 December 1984

**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM**

**SUBJECT: Soviet Comments on January Arms Talks**

Soviet commentators have argued that substantive progress depends on the actions and attitudes of the United States:


- In a Literaturnaya Gazeta article on 28 November, Central Committee member Leonid Zamyatin said that the administration's response to "specific" Soviet proposals will provide a "test" of its interest in arms control and improved relations.
- A Pravda article on 2 December asserted that the Soviet Union had taken its step and now was awaiting action by the United States.

By claiming that the ball is in the US court, the Soviets hope to put domestic and international pressure on the administration as it prepares for the Geneva meeting and to lay the groundwork for blaming the United States should the talks fail to produce results.

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Although Soviet commentators have expressed skepticism about whether the United States is prepared to take concrete steps, they generally have reserved judgment about the administration's future course of action. They have asserted that the administration agreed to the talks because of pressure from American public opinion, concern expressed by NATO allies, and budgetary constraints. In public statements and in a series of demarches to US allies, the Soviets have claimed credit for proposing the talks.

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Agenda

Space Weapons. Public and private Soviet statements indicate that discussion of space weapons is a priority in Soviet thinking:

- Chernenko indicated this last week to visiting British Labor Party officials.
- He said Moscow was especially interested in an ASAT test freeze. He claimed that the recent US ASAT test had "freed" the Soviets from their unilateral testing moratorium but expressed hope that this issue could be dealt with in the talks.

Soviet commentaries may signal Moscow's unwillingness to accept space weapon limitations that deal only with ASAT weapons and not with the SDI, foreshadowing tough Soviet bargaining on the issue:

- A Pravda commentary on 3 December stressed the priority of the space weapons issue for the January meeting and called for a total ban on "space strike weapons," including both anti-satellite and anti-missile weapons.
- An article in Sovetskaya Rossiya on 30 November characterized the SDI as an "obstacle" to achieving an arms control agreement with the United States. (C)

START Issues. Some public and private statements by Soviet officials suggest that Moscow may attempt to use perceived US interest in a strategic nuclear arms agreement as bargaining leverage to achieve Soviet negotiating objectives on space weapons:

- Following the visit of the British Labor Party delegation, Chernenko stated on 26 November that the demilitarization of outer space and the reduction of nuclear arms--both strategic and "medium range"--were "interconnected" questions.
- In a meeting on 3 December with a Western ambassador, First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko asserted that there could be no agreement on strategic arms without agreement on other major issues. He indicated that there were "organic links" between strategic, INF, and space weapons.
- A senior Soviet Foreign Ministry official last week told members of the US nuclear non-proliferation delegation in Moscow that an agreement on nuclear weapons would be "senseless" without an agreement on space weapons but indicated that the latter need not be reached first.

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-- A Soviet diplomat [redacted]

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[redacted] that if the United States proceeds with the testing and deployment of space-based weapons such as ABM systems, arms control agreements in any other field would be impossible. [redacted]

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INF Issues. Moscow also probably will take a tough position on INF issues despite not having made the removal of US missiles from Europe a precondition for the January talks:

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- [redacted]

The Soviets almost certainly will place renewed emphasis on disrupting NATO's consensus on additional INF deployments by claiming Soviet eagerness to seek a negotiated solution to the INF question:

- Soviet public and private assertions that Moscow's "counterdeployments" to US INF missiles have restored the balance in Europe could set the stage for a Soviet proposal for a mutual moratorium on further US and Soviet deployments.
- The Soviets might calculate that such a proposal would exacerbate existing political difficulties on the INF basing issue in Belgium and the Netherlands.

Chernenko, in a public statement following the visit by the British Labor Party delegation, said that the issue of Soviet operational tactical missiles in the GDR and Czechoslovakia-- deployed after US INF deployments were begun-- would have to be decided in conjunction with further "actions" of the US side. This remark may indicate that the Soviets will seek to include these missiles in the negotiations, possibly proposing that a reduction in deployed US INF missiles would be matched by a withdrawal of Soviet SS-12s from Eastern Europe. [redacted]

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#### Modalities

Recent private statements by Soviet leaders and officials suggest that Moscow views the January meeting in Geneva as possibly the first of a series of preliminary agenda-setting meetings, with actual negotiations perhaps deferred for a considerable period:

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[redacted] that Chernenko said the Geneva meeting would be "talks about talks." Chernenko reportedly was open-minded about the form of continued dialogue after the Geneva meeting, indicating that additional sessions could be held at the same or different levels.

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-- [redacted] a Soviet diplomat in [redacted] recently predicted that it could take a year for the sides to set the agenda for substantive discussions. [redacted]

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The Soviets might calculate that a delay in the beginning of actual negotiations would further pressure the administration to move toward the Soviet agenda. It also could provide the Soviets time to assess NATO's resolve to continue INF deployments. The Soviets also may believe that they will be in a stronger negotiating position on START issues a year from now, once deployments of new SLCMs and of new SS-X-25 and SS-X-24 ICBMs are under way. [redacted]

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### Summit

On 28 November, following a meeting with Chernenko, American industrialist Armand Hammer claimed publicly that the Soviet leader had indicated an early summit meeting with President Reagan was possible if Washington met certain conditions. According to Hammer, Chernenko said he would agree to such a meeting if the United States accepted the Soviet proposal for a treaty banning the first use of nuclear weapons and if the January meeting were successful:

-- This report is consistent with Chernenko's comment [redacted] that additional US-Soviet discussions could take place at a "higher" level.

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-- When asked about a summit in his 17 November interview with NBC news, Chernenko replied that he did not believe the conditions were yet right for a summit to yield results. He added that if there were confidence that a summit would yield positive results, it would not be difficult to set a date for such a meeting.

-- An article in Sovetskaya Rossiya on November 30 printed an earlier quote from Chernenko in which he recalled the June 1979 US-Soviet summit and claimed that it had been an important step in improving US-Soviet relations. [redacted]

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The Soviets probably are floating the idea of a summit at this time as an inducement to Washington to be accommodating in the January meeting. The Soviets might consider holding a summit to lay out the basic framework for a future strategic arms control agreement. They almost certainly would insist, however, that agreement be reached beforehand on the fundamental elements of a treaty--limits on central strategic systems, INF missiles, and an accounting for French and British and US forward based systems--and argue that it should be an evolutionary agreement based on SALT II. [redacted]

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The Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #06641-84  
26 November 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Chairman, National Intelligence Council  
Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM: Fritz W. Ermarth  
National Intelligence Officer for USSR

SUBJECT: The Soviets Grab the Umbrella

1. The Soviets have decided to engage in the umbrella arms control exchange in a remarkable, but not surprising, tactical switch from the stone-wall policies followed with almost uniform consistency since the end of last year. Their aim is no less than to encourage a substantial redirection of the Administration's policies in its second term. Soviet commentaries -- the most recent and comprehensive current example is attached -- lay out for internal audiences why this is worth a try:

The stress on "new talks", not resumption of the old ones, makes it possible to resume negotiations without explicitly repudiating past positions, such as no talks on INF without reversal of US INF deployments.

The world has learned that the "language of force" and "positions of strength" will not force Soviet concessions. Read: Moscow's hanging tough for the past year paid off after all.

President Reagan is being pulled in the opposite directions of "playing the peacemaker" or "returning to the course of confrontation". He currently leans toward the former role.

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Washington is in the throes of political battle which will determine the future US line, whose outcome cannot be assured, but which, by implication, ought to be influenced by active Soviet political tactics.

Meanwhile, US allies, domestic opinion, and economic conditions have generated pressure that could modify Administration behavior in the next four years.

Firm Soviet pursuit of "its principled line" has contributed to this pressure and created a potentially new situation. Resumption of talks does not represent a Soviet concession, but response to opportunity -- which will be very cautiously explored.

2. There is a certain amount of rationalization in these arguments. They are crafted to reassure skeptics within the Soviet elite, among whom there are surely many, that these talks will not put Moscow on the slippery slope to unnecessary concessions, but offer the chance of coaxing Washington onto it. It is unlikely that these rationalizations will be entirely persuasive. We can expect in coming weeks to see implicit questioning on the part of such skeptics as to who is going to take advantage of whom ("kto kovo", or "who gets whom" as Lenin put it) in these talks and the process that follows.

3. Underlying these arguments is the pragmatic recognition that you can't make money at political poker by staying out of every hand. With the President massively reelected and the Soviet bureaucracy convinced, according to many good reports, that the previous policy had run its course, it is now time to rejoin the game.

4. It is worth note that a Soviet Politburo evidently beset by vigorous internal politicking over succession has been able to make this tactical adjustment quite handily. It is equally significant that the process of adjustment coincided with the reassertion of Chernenko's political status. This coincidence should not be read as proof of Chernenko's detentist proclivities, at least for the moment. Rather his reemergence damped prospects for an immediate succession and permitted the Politburo to get some other business done. All reporting about his current authority indicates that Gromyko must have had a decisive voice in the Soviet decision.


5. The Soviet decision to reengage the Reagan Administration does not represent a fundamental or strategic change of foreign policy line. So far, it is a sensible tactical shift in dealing with a US administration that will be around for another four years and clearly wants its second term marked by better US-Soviet relations or, at least, earnest attempts to get them. The Soviets have certainly heard Bud McFarlane's assurance that the President is committed to getting arms control results before he leaves office. This sets them up for playing hard to get.

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6. In the months ahead, we can expect the Soviets to be more active on many fronts to influence the political setting in which the US decides its negotiating positions in new arms control talks and, equally important, the contents of the rest of its national security agenda: military budgets and programs, and policy toward regional security matters such as Nicaragua and Afghanistan. With arms control talks once again in prospect or progress, the Soviets expect they will have better prospects to influence this agenda than they did over the past year, or possibly the past four years.

7. Playing this game does not require a lot of decisiveness in Moscow given its advantages of secrecy and its ability to pursue several seemingly contradictory tactical lines at once. Chernenko has made plain that the larger objective of the game -- admittedly a long shot, but worth a try -- is to get back to the "experience of the '70s" and to detente as "the natural state" of US-Soviet relations. Such a condition would tend to spare the Soviet leadership the necessity of more fundamental choices in foreign, military, and domestic affairs, or at least to delay the need for fundamental choice. That would be tailor made for this Soviet leadership.



Fritz W. Efmarrth

Attachment: As Stated

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NIO/USSR

DCI/NIO MEETING  
21 NOVEMBER 1984SOVIET DESIRE FOR ARMS TALKS TO INFLUENCE US DEFENSE PROGRAMS

A primary Kremlin objective in the near term will be to elicit US participation in arms control talks. In the context of the Soviets' long term strategy of using arms control as another instrument to gain and maintain advantages, they probably believe the next six months are a particularly important window for influencing US defense programs. The neo-Brezhnevite leadership, which regularly recalls with fondness detente as practiced in the early 1970s, probably believes that a positive arms control dialogue can influence the Congress and others to treat US defense issues with lesser urgency.

- o They now want to maximize pressure on the Congress to cut defense spending as we come to grips with the deficit.
- o They may believe SDI and the MX are particularly vulnerable.
- o They probably hope that a setback to US military spending this year would halt and even reverse the momentum of the Administration's defense program over the next several years.

The Soviets are further interested to undermine US defense spending at this time because of their serious economic problems and aversion to major economic restructuring. They are at or near the end of a long economic policy cul de sac, and the implications for their defense goals are bad. Saturday's Washington Post article relating that Chernenko called for a boost in Soviet defense spending at last week's expanded Politburo meeting was wrong.

- o What was noteworthy about Chernenko's comments was how little he said about defense spending and the near backhanded treatment he did give it.
- o The speech was replete with lamentation about Soviet economic difficulties and exhortation to overcome these problems.
- o Chernenko's preaching on behalf of consumers denotes considerable concern to improve living standards and, implicitly, even some anxiety about public feelings toward the regime.
- o Editorials in Pravda and Krasnaya Zvezda in September suggested a leadership decision against diverting resources from consumer programs to defense, and a more recent Novoye Vremya article explaining the Soviet defense budget had a very defensive tone.

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Arms talks leading to reduced US defense programs would reduce the pressure on the Soviets to divert scarce resources to defense and allow the Soviets greater leeway to deal with their economic problems.

Moscow, in its desire for a negotiation on SDI, probably is resigned to talks that also include INF. Because the Soviets now want to improve the East-West climate and prospects for talks, they did not claim that the US ASAT test last week violated the terms of their current test moratorium or otherwise condemn it vitriolically. Insofar as their momentary concern is to restart and politically utilize the arms talks process, they probably are not now focussing as much on possible outcomes. This may be particularly true of Chernenko, whose words and tones -- in the Washington Post interview and the more recent one with NBC -- hail directly from the Brezhnev school of moderate, placating rhetoric.

The Soviets also are likely to utilize high level visits and exchanges to foster a positive climate. These may include:

- o A possible visit to Moscow by Secretary Shultz.
- o A visit to Moscow by a US trade delegation in January.

A corollary to Soviet interest in arms talks and other diplomatic instruments as a means of influencing US defense programs, and relatedly US domestic attitudes toward international affairs generally, is a probable disinclination among the leadership at this time to act provocatively toward the US.

- o This would seem to be a time when the Kremlin would not send MiGs to Nicaragua.
- o This might be a good time for the Allies to press the Soviets to curtail their restrictions on access to Berlin.

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