

Talking Points for DCI on Reykjavik Goals

Beyond INF and setting a summit date, the big issues at Reykjavik are:

- * On arms control: Space arms and their connection to START deductions
- * On regional issues: Afghanistan

The minimum goal of the President should be to assert and defend his positions on these key issues.

* His framework on space as presented in his 25 July letter, (superseding or "novating" the ABM Treaty) versus Gorbachev's framework ("strengthening" the ABM Treaty).

* On Afghanistan, the need for the USSR to withdraw and give upon imposing a Communist regime there (and elsewhere). The maximum reasonable goal the President could strive for is to get Gorbachev to agree to talk seriously and negotiate about:

- * The President's space framework
- * The possibility of a non-Communist regime in Afghanistan.

Even if Gorbachev gave no more than a promise to talk seriously about these points--which he has studiously avoided--the President would get a big boost of SDI and the Soviet position in Afghanistan would be weakened. Yet both things are reasonable to ask for and, if refusal caused the meeting to fail, the President would have the high ground, not Gorbachev.

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*for mtg w/ Pres. & sr advisors
re: Reykjavik*

The intelligence which appears most relevant to the Iceland meeting involves Gorbachev's posture in his country which in turn leads to what he will be looking for from the meeting, what his long-term needs and objectives are, and the relationship between our basic security position and theirs.

I will start first with the latter. They have significant advantages in their strength on the Warsaw Pact front in Europe. In strategic capabilities, the Soviets have and are increasing their capability to decapitate our nuclear deterrent. They have made and are strengthening their ability to sustain any retaliatory response. There is a briefing which all of you should hear about the deep underground facilities--tunnels, secret subway lines and other facilities--below Moscow and major Soviet cities. These facilities are in some cases hundreds of meters below the surface and capable of handling hundreds of people. At tens of millions of dollars, this program is designed solely to protect the senior Soviet leadership from the effects of nuclear war.

The Soviets are well ahead of us in ensuring that intelligence and communications satellites are available during any military operations. Since the early 1980s, the Soviets have launched satellites, stored them in orbit for a period of time, and then turned them on to accomplish their mission. They have the ability to launch additional satellites in a short time. To control or receive data from these satellites, they have widely dispersed ground stations and probably have the ability to protect them in their hardened underground facilities.

In addition, the Soviets have working missile defenses around Moscow and radars and production lines for interceptors which could be used to rather rapidly extend missile defense to other parts of the country. In addition,

there are many years of work on the laser, rail gun, sensor and radar capabilities similar to those on which we are working in our Strategic Defense Initiative.

They are ahead of us in protecting the survivability of their missiles by making them mobile so that we will have increasing difficulty in finding and targeting them on the ground. All of this places a very heavy premium on the potential for being able to shoot their missiles out of the air through your Strategic Defense Initiative.

In all of Gorbachev's statements and initiatives, as well as those put out by his various political and propaganda instruments, the primary objective is to stop or delay SDI. The emphasis has been on stopping SDI, strengthening the ABM treaty as an obstacle to SDI, and limiting or stopping nuclear testing, which would undercut our missile defense efforts. For a variety of reasons, the Soviets may be ready to reduce offensive weapons--for economic reasons, because the new missiles they have coming on can carry sufficiently more warheads with sufficiently greater accuracy to offset significant reductions, to induce us to take steps which would diminish the support for and the potential of SDI.

The fundamental fact to keep in mind on this is that a 30-50 percent reduction in offensive missiles will not make us significantly safer. As Henry Kissinger put it in a recent op-ed piece, the Soviets will still have enough to decapitate our missile deterrent and destroy our country.

DEEP UNDERGROUND FACILITIES

1. For four decades, the Soviet Union has had a vast program under way to ensure the survival of the leadership in the event of nuclear war. This has involved, among other things, the construction of deep underground bunkers, tunnels, secret subway lines, and other facilities beneath Moscow and other major Soviet cities. The Soviet Union has spent billions of dollars, solely to protect the senior Soviet leadership from the effects of nuclear war. These deep underground facilities today are, in some cases, hundreds of meters beneath the surface and can accommodate thousands of people. As nuclear arsenals on both sides have become larger and more potent, these facilities have been expanded and driven deeper beneath the surface. (S NF)

2. Neither changes in the USSR's leadership nor the restructuring of the strategic balance and the shifts in doctrinal philosophy that accompanied these changes in any way diminished the USSR's commitment to that program. Its purpose has remained essentially unchanged--leadership survival so that Soviet military power, nuclear and conventional, can be centrally directed in a war effort led by a surviving leadership. This is not a program undertaken for its deterrent value. The very secrecy that has surrounded Soviet pursuit of this program strongly suggests that its basic objective has been nuclear war survival; if their purpose in creating such a program had been to deter a potential nuclear attack on the USSR, they would have let the West know about its existence. The Soviets have never subscribed to US deterrence theory and our notion of Mutual Assured Destruction, this despite their recognition of the dreadful consequences that the use of nuclear weapons implies. Instead of becoming partners in what they have derisively described as a mutual suicide pact, they have consistently invested in defensive programs designed to complement their offensive forces. (S NF)

3. The deep underground program is one element of a much broader centralized nationwide program of passive and active strategic defenses. This nationwide effort, which rivals the Soviet offensive strategic weapons programs both in the scale and level of commitment, was essentially undiminished by the ABM Treaty. Indeed, the continuing Soviet preoccupation with programs to protect the leadership is at odds with the Kremlin's worldwide propaganda campaign. All defensive preparations for nuclear war are futile because of the cataclysmic nature of nuclear war. (S NF)

4. The deep underground facilities beneath the city of Moscow are directly associated with the main centers of state power. They provide the leaders of the various organs of state control the opportunity to move from their peacetime offices through concealed entryways down to protective quarters below the city, in some cases, hundreds of meters down; from there, the Politburo, the Central Committee, the Ministry of Defense, the KGB, and the apparatchiks of the many other state ministries can remain while the USSR converts to a wartime posture. This forty-year construction program now offers the Soviet wartime leadership the option of remaining beneath Moscow or at some point boarding secret subway lines connecting these deep underground facilities. From there the Soviets can make their way to nearby underground complexes outside Moscow where they plan to survive nuclear strikes and direct the war effort. The top leadership of the USSR also has the option of going by secret subway lines out to Vnukovo Airfield, about 17 miles southwest of the Kremlin, from where they could fly to more remote relocation facilities. They also have a fleet of aircraft, trains, and other vehicles from which yet another option for survival; the aircraft and trains in this program have extensive communications support would permit the surviving leadership to reconstitute

Soviet military power for the ensuing military operations. While Soviet preparations for leadership protection are most intensive around Moscow, the Soviets have similar programs in other key cities. Moreover, Soviet planning apparently calls for the evacuation of the leadership from several hundred additional cities to rural relocations facilities. (S NF)

5. With this deep underground program, with production lines and deployment for missile defense around Moscow, with 20 years of work on long-range laser, particle beam and rail gun weapons, with satellites stored in orbit and around the country, with dispersed radar and ground stations, the Soviets have sustained a steady, enormous commitment to strategic defense, as exemplified by the leadership protection program, throughout the nuclear age. This commitment belies recent pronouncements by Soviet leaders of the futility of defending against nuclear weapon attacks. (S NF)

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Requirements for Strong Verification of LRINF Reductions

Verification will be the central substantive issue, once political decisions are made to do something with nuclear-equipped weaponry.

Verification will be vital to ensure that the US knows whether:

- The decisions are being implemented and the agreed steps occur.
- Unpermitted activities occur (or not) thereafter (e.g., at the razed bases).

The following procedural requirements should be essential for a strong verification regime for reductions in the number of deployed SS-20 IRBM launchers to agreed levels:

- Baseline data exchange for agreed-on SS-20-associated equipment and facilities.
 - . numbers of warheads, missiles, launchers, re-supply vehicles
- Reductions of SS-20 launchers will be undertaken by base.
 - . no reductions will be credited until all agreed-on pertinent elements of a base have been dismantled, destroyed or converted (DD or C) to a permitted use.
 - . This means that missiles will be physically cut up; base buildings and foundations will be physically demolished; and missile-related equipment (such as launchers) will be dismantled in such a way as to make them useable.
- One-time on-site inspection/monitoring will be accomplished at each base (designated for DD or C) prior to DD or C.
- On-site inspection/monitoring will be accomplished to verify DD or C of unique SS-20 IRBM related-equipment (e.g., missiles, canisters, TELs, resupply vehicle) at agreed-on locations.
- On-site inspection/monitoring at agree-on SS-20 IRBM production facilities to ensure no increase in numbers of SS-20s produced for operational use.
- No SS-20 missiles or related equipment once removed from a base, may be reintroduced.