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
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Airdrops in  
Bosnia, 19 February 1993

1. The Principals decided to propose to the President that we conduct "supplementary and emergency" airdrops of humanitarian aid in eastern Bosnia. General Powell said the airdrops could take place 3-5 days after Presidential approval.

- COL Mike Koerner, former air advisor to UNPROFOR/Sarajevo commander Morillon, provided a first-hand account of the military and humanitarian situation in Bosnia. Koerner stated firmly and repeatedly that the Muslims, Croats, and Serbs are equally guilty of attacks and atrocities, and that agreements they sign are equally unreliable. He described Muslim mortar attacks on Sarajevo airport that wounded several French Legionnaires. Focusing on eastern Bosnia, he explained that sources of reliable information there are few and far between.
  - General Powell briefed in detail on the proposed airdrops on Gorazde and Zepa, and possibly Srebrenica and Cerska. The initial drops would be at 10,000 feet to reduce the risks of AAA and missile attack; if not fired upon, they would reduce the flight altitude for greater efficiency. There would be no fighter escorts (so as not to compromise the humanitarian character of the mission), and SAR support could be based at Split or (preferably) afloat on the aircraft carrier Roosevelt when it arrives in a couple of weeks. MC-130 aircraft might be used for night drops if security conditions require. Overall, this effort is expected to entail 4-5 sorties/day and be relatively inexpensive.
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- The DCI summarized the risks, with GEN Powell agreeing that he considered the Muslims a greater potential problem than the Serbs. In view of the risks, expense, and inefficiency, the group insisted that any airdrops should be "emergency efforts for specific and unique situations" that could never substitute for ground convoys. Medical supplies--being high-value, long-lasting, and low-bulk--would be ideal for this means of delivery.
- Ambassador Bartholomew reviewed his discussion of airdrops (among other issues) with Vitaliy Churkin, and the desirability of Russian participation. The DCI noted that, if a Russian transport staged, with ours, through Rhein-Main, the public appreciation of the airlift's multinational character might be enhanced. The Principals agreed to pursue this with Moscow, as well as with London and Paris. The P-5 might be the best overall forum for coordination, it was agreed, if the President approves the concept.
- Following a somber but unanimous vote among the policymakers, Tony Lake asked Jenonne Walker to draft a Presidential decision memorandum. (Walker later provided the attached draft, which we faxed to the DCI for his comments. )

2. **Lifting the Siege of Sarajevo.** Ambassador Bartholomew raised with Churkin the 2 February Russian initiative to get a ceasefire in Sarajevo. In contrast to the standoffish Kozyrev and Vorontsov, Churkin warmed to the idea of a joint effort; whereas he had (in Moscow) proposed to silence the (Serb) heavy weapons, however, Churkin this time suggested the goal might be to stop the fighting around Sarajevo generally (including Muslim attacks).

- Lake asked Walker to arrange a study of "what's doable in Sarajevo." (We are preparing some materials that could be provided to Walker if the DCI approves. )

3. In rapid order, Tony Lake moved through several outstanding issues:

- **Easing Sanctions?** Churkin suggested to Bartholomew that we work out a timetable of actions (Serbian behavior) that would permit easing some sanctions. Leon Fuerth will rank order the sanctions to enable keeping the potentially most effective ones (e.g., financial) until last. Fuerth also promised to provide the Principals with an interagency-cleared list of his proposed measures to tighten sanctions.

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- **Kosovo Monitors.** Lake asked Tarnoff to report back on how we might get more civilian monitors into Kosovo. We should not rule out more US participants.
- **No-Fly Enforcement.** The group authorized Albright to promote enforcement in New York.
- **NATO Guarantees.** Romania and Bulgaria want US security guarantees against Serbian actions in order for them to better enforce sanctions on the Danube. Fuerth will provide some suggestions to the Deputies on Monday. (We will draft talking points on this issue; any such guarantees would be manipulated to gain much broader NATO guarantees.)

4. A Deputies Committee is scheduled for 1700 hours, Monday, 22 February. The agenda is financial sanctions, and potentially actions to lift the seige of Sarajevo, but we will prepare materials on these various topics just in case.



Daniel W. Wagner  
Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

Attachment: BTF Memo to DCI, with  
draft Presidential Decision Memorandum

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