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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on the Former
 Yugoslavia, 22 February 1993

1. The meeting focused on the upcoming humanitarian airdrops in eastern Bosnia, Ambassador Bartholomew's plans to visit the former Yugoslavia, and the status of several policy initiatives.

2. The President has approved the airdrops, and Mr. Berger believed--but was not certain--that he had authorized General Powell to lower the flight altitude if--as expected--that proves necessary. We have begun informing the Allies and others, and the President may make a public announcement on Wednesday.

-- Ambassador Wisner reported that, according to General Shalikashvili, an initial effort of 7-9 days, 5 aircraft per day, could deliver 100-120 tons/day, although that seems to exceed C-130 capacity. Wisner noted that because Srebrenica is so close to the Serbian border, we probably will violate Serbian airspace after all; we will inform Belgrade. The air drops are to be at night, with leaflets, RFE, and other means used to alert villagers to expect them.

-- The Deputies doubted that high-altitude, night drops will prove sufficiently accurate, but were wary of daylight or lower-level flights. [redacted]

[redacted] The DDCI asked whether we would fire back if fired upon; although the transports will not be escorted, any SAR mission would need to be instructed in detail. No decision was taken. Finally, the DDCI noted that unless the UNHCR can be prodded to put people into these isolated towns who can tell us their needs, we will be taking risks for unknowable benefits.

-- Responding to criticism of airdrops as inadequate to the scale of Bosnia's needs, Wisner clarified that they were for political purposes: to catalyze others to take action,

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to work with the Russians, and to push the Allies to do more. Bartholomew added that the US cannot stand by and permit brutal sieges.

3. A key goal is multilateral participation. Bartholomew and Admiral Jeremiah said they had pressed Churkin and the Russian Army Commander respectively for Russian participation in the airdrops. The NAC could discuss the issue on Wednesday if the President makes an announcement on Tuesday, with the NATO foreign ministers asked to approve on Friday.

-- Mr. Inderfurth reported that the Russians, British, and French have advised against pursuing a No-Fly enforcement resolution and airdrops simultaneously, but the Deputies considered the issues unrelated.

-- The DDCI suggested we also inform the Kosovar Albanians--lest they think the air drops foreshadow US military intervention and do something rash. Mr. Johnson said we would, through Albanian President Berisha.

4. **Bartholomew Trip.** Bartholomew proposed that he travel soon to the former Yugoslavia to meet the Serb, Croat, and Muslim leaders. He said he could invite Izetbegovic to return with him. (That led to discussion of Karadzic's refusal to come back to New York, with suggestions offered that we guarantee he will not be arrested and possibly expand his visa-permitted travel radius "a few blocks" so he can visit a Serbian church.) Bartholomew will propose his travel plans to Secretary Christopher.

5. **EUCOM Assessment.** Jeremiah summarized the cable from BGEN Jones' inspection visit to Sarajevo (attached). Jeremiah and the DDCI both disagreed with the judgment that the Muslims are responsible for all UNPROFOR casualties, and Bartholomew said that misperception colors all of UNPROFOR's judgments. (In a DDCI-Fuerth side conversation later, we agreed to research this.)

6. **Humanitarian Fact-Finding Trip.** Wisner reported that an interagency team of 10-12 people planned to leave as early as Wednesday for two weeks (10 days in the former Yugoslavia). They will visit Belgrade, Zagreb, and--via US aircraft from Split--Sarajevo. State and Defense both received the risk assessments from [redacted] and Berger noted that the Principals must approve the trip.

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-- Subsequently, the team leader called me to accept our offer of a briefing on the humanitarian and security situations. We will provide that on Tuesday.

7. **Lifting the Siege of Sarajevo.** No progress yet, but Bartholomew asked for a clear statement of objectives. The DDCI raised the shifting Russian position--they now want to end the fighting around Sarajevo (including Muslim offensives) rather than just silence the (Serb) guns. The Deputies agreed, and we are willing to see the Muslims remain bottled up in the city.

8. **Kosovo Monitors.** The DDCI noted that there are 9 observers in Kosovo, 3 of them Americans, and their mandate expires next month. There are no additional FSOs or other appropriate people available to go.

9. **Sanctions.** Mr. Fuerth promised to circulate a short summary of sanctions proposals to the Principals. Nothing will require new authority from the UN. Fuerth noted that there is plenty of intelligence, the problem is downgrading or declassifying it enough to permit getting action from other governments.

-- Wisner asked how we are going to pay the several millions of dollars required for additional measures. He suggested seeking spending authority.

-- After the meeting, the DDCI and Fuerth discussed sanctions. Shown what we are putting together to detail Serbian financial activity in violation of sanctions, Fuerth was obviously pleased.

[Redacted]
Daniel W. Wagner

Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

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