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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 25, 1993 83 AUG 25 P6:01

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Bosnian End-Game Strategy

All the parties left Geneva last Friday to consult on a map presented by Owen and Stoltenberg. They have asked the parties to return Geneva, with official positions, on Monday, August 30.

I had an informal meeting yesterday with senior advisors on Bosnia to make sure we are doing what we can to get the best agreement possible and to think through next steps after that.

We discussed whether we should (a) press Bosnian President Izetbegovic to accept the current map; (b) take no position; or (c) tell Izetbegovic we would support Bosnian proposals for reasonable changes. After some discussion we concluded that we will support reasonable counter-proposals by the Bosnian government but, until the Bosnian leadership takes a formal position, we should only reiterate general expressions of support and encourage flexibility. We will reaffirm to Izetbegovic our willingness, through NATO and the UN, to help implement and enforce a viable settlement.

Influencing the Negotiations

Our reporting suggests that Izetbegovic wants an agreement. He understands the limits on outside military help he can expect, and the disaster another winter under siege would bring. He hopes to persuade the Bosnian leadership to ask that the present map be changed only to ensure better access to the Adriatic in the west and to Muslim enclaves in the east (Map at Tab A). In return for the latter, he may be willing to cede other territory to Bosnian Serbs.

Izetbegovic hopes the Bosnian leadership will take a formal position on Friday. We will assess it on the assumption that we will want to look for opportunities to support reasonable changes, without seeming to make American proposals. We will, for example, argue to Owen and Stoltenberg that widening the access corridors would not just be a concession to the Muslims, but also contribute to effective implementation of any settlement.

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff~~SECRET~~

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Contingency Planning for Implementation

We are:

- Reviewing both the enforcement accords already agreed among the Bosnian parties, and what more needs to be done at NATO, and between NATO and the UN, on Command and Control and Rules of Engagement.
- Exploring how best to fund a peacekeeping effort.
- Inviting Congressional leaders to the first of a regular series of consultations with Chris, Les, and myself on national security issues, beginning the week after Labor Day. We will include Bosnia and Somalia as subjects for the first session. In the calls and at the meeting, we will begin to prepare them for a commitment of American ground troops to implementation. But we do not believe you should make a formal decision or notify them of it until we are sure there is a settlement to implement. (At that time, we would need to move very quickly.) This could be a major issue this fall.

Reconstruction Assistance to Bosnia

The need will be vast, and some tangible prospect that it will be met could help Izetbegovic sell compromises to his colleagues. West Europeans should shoulder most of the burden. We are developing ideas for energizing them as well as for approaching Muslim states.


Easing Serbian Sanctions after Agreement

We are preparing proposals for a phased lifting of sanctions, keyed to Serbian compliance with a settlement and other demands we might make, such as compliance with the January 1992 Vance Plan for Croatia.


Addressing Broader Balkan Instabilities

Croatia will need assurance that its grievances will not be forgotten, lest it take unilateral action to retrieve parts of Croatia seized by Serbs in 1991. We are exploring ideas for either refocusing the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia on that and other tensions resulting from Yugoslavia's breakup, or perhaps a broader Balkan conference that could address other problems in the region as well. A follow-on conference could oversee the phased lifting of sanctions, and help tailor an international reconstruction fund to promote better relations within and among Balkan states.

Attachment
Tab A Map

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Proposal for the Partitioning of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 20 August 1993



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