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DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY: JULY 30 GENEVA MINISTERIALBEST COPY
AVAILABLEThe Communique

Our primary goal for the July 30 Geneva Ministerial should be to reach agreement on a Ministerial Communique announcing the imposition of consequences against the Bosnian Serbs in response to their rejection of the Contact Group map. Contact Group Ministers need to commit themselves publicly to tighten sanctions against the Serbs, to extend and strictly enforce the exclusion zones, and to agree that a decision in the Security Council to lift the arms embargo could become unavoidable if the Bosnian Serbs continue in their refusal to accept the Contact Group map. This should include, at the very least, tasking NATO to take prompt action to extend the exclusion zones to the other safe areas.

Ministers should also welcome the unconditional Bosnian government acceptance of the map and express disappointment at Bosnian Serb rejection. Contact Group commitment to preserving the territorial integrity of Bosnia within its internationally recognized borders should also be stressed.

Preparing for the Meeting

Although the Communique is the public manifestation of ministerial agreement, we will need to work hard in the run-up to the meeting, and probably in its aftermath as well, to ensure that the consequences package agreed to is as tough as we can possibly make it. This will not be easy, since both the Europeans and the Russians will probably become increasingly nervous at the prospect of bringing increasing pressure, particularly military pressure, to bear against the Serbs. An added complication is the Boutros Ghali letter stating that UNPROFOR should be withdrawn if any additional military steps against the Bosnian Serbs are implemented.

Taking a "No" for a "Yes But"

We may face pressure from the Russians and Europeans to give the Bosnian Serbs more time to change their minds, or even to agree to resume negotiations. Since we have already agreed with the Russians that we would use the July 30 meeting to present any recalcitrant party with a final deadline for accepting the map, we can agree to give the Serbs an additional week or ten days to do so, at which time the consequences package would begin to be implemented. Under no circumstances, however, should we agree to let the Serbs reopen negotiations.

Another possibility is that the Russians will succeed in convincing the Bosnian Serbs to take a more forthcoming position in the run-up to July 30. To satisfy us as a "yes" they would have to drop all their territorial reservations, as well as their linkages to extraneous issues. We need to make certain that this remains our bottom line, and that we do not

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permit further negotiations. The case will be more difficult if the Serbs whittle down their objections to the constitutional issue alone. In that case, we would face considerable pressure from both the Russians and the Europeans to provide assurances. Since the Contact Group has already done work in this area, we should be in a position to quickly table a proposal that does not prejudge key constitutional issues, such as partition.

Sanctions and the Russians

In our judgment, no amount of sanctions relief is likely to turn the Bosnian Serb "no" into a "yes". Nonetheless, the Russians have been intimating that unless we drop all sanctions linkages to Krajina and produce a draft UNSC resolution that would essentially lift all sanctions in return for full withdrawal, they might not be able to attend the July 30 meeting, much less agree to a robust consequences package against the Bosnian Serbs. Given the almost certain prospect of war over Krajina if we do not maintain some credible linkages, we cannot afford to give in to this Russian demand. The Russians and we have very similar interests in preventing new hostilities in Krajina, and we worked well together in brokering the Krajina cease-fire earlier this spring. We should play on this theme to win Moscow over to our position.

Our current position would suspend all sanctions against Serbia except those on strategic trade in return for full Bosnian Serb withdrawal to the territories allotted them in the Contact Group map. Strategic trade sanctions would be suspended in return for achievement of a modus vivendi in Krajina, including a cease-fire and confidence-building measures. Although strategic trade is a big-ticket item, we believe that Milosevic has the influence to deliver a modus vivendi in fairly short order. We need to continue to press this position with the Russians and hold firm to our key equities.

The Europeans and the Consequences Package

Tightening Sanctions

Although they very reluctantly agreed to the concept of disincentives for the Serbs, the British and the French do not like what they see when they look down the road to implementation. The British, in particular, do not like any aspect of the consequences package. They have refused to agree to a sanctions tightening resolution that would really shut down FRY offshore operations, since it would throw people working for FRY firms in Britain out of work. Although the UK successfully prevents the repatriation of profits from these firms, others do not, particularly the Cypriots, the Russians

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and the Greeks. Unless this loophole can be closed, any agreement to tighten sanctions will ring hollow.

Barriers to Strict Enforcement

Strict enforcement of the exclusion zones is an essential--and neuralgic--element of our strategy. The following considerations are in play. In order to implement strict enforcement, we must be prepared to address the following:

- o The UK, France and the UN tend to equate strict enforcement with the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from the safe areas, and perhaps from Bosnia. This is the central issue.
- o Any NATO decision on strict enforcement will require full key allied support, and must be implemented in order to avoid damaging the Alliance.
- o The risks of doing nothing are now seen by many as less than the risk of implementing the disincentives.
- o Strict enforcement (even extension) will be widely seen as partisan, involving NATO on the Bosnian side. This is why Boutros Ghali apparently wants to pull UNPROFOR out prior to beginning extension.
- o Allied militaries and the UN have opposed going to strict enforcement.
- o UNPROFOR's withdrawal will mean the loss of ground observers, which will severely limit the effectiveness of air power.
- o Prior to a NATO decision on strict enforcement, we need assurances from UNPROFOR that they will approve the use of NATO air power. (Assuming UNPROFOR will still be there perform an approval function.)

Implementing Strict Enforcement

Although the Contact Group understanding was clear that sanctions would be tightened at the same time as we began to extend and strictly enforce the exclusion zones, the British now want agreement to stage them, with tightening to come first. Once extension and strict enforcement begins, they want to begin with extension only, progressively implemented and stretched out over an unspecified but presumably lengthy period. Strict enforcement would come later. The British seem less concerned about how strict enforcement would be staged, since they have made clear they would have removed their

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UNPROFOR forces before then. The French may harbor similar sentiments.

The British and French may be bluffing about pulling out of UNPROFOR prior to strict enforcement. If they are bluffing and intend to remain, then it is likely to prove very difficult for us to get the strict enforcement we are looking for--regardless of what might be agreed to on paper. Sarajevo and Gorazde make clear that the British and French are not prepared to authorize that kind of escalation when their forces are so vulnerably in harm's way. Given this fundamental fact, we may be better off seeing them go sooner rather than later. This could make the transition to lifting the arms embargo easier, although the Russians might balk at taking action in the Security Council regardless of whether UNPROFOR has departed.

The same arguments would apply to Boutros Ghali's threat to pull out UNPROFOR prior to extension, although we would find ourselves looking at the lift option that much earlier. Although Contact Group partners might try to use Boutros Ghali's threat to delay action, if the Contact Group remains united and agrees to commence extending the exclusion by tasking the NAC to take the necessary steps, we can probably keep UNPROFOR in place through the extension phase.

Basic Principles on Strict Enforcement

Although it may be overly ambitious to think that we can agree on all the details of implementing the consequences package prior to July 30, we should at least lay down some fundamental principles.

- o The first principle should be that tightening sanctions and moving to extend and strictly enforce the exclusion zones should begin simultaneously. Otherwise, we will look like we are stalling from the get-go and Congress will be right back at us with pressure for unilateral lift. This problem will only be compounded if we do not get a robust tightening package. If the other Contact Group members unite behind a phased approach, our fallback should be to press for as short a period as possible between the beginning of sanctions tightening and exclusion zone extension.
- o Although we can probably agree to have an extension stage that precedes the strict enforcement stage, our second principle should be that the entire extension stage should not be unduly prolonged, and in no case last longer than one month. The point here is the same. Taking more time will make it look like we are stalling and invite the same response.

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- o In moving through extension and strict enforcement, we cannot avoid the consequences for UNPROFOR. Even prior to beginning to extend the exclusion zones, we should encourage UNPROFOR and other UN and civilian personnel to consolidate themselves as far as possible out of harm's way. Our third principle should be that time--perhaps a week, perhaps a bit more--should be set aside before beginning to extend the exclusion zones during which at-risk troops and civilians could move to places of relative safety. We should seriously consider recommending that UNMOs be called in and that UNPROFOR forces guarding weapons depots within the Sarajevo exclusion zone withdraw.
- o Given the real possibility that the British will want to lead a European exodus from UNPROFOR prior to commencement of strict enforcement, we should provide a stage of perhaps three weeks between the end of extension and the beginning of strict enforcement during which time they and anyone else who wishes could depart. In laying this down as our fourth principle, we should consider making the following points.
- o If the Europeans do depart and UNPROFOR unravels we should ensure that this is perceived not as a rout or setback, but as a necessary step to set the stage for more robust military action, up to and including lifting the arms embargo. If the Europeans decide to stay, however, we must insist that UNPROFOR adheres to our understanding that in those new circumstances the dual key arrangement will not be used to thwart genuine implementation of strict enforcement. This should be our fifth principle. If they cannot agree to this, then we are probably better off suggesting that they depart, since their presence would only help ensure that our efforts come to naught.
- o If the Europeans depart UNPROFOR prior to strict enforcement, we should be prepared to move quickly to lift the arms embargo. This should be our sixth principle. Whether we move immediately to this stage should depend in large part on whether the Bosnian Serbs took advantage of the departure to take over the eastern enclaves, close the noose around Sarajevo or otherwise terminate the humanitarian relief effort through areas under their control. Although we would presumably respond with air power to such provocations, there would be no reason to delay seeking to rearm the Bosnian government. Assuming the Serbs did not engage in provocations, then we should seek agreement that the arms embargo would be lifted no later than one month from the time that strict enforcement is completed.

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- o. Assuming that Bosnian Serb actions do not precipitate immediate movement to lift, the process of implementing full strict enforcement should not be unduly delayed. Although we could agree to progressive strict enforcement, beginning perhaps with Sarajevo and Gorazde and then moving on to the others, the entire process should not take any longer than one month to complete. The reasons here are the same as for the extension stage. This should be our seventh principle.
- o. Given past Bosnian Serb behavior, there is good reason to believe that they will respond sooner rather than later to a ministerial decision to implement the consequences package against them. They have already managed to shut down Sarajevo airport in a show of displeasure. Such relatively minor behavior could easily escalate out of control, with hostages taken prior to consolidation, the humanitarian relief effort through Serb territories shut down, and perhaps UNPROFOR forces themselves directly attacked. We need to frame these possibilities for the other Contact Group members and seek agreement that in such a situation we would need to respond quickly and decisively, including rapidly moving through the extension and strict enforcement, directly to lifting the embargo. This should be our eighth principle.

Although we should seek agreement to as many of the above principles as possible, other Contact Group members are unlikely to be willing to agree to all of them at this time. Nonetheless, pressing these principles forward will give the Europeans and the Russians a good idea of our own view of the situation and of our determination to follow through. At the very least, we need to produce ministerial agreement to ask the NAC to produce the requisite decision on extending the exclusion zones.

Lifting the Arms Embargo

At the July 5 ministerial, Secretary Christopher reminded ministers of Congressional efforts to unilaterally lift the arms embargo and made clear that we beat back these efforts--barely--only because a negotiating process was in train that would either produce a peace settlement or ultimately lead to multilateral lift. The Secretary made clear that if the Contact Group effort did not produce either result, pressure in the Congress would redouble and could prove overpowering.

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At this key ministerial meeting, we need to make clear that the current Contact Group effort is the last best hope we have to produce peace through a negotiated settlement. In putting forward the consequences package, the Contact Group has made use of all the leverage available to the international community. If the Bosnian Serbs do not accept peace on these terms, then the Contact Group has no choice but to implement the consequences against them. If the international community steps back from this effort, then it will have conceded victory to the Bosnian Serbs and accepted a precedent that can only have the gravest consequences for stability in the region.

Although the Secretary laid down a marker on July 5, we now need to go beyond this and make clear that we will not permit this to happen. We need to let them know that if the other members of the Contact Group waver and step back from vigorous implementation of the consequences package, including multilateral lift when the time comes, we will have no choice but to move together with the Congress to unilaterally lift the arms embargo, and to provide the Bosnian government with the arms and air support they would need to carry the conflict to the Bosnian Serbs.

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