

2 December 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force
SUBJECT: Principals' Committee Meeting on Bosnia

1. Today's Principals' Committee meeting will focus on longer-term options for dealing with the Bosnia crisis and whether to extend assurances to NATO that the US--if requested--would commit ground forces to help extricate UNPROFOR from Bosnia. We have not yet received a formal agenda from the NSC, but the Senior Director for Europe, Sandy Vershow, told me last night that you would not repeat not be required to do a formal intelligence update.

- The INTELLIGENCE UPDATE TAB includes points you can make during the meeting on recent military developments (Bihac, Croatia), the humanitarian situation, status of UNPROFOR personnel being detained by the Serbs, and reactions to recent US policy decisions.
- The POST-BIHAC BOSNIA TAB includes a "think piece" that I highly recommend that attempts to take a broader look at where things stand in the aftermath of the recent crisis.
- You will also have an updated page-size areas of control map to distribute at the meeting.
- As of 0900 this morning, there were no fast-breaking developments in Bosnia that you would need to report on.

2. The LAST BOSNIA PC TAB includes the MFR on Monday's meeting. Principals agreed at that time that, with a number of ministerials on the horizon, precedence needed to be given to repairing damage to NATO. Accordingly, they agreed to come out more firmly against unilateral lift, and Secretary Perry was to prepare a recommendation to the President that we provide assurances to NATO that the US would commit ground forces to help extricate UNPROFOR from Bosnia.

- Perry, however, apparently got cold feet on committing US ground troops following a meeting he had with nine key Congressional leaders. As a result, the recommendation was never made to the President and Principals will consider the issue again today.

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

- The UNPROFOR WITHDRAWAL TAB includes a background paper on the likelihood that UNPROFOR would encounter problems during a withdrawal.
- The BOSNIA AFTER UNPROFOR TAB includes a background paper on the broader implications of an UNPROFOR withdrawal. [REDACTED]

3. The MEETING PAPER TAB includes a paper prepared by the NSC prior to the last PC that will also serve as the basis for today's discussion of short- and long-term options for dealing with the Bosnia crisis. This paper is more sober than most in terms of acknowledging that the Serbs have a strong hand to play and that if we really want a negotiated settlement, we will need to be more flexible in dealing with them.

- In terms of longer-term options, Principals reportedly will consider whether to continue to support "lift and strike" if negotiations do not produce results by next spring.
- Recent PCs have concluded that the Administration cannot politically abandon multilateral lift at this time. Lake and others acknowledge problems with multilateral lift, but argue that they would be more manageable than under unilateral lift.
- The ARMS EMBARGO LIFT TAB includes the Special Estimate on implications of multilateral lift that Principals requested. Its message is negative. [REDACTED]

4. The Task Force has been asked several times this week whether we think "the war is over." There is considerable unhappiness with Perry's public statement last weekend, and our contacts at State and the NSC have wanted to know "whether we were telling him this." You may be asked the same question today, so we should make a point of discussing the issue during the pre-briefing, now scheduled for 1100. [REDACTED]

5. Today's meeting is Principals-only--not surprising given the press leaks after Monday's session. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A. Norman Schindler

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]