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19 December 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Deputies' Committee Meeting on Bosnia, 19 December 1994

1. The DDI attended the meeting, chaired by Deputy National Security Advisor Berger, to discuss strategies for undercutting Congressional support for a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo against the Bosnian Government. Other attendees included Deputy Secretary of State Talbott, Deputy Secretary of Defense Deutch, Vice Presidential National Security Advisor Fuerth, Ambassador Inderfurth, and Vice Chairman JCS Owens.

2. The meeting was dominated by issues related to former President Carter's ongoing visit to Bosnia. Indeed, Carter telephoned Berger during the meeting to report that he had worked out a "statement of intent" to be signed by Bosnian Serb "President" Karadzic and Army Commander Mladic that would endorse negotiations to commence on 27 December and end by 15 January on a cessation of hostilities to last at least five months. The cessation of hostilities would be used to negotiate a comprehensive settlement using the Contact Group plan "as the basis for negotiations of all points." The Deputies agreed that the Carter formulation was not bad, particularly in that he had avoided reference to using the Contact Group plan "as a starting point" for negotiations.

3. The Deputies expressed concern about the lack of progress in securing NATO approval to strengthen UNPROFOR. At a meeting of chiefs of defense staffs at The Hague, there was general agreement only on limited measures to provide additional equipment to assist UNPROFOR in carrying out its current mission. There was no consensus in favor of expanding UNPROFOR's mission, or on measures to establish land and air bridges to Sarajevo. The Deputies were concerned that the results of the meeting would be interpreted in the press as the first step toward a withdrawal of UNPROFOR.

4. The Deputies briefly discussed Senator Nunn's proposal for a "build down" of Bosnian Serb and Muslim forces as an alternative to unilateral lift. There was considerable doubt about the feasibility of "build down," which was termed as an attempt to persuade the Serbs to unilaterally disarm. OSD was instructed to flesh out this option further, particularly with regard to implementing it in an environment in which UNPROFOR still is in Bosnia.

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5. The Deputies also discussed inter-Serbian sanctions. Deputies were informed of a decision by Milosevic to impose an embargo against the Krajina Serbs, which, if carried out, would close the most significant loophole in the inter-Serbian sanctions regime. Deputies discussed the procedure that will be used to assess whether Serbia has effectively sealed its border with Bosnia and concluded that this might be a useful task for themselves. The Intelligence Community was requested to disseminate an updated version of its matrix on inter-Serbian sanctions as soon as possible; it probably will be completed and disseminated on 20 December. [REDACTED]

6. The Deputies agreed that they would attempt to meet at least once a week, although no date was set for the next meeting. The Deputies also mandated that a Congressional-Public Affairs Working Group on Bosnia, led by the NSC, be established to discuss how to influence opinion on Bosnia in advance of the arrival of the new Congress in January. As part of this effort, the Intelligence Community may be asked to participate on an interagency briefing team. [REDACTED]

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A. Norman Schindler
Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

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