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27 January 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD


SUBJECT: Deputies' Committee Meeting on Bosnia
25 January 1995

1. Deputy National Security Advisor Berger chaired a Deputies' Committee meeting to review efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement in Bosnia and preparations for possible withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Croatia and/or Bosnia. Attendees, in addition to the DDI, included Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Tarnoff, Vice Presidential National Security Advisor Fuerth, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Nye, JCS/J-5 LTG Clark, Gordon Adams (OMB), David Sheffer (USUN), and Nancy Soderberg. [redacted]

2. State briefed on the latest developments in the Contact Group's efforts to achieve Serb and Muslim agreement to resume peace negotiations. It was noted, based on information received from Special Envoy Thomas, that press reports of divisions within the Contact Group and that efforts to re-start talks had been abandoned were erroneous. There was praise for a CIA paper outlining the positions of Serbs and Muslims on key territorial and constitutional issues to be addressed in negotiations. Deputies deferred discussion on what position the US should adopt vis-a-vis these substantive differences until it becomes clearer that negotiations will get started. Some Deputies expressed concern that they were not receiving adequate information on Contact Group developments, and they mandated that State and the Intelligence Community produce a daily situation report for Principals and Deputies. (The first situation report was supposed to be disseminated on 27 January.) [redacted]


3. Deputies considered options for augmentation of UNPROFOR forces in Bosnia. They concluded that the US should support the proposed augmentation by 6,500 troops even if they are not drawn from Croatia. At the same time, there was a general consensus that the roughly 14,000 UNPROFOR personnel in Croatia is far in excess of the number required to fulfill existing missions, and that the US would press the UN to rationalize its force deployments in Croatia. In the meantime, State was tasked to prepare a paper on options for financing UNPROFOR augmentation. [redacted]

4. Deputies reviewed developments in Croatia. They agreed with the DDI's point that Tudjman was operating under two dangerous misconceptions--that Croatian forces could defeat the Krajina Serbs and that Belgrade would not intervene on their behalf. Deputies agreed that the best way to minimize the risk of conflict would be to modify the existing UNPROFOR mandate to permit a residual UN force to monitor a buffer zone between the Croats and Serbs, although they recognized it would be an uphill battle to win Croatian support for this. [redacted]

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5. The JCS representative briefed the Deputies on progress in planning to withdraw UNPROFOR from Croatia. Deputies expressed concern that NATO and UN planners were assuming that the US would contribute ground forces to an extrication effort, which all agreed was likely to involve some violence. Deputies, moreover, were surprised to learn that decisions on the US role would be required by early February to permit the predeployment to the theater of necessary communications equipment. Deputies requested that JCS and CIA prepare a threat assessment and options for US participation to be considered by the Deputies and Principals during the week of 30 January. 


A. Norman Schindler
Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

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