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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: February 7, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 2:30 - 4:00pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Bosnia and Croatia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair

Anthony Lake

CIA

William Studeman

OVP

Leon Fuerth

JCS

General John Shalikashvili

StateWarren Christopher
Charles Thomas (Special Envoy)White HouseSamuel Berger
Nancy SoderbergDOD

Dr. William Perry

NSC

Alexander Vershbow

USUN

Ambassador Madeleine Albright

Summary of Conclusions

1. Principals reviewed the progress of efforts to renew negotiations on a political settlement, options for responding to the French proposal for an international conference, and prospects for achieving mutual recognition of all former Yugoslav Republics as a means of further isolating the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs. They agreed that recognition by Belgrade of Bosnia and Croatia, if genuine, would be a positive step toward resolving the Balkans conflict, although not a panacea. Principals approved a renewed effort with Milosevic aimed at achieving meaningful mutual recognition of all former Yugoslav Republics.

(Action: State) ~~(S)~~

2. Principals discussed options for handling the French proposal for an international conference to promote cross-recognition and launch new negotiations. They agreed that a

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conference would only be useful if it is well prepared and produces positive results. Principals agreed that State should engage Contact Group partners to shape the conference agenda, making clear the conditions for U.S. support and participation. (Action: State) (S)

3. Principals reviewed options for suspending sanctions against Belgrade in return for cross-recognition of all former Yugoslav Republics, continued endorsement of the Contact Group plan, continued closure of the FRY border to all but humanitarian supplies for Pale and Knin, and support for the Zagreb-4 plan. They authorized discussions with Contact Group partners aimed at developing a common position on the degree of sanctions relief we would be willing to trade for recognition. Principals approved the Plan B alternative in the OVP paper as the starting position for achieving a common position, with flexibility to accept further compromises short of the full EU position. (Action: OVP/State) (S)

4. Principals reviewed the status of NATO military planning to support UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia and Croatia. They agreed that, while we should continue to press Croatia to retain at least a reduced UNPROFOR presence, our planning should assume that the Croatian decision will not be reversed. Therefore, Principals agreed to support NATO's Phase I prepositioning of communications equipment to establish a theater communications architecture that will support UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia or Croatia, as well as implementation of a peace plan should a peace agreement be reached. Principals directed that talking points be prepared for calls to appropriate Congressional staff informing them of the Administration's support for Phase I prepositioning. (Action: State and NSC) (S)

5. Principals also agreed that the U.S. could inform NATO Military Authorities of the forces the U.S. would provide to an UNPROFOR withdrawal operation from Bosnia, while reaffirming that their actual deployment would be contingent on a final review of the plans and consultations with Congress. (Action: JCS) (S)

6. Principals discussed extending to Croatia the President's decision, in principle, to commit U.S. ground forces to a NATO operation supporting UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia. They agreed to recommend to the President that he authorize U.S. participation in a NATO operation to support UNPROFOR withdrawal from Croatia should it become necessary. They directed that a decision memorandum for the President be prepared that includes the concept, rough size, and duration of the mission. (Action: NSC with JCS input) They also directed that a legislative strategy be prepared for consulting with the Congress if the

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President approves the recommendation. (Action: State and NSC)
(S)

7. Principals discussed the status of efforts at the United Nations to strengthen UNPROFOR in Bosnia. Reiterating their support for the strengthening measures adopted at the December Chiefs of Defense meeting in The Hague, they requested that the Deputies review the issue and make a formal recommendation on next steps. (Action: JCS) (S)

8. Principals discussed a longer-term strategy in the event diplomacy fails to achieve a negotiated settlement and UNPROFOR withdraws from Bosnia and Croatia. They requested more comprehensive planning on options to contain the conflict should fighting rekindle, with special emphasis on strengthening forces in Macedonia to deter expansion of the war. (Action: OSD)
Principals also requested an analysis of the impact on the region should current UN forces in Macedonia be reinforced or replaced.
(Action: CIA) (S)

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