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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

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Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: February 13, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 6:00 - 7:00pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
 on Bosnia and Croatia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair

Anthony Lake

CIA

Douglas MacEachin

OVP

Leon Fuerth

JCS

Admiral William Owens

State

Peter Tarnoff

White House

Samuel Berger

Nancy Soderberg

DOD

Dr. William Perry

NSC

Alexander Vershbow

USUN

Ambassador Madeleine Albright

Summary of Conclusions

1. Principals met to review the U.S. position on additional sanctions relief for Milosevic in return for Serbian recognition of Bosnia, Croatia and other former Yugoslav republics within their existing borders. While they agreed that mutual recognition, in itself, will not lead to political settlements, the possibility that recognition might alter the strategic equation and head off a new war in Croatia justified the risks of our support. Therefore, Principals authorized our Contact Group representative to agree to offer a total suspension of sanctions on the FRY in return for mutual recognition, subject to the following conditions:

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A. Conditions proposed by State:

- that Milosevic's recognition of Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia and Slovenia in their internationally recognized borders be genuine and unequivocal;
- that sanctions be suspended for 2-month periods, with a positive vote by the UN Security Council required to renew each time;
- that the sanctions enforcement regime against the FRY remain in place, so that sanctions can be reimposed on short notice;
- that the "outer wall" of sanctions be kept in place, i.e. measures going beyond UNSC resolutions: no assistance from the IFIs or the EU; no granting of a UN seat to the FRY; and no readmission to OSCE (for our part, we would not recognize the FRY at this time);
- that there be a significant toughening up of the monitoring regime on the Bosnia/Serbia and Croatia/Serbia borders, including several hundred more monitors plus equipment such as radars to help deal with the helicopter problem;
- that there be continued firm adherence by Milosevic to the Contact Group plan for Bosnia;
- that Milosevic endorse the principles in the Zagreb-4 peace plan for Croatia, i.e. the reintegration of the occupied areas under Croatian sovereignty, with autonomy for historically Serb-majority areas; and
- that nothing be done to in any way affect the commitment to the War Crimes Tribunal.

B. Additional conditions added by Principals:

- that before we pursue Milosevic's recognition of Croatia, we insist that Tudjman agree to extend UNPROFOR's mandate in return for recognition.
- that the sanctions relief not go into effect until after the inter-Serbian border is more tightly closed and the Europeans have deployed the additional monitors required; and

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-- that we secure Tudjman's agreement to terminate economic relations with the Krajina Serbs, since this could undermine the effects of Milosevic's cut-off of support to the Krajina and permit the Bosnian Serbs to receive support through the back door.

2. Principals directed our Contact Group representative to put down a marker that, if this initiative fails and the war resumes, our partners will reciprocate our flexibility by supporting the kinds of coercive measures against the Bosnian Serbs that they agreed to previously but never implemented. We would not, however, make their commitment to such measures a quid pro quo.

3. Principals directed that talking points be prepared for dealing with the press and for briefings on the Hill. (Action: State/NSC)

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